JUDGMENT Hon’ble Chandra Dhari Singh, J.—Heard Mr. I.B. Singh Sr. Advocate alongwith Mr. Ishan Baghel and Mr. Sajeet Singh learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Shiv Nath Tehlari learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the records. 2. The present application has been filed for quashing the orders dated 28.11.2015, 24.2.2016 and 27.5.2017 passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act)/Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow, in Sessions Trial No. 06 of 2016 and 255 of 2016 (State v. Mohammad Mahbood Ali @ Sheru @ Sheikh Alam) bearing Case Crime No. 02/2015, under Sections 489-B, 489-C I.P.C. and Section 16 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, P.S. A.T.S., District Lucknow. 3. Brief facts of the case : I. According to the prosecution story on the basis of prior information a vehicle, ‘Bolero’, bearing the Registration No. B.R.-22-P-6092, driven by the applicant was intercepted at Gorakhpur Bus Stand, Gorakhpur, at early morning on 2.6.2015. Upon conducting a search of applicant and his bag, the total high quality counterfeit Indian currency worth Rs. 5,04,500/- was recovered from the possession of the applicant. The first information report was registered on the same day in P.S. ATS, Lucknow, under Section 121A, 489-B, 489-C I.P.C. against the applicant as Case Crime No. 2/2005. II. On 9.6.2015, the Police remand was granted and during remand, on the pointing out of the accused, Rs. 50,000/- ‘high quality counterfeit fake currency’ was recovered from the house of one Vishal Jaiswal. The total Rs. 5,54,500/-, ‘high quality counterfeit fake currency’ has been recovered from the possession of the accused/applicant. Driving licence issued by the Nepal authorities, certificate of Nepal citizenship, five visiting car, debit cards of different banks were also recovered. III. the Investigating Officer moved an application before C.J.M.-VIIIth, Lucknow regarding examination of recovered currency and after getting the order of the Court, a report was received from the ‘Currency Note Nasik Road’ which was submitted before the Court below. As per the examination report, the referred suspected note Rs. 500/- and Rs. 1000/- were certified as ‘High Quality Counterfeit Notes’. IV. After receiving the report the, I.O. sent a letter to the Police Superintendent for seeking permission to add Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. On 5.8.2015, permission was granted and Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was added and the Investigation of the Case was transferred to Deputy S.P., ATS. IV. After receiving the report the, I.O. sent a letter to the Police Superintendent for seeking permission to add Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. On 5.8.2015, permission was granted and Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was added and the Investigation of the Case was transferred to Deputy S.P., ATS. V. The charge-sheet bearing No. 03/2005 was filed under Section 489-B, 489-C I.P.C. on 28.11.2015. The Special Judge SC/ST Act /Additional District Judge, Lucknow took cognizance for the offence punishable under Sections 489-B, 489-C I.P.C.. For the charges of Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the prosecution sanction was granted on 22.12.2015 and thereafter, the supplementary charge-sheet No. 3A/16 was submitted on 5.1.2016. The Special Judge SC/ST Act/Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow took cognizance for offence, under Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. VI. vide order dated 24.2.2016, cognizance was taken on additional/supplementary charge-sheet No. 3A/2015, offence under Section 16 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. VII. The applicant/petitioner moved an application for discharge before the Court below. vide order dated 27.5.2017, the Court below dismissed the discharge application and framed the charges against the applicant/petitioner. 4. Mr. I.B. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of applicant contended that the concerned Court below has taken cognizance in additional/supplementary charge-sheet No. 3A/2015 dated 5.1.2006, offence punishable under Section 16 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 on illegal and invalid sanction. The cognizance order dated 24.2.2016 is void ab-initio, then the prosecution against the applicant/petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 16 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 is void. He further contended that there is a clear provision regarding Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008, which has not been complied by the sanctioning Authority. He further submitted that neither the Investigation Officer nor Sanctioning Authority has followed the mandatory provisions, which is clearly in violation of the procedure established by Law. Therefore, the said prosecution sanction is not tenable in eyes of law. He submitted that objections were raised upon the illegal, without application of mind and void sanction through his discharge application dated 16.4.2016, when the objection was raised, another fresh sanction order dated 6.1.2017 was submitted without covering application, only to fulfill the lacuna. Therefore, the said prosecution sanction is not tenable in eyes of law. He submitted that objections were raised upon the illegal, without application of mind and void sanction through his discharge application dated 16.4.2016, when the objection was raised, another fresh sanction order dated 6.1.2017 was submitted without covering application, only to fulfill the lacuna. He further contended that the fresh sanction is not permissible under the law, as no further investigation was pending and the sanction was not obtained in furtherance of any investigation. The Sanctioning Authority has no power to review or reconsider the previous sanction in the absence of any additional material. He further contended that the mandatory provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, “High quality counterfeit Indian Currency Rules”, 2013 and National Investigating Agency Act, 2008 have not been complied by the Investigating Agency. The entire proceeding initiated against the applicant/petitioner is based on false and fabricated facts and manifests the malafide intent with which only the applicant/petitioner is being framed. Mr. Singh submitted that in exercise of power conferred by Sub-Section (1) and Clause (f) of Sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Central Government has made rules regarding investigation of High Quality Counterfeit Indian Currency Offence i.e. ‘The Investigation of High Quality Indian Currency Offence Rule, 2015’. The said Rules prescribed the procedure for applying the provisions of Sub-Clause (iii) of Clause (o) of Sub-Section (i) of Section 15 read with Section 16. The Investigating Agency has failed to follow the mandatory and submitted the charge-sheet without following the mandatory provision. He while placing reliance on the decision of the Orissa High Court in Subhashree Das @ Mili Panda and others v. State of orissa, (2012) 109 AIR 922 and another, judgment of Jharkhand High Court in Ravit Sharma @ Arjun @ Mahesh @ Ashok v. State of Jharkhand and others. In both judgments, it was held that the cognizance orders are bad in law as mandatory provisions were not followed and the applications were allowed by the respective High Courts. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Shiv Nath Tehlari, learned A.G.A., appeared on behalf of State/ATS vehemently opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicant. In both judgments, it was held that the cognizance orders are bad in law as mandatory provisions were not followed and the applications were allowed by the respective High Courts. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Shiv Nath Tehlari, learned A.G.A., appeared on behalf of State/ATS vehemently opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicant. The submission made by the learned A.G.A. is that the prosecution sanction was granted vide order dated 22.12.2015, after considering the evidence related with the offence committed under Section 16 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967, but as it was granted under Section 196 of Cr.P.C., therefore, the modified Sanction order No. 2755 kha/cha/pu/4/16/1(83) B/15 was issued on 6.1.2017. He further contended that during investigation the material evidence has been collected and on the basis thereof, the complicity of the accused/applicant has been found and established. The Court below after satisfaction by a reasoned order has rejected the discharge application and framed the charges against the accused/applicant. Mr. Tehlari submitted that a modified sanction order dated 16th January was issued due to the reason that in the earlier sanction order dated 22.12.2015, Section 196 Cr.P.C. had been mentioned. It is submitted that mere mentioning of wrong section would not vitiate the proceeding. After perusal of sanction order clearly establishes that after considering the nature of offence and the material collected during the investigation, the sanction order was passed. He further contended that issue of sanction can be raised only during trial. The validity should not be examined during the state of inquiry or at pre-trial stage. There is no illegality in the sanction order. He relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C.B.I. v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2013) 15 SCC 222 . Mr. Telhari submitted that petition/application filed by the petitioner/applicant under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the orders dated 28.11.2015, 24.12.2016 and 28.5.2017 has no force and deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. Before I proceed to examine the impugned orders of Court below and the facts of the case, it may be desirable refer to settle legal proposition which has to be appeared in the instant case. Section 482 Cr.P.C. Saving of Inherent Power of High Court. 7. Before I proceed to examine the impugned orders of Court below and the facts of the case, it may be desirable refer to settle legal proposition which has to be appeared in the instant case. Section 482 Cr.P.C. Saving of Inherent Power of High Court. 7. “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent power of the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Court, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 8. In the State of Bihar v. JAC Saldanha, (1980) 1 SCC 544, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “The High Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction committed a grave error by making observations on seriously disputed questions of facts taking its cue from affidavits which in such a situation would hardly provide any reliable material. The High Court was clearly in error in giving the direction virtually amounting to a mandamus to close the case before the investigation is complete, we say no more.” 9. In Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad, (1972) 1 SCC 452 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “In exercising the inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Cr.P.C., the High Court can quash proceedings if there is no legal evidence or if there is any impediment to the institution or continuance of proceedings; but the High Court does not ordinarily inquire as to whether the evidence is ‘reliable or not’. Where again, investigation into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence is carried on under the provisions of the Cr.P.C., the High Court does not interfere with such investigation, because, it would then be impeding investigation and the jurisdiction of statutory authorities exercising power in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.” 10. In Kurukshetra University and another v. State of Haryana and another, (1977) 4 SCC 451 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held : “It surprises, us in the extreme that the High Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C,, it could quash a First Information Report. In Kurukshetra University and another v. State of Haryana and another, (1977) 4 SCC 451 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held : “It surprises, us in the extreme that the High Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C,, it could quash a First Information Report. The police had not even commenced investigation into the complaint filed by the Warden of the University and no proceeding at all was pending in any Court in pursuance of the F.I.R. It ought to be realized that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power had to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases.” 11. In Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 574 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held : “When it is brought to the notice of the Court that grave miscarriage of justice would be committed if the trial is allowed to proceed where the accused would be harassed unnecessarily if the trial is allowed to linger when prima facie it appears to Court that the trial would likely to be ended in acquittal. In other words, the inherent power of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked by the High Court either to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 12. In R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized some of the categories of cases where inherent power should be exercised to quash the criminal proceeding against the accused stating: “(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance that is want of sanction. (ii) Where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its effects value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. (iii) Where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly failed to prove the charge. Gajendragadkar, J., who spoke for the Court in Kapur’s case observes in his judgment that it was not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. Gajendragadkar, J., who spoke for the Court in Kapur’s case observes in his judgment that it was not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The three instances cited in the judgment as to when the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction are only illustrative and can in the very nature of things not be regarded as exhaustive. Considerations justifying the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends of justice vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred by Section 482 Cr. P.C. ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula.” 13. A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswani and other, (1977) 2 SCC 699 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that : “In exercise of its wholly some power, the High Court was entitled to quash a proceeding as this power to ensure a salutary public purpose which is that a Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into weapon of harassment or persecution. No doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any state of the trial, if he considers the charge to be groundless. But that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court, under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India to have the proceedings quashed against him and still he must go the agony of criminal trial.” 14. In the case of Indermohan Goswami and others v. State of Uttranchal and others, AIR 2008 SC 251 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while referring to the law, both scope of ambit and Courts power under Article 482 and principles governing for quashing of the criminal proceedings, the Court said that every High Court has inherent power to act ‘ex debito justitiae’ to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. Authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. In that case, the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings taken under Sections 420, 120-B and 467 I.P.C. against the accused. 15. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. R.K. Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCR 884 , the Hon’ble Suprmee Court held that : “It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting any thing, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.” 16. In the latest judgment of Prabathbai Aahir @ Prabatbhai v. State of Gujrat, (2017) 9 SCC 641 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explaining the principles governing the inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., said that while the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised to secure the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process of any Court. The Court summarized the elaborate principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases. Below is the summary of the principles. “(i) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the Court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.” “(ii) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.” “(ii) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.” “(iii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.” “(iv) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice.” “(v) Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” 17. Touching on the validity of sanction Mr. I.B. Singh, Senior Advocate submitted that there was no proper application of mind by granting the sanction, there was no sanction for the offence under Unlawful Activities prevention Act, 1967, whereas sanction was given for inapplicable offences under the I.P.C. The facts constituting the offence have not been stated in the sanction order and no evidence has been adduced to show that the competent authority addressed himself to the relevant facts and material. 18. 18. On the other hand learned A.G.A. relied the judgment of C.B.I. v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, 2013 (15) SCC 222 , and stated that the stage of examination of the validity of the sanction is during the trial and the same should not be examined during the stage of inquiry or at pre-trial stage. 19. In Ashok Tshering Bhutia v. State of Sikkim, (2011) 4 SCC 402 , while dealing with the issue whether invalid sanction goes to the root of jurisdiction of the Court which would vitiate the trial and conviction, held that in the absence of anything to show that any defect of irregularity therein caused a failure of justice, the contention was without any substance. The failure of justice would be relatable to error, omission or irregularity in the grant of sanction. However, a mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is not considered to be fatal unless it has resulted in the failure of justice or has been occasioned thereby. 20. Mr. Singh contended that in the case of Ashok Kumar Agrawal, the High Court vide its order dated 3.10.2007 set aside the order of learned Special Judge dated 28.7.2007 and remanded the matter back to the Special Judge, directing him to record the finding in terms of Clause-B of Sub-Section (3) and Sub-Section (4) of Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 that whether the non-production of relevant material has resulted in any ‘failure of justice’. The Court of Special Judge, C.B.I., rejected the application of Ashok Kumar Agarwal vide order dated 28.7.2007, observing that the issue could be examined during trial. He further contended that Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that the documents collected during investigation were not placed before the Sanctioning Authority. However, without commenting on the validity of the sanction, the Supreme Court vide order dated 22.11.2013 upheld the order dated 3.10.2007 of the High Court. Thereafter, learned Special Judge vide order dated 24.5.2014 observed that with-holding of documents would have caused prejudice to the applicant, if in a situation when the documents or materials withheld, has been produced and considered by the sanctioning authority, it was of a such kind or nature or having an information that it would have persuaded the sanctioning authority, to consider not to give sanction to prosecute the applicant. In this respect, the Special Judge held that the applicant was not able to produce in such documents before it. Consequently, the learned Special Judge held that there had been no ‘failure of justice’ in the instant case. Thereafter, once again Ashok Kumar Aggarwal challenged the order passed by learned Special Judge which is subsequently set aside and quashed by the High Court vide order dated 13.1.2016 and after that no appeal has been filed by the C.B.I. 21. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. starts with the words “nothing in this Code”. Thus, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised even when there is a bar under Section 397 or some other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The inherent power is to be used only in the cases where there is an abuse of the process of the Court or where inference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The most common cases where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is fair criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatious or without jurisdiction. 22. The category of doctrine of abuse is more exceptional that those describe above. It arises from the duty of the High Court (in the case of Bennett v. Horseferry Magistrate Court) to over see executive action 80 as to prevent the sale taking advantage of acts that threaten either basic human rights or the rule of law. In Bennett v. Horeferry Road Magistrate’s Court, there was a challenge to proceedings where the defendants had been brought to U.K. from South Africa. It was held that it was an abuse of process for a person to be forcibly brought the jurisdiction of the Court is disregard of extradition proceeding. 23. In principles explained in Bennett were applied in R v. Mullen, (1999) 2 Crapp. R. 143, although in that case, the Court of appeal stressed that there may be cases in which the seriousness of the crime is so great, relatives to the nature of a particular abuse of process, that would be a proper exercise of judicial discretion to allow the prosecution to succeed. 24. R. 143, although in that case, the Court of appeal stressed that there may be cases in which the seriousness of the crime is so great, relatives to the nature of a particular abuse of process, that would be a proper exercise of judicial discretion to allow the prosecution to succeed. 24. In R. v. Looseley, Attorney General Reference No. 3 of 2000 [2002] 1 Cr App R 29, The house of Lords held that : “(i) It is not acceptable for the State to lure its citizens into committing illegal acts and then seek to prosecute them for doing so. (ii) The Courts can use their inherent power to stay proceedings in order to ensure that executive agents of the state do not misuse the coercive, law enforcement functions of the Court. (iii) A usual guide to identify the limits of acceptable police conduct to consider whether in the particular circumstances, the police did no more to imprisonment the defendant with a exceptional opportunity to commit a crime and (iv) The Court will need to carefully consider whether to exclude the evidence under Section 78 PACE 1984, or to stay proceeding. Where the Court is faced with illegal conduct by police or prosecutor, so grave has to threaten to undermine the rule of law. The Court is likely to record itself as bound to stop the case, (R. v. Grant) [2005] 2 Cr. App.R.28.” 25. However, the Courts have an overriding duty to promote justice and prevent injustice. From this duty there arises an inherent power to stay an indictment, if the Court is of the opinion that to allow the prosecution to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Abuse of process has been defined as “something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the Court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects”, a perfectly supportable case [Hui-Chi-Ming v. R. (1992) 1 AC.34, PC]. (‘Unfair and wrong’) is for the Court to determine on the individual facts of each case. The concept of a fair trial involves fairness to the prosecution and to the plea as well as to the defendant. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court to stop a prosecution to prevent an abuse of process is to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. 26. The concept of a fair trial involves fairness to the prosecution and to the plea as well as to the defendant. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court to stop a prosecution to prevent an abuse of process is to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. 26. Undoubtedly, the stage of examination of the validity of sanction is during the trial. However, in the instant case, the fact situation warrants a different course altogether as stated admittedly did not disclose the material facts in the counter-affidavit that he complied the mandatory statutory provisions. The Court must examine whether the issue raised regarding tenure of justice is actually a factum of justice in the true sense or whether it is only camouflage argument. The expression ‘failure of justice’ is an extremely pliable or facile an expression which can be made to fit into any case. The Court must endeavor to find out the truth. 27. In the absence of recital of facts to sustain prosecution or proof of consideration of such facts, the sanction order must be held to have been vitiated on the ground of non application of mind. The dicto of Privy Council in Gokul Chand case AIR 1948 PC 82 , which has been pointed out that “no facts constituting the relevant offences were set out in the order nor was any extraneous evidence let into show that the sanctioning authority was ceased of the facts alleged to constitute the relevant offence”. In Gokul Chand case, the sanction order of the Government was a bald order stating that the Government was pleased to accord sanction under Clause 23 of the Cotton of Cloth and Yarn (Control) order to the prosecution of Mr. Gokul Chand Dwarikadas for breach of the provisions of Clause 18 (2) of the said order. The Privy Council held that the sanction read with the evidence adduced at the trial was not in compliance with the provisions of Clause 23 of the said control order. 28. Sections 43 and 45 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, read as follows: “43. The Privy Council held that the sanction read with the evidence adduced at the trial was not in compliance with the provisions of Clause 23 of the said control order. 28. Sections 43 and 45 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, read as follows: “43. Officers competent to investigate offences under Chapter IV and VI.—Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no police officer,- (a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, constituted under Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, (25 of 1946), below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank; (b) in the metropolitan areas of Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Ahmedabad and any other metropolitan area notified as such under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Code, below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Police; (c) in any case not relatable to clause (a) or clause (b), below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of an equivalent rank, shall investigate any offence punishable under Chapter IV or Chapter VI.”. 45. Cognizance of offences—(1) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence- (i) under Chapter III without the previous sanction of the Central Government or any officer authorized by the Central Government in this behalf; (ii) under Chapters IV and VI without the previous sanction of the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government and where such offence is committed against the Government of a foreign country without the previous sanction of the Central Government. (2) Sanction for prosecution under sub-section (1) shall be given within such time as may be prescribed only after considering the report of such authority appointed by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government which shall make an independent review of the evidence gathered in the course of investigation and make a recommendation within such time as may be prescribed to the Central Government or, as the case may, the State Government”. 29. The relevant provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008, read as under : “3. 29. The relevant provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008, read as under : “3. Time limit for making a recommendation by the Authority—The Authority shall, under sub-section (2) of Section 45 of the Act, make its report containing the recommendations to the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government within seven working days of the receipt of the evidence gathered by the investigating officer under the Code. 4. Time Limit for sanction of prosecution—The Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government shall, under sub-section (2) of Section 45 of the Act, take a decision regarding sanction for prosecution within seven working days after receipt of the recommendations of the Authority”. 30. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the Act and Rules, it is apparent that the Investigating Agency has not followed the mandatory statutory provisions. Furthermore, Section 45 of the Act clearly prescribes that no Court shall take cognizance of the offence under the Act without there being any sanction of the Competent Authority. In the present case, the question has been raised as to whether the said sanction has been given by the Competent Authority duly appointed by the Government as per the statute. As per the settled principle of law, Sanctioning Authority is independently required to consider the report/materials provided in it by the Investigating Agency. It is further contended by the counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant that till date no authority has been appointed by the State Government as required under Rule 2(b) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008. 31. On the other hand learned A.G.A. appearing on behalf of Stated has failed to establish that the mandatory provisions have been followed and valid sanction has been granted. He further argued in the light of Ashok Kumar’s case that all these submissions and objections made by counsel for the applicant will be seen at the stage of the trial and the same should not be examined during the stage of enquiry or at pre-trial stage. The State has also failed to produce any documentary evidence in order to establish the compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 45 of the Unlawful Activities of (Prevention) Act. The State has also failed to produce any documentary evidence in order to establish the compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 45 of the Unlawful Activities of (Prevention) Act. It is well-settled proposition of law that where there is no sanction by the competent authority, the proceeding itself stands vitiated. 32. In view of the aforementioned discussions, the order dated 24.2.2016 passed by A.C.J.M.-I, Lucknow in Crime Case No. 2 of 2015, so far as it relates to taking cognizance against the applicant/petitioner, under Section 16 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act as contained in Annexure-2 to the application/petition and the impugned order dated 27.5.2017 passed by the Special Judge SC/ST, Additional Session Judge, Lucknow in Session Trial No. 6 of 2016 and 255 of 2016 (State v. Mohd. Mahboob Ali @ Sheru @ Sheikh Alam) in Case Crime No. 2 of 2015, to the extent of framing charges under Section 16 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, against the petitioner as contained in [(Para 3) Annexure-4] to the petition, are hereby, quashed. 33. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial only with respect to the rest of the offences i.e. under Sections 498-B, 498-C I.P.C. against the applicant/petitioner. 34. Accordingly, the present petition/application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is disposed off. 35. The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the Court concerned for compliance.