JUDGMENT : Manoj K. Tiwari, J This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by a trade union challenging the preliminary award dated 10.04.2014 and the final award dated 14.07.2014 rendered by learned Industrial Tribunal, Haldwani in Adjudication Case No. 1 of 2010. 2. Brief facts of the case are as follows:- Petitioner/trade union raised an industrial dispute alleging that management of M/s ALP Overseas Pvt. Ltd. has prevented its 101 workmen from entering the factory premises and performing their duties w.e.f. 17.07.2009. The dispute was sent for conciliation and upon submission of failure report, the Competent Authority referred the dispute for adjudication to the learned Industrial Tribunal, Haldwani vide order dated 25.05.2010. English translation of the dispute, which was referred, is as follows:- Whether the act of the employer of not taking its 101 workmen in employment, w.e.f. 17.07.2009, is legal and justified? If not, then what relief the workmen, whose names have been mentioned in the enclosed list, are entitled to with which other particulars? 3. The reference was registered as Adjudication Case No. 1 of 2010. The employer filed its written statement stating that subsequent to 17.07.2009, workmen were dismissed from service after holding domestic enquiry, however, validity of dismissal orders cannot be considered in these proceedings. Learned Industrial Tribunal framed following three issues:- (i) Whether the domestic enquiry conducted by the employer has been done as per law, by following principles of natural justice? If yes, its effect? (ii) Whether the reference is against the law? (iii) Whether the refusal on the part of the employer to take 101 workmen in employment, w.e.f. 17.07.2009 is justified/legal? If not, then the workmen, whose names have been mentioned in the enclosed list, are entitled to what relief/compensation? 4. The trade union examined as many as eight witnesses in support of its case, while employer examined two witnesses. After considering the evidence on record, learned Industrial Tribunal decided issue No. 1, as a preliminary issue, vide order dated 10.04.2014, wherein a finding was returned that the domestic enquiry was held in accordance with principles of natural justice. It was further held by the Industrial Tribunal in the said order that conclusions drawn on the basis of a valid domestic enquiry are also legal. The trade union filed WPMS No. 1416 of 2014 before this Court against the order dated 10.04.2014. It was further held by the Industrial Tribunal in the said order that conclusions drawn on the basis of a valid domestic enquiry are also legal. The trade union filed WPMS No. 1416 of 2014 before this Court against the order dated 10.04.2014. The employer opposed the said writ petition by contending that it is open for the trade union to challenge the finding on preliminary issue No. 1 with the final award. A coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 19.06.2014 disposed of the said writ petition with the following observations:- “Considering the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and without expressing any opinion about the merits of the case, I dispose of this writ petition with the observation that the observation made in the order dated 10.04.2014 about the “consequences of the valid inquiry are also valid” recorded in respect of issue no. 1, may not solely prejudice the learned Industrial Tribunal and the learned Tribunal shall decide the issue nos. 2 and 3 independently on its own merit.” 5. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by this Court in WPMS No. 1416 of 2014 was filed by the trade union before learned Industrial Tribunal along with an application seeking permission to lead evidence, on 08.07.2014. According to him, learned Industrial Tribunal accepted the order of this Court on record, however, permission for leading evidence on issue Nos. 2 and 3 was refused. He further submits that the evidence, which was considered by the learned Industrial Tribunal, was led before it only with regard to issue No. 1, therefore, trade union was entitled to lead evidence regarding issue Nos. 2 and 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to page 3 of the final award dated 14.07.2014, where learned Industrial Tribunal has observed that High Court has not issued any direction for recording any additional evidence. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that learned Industrial Tribunal has completely misread the order passed by this Court in WPMS No. 1416 of 2014 for holding that the finding on issue No. 1 has been upheld. He further submits that learned Tribunal has wrongly mentioned in the award that parties were heard on 28.05.2014 and 02.06.2014, while on these two dates, no hearing took place. He further submits that learned Tribunal has wrongly mentioned in the award that parties were heard on 28.05.2014 and 02.06.2014, while on these two dates, no hearing took place. Learned counsel has taken the Court to the order-sheet of the learned Tribunal, which indicates that on 28.05.2014 and 02.06.2014, no hearing actually took place. A bare perusal of the order-sheet reveals that neither any hearing took place on issue Nos. 2 and 3 nor any opportunity was given to the trade union to lead evidence on issue Nos. 2 and 3. Thus learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Industrial Tribunal has acted contrary to the direction of this Court issued in WPMS No. 1416 of 2014. He further submits that the trade union was entitled to lead evidence on issue Nos. 2 and 3, however, learned Industrial Tribunal has erred in recording finding only on issue No. 1 despite direction of this Court to decide issue Nos. 2 and 3 independently on merits. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Vs The Workmen & others, (1967) AIR SC 469 and submits that the learned Industrial Tribunal has erred in framing issue No. 3 and in recording a finding that the order of reference was defective. He has placed reliance upon paragraph Nos. 16 to 19 of the said judgment, which are extracted below:- “16. In the last mentioned case, the question whether C rank officers were workmen had to be examined by the tribunal, for, if they were not, there could be no reference under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the case before us, there is no such difficulty. The third and the fourth terms of reference in the instant case are founded on the basis that there was a strike at the Delhi Cloth Mills and a sit down strike at the Swatantra Bharat Mills and that there was a lock-out declared by the management of the Delhi Cloth Mills on 24-2-1966. On the order of reference, it was not competent to the workmen to contend before the Tribunal that there was no strike at all; equally, it was not open to the management to argue that there was no lock-out declared by it. On the order of reference, it was not competent to the workmen to contend before the Tribunal that there was no strike at all; equally, it was not open to the management to argue that there was no lock-out declared by it. The parties would be allowed by their respective statement of cases to place before the Tribunal such facts and contentions as would explain their conduct or their stand, but they could not be allowed to argue that the order of reference was wrongly worded and that the very basis of the order of reference was open to challenge. The cases discussed go to show that it is open to the parties to show that the dispute referred was not an industrial dispute at all and it is certainly open to them to bring out before the Tribunal the ramifications of the dispute. But they cannot be allowed to challenge the very basis of the issue set forth in the order of reference. 17. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Chari put before us four propositions which according to him the Tribunal had to consider before coming to a decision on these two issues. They were: (i) The fact that there was a recital of dispute in the order of reference did not show that the Government had come to a decision on the dispute; (ii) The order of reference only limited the, Tribunal's jurisdiction in that it was not competent to go beyond the heads or points of dispute; (iii) Not every recital of fact mentioned in the order of Government was irrebuttable; and (iv) In order to fix the ambit of the dispute it was necessary to refer to the pleadings of the parties. No exception can be taken to the first two points. The correctness of the third proposition would depend on the language of the recital. 18. So far as the fourth proposition is concerned, Mr. Chari argued that the Tribunal had to examine the pleadings of the parties to see whether there was a strike at all. No exception can be taken to the first two points. The correctness of the third proposition would depend on the language of the recital. 18. So far as the fourth proposition is concerned, Mr. Chari argued that the Tribunal had to examine the pleadings of the parties to see whether there was a strike at all. In our opinion, the Tribunal must, in any event, look to the pleadings of the parties to find out the exact nature of the dispute, because in most cases the order of reference is so cryptic that it is impossible to cull out therefrom the various points about which the parties were at variance leading to the trouble. In this case, the order of reference was based on the report of the Conciliation Officer and it was certainly open to the Management to show that the dispute which had been referred was not an industrial dispute at all so as to attract jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act. But the parties cannot be allowed to go a stage further and contend that the foundation of the dispute mentioned in the order of reference was nonexistent and that the true dispute was something else. Under Section 10(4) of the Act it is not competent to the Tribunal to entertain such a question. 19. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal had to examine issues 3 and 4 on the basis that there was a strike at the D.C.M. unit and a sit-down strike at Swatantra Bharat Mills and that there was a lock-out declared with regard to the former as stated in the third term of reference. It was for the Tribunal to examine the evidence only on the question as to whether the strikes were justified and legal. It then had to come to its decision as to whether the workmen were entitled to the wages for the period of the lock-out in the Delhi Cloth Mills and for the period of the sitdown strike at the Swatantra Bharat Miffs.” 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since order of reference assumed that workmen were not permitted to discharge duties w.e.f. 17.07.2009, therefore, the learned Industrial Tribunal could not have gone beyond this assumption by recording a finding that nothing has happened on 17.07.2009, which is contrary to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since order of reference assumed that workmen were not permitted to discharge duties w.e.f. 17.07.2009, therefore, the learned Industrial Tribunal could not have gone beyond this assumption by recording a finding that nothing has happened on 17.07.2009, which is contrary to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court. In support of this contention, petitioner has relied upon para 14 of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs Om Prakash Sharma, (2006) 5 SCC 123 . Paragraph No. 14 of the said judgment is extracted below:- “14. In the instant case, the Award of the Labour Court suffers from an illegality, which appears on the face of the record. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court emanated from the order of the reference. It could not have passed an order going beyond the terms of the reference. While passing the Award, if the Labour Court exceeds its jurisdiction, the Award must be held to be suffering from a jurisdictional error. It was capable of being corrected by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. The High Court, therefore, clearly fell in error in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction. The Award and the judgment of the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The award is set aside to the extent of order of reinstatement with back wages. The writ petition filed by the appellant in the High Court is, thus, allowed.” 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that learned Industrial Tribunal has also erred in recording finding about domestic enquiry held after 17.07.2009 and termination order passed against the workmen subsequent to 17.07.2009. According to him, learned Tribunal should have confined its enquiry to the fact situation obtaining on the date indicated in the reference order i.e. 17.07.2009. Thus, his contention is that learned Industrial Tribunal cannot go beyond the scope of reference and therefore, preliminary award, on the issue No. 1, given by learned Industrial Tribunal on 10.04.2014 is unsustainable and without jurisdiction. 10. Per contra Sri Piyush Garg, learned counsel for the employer/respondent submits that learned Industrial Tribunal had passed an order on 23.05.2014, wherein it was provided that since issue Nos. 10. Per contra Sri Piyush Garg, learned counsel for the employer/respondent submits that learned Industrial Tribunal had passed an order on 23.05.2014, wherein it was provided that since issue Nos. 2 and 3 are legal in nature, therefore, no evidence is required for decision on these issues. He further submits that when the trade union filed writ petition, subsequent to passing of that order, the said order was not challenged before this Court and the trade union did not make any prayer before this Court seeking permission to lead evidence. He further submits that judgment was reserved by learned Industrial Tribunal on 08.07.2014, while application seeking permission to lead evidence was moved by the trade union on the same day. He further submits that trade union did not move any application seeking recall of the order dated 23.05.2014. Thus, according to him, workmen were granted sufficient opportunity of hearing. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Oshiar Prasad & others Vs Employers in relation to Management of Sudamdih Coal Washery of M/s Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd, Dhanbad, Jharkhand, (2015) 4 SCC 71 . Relevant paragraphs cited by learned counsel for the respondent are extracted below:- “22. It is thus clear that the appropriate Government is empowered to make a reference under Section 10 of the Act only when “Industrial dispute exists” or “is apprehended between the parties”. Similarly, it is also clear that the Tribunal while answering the reference has to confine its inquiry to the question(s) referred and has no jurisdiction to travel beyond the question(s) or/and the terms of the reference while answering the reference. A fortiori, no inquiry can be made on those questions, which are not specifically referred to the Tribunal while answering the reference. 23. Coming now to the facts of this case, it is an admitted case that the services of the appellants and those at whose instance the reference was made were terminated long back prior to making of the reference. These workers were, therefore, not in the services of either Contractor or/and BCCL on the date of making the reference in question. Therefore, there was no industrial dispute that “existed” or “apprehended” in relation to appellants' absorption in the services of the BCCL on the date of making the reference. 24. These workers were, therefore, not in the services of either Contractor or/and BCCL on the date of making the reference in question. Therefore, there was no industrial dispute that “existed” or “apprehended” in relation to appellants' absorption in the services of the BCCL on the date of making the reference. 24. Indeed a dispute regarding the appellants' absorption was capable of being referred to in reference for adjudication, had the appellants been in the services of Contractor or/and BCCL. But as said above, since the appellants' services were discontinued or/and retrenched (whether rightly or wrongly) long back, the question of their absorption or regularization in the services of BCCL, as claimed by them, did not arise and nor this issue could have been gone into on its merits for the reason that it was not legally possible to give any direction to absorb/regularize the appellants so long as they were not in the employment. 25. It is a settled principle of law that absorption and regularization in the service can be claimed or/and granted only when the contract of employment subsists and is in force inter se employee and employer. Once it comes to an end either by efflux of time or as per the terms of the Contract of employment or by its termination by the employer, then in such event, the relationship of employee and employer comes to an end and no longer subsists except for the limited purpose to examine the legality and correctness of its termination. 26. In our considered opinion, the only industrial dispute, which existed for being referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication was in relation to termination of appellants' employment and - whether it was legal or not? It is an admitted fact that it was not referred to the Tribunal and, therefore, it attained finality against the appellants. 27. In our considered opinion, therefore, the reference, even if made to examine the issue of absorption of the appellants in the services of BCCL, the same was misconceived. 28. Apart from this infirmity noticed in this case, we have also not been able to find any parity in the facts of the earlier reference (R.C.No.58/81) and the case in hand. As noted above, the earlier reference was made to decide the absorption of 39 workers in the BCCL. This could be made because they were in the service. 28. Apart from this infirmity noticed in this case, we have also not been able to find any parity in the facts of the earlier reference (R.C.No.58/81) and the case in hand. As noted above, the earlier reference was made to decide the absorption of 39 workers in the BCCL. This could be made because they were in the service. So far as the present case is concerned, the appellants were not in service. 29. It can safely be noted that merely because the workers in both the references were working in one project by itself was not enough to give them any right to claim parity with the claim of others. So long as, the parity was not proved on all the relevant issues arising in the case, no worker whether individual or collectively was entitled to claim the relief only on the basis of similarity in the status qua employer. 30. In the light of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the reference made to examine the issue of appellants' absorption qua the BCCL was incapable of being referred to on the said question and in any event, it was incapable of being answered in favour of the appellants.” 11. Based on the said judgment, learned counsel for the respondent submits that since the services of the workmen stood terminated, before the order of reference was passed by the Competent Authority, therefore, only question, which required adjudication was termination of service of workmen, which was never referred for adjudication. Thus, he submits that reference was incapable of being answered and the learned Industrial Tribunal has rightly given the award that the reference was bad in law. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to paragraph No. 23 of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Contractual Workers Union, (2008) 12 SCC 275 . Paragraph No. 23 of the said judgment is extracted below:- “23 We have also considered Mr. Dave's argument with regard to the nature of the reference. We re-produce the reference as made: “Whether the demand of the ONGC 'Contractual Workers' Union, Silchar on the management of ONGC, Cachar Project, Silchar for regularization of the services of the contractual workers is justified. Dave's argument with regard to the nature of the reference. We re-produce the reference as made: “Whether the demand of the ONGC 'Contractual Workers' Union, Silchar on the management of ONGC, Cachar Project, Silchar for regularization of the services of the contractual workers is justified. If so, what relief are the workmen concerned entitled to?” It is true that the underlined portion of the reference prima facie does give the impression that it presupposes that the workmen were contractual employees and the only dispute was with regard to the regularization of their services. It is equally true that the reference appears to have been rather loosely worded but as observed by the Industrial Tribunal and the Division Bench, both parties were aware of the real issues involved in the light of the protracted litigation and the efforts made during conciliation proceedings. The Division Bench has, thus, rightly observed that it was open to the Industrial Tribunal to have lifted the veil so as to determine the nature of the employment and the dispute between the parties and for that purpose to look into the pleadings and evidence produced before it.” 12. Based on the above referred judgment, learned counsel for the respondent submits that it is open to the Industrial Tribunal to look into the pleading and evidence to determine the nature of dispute and it is not bound by the order of reference. 13. In the present case, the dispute referred to the Tribunal was that whether the employer was justified in not taking its workmen in employment w.e.f. 17.07.2009. 14. In his written statement, employer took the specific stand that Tribunal has no jurisdiction to travel beyond the terms of reference and since the matter of dismissal of workmen has not been referred for adjudication, so the Tribunal cannot adjudicate on this aspect of the matter. It was further stated that enquiry was held against the workmen and based on the enquiry reports, they were dismissed from service by means of separate orders issued between 10.11.2009 to 24.04.2010. In sum and substance, employer's contention in his written statement was that domestic enquiry was held against the workmen after 17.07.2009 and dismissal orders were also passed against them after the date mentioned in the reference order, therefore, these aspects can not be gone into in the present adjudication proceedings. 15. In sum and substance, employer's contention in his written statement was that domestic enquiry was held against the workmen after 17.07.2009 and dismissal orders were also passed against them after the date mentioned in the reference order, therefore, these aspects can not be gone into in the present adjudication proceedings. 15. Therefore, the learned Tribunal could not have travelled beyond the scope of reference by recording a finding that the domestic enquiry, which was subsequently held, was just and proper and consequence of such enquiry is also legal. Thus, learned Tribunal upheld the dismissal order by travelling beyond the ambit of reference. The scope of enquiry made by learned Tribunal should have been limited to the fact situation obtaining on the date indicated in the reference order. Moreover, the observation made by learned Tribunal in its final award dated 14.07.2014 that the order of reference is legally unsustainable as no cause of action arose to the workmen on 17.07.2009, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 16. The judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents are distinguishable on facts. The question involved in the case of Oshiar Prasad & others was that the dispute which was referred for adjudication was regarding absorption, therefore, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that once relationship of employee and employers comes to an end, absorption and regularisation of service cannot be claimed and/or granted. Since the dispute referred was only regarding absorption and not regarding termination, therefore, it was held that the reference was misconceived. 17. Similarly, the judgment rendered in the case of General Manager, ONGC is distinguishable on facts, as in that case the Industrial Tribunal lifted the veil so as to determine the nature of employment of contractual worker, who were claiming regularisation. 18. In the present case, the matter can be examined from another angle. On 17.07.2009, services of the workmen were not terminated and their services were terminated on 24.04.2010, as mentioned by Industrial Tribunal while dealing with issue no. 2. It was nobody's case that the services of workmen were terminated on 17.07.2009 i.e. the date indicated in the reference order. In the impugned award, learned Tribunal not only approved the domestic enquiry held by the employer after 17.07.2009, but also approved the termination order. In the face of this finding, the workmen are left with no remedy against the termination order passed after 17.07.2009. In the impugned award, learned Tribunal not only approved the domestic enquiry held by the employer after 17.07.2009, but also approved the termination order. In the face of this finding, the workmen are left with no remedy against the termination order passed after 17.07.2009. Such a situation would be wholly undesirable. In such view of the matter, the impugned awards cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, therefore, they are set aside. 19. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The matter is remanded back to learned Industrial Tribunal, Haldwani for decision afresh, in accordance with law, in the light of the observations made above. Consequently, Adjudication Case No. 1 of 2010 shall stand restored to the file.