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2018 DIGILAW 2111 (ALL)

HAWKINS COOKERS LTD v. STATE OF U. P.

2018-10-04

SUNITA AGARWAL

body2018
JUDGMENT : SUNITA AGARWAL, J. 1. Heard Shri Sunil Kumar Tripathi learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Bhupendra Nath Singh for the respondents in both the connected matters. 2. The two writ petitions arise out of the same controversy and hence have been heard and are being decided together by this common judgment. 3. M/s. Hawkins Cookers Ltd., is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act having three manufacturing units, out of which one unit is situated in Satharia Industrial Area, Satharia, Jaunpur. The said unit is registered under the Factories Act, 1948 and has got certified Standing Orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. 4. As per the case of the petitioners, 209 workmen are employed in the manufacturing unit at Satharia, Jaunpur. It is admitted that all the provisions of Labour Laws are applicable on the Manufacturing Unit. The respondent Nos. 5 to 10 are members of Hawkins Cookers Mazdoor Union which has been impleaded as respondent No.11 in the first petition. The claim of the petitioner company is that the said Union is not recognized by them. The respondent-Union has been opposing the past prevailing practice of the Union to enter into tri-yearly bipartite settlement between the petitioner-management on one hand and majority of the workmen represented through their elected representatives on the other hand, under Rule 5 of the U.P. Industrial Dispute Rules, 1957 (in short the Rules, 1957) framed under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the Act, 1947) i.e. the settlement outside the conciliation proceedings in Form-I. 5. The tri-yearly bipartite wage settlement with the workers of the Union was arrived as per Rule 5(2)(b) of the Rules, 1957 which prescribes that where there is no such Union, the settlement may be signed by five representatives of the workmen duly authorized in this behalf at the meeting of the workmen held for the purpose. 6. According to the past practice, the bipartite settlement dated 4.11.2014 was entered with the workmen through duly elected eight representatives. Consequent to which, memorandum of settlement was signed on 4.11.2014 by the petitioner-management on one hand and the eight representatives on behalf of the workmen on the other. The parties to the settlement applied for registration as per Section 6-B of the Act, 1947 before the Assistant Labour Commissioner on 16.5.2015 and a Registration Certificate No.1 of 2015 was issued. Consequent to which, memorandum of settlement was signed on 4.11.2014 by the petitioner-management on one hand and the eight representatives on behalf of the workmen on the other. The parties to the settlement applied for registration as per Section 6-B of the Act, 1947 before the Assistant Labour Commissioner on 16.5.2015 and a Registration Certificate No.1 of 2015 was issued. The copy of the memorandum of settlement dated 4.11.2014 and the registration certificate dated 16.5.2015 have been brought on record. 7. It appears that pursuant to the said settlement, an application dated 11.5.2017 under Section 6-H (1) of the Act, 1947 was moved by 12 workmen through the President of Hawkins Cookers Mazdoor Union, seeking benefit of the settlement dated 4.11.2014 for the period from December 2014 to December 2015, on which the notices were issued by the Assistant Labour Commissioner. The petitioner management filed written objections on 29.5.2016 raising dispute regarding the claim of the applicants. 8. The said application was, however, allowed vide order dated 20.7.2017. It has been recorded in the order impugned that with regard to the entitlement of the workmen, no objection had been taken by the employer rather in the written objection dated 29.5.2016, only dispute has been made with regard to some payment made to the workmen at Serial No.3 of the list appended with the application dated 11.5.2017. Further, it was asserted that a writ petition filed by the workmen namely Writ C No.58038 of 2014 was pending and, as such, their application could be considered only after the decision in the said writ petition. To this objection of the employer, it was recorded in the order impugned that Writ Petition No.58038 of 2014 was decided vide judgment and order dated 3.5.2017 with the direction to decide the claims of 12 workmen made in the application filed by the Union, in accordance with law. It has further been recorded therein that the workmen were raising their claim for granting benefit of the settlement and only objection was that due to pendency of the writ petition, their claim cannot be accepted. It was further held therein that the claim of workmen for providing benefits of the settlement for the period between 1.12.2014 to 31.12.2015 was not part of the previous order dated 8.7.2017 and, as such, the said claim was liable to be allowed. 9. It was further held therein that the claim of workmen for providing benefits of the settlement for the period between 1.12.2014 to 31.12.2015 was not part of the previous order dated 8.7.2017 and, as such, the said claim was liable to be allowed. 9. To assail this finding, placing the copy of the objection at Page 47' of the paper book, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that specific objection was taken by filing a written objection on 29.5.2016 that the workmen mentioned against Serial nos.1 and 3 and 4 to 7 of the application dated 11.5.2017 had not accepted the settlement dated 4.11.2014 and as such were not entitled to any benefit thereof. In respect of remaining six workmen mentioned at Serial No.3 and 8 to 12, it was submitted that those who had signed the settlement, each of them had been provided full benefits of the settlement from the respective date of singing of the same as per the terms and conditions thereof. More than that nothing was payable to them. Submission is that the specific objection of the employer that the settlement dated 4.11.2014 was binding only on the parties to it i.e. the workmen who had signed the same, was not considered at all. It is further submitted that the application dated 11.5.2017 was decided finally on 8.7.2017 by the Assistant Labour Commissioner. After the said decision, it was not open for him to pass the modified order by adding some more claims on the pretext that those claims were not considered while issuing the recovery certificate under Section 6-H(1) of the Act, 1947 vide order dated 8.7.2017. It is further contended that there is a serious infirmity in the decision making process i.e. in passing the order dated 20.7.2017. Further, the impugned order dated 20.7.2017 has been passed without notice or opportunity to the petitioner. The Assistant Labour Commissioner did not consider the written objections of the petitioner management filed on 29.5.2016 as noted above rather recorded wrong findings on extraneous consideration that the management did not object to the entitlement of the workmen. Submission is that the respondent nos.5 to 10 in Writ Petition No.58038 of 2014, filed through Hawkins Cookers Mazdoor Union (respondent no.11) had sought for quashing of the memorandum of settlement dated 4.11.2014 and further to take appropriate decision in respect of 12 demands. Submission is that the respondent nos.5 to 10 in Writ Petition No.58038 of 2014, filed through Hawkins Cookers Mazdoor Union (respondent no.11) had sought for quashing of the memorandum of settlement dated 4.11.2014 and further to take appropriate decision in respect of 12 demands. As these workmen did not agree to put their signature on the settlement and raised a challenge, they cannot be accorded benefit thereof. As regards the remaining respondent-workmen, benefits were payable to them from the date of signing of the settlement i.e. the date of their acceptance. The consent was required to be given by each workman individually and not by the Union as per Para 13.2 of the settlement. It was further not open for the Assistant Labour Commissioner to grant benefit to the respondent-workmen from the date of commencement of the settlement. Lastly, it is submitted that from time and again, it has been held that the terms of the settlement arrived otherwise than in the course of the conciliation proceedings i.e. outside the conciliation proceedings is binding on the parties to the settlement i.e. those who agree to sign and subscribe to it. Moreover, the Assistant Labour Commissioner had acted beyond its jurisdiction in determination of the said dispute by entertaining application under Section 6-H (1) of the Act, 1947. It is contended that the proceedings under Section 6-H(1) of the Act, 1947 are simply execution proceedings. Any dispute between the parties which would require adjudication cannot be entertained therein. Reliance is placed upon the judgments of this Court in (2013) 137 FLR 787 (Hawkins Cookers Mazdoor Union and Anr. v. Conciliation Officer and Anr.) and 2007 (6) ALL LJ 499 (Hawkings Cookers Mazdoor Union Satharia Jaunpur & Anr. v. Labour Commissioner, U.P. Kanpur & Ors.) to submit that the benefit of settlement arrived outside the conciliation proceedings is available only on those who are party to the agreement or those who sign and subscribe to it subsequently. With reference to judgment of Apex Court in 2007 (5) SCC 281 (Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Dy. v. Labour Commissioner, U.P. Kanpur & Ors.) to submit that the benefit of settlement arrived outside the conciliation proceedings is available only on those who are party to the agreement or those who sign and subscribe to it subsequently. With reference to judgment of Apex Court in 2007 (5) SCC 281 (Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Dy. Labour Commissioner & Ors.) and of this Court in 2003 (99) FLR 369 (Meerut Textiles, Meerut v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut & Ors.) and 2012 (133) FLR 711 (Jai Prakash Ahirwar v. State of U.P. & Ors.), it is submitted that the proceedings under Section 6-H (1) of the Act, 1947 are of limited jurisdiction being executionary in nature. They are not adjudicatory in nature and the authority concerned shall not be required to discuss the dispute raised or to adjudicate the same. Placing reliance upon the judgment of this Court in 2013 (136) FLR 379 ( M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur v. Labour Court (II), U.P. Kanpur & Ors.), it is contended that as there is no provision in the U.P. Act, 1947 as that of Section 6(ra) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to define unfair labour practice' and, as such, the said provision cannot be invoked in a matter under the U.P. Act, 1947 to address the existence of unfair labour practice in relation to the industries situated in the State of U.P. The counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 5 to 11. Alongwith the counter affidavit, a copy of the judgment of the Apex Court dated 7.10.2013 in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 17538-17539 of 2013 (Hawkins Cookers Mazdoor Union v. Conciliation Officer & Addl. Lab. Comm. & Ors.) has been filed to submit that with regard to a dispute relating to the benefits of the earlier settlement arrived in the year 2004-05, the Apex court has directed that the claim of 12 workmen who were denied benefit only on account of the fact that they were supporting the trade union shall be considered fairly and further directed that they be granted benefits which the other workmen were availing. Submission is that the copy of the said judgment was provided to the management but they did not pay the arrears. Submission is that the copy of the said judgment was provided to the management but they did not pay the arrears. As a result of denial, the respondent no.11 filed the application on 13.1.2016 claiming benefit of the agreement dated 4.11.2014 i.e. arrears of salary for the period from 1.12.2014 to 31.12.2015, before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, U.P., Jaunpur which was registered as Case No.1 of 2016. On the objection filed by the management, no decision was taken in the said matter on the ground that the union/workmen had challenged the settlement dated 4.11.2014 by filing the Writ Petition No.58038 of 2014. It was observed that the recovery certificate shall be issued after final outcome of the said writ petition. The order dated 16.2.2017 passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner in this regard has been filed as Annexure-'CA-3'. In another Case No.2 of 2016 wherein the respondents and other workers claimed benefits under the Supreme Court's judgment dated 7.10.2013, the benefits were denied vide separate order dated 16.2.2017. Both the said orders were challenged in Writ Petition No.18673 of 2017 (Hawkins Cooker Mazdoor Union Thr. Its President & Anr. v. State of U.P. & 4 Ors.). The above noted two writ petitions were decided vide judgments and orders dated 3.5.2017 and 1.9.2017; respectively, relegating the matter to the Assistant Labour Commissioner with the direction to pass a fresh order considering the grievances of the parties. It is noteworthy that in Recovery Case No.1 of 2016, the Assistant Labour Commissioner issued recovery certificate dated 20.7.2017 to the tune of Rs.4,70,000/- with respect to six workmen to whom benefit of settlement had not been given. It is contended that since there was a calculation mistake in the order dated 8.7.2017 and the benefits payable to them were wrongly computed. Thus, the order dated 20.7.2017 was passed for correction of the computation only. Admittedly no recall application was filed by the management for recall of the order dated 20.7.2017 on the grounds taken herein i.e. that opportunity was not provided to it. The said objection taken in the first petition are, therefore, nothing but an after thought. Moreover, there is no objection to the computation made by the Assistant Labour Commissioner. Admittedly no recall application was filed by the management for recall of the order dated 20.7.2017 on the grounds taken herein i.e. that opportunity was not provided to it. The said objection taken in the first petition are, therefore, nothing but an after thought. Moreover, there is no objection to the computation made by the Assistant Labour Commissioner. With regard to the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner regarding entitlement of the workmen, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the benefits of settlement dated 4.11.2014 cannot be denied to the respondents workmen, moreso, in view of the observation of this Court in the judgment and order dated 3.5.2017 passed in Writ C No.58038 of 2014. The relevant observations placed before the Court are to be reproduced as under:- "Admittedly, there was a settlement reached between the employer and the workmen. It appears that the petitioner union at behest of certain workmen was not agreeable to the same and certain differences were existing, some of which are said to be existing even today. However, it is admitted that the settlement has been registered and has been acted upon in respect of most of the workmen. In so far as the first part of the original prayer is concerned, no specific directions are required except that if any application is pending regarding 12 demands as alleged has been filed by the workmen before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the same may be dealt with and decided in accordance with law. So far as the other part of the prayer, the same cannot be granted in view of the facts noted above. Similarly, the settlement having been registered the amended prayer cannot also be granted at this stage. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the Assistant Labour Commissioner to proceed and decide the application of the Union in respect of 12 demands, in accordance with law, leaving it open to both parties to raise such pleas and lead such evidence as they may be advised. " It is further contended that since the settlement has been registered and has been acted upon in respect to most of the workmen, the benefits thereof cannot be denied to the few who were opposing the same. Considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. " It is further contended that since the settlement has been registered and has been acted upon in respect to most of the workmen, the benefits thereof cannot be denied to the few who were opposing the same. Considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. First question which has arisen in the light of the dispute raised by the parties is as to whether the respondents workmen are entitled to the benefits of the settlement signed on 4.11.2014 and, if so, from which date. There is no dispute about the fact that the said settlement had been arrived outside the conciliation proceedings and was registered under Section 6-B read with Rule 5 (1) of the Rules, 1957 framed under the U.P. Act, 1947. In New Standard Engineering Company Ltd. v. N.L. Abhyankar & Ors. reported in (1978) 2 SCC 133 , the Apex Court has held that the settlement of labour disputes by direct negotiation or settlement through collective bargaining is always to be preferred for, as is obvious, it is the best guarantee of industrial peace which is the aim of all legislation for the settlement of labour dispute. In order to bring such a settlement more easily and to make it more workable and effective, a written agreement between the employer and the workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of a conciliation proceedings has been included by nature of the definition in Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act). A written agreement, thus, signed by the parties in the prescribed manner has to be sent to the authorised officer. It becomes binding on the parties and comes into operation on the date it is signed soon after its registration. The requirement of registration of the said settlement is aimed to put all future disputes to an end as the authorised officer is to satisfy itself about the settlement being in conformity with the public policy before its registration. In the present case the settlement dated 4.11.2014 is a settlement within the meaning of Section 2(t) of the U.P. Act, 1947 read with Rule 5 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 framed under that Act. In order to appreciate the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to go through the memorandum of settlement, itself. In order to appreciate the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to go through the memorandum of settlement, itself. The opening paragraph of the memorandum of settlement (page-'61' of the paper book) says that it was a settlement arrived between the Hawkins Cooker Limited through its Executive Director, Finance & Administration, and the Chief Executive, Jaunpur plant who would, thereafter, be referred as the management and the permanent workmen at the plant located at Satharia District Jaunpur, Uttar Pradesh. Eight workmen had signed the settlement in representative capacity. The short recital as contained in the first page of the settlement reads as under:- "1. The Management and the Workers had a Settlement dated August 16, 2012, covering the period April 1, 2011 to November 30, 2014. The workmen of the Plant decided eight representatives to negotiate and sign a new Settlement with Management. Vide letter dated August 21, 2014, 143 workers named eight representatives listed herein above to negotiate and sign the Settlement with the Management. After a Conciliation Meeting at the office of the Learned Assistant Labour Commissioner, Jaunpur, at which the Management and the said representatives participated, discussions between the authorised representatives of the workers and the representatives of the Management were held on November 3 and 4, 2014. The parties have reached a mutually agreed settlement recorded hereunder " A perusal of the terms and conditions of the settlement shows that basic monthly salary, house rent allowance, medical allowance, leave travel allowance, second/third shift allowance, physical effort allowance, special job allowance were revised and the incentives under the then scheme were counted. In addition to it, modalities were finalised with regard to the payment of dearness allowance, conveyance allowance etc. and leave in relation to the workmen who were confirmed employees of the company. Clause 13.1 of the General Clause of the settlement says that it is applicable to all the confirmed permanent workmen who are in the service of the company at Jaunpur plant on the date of signing of the settlement. As per Clause 13.2, these benefits were available to all workers of Jaunpur plant w.e.f. December 1, 2014. However, a condition had been put that each worker had to give his acceptance in writing within 30 days of the entering of the settlement. As per Clause 13.2, these benefits were available to all workers of Jaunpur plant w.e.f. December 1, 2014. However, a condition had been put that each worker had to give his acceptance in writing within 30 days of the entering of the settlement. If not, the benefits of the settlement shall be available to such worker(s) (who had not signed within 30 days), only from the date of acceptance of the settlement by them in writing. As per Clause 13.3, the said settlement shall remain valid after November 30, 2017 till such time when it is replaced by the next settlement. Thus, from a careful reading of the memorandum of settlement, there can be no doubt that the parties to the said settlement were the workmen of the plant namely Satharia Plant at Jaunpur. The settlement was arrived in order to determine the salary and allowance payable to all permanent workmen of the plant from December 1, 2014 onwards, till the said settlement was replaced by the next settlement. As per Clause 13.2, the workmen were required to give their consent in writing within 30 days of the settlement so as to get benefit w.e.f. 1.12.2014. All other workers who signed the settlement at a later stage were also eligible for the benefits thereof subject to the condition that the date of conferment of the benefit upon them would be the date of signing of the agreement or giving their consent in writing. The dispute being raised in the present petition is with regard to the second para of Clause 13.2. The claim of the petitioner management is that six out of 12 workmen who put their claim by filing application dated 11.5.2017 did not sign the agreement at all and, therefore, they were not entitled for the benefits thereof. Specific dispute was raised by the petitioner management before the Assistant Labour Commissioner with regard to their entitlement, however, it was not considered at all while issuing the recovery certificate vide order dated 8.7.2017 as modified/amended vide order dated 20.7.2017. According to the petitioner management for the said fault of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the order dated 20.7.2017 and the consequent recovery certificate dated 17.8.2017 cannot be sustained. According to the petitioner management for the said fault of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the order dated 20.7.2017 and the consequent recovery certificate dated 17.8.2017 cannot be sustained. Additionally, it is argued that the dispute was raised by the petitioner with regard to entitlement of the respondents for the benefits of the settlement and such a dispute could not have been adjudicated in a proceeding under Section 6-H(1) of the Act, 1947 which are only in the nature of execution. Only undisputed claims could have been computed for making any determination under the said provision. As regards the objection of the petitioner management for entitlement of six workmen relevant is to note that they have pleaded in the application under Section 6-H(1) of the Act, 1947 filed as early as on 13.1.2016 that they were demanding benefit of the settlement dated 4.11.2014 i.e. arrears of salary from 1.12.2014 to 31.12.2015 etc. for a long time though they had raised a dispute with regard to the terms of the settlement by filing a Writ Petition No.58038 of 2014. This Court after hearing both the parties, while passing the order dated 3.5.2017, though refused to entertain the challenge to the settlement dated 4.11.2014 but on the entitlement of the said workmen for the benefits of the settlement, it was observed therein that most of the workmen had been granted benefit thereof and there was some differences between certain workmen and the employer. It was then directed that the demand of 12 workmen which was filed before the Assistant Labour Commissioner was required to be dealt with and decided in accordance with law. As noted above, in the written objections filed by the petitioners before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, objection was raised with regard to entitlement of only six workmen out of 12; whereas for the remaining six it was stated that full benefits of the settlement had already been given to them as per the terms and conditions thereof. It further transpires in the instant writ petition that 209 workers are employed in the manufacturing unit i.e. the plant at Satharia, Jaunpur. Out of 209 workmen, only those who were protesting by raising their demands had not been accorded benefit of the settlement arrived with their representatives. It further transpires in the instant writ petition that 209 workers are employed in the manufacturing unit i.e. the plant at Satharia, Jaunpur. Out of 209 workmen, only those who were protesting by raising their demands had not been accorded benefit of the settlement arrived with their representatives. From the reading of the memorandum of settlement, there cannot be any doubt to the fact that the parties to the settlement were the management on the one hand and "all permanent workmen of the plant" on the other, who were represented through eight representatives who signed the settlement on their behalf. The terms and conditions of the services of permanent workmen such as salary, allowances and leave etc. had been determined under the said settlement, in terms of the agreement arrived between the management and the representatives of workmen (who had negotiated on behalf of all permanent workmen). Out of 209 workmen, 203 workmen had been accorded benefit of the settlement. Six workmen who were protesting and raising their head against the management are being denied benefits on the ground that they had not complied with the conditions of Para 13.2 of the said settlement. In the opinion of the Court, the only purpose of incorporating the said condition in Clause 13.2 in the memorandum of settlement was to bring an end to the dispute between the management and the workers at large i.e. to avoid any situation of industrial unrest, in future. Twelve workmen out of 209 did not agree to this settlement for some period but six had succumbed after some time and the management had accorded them benefit of the revised pay and allowances etc. Remaining six workmen though continued their protest for some more time but later on succumbed to the wishes of the other workmen and agreed to accept the terms and conditions of the settlement. At this stage, still the management had denied them benefits. They, therefore, had to approach the Assistant Labour Commissioner by moving application under Section 6-H(1) of the Act, 1947 pleading therein that dues under the settlement were to be computed and paid to them. The management again contested their claim with the assertion that they were not signatories to the agreement and, therefore, they were not entitled for the benefits thereof. This approach of the management is wholly unacceptable. The management again contested their claim with the assertion that they were not signatories to the agreement and, therefore, they were not entitled for the benefits thereof. This approach of the management is wholly unacceptable. The requirement of Clause 13.2 of the memorandum of settlement dated 4.11.2014 of accepting the settlement had been fulfilled by the workmen by laying their claim in writing before the Assistant Labour Commissioner. It further appears that prior to filing of the said application, they had approached the management praying for grant of the benefits. It appears that the management had never made an effort to settle the dispute rather it was hellbent to deny the claim of these workmen when they offered to accept benefits under the settlement. The stand taken by the management that these workmen are entitled to benefit, if any, only from the date of giving their consent in writing, therefore, if accepted would defeat the purpose of the settlement. Mere fact that some workmen were raising their voice against the management, they cannot be denied benefits of the revised salary, allowance as has been given to other similarly situated permanent workmen. There is no other opposition to their claim. The poor workmen who were fighting with the mighty employers cannot be put to disadvantage merely on the plea of the management that they were not signatory to the registered settlement. The law laid down by this Court in the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, is of no help. The above view taken by this Court is further fortified from the observations made by the Apex Court in the order dated 7.10.2013 in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.17538-17539 of 2013 which was decided interse parties wherein the Apex Court had directed the management to consider the claim of the workmen fairly and to grant them benefit which had been accorded to other workmen. Now, the question remains as to whether this dispute could be examined by the Assistant Labour Commissioner in exercise of power under Section 6-H (1) of the Act, 1947. Having considered the recital of the settlement and reached at the conclusion that the settlement dated 4.11.2014 was entered on behalf of all permanent workmen of the plant, in the opinion of the Court, no adjudication was required on the dispute. Having considered the recital of the settlement and reached at the conclusion that the settlement dated 4.11.2014 was entered on behalf of all permanent workmen of the plant, in the opinion of the Court, no adjudication was required on the dispute. Section 6-H(1) of the Act, 1947 empowers the authorized officer to issue recovery of the money due to the workmen from an employer under the settlement, within the meaning of Section 2(t) of the UP Act, 1947, on an application moved by the workmen. The "industrial dispute" defined under Section 2(l) of the U.P. Act, 1947 would not take within its sweep the dispute raised by the workmen for getting the benefits arising out of the settlement. Only dispute between the parties was as to whether these workmen, who did not sign the agreement at the initial stage would be entitled to benefits thereof when they showed their willingness to accept the same at a later stage. Reference may also be made to the judgment of Apex Court in Anz Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2005) 12 SCC 738, wherein the challenge to the reference made by the Central Government for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal was accepted. In the said case, there was a dispute between the bank and the federation (of employees) about the action of the bank in asking for a receipt from those (members of the federation) who wanted to avail the benefit of settlement arrived between the bank and another association of employees. Considering the definition of "industrial dispute" under Section 2(k) of the U.P. Act, 1947 it was held therein that such a dispute cannot be said to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Act, 1947 and, as such, reference made by the State Government was a futile exercise and wholly uncalled for. Thus, only computation of benefits of the settlement with regard to six workmen to whom the benefits have been denied by the management, was to be made by the Assistant Labour Commissioner which was well within its jurisdiction under Section 6-H (1) of the Act, 1947. The Assistant Labour Commissioner, therefore, cannot be said to have exceeded in its jurisdiction in passing the order dated 20.7.2017 and issuing the recovery certificate dated 17.8.2017. The Assistant Labour Commissioner, therefore, cannot be said to have exceeded in its jurisdiction in passing the order dated 20.7.2017 and issuing the recovery certificate dated 17.8.2017. Lastly, as far as the dispute regarding the amended/modified order dated 20.7.2017 raised by the petitioner is concerned, suffice it to say that the mistake committed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner in computation was corrected on an application moved by the workmen. No dispute has been raised in the present petition with regard to the said computation being wrong. For all the above noted reasons, this Court does not find any justification to interfere. The writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merits.