Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 2115 (ALL)

Zaffar Mansoor Khan v. Raju

2018-10-04

AJAY BHANOT

body2018
JUDGMENT : Ajay Bhanot, J. 1. The present appeal arises out of the judgment and award dated 08.09.2000 passed by Special Judge (E.C. Act)/Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Banda in M.A.C.P No. 134/70/98 (Smt. Raju And Others Vs. Zaffar Mansoor Khan and Others), whereby the Tribunal has awarded Rs.7,54,600/- along with 12% per annum interest as compensation to the claimants-respondents for the death of one Chandra Shekhar. 2. A claim petition claiming compensation for the death of one Chandra Shekhar in a motor vehicle accident, was filed by the heirs and dependants of the said Chandra Shekhar (since deceased). The claim petition was registered as MACP No. 134/70 of 1998 (Smt. Raju and Ors Vs. Zaffar Mansoor Khan and Ors.) before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, District Banda. 3. In the claim petition, it was asserted that Chandra Shekhar (since deceased) while riding his bicycle met with a fatal accident on 24.02.1998 at 09:05 PM. The accident caused by collision with a motorcycle bearing registration no. UAD/1246 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Vehicle') occurred near the residence of Superintendent of Police, District Banda. It was averred that the driver of the motorcycle Tariq Zaman Khan was driving in a rash and negligent fashion resulting in the accident. The motorcycle collided with the bicycle at the rear side of the bicycle. Deceased Chandra Shekhar sustained serious bodily injuries in the aforesaid accident. He died of the injuries sustained in the said accident. A First Information Report was lodged on 25.02.1998 at Kotwali Police Station, District Banda at 12:30 PM. The claimants are the wife and the minor children of the deceased Chandra Shekhar. The said Chandra Shekhar (since deceased) was aged about 33 years at the time of his death. He was working in the Health Department. His monthly salary was Rs. 3,300/-. 4. The appellant who was arrayed as opposite party no. 1 in the claim petition contested his liability. The case set up by the opposite party no.1-appellant before the learned Tribunal was that the appellant was not the owner of the vehicle. The owner of the vehicle on the date of the accident was opposite party nos. 2/3. It was further asserted by the appellant that the said ill-fated Vehicle was put to auction. The appellant was the highest bidder in the auction. His bid was accepted and he had deposited the bid amount. The owner of the vehicle on the date of the accident was opposite party nos. 2/3. It was further asserted by the appellant that the said ill-fated Vehicle was put to auction. The appellant was the highest bidder in the auction. His bid was accepted and he had deposited the bid amount. However, the appellant asserted that the requisite formalities and documentations under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 were not completed and the ownership was not transferred in his name on the date of the accident. On the date of the accident, the vehicle was registered in the name of the Superintendent of Police, District Banda and hence was in the ownership of Superintendent of Police, Banda. 5. The opposite party nos. 2 and 3 arrayed as respondent nos. 5 and 6 in the instant appeal, entered their response in the claim petition. The opposite party nos. 2 and 3 stated that the vehicle was purchased by the appellant in an auction held on 16.01.1998 for a sum of Rs. 16,000/-. The opposite party no. 1-appellant had deposited the bid amount in the Police Department, Banda. The opposite party nos. 2 and 3/respondent nos. 5 and 6 denied any liability for payment of compensation. The learned Tribunal framed the following issues: (i). Whether the accident occurred on 24.02.1998 in front of the District Hospital, Banda was caused by rash and negligent driving of Tariq Zaman Khan who was driving Vehicle No. UAD/1246? (ii). Whether the opposite party no. 1-appellant had obtained the possession and control of Vehicle No. UAD/1246 from opposite party no. 2/respondent no. 5 on 05.02.1998? (iii). Whether the claimants are entitled to any compensation and, if so, to what extent? 6. While deciding Issue No. 1, the Tribunal found that the accident which happened on 24.02.1998 was caused by rash and negligent driving of Tariq Zaman Khan who was driving the motorcycle No. UAD/1246. Driver of the motorcycle collided his vehicle with the bicycle which the deceased was riding. On the foot of the aforesaid finding, the Issue No. 1 was decided and the claimants were found entitled to compensation of Rs. 7,54,600/- along with interest of 12% from the date of the institution of the claim petition on 29.08.1998. 7. The fact of the accident has not been seriously disputed by the appellant. On the foot of the aforesaid finding, the Issue No. 1 was decided and the claimants were found entitled to compensation of Rs. 7,54,600/- along with interest of 12% from the date of the institution of the claim petition on 29.08.1998. 7. The fact of the accident has not been seriously disputed by the appellant. The grant of the quantum of compensation to the claimants is also not in dispute in the instant appeal. The extent of interest to be awarded has been orally contested on behalf of the Superintendent of Police, Banda by the learned Standing Counsel. 8. In the instant appeal, the appellant has denied his liability to pay the aforesaid compensation. In such view of the matter, findings returned by the learned Tribunal on Issue No. 2 are of consequence. While deciding issue no. 2, the learned Tribunal held that the said Vehicle was in the possession and control of the appellant on 05.02.1998. 9. Thus the only issue raised for determination in the instant appeal is the ownership of the offending vehicle on the date of the accident and fixation of liability to pay compensation. The appellant has denied his liability to pay compensation. The learned counsel for the appellant Sri Gulrez Khan contends that the liability to pay compensation rests with the respondent no. 5 and 6. The liability to pay the compensation has to borne by the owner of the vehicle. The person in whose name the vehicle stands registered on the date of the accident is the owner of the vehicle. In the instant case such person was the Superintendent of Police, Banda. The learned counsel fortifies his submissions by relying on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Naveen Kumar Vs. Vijay and Ors. reported at (2018) 3 SCC 1 . 10. Heard Sri Gulrez Khan, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri A. K. Mehrotra, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent no. 5 and 6. 11. It is borne out from the records that the ill-fated Vehicle was put to before auction on 16.01.1998. The appellant was the highest bidder at the fall of the hammer. The bid of the appellant was accepted. The appellant deposited the bid amount and other charges to the extent of Rs. 16,800/- on 27.01.1998. 5 and 6. 11. It is borne out from the records that the ill-fated Vehicle was put to before auction on 16.01.1998. The appellant was the highest bidder at the fall of the hammer. The bid of the appellant was accepted. The appellant deposited the bid amount and other charges to the extent of Rs. 16,800/- on 27.01.1998. The deposit is attested by the receipt issued by the competent authority and marked as Paper No. 74 Ka. On 05.02.1998, a letter was issued by the Superintendent of Police, District Banda recording that there was no objection to the transfer of the vehicle in the name of the appellant. The document was marked as Paper No. 36 Ga. The document bears a receipt and endorsement made by the appellant to the following effect. ^^eSaus viuh xkM+h ;w,Mh@1246 dh vkjlh vkSj isij ÁkIr fd;k** . (I have received the registration certificates and Papers of Vehicle No. UAD/1246)." 12. This document was proved by one Ramesh Chandra Tiwari, defendant-witness no. 4. 13. In his deposition before the trial court, the appellant did not dispute his signatures on the aforesaid receipt and endorsement. The appellant, however, clarified the import of the said documents before the court below. The appellant testified that he had only received the papers of the vehicle. The appellant in his testimony before the trial court stated that the possession of the vehicle was made over to him on 25.02.1998. 13.1 The specific case of the appellant before the trial court was that the document dated 05.02.1998 was interpolated, inasmuch as, some recitals in the document were made after he had affixed his signatures to the same. The signature on the document dated 05.02.1998 was made under duress. On behalf of the appellant, the interpolations in the document dated 05.02.1998 were pointed out to the learned trial court. Ink used in the signatures made by the Superintendent of Police, Banda is different from the ink used to endorse the date which is recorded is below the signatures. The colour tones of the ink are different. Distinction in the colours is visible to the naked eye. 14. In regard to the document dated 05.02.1998 there is apparent contradiction in the versions of DW 4, Ramesh Chandra Tiwari and D.W. 5, Girja Shanker Pandey. The colour tones of the ink are different. Distinction in the colours is visible to the naked eye. 14. In regard to the document dated 05.02.1998 there is apparent contradiction in the versions of DW 4, Ramesh Chandra Tiwari and D.W. 5, Girja Shanker Pandey. Sri Ramesh Chandra Tiwari, DW 4 has stated in his deposition that the date on the document was not in the handwriting of the Superintendent of Police. On the contrary Girja Shanker Pandey, DW 5 deposed that the date was affixed by the Superintendent of Police, Banda in his presence. 15. The learned trial court underplayed the apparent contradictions between the two witnesses and overruled the objection raised by the appellant. The learned trial court held that the person who endorsed the date on the document and the ink used therein was not relevant since the signatures of D.W. 1, Zaffar Mansoor Khan- Appellant are admitted 16. The versions of DW 4 and DW 5 have material contradictions and not minor inconsistencies. The depositions of the two witnesses cancel out the stand taken by each other. The consequences of such contradictory testimonies of DW 4 and DW 5 can be better appreciated by collating other evidence on the issue. The appellant had in the first instance testified that he made his signatures under duress. The interpolations in the document were pointed out with clarity to the trial court and specific objections were raised in this regard. The cumulative effect of the evidence in the record is that the date endorsed on the document 36Ga i.e. 05.02.1998 becomes doubtful. The document 36 Ga does not inspire confidence and its authenticity is discredited. In the light of the above discussion, the finding of the trial court on this issue is not sustainable. 17. An application was moved by the appellant on 25.02.1998 before the Kotwali. The appellant secured possession and other papers on the footing of the aforesaid application dated 25.02.1998. The document trail starting from the application dated 25.02.1998, clearly establishes that possession of the vehicle was made over to the appellant on 25.02.1998 on the foot of the application of the like date. No credible challenge has been laid to the said document. The appellant secured possession and other papers on the footing of the aforesaid application dated 25.02.1998. The document trail starting from the application dated 25.02.1998, clearly establishes that possession of the vehicle was made over to the appellant on 25.02.1998 on the foot of the application of the like date. No credible challenge has been laid to the said document. The learned trial court has erred in holding that the making over of the possession of the ill-fated vehicle to the petitioner, was not effectuated by the application dated 25.02.1998 and the document trail created by it. 18. Finding of the trial court in regard to the title and possession of the vehicle on the footing of the document dated 05.02.1998 suffers from perversity and is not sustainable. The document dated 05.02.1998 does not establish the fact of making over of the possession of the vehicle to the appellant on 05.02.1998. Consequently, this court finds that the possession and control of the vehicle was not made over to the appellant on the date of the accident by the defendant no. 5 and 6. 19. The registration papers of the ill-fated vehicle were not executed in favour of the appellant on or before the date of the accident. On the date of the accident the said registration papers of the ill-fated vehicle recorded that the defendant no. 2/respondent no. 5, Superintendent of Police, Banda was the registered owner of the ill-fated vehicle. These facts were not disputed before the trial court and are not in contest in the appeal. 20. In such view of the matter, fixation of any liability for paying compensation upon the appellant is arbitrary and illegal. Findings of the trial court fixing liability on the appellant are unsustainable and are set aside. 21. The liability to pay compensation under the Motor Vehicle Act rests with the owner of the offending vehicle. Sale of a motorcycle entails change of ownership and shifts liability to pay compensation. Disputes regarding the meaning and attributes of "ownership" and onus of liability to pay compensation, arose consequent to the sale of motor vehicles. 22. The line of authorities in point is long but the law has been consistent. It would be apposite to fortify the narrative with the cases in point. 23. Disputes regarding the meaning and attributes of "ownership" and onus of liability to pay compensation, arose consequent to the sale of motor vehicles. 22. The line of authorities in point is long but the law has been consistent. It would be apposite to fortify the narrative with the cases in point. 23. The judicial authorities in point, have delineated the concept of ownership in civil law from the attributes of ownership under the Motor Vehicles Act. 24. But first a reference to the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would be fruitful, since the judicial authorities turn on the interpretation of such provisions. 25. The expression "owner" is defined in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, thus: "2(30) "owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement*, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement" 26. Clearly, the definition stipulates that for the purposes of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the person in whose name the motor vehicles stands registered is treated as the 'owner'. 27. Clearly, the definition stipulates that for the purposes of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the person in whose name the motor vehicles stands registered is treated as the 'owner'. 27. Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the procedure for the transfer of the ownership and provides as under: "Transfer of ownership.-- (1) Where the ownership of any motor vehicle registered under this Chapter is transferred,-- (a) the transferor shall,-- (i) in the case of a vehicle registered within the same State, within fourteen days of the transfer, report the fact of transfer, in such form with such documents and in such manner, as may be prescribed by the Central Government to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the transfer is to be effected and shall simultaneously send a copy of the said report to the transferee; and (ii) in the case of a vehicle registered outside the State, within forty-five days of the transfer, forward to the registering authority referred to in sub-clause (i)-- (A) the no objection certificate obtained under section 48; or (B) in a case where no such certificate has been obtained,-- (I) the receipt obtained under sub-section (2) of section 48; or (II) the postal acknowledgment received by the transferee if he has sent an application in this behalf by registered post acknowledgment due to the registering authority referred to in section 48, together with a declaration that he has not received any communication from such authority refusing to grant such certificate or requiring him to comply with any direction subject to which such certificate may be granted; (b) the transferee shall, within thirty days of the transfer, report the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he has the residence or place of business where the vehicle is normally kept, as the case may be, and shall forward the certificate of registration to that registering authority together with the prescribed fee and a copy of the report received by him from the transferor in order that particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in the certificate of registration. (2) Where-- (a) the person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered dies, or (b) a motor vehicle has been purchased or acquired at a public auction conducted by, or on behalf of, Government, the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicle or, as the case may be, who has purchased or acquired the motor vehicle, shall make an application for the purpose of transferring the ownership of the vehicle in his name, to the registering authority in whose jurisdiction he has the residence or place of business where the vehicle is normally kept, as the case may be, in such manner, accompanied with such fee, and within such period as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (3) If the transferor or the transferee fails to report to the registering authority the fact of transfer within the period specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1), as the case may be, or if the person who is required to make an application under sub-section (2) (hereafter in this section referred to as the other person) fails to make such application within the period prescribed, the registering authority may, having regard to the circumstances of the case, require the transferor or the transferee, or the other person, as the case may be, to pay, in lieu of any action that may be taken against him under section 177 such amount not exceeding one hundred rupees as may be prescribed under sub-section (5): Provided that action under section 177 shall be taken against the transferor or the transferee or the other person, as the case may be, where he fails to pay the said amount. (4) Where a person has paid the amount under sub-section (3), no action shall be taken against him under section 177. (5) For the purposes of sub-section (3), a State Government may prescribe different amounts having regard to the period of delay on the part of the transferor or the transferee in reporting the fact of transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle or of the other person in making the application under sub-section (2). (6) On receipt of a report under sub-section (1), or an application under sub-section (2), the registering authority may cause the transfer of ownership to be entered in the certificate of registration. (6) On receipt of a report under sub-section (1), or an application under sub-section (2), the registering authority may cause the transfer of ownership to be entered in the certificate of registration. (7) A registering authority making any such entry shall communicate the transfer of ownership to the transferor and to the original registering authority, if it is not the original registering authority. 28. The question of liability of the recorded owner of a vehicle after its sale to another person came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. T. V. Jose v. Chacko P M, reported at (2001) 8 SCC 748 . The proceedings in Dr. T. V. Jose (supra) arose under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In the case of Dr. T. V. Jose (supra), the sale consideration had been paid to the original owner. In civil law the title accordingly stood transferred to the new owner upon payment of such consideration and the delivery of the vehicle. However, the issue of liability to pay compensation had to be decided in terms of the provisions regarding 'ownership' stipulated under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. T. V. Jose (supra), after considering the aforesaid facts held thus: "9. Mr Iyer appearing for the appellant submitted that the High Court was wrong in ignoring the oral evidence on record. He submitted that the oral evidence clearly showed that the appellant was not the owner of the car on the date of the accident. Mr Iyer submitted that merely because the name had not been changed in the records of RTO did not mean that the ownership of the vehicle had not been transferred. Mr Iyer submitted that the real owner of the car was Mr Roy Thomas. Mr Iyer submitted that Mr Roy Thomas had been made party-Respondent 9 to these appeals. He pointed out that an advocate had filed appearance on behalf of Mr Roy Thomas but had then applied for and was permitted to withdraw the appearance. He pointed out that Mr Roy Thomas had been duly served and a public notice had also been issued. He pointed out that Mr Roy Thomas had chosen not to appear in these appeals. He submitted that the liability, if any, was of Mr Roy Thomas." "10. He pointed out that Mr Roy Thomas had been duly served and a public notice had also been issued. He pointed out that Mr Roy Thomas had chosen not to appear in these appeals. He submitted that the liability, if any, was of Mr Roy Thomas." "10. We agree with Mr Iyer that the High Court was not right in holding that the appellant continued to be the owner as the name had not been changed in the records of RTO. There can be transfer of title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. The evidence on record shows that ownership of the car had been transferred. However, the appellant still continued to remain liable to third parties as his name continued in the records of RTO as the owner. The appellant could not escape that liability by merely joining Mr Roy Thomas in these appeals. Mr Roy Thomas was not a party either before MACT or the High Court. In these appeals, we cannot and will not go into the question of inter se liability between the appellant and Mr Roy Thomas. It will be for the appellant to adopt appropriate proceedings against Mr Roy Thomas if, in law, he is entitled to do so." 29. The legal proposition enunciated in Dr. T. V. Jose (supra), was followed by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in P. P. Mohammed vs. K. Rajappan, reported at (2008) 17 SCC 624, in the following terms: "These appeals are filed by the appellants. The insurance company has chosen not to file any appeal. The question before this Court is whether by reason of the fact that the vehicle has been transferred to Respondent 4 and thereafter to Respondent 5, the appellant got absolved from liability to the third person who was injured. This question has been answered by this Court in T.V. Jose (Dr.) v. Chacko P.M. [ (2001) 8 SCC 748 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 94] wherein it is held that even though in law there would be a transfer of ownership of the vehicle, that, by itself, would not absolve the party, in whose name the vehicle stands in RTO records, from liability to a third person. We are in agreement with the view expressed therein. Merely because the vehicle was transferred does not mean that the appellant stands absolved of his liability to a third person. We are in agreement with the view expressed therein. Merely because the vehicle was transferred does not mean that the appellant stands absolved of his liability to a third person. So long as his name continues in RTO records, he remains liable to a third person." 30. The same legal issue arose in proceedings under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa @ Leela Vs. Shakuntala reported at (2011) 2 SCC 240 . In the case of Pushpa @ Leela (supra) also the ownership of the ill-fated vehicle changed hands. One Jitendra Gupta, the registered owner, sold the vehicle and made over the possession to the transferee one Salik Ram. Notwithstanding, the sale of the vehicle, neither the vendor Jitendra Gupta nor the vendee Salik Ram took any steps under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to effect a change in the ownership under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. Consequently, the name of the vendor Jitendra Gupta continued to be manifested as the registered owner in the certificate of registration of the vehicle. In the aforesaid facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: "...In view of this omission Jitender Gupta must be deemed to continue as the owner of the vehicle for the purposes of the Act, even though under the civil law he ceased to be its owner after its sale on 2-2-1993." 31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pushpa @ Leela (supra) relied upon the ratio of the decision in Dr. T. V. Jose (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court duly noticed that the decision in Dr. T. V. Jose (surpa) was rendered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. However the Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to apply the ratio of the decision rendered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 to the proceedings arising out of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, by holding thus: "The decision in T.V. Jose (Dr.) [ (2001) 8 SCC 748 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 94] was rendered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. But having regard to the provisions of Section 2(30) and Section 50 of the Act, as noted above, the ratio of the decision shall apply with equal force to the facts of the case arising under the 1988 Act. But having regard to the provisions of Section 2(30) and Section 50 of the Act, as noted above, the ratio of the decision shall apply with equal force to the facts of the case arising under the 1988 Act. On the basis of these decisions, the inescapable conclusion is that Jitender Gupta, whose name continued in the records of the registering authority as the owner of the truck was equally liable for payment of the compensation amount. Further, since an insurance policy in respect of the truck was taken out in his name he was indemnified and the claim will be shifted to the insurer, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd." 32. The law on point was lastly consolidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Naveen Kumar Vs. Vijay and Ors. reported at (2018) 3 SCC 1 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the entire case literature in point including the decision of a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam, reported at (2014) 14 SCC 142 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Naveen Kumar (supra) while noticing the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Purnya Kala Devi (supra) held thus: "The decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam, (2014) 14 SCC 142 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 251 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 304] involved a situation where the registered owner of a vehicle involved in an accident denied his liability to compensate the legal heirs of the deceased victim on the ground that the State Government had requisitioned the vehicle. On the date of the accident, the vehicle stood requisitioned under the Assam Requisition and Control of Vehicles Act, 1968. The State failed to establish that the vehicle was released from requisition after service of a notice in writing to the owner, to take delivery, as required by Section 5(1) of the State Act. Under the Assam Act, it was only upon the service of a notice to that effect that no liability for compensation would lie with the requisitioning authority. The High Court absolved the State Government on the basis of the definition of the expression "owner" in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Reversing the judgment, this Court held thus: (SCC p. 147, para 16) "16. ... The High Court absolved the State Government on the basis of the definition of the expression "owner" in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Reversing the judgment, this Court held thus: (SCC p. 147, para 16) "16. ... the High Court, without adverting to Section 5 of the Assam Act, merely on the basis of the definition of "owner" as contained in Section 2(30) of the 1988 Act, mulcted the award payable by the owner of the vehicle. The High Court failed to appreciate that at the relevant time the offending vehicle was under the requisition of Respondent 1 State of Assam under the provisions of the Assam Act. Therefore, Respondent 1 was squarely covered under the definition of "owner" as contained in Section 2(30) of the 1988 Act. The High Court failed to appreciate the underlying legislative intention in including in the definition of "owner" a person in possession of a vehicle either under an agreement of lease or agreement of hypothecation or under a hire-purchase agreement to the effect that a person in control and possession of the vehicle should be construed as the "owner" and not alone the registered owner. The High Court further failed to appreciate the legislative intention that the registered owner of the vehicle should not be held liable if the vehicle was not in his possession and control. The High Court also failed to appreciate that Section 146 of the 1988 Act requires that no person shall use or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place without an insurance policy meeting the requirements of Chapter XI of the 1988 Act and the State Government has violated the statutory provisions of the 1988 Act. The Tribunal also erred in accepting the allegation of Respondent 2 that the vehicle was released on the date of the accident at 10.30 a.m. and the accident occurred at 10.30 a.m. without any evidence even though in the claim petition, it was stated that the accident had occurred at 10.15 a.m." "The above observations would indicate that a combination of circumstances cumulatively weighed with this Court. Significantly, for the purposes of the present discussion, what emerges from the above judgment is the circumstance that the motor vehicle was on the date of the accident requisitioned by the State Government. Significantly, for the purposes of the present discussion, what emerges from the above judgment is the circumstance that the motor vehicle was on the date of the accident requisitioned by the State Government. Requisitioning by its very nature is involuntary insofar as the person whose property is requisitioned is concerned. This Court observed that it is the person in control and possession of a vehicle which is under an agreement of lease, hypothecation or hire purchase who is construed as the owner and not the registered owner. The same analogy was drawn to hold that where the vehicle had been requisitioned, it was the State and not the registered owner who had possession and control and would hence be held liable to compensate. Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam, reported at (2014) 14 SCC 142 : does not hold that a person who transfers the vehicle to another but continues to be the registered owner under Section 2(30) in the records of the Registering Authority is absolved of liability. The situation which arose before the Court in that case must be borne in mind because it was in the context of a compulsory act of requisitioning by the State that this Court held, by analogy of reasoning, that the registered owner was not liable." 33. After considering other authorities in point, the Hon'ble Supreme Court distilled the position of law as follows: "The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges from the above decisions is that in view of the definition of the expression "owner" in Section 2(30), it is the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who, for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the "owner". However, where a person is a minor, the guardian of the minor would be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle is subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement is treated as the owner. In a situation such as the present where the registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but continues to be reflected in the records of the Registering Authority as the owner of the vehicle, he would not stand absolved of liability. Parliament has consciously introduced the definition of the expression "owner" in Section 2(30), making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier 1939 Act. Parliament has consciously introduced the definition of the expression "owner" in Section 2(30), making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier 1939 Act. The principle underlying the provisions of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in the case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for compensation ought not to be burdened with following a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered with the Registering Authority. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate the fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case, the first respondent was the "owner" of the vehicle involved in the accident within the meaning of Section 2(30). The liability to pay compensation stands fastened upon him. Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured. The High Court has proceeded upon a misconstruction of the judgments of this Court in Reshma [HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Reshma, reported at (2015) 3 SCC 679 and Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam,reported at (2014) 14 SCC 142 " "The submission of the petitioner is that a failure to intimate the transfer will only result in a fine under Section 50(3) but will not invalidate the transfer of the vehicle. In T.V. Jose [T.V. Jose v. Chacko P.M., (2001) 8 SCC 748 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 94] , this Court observed that there can be transfer of title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. But for the purposes of the Act, the person whose name is reflected in the records of the Registering Authority is the owner. The owner within the meaning of Section 2(30) is liable to compensate. The mandate of the law must be fulfilled." 34. The determination of ownership of a vehicle was thus made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Naveen Kumar Vs. Vijay and Ors. reported at (2018) 3 SCC 1 , on the footing of the registered papers of the vehicle. 35. In the light of the findings of fact in the earlier part of the judgment, the law laid down by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Naveen Kumar (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of this case and would rule its fate. 35. In the light of the findings of fact in the earlier part of the judgment, the law laid down by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Naveen Kumar (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of this case and would rule its fate. 36. On the date of the accident the registration papers recorded that Superintendent of Police, Banda was owner of the offending vehicle. The Superintendent of Police, Banda was the owner of the vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on the date of the accident. Consequently the Superintendent of Police, Banda is liable to compensate. 37. The Superintendent of Police, Banda is solely liable to pay the compensation awarded to the claimants. 38. The interest shall be awarded at the rate of 9% per annum in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Neeta Vs. Divisional Manager, MSRTC reported at 2015(3) SCC 590 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: "11. The Appellants are also entitled to the interest on the compensation awarded by this Court in these appeals at the rate of 9% p.a. along with the amount under the different heads as indicated above. The courts below have erred in awarding the interest at the rate of 8% p.a. on the compensation awarded by them to the Appellants without following the decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi v. Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association and Ors. MANU/SC/1255/2011 : (2011) 14 SCC 481 . Accordingly, we award the interest at the rate of 9% p.a. on the compensation determined in these appeals from the date of filing of the application till the date of payment." 39. The State Government/ Superintendent of Police, Banda- defendant nos. 5 and 6, shall deposit the entire awarded amount alongwith the interest before the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Banda within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The amount which has been paid by the appellant to the claimants in compliance of the orders of this court, shall be released by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Banda in his favour along with interest. The amount which has been paid by the appellant to the claimants in compliance of the orders of this court, shall be released by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Banda in his favour along with interest. The remaining amounts deposited by the appellant in compliance of orders of this court as FDRs shall along with accrued interest be released by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Banda in his favour. The rest of the decretal amount shall be released in favour of the claimants. 40. Interest @ 9% per annum shall be payable from the date of the institution of the claim till the date it is actually paid to the claimants. 41. The defendant nos. 5 and 6 shall deposit the entire amount awarded by the learned Tribunal along with 9% interest per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition. 42. The appeal is allowed.