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2018 DIGILAW 2122 (RAJ)

Kailash v. State of Rajasthan

2018-10-24

PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

body2018
JUDGMENT : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. This criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been preferred claiming the following relief: "It is therefore, respectfully prayed that your Lordships may graciously be pleased to accept and allow the present criminal misc. petition and record of the case may kindly be called for and the impugned order dated 02.02.2018 as well as 17.07.2018 passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate No.8, Jodhpur Metro, Jodhpur may kindly be quashed and set aside." 2. Brief facts of this case indispensable for the present adjudication are that an FIR was lodged by the respondent/complainant on 25.10.2017 with the allegations that his daughter, namely, Anita @ Anjali, was married with Kailash (petitioner No.1) on 30.11.2016, and after her marriage, his daughter was harassed in connection with demand of dowry by her in-laws. It has further been alleged that Tarachand, the fatherin-law of the complainant's daughter telephonically informed the complainant that his daughter, Anita was ill and when the complainant rushed to the hospital, Anita had already expired. 3. On the investigation being made, a charge-sheet was submitted against Kailash, the husband of complainant's daughter Anita on 30.01.2018, whereupon the learned magistrate registered a case, and proceeded to take cognizance against the charge-sheeted accused of the offence under Sections 304B and 498A IPC and further ordered committal of the case under Section 209 Cr.P.C. as the offence was triable by the court of sessions. 4. The point of consideration in the present case is arising out of an application dated 02.02.2018 filed by the respondent/complainant before the learned magistrate, seeking direction upon the concerned investigating officer to submit the progress report. On 17.07.2018, the learned magistrate, after noticing the factual matrix of the case, including the fact that on 27.04.2018 a supplementary charge-sheet was presented against mother-in-law i.e. petitioner No.2 in the case, allowed the application and directed further investigation invoking the powers under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners states that the impugned order allowing the application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. could not have been passed, as further investigation after submission of the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. was the prerogative of the investigating agency only. 6. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel Vs. 6. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel Vs. Sumanbhai Kantibhai Patel, reported in, (2017) 4 SCC 177 , in which while taking into consideration the other judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, including Abhinandan Jha and Others. Vs. Dinesh Mishra, reported in, (1968) AIR SC 117 and Chandra Babu alias Moses Vs. State through Inspector of Police and Others, (2015) 8 SCC 774 , it was observed in Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel (supra) as under:- "32. The scope of the judicial audit in Reeta Nag [Reeta Nag v. State of W.B., (2009) 9 SCC 129 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1051] to reiterate, was whether, after the charge-sheet had been filed by the investigating agency under Section 173(2) CrPC, and charge had been framed against some of the accused persons on the basis thereof, and other co-accused had been discharged, the Magistrate could direct the investigating agency to conduct a reinvestigation or further investigation under sub-section (8) of Section 173. The recorded facts revealed that the Magistrate had in the contextual facts directed for reinvestigation and to submit a report, though prior thereto, he had taken cognizance of the offences involved against six of the original sixteen accused persons, discharging the rest. The informant had thereafter filed an application for reinvestigation of the case and the prayer was acceded to. This Court referred to its earlier decisions in Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P. [Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P., (1962) AIR SC 1208 : (1962) 2 CrLJ 288] and Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1966) AIR SC 1047] to the effect that after the Magistrate had passed a final order framing charge against some of the accused persons, it was no longer within his competence or jurisdiction to direct a reinvestigation into the case. The decision in Randhir Singh Rana [Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1997) 1 SCC 361 ] , which propounded as well that after taking cognizance of an offence on the basis of a police report and after the appearance of the accused, a Magistrate cannot of his own order further investigation, though such an order could be passed on the application of the investigating authority, was recorded. It was reiterated with reference to the earlier determination of this Court in Dinesh Dalmia v. CBI [Dinesh Dalmia v. CBI, (2007) 8 SCC 770 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 36] that the power of the investigating officer to make a prayer for conducting further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code was not taken away only because a charge-sheet had been filed under Section 173(2) and a further investigation was permissible even if cognizance had been taken by the Magistrate. This Court, therefore summed up by enouncing that once a charge-sheet was filed under Section 173(2) CrPC and either charges have been framed or the accused have been discharged, the Magistrate may on the basis of a protest petition, take cognizance of the offence complained of or on the application made by the investigating authority, permit further investigation under Section 173(8), but he cannot suo motu direct a further investigation or order a reinvestigation into a case on account of the bar of Section 167(2) of the Code. It was thus held that as the investigating authority did not apply for further investigation and an application to that effect had been filed by the de facto complainant under Section 173(8), the order acceding to the said prayer was beyond the jurisdictional competence of the Magistrate. It was, however observed, that a Magistrate could, if deemed necessary, take recourse to the provisions of Section 319 CrPC at the stage of trial. 33. This decision reinforces the view that after cognizance is taken by the Magistrate on the basis of a report submitted by the police on the completion of the investigation, no direction for further investigation can be made by the Magistrate suo motu and it would be permissible only if such a request is made by the investigating authority on the detection of fresh facts having bearing on the case and necessitating further exploration thereof in the interest of complete and fair trial. 46. As adumbrated hereinabove, Chapter XIV of the Code delineates the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings before a Magistrate. 46. As adumbrated hereinabove, Chapter XIV of the Code delineates the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings before a Magistrate. Section 190, which deals with cognizance of offences by Magistrate, sets out that any Magistrate of the First Class and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered, as contemplated, may take cognizance of any offence either upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a police report of such facts or upon information received from any person other than the police officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence had been committed. Section 156, which equips a police officer with the power to investigate a cognizable case mandates vide sub-section (3) thereof that any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation. The procedure for dealing with complaints to Magistrate is lodged under Chapter XV of the Code. Section 202 appearing therein predicates that any Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which had been made over to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit and shall in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction, postpone the issue of process against the accused and either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. The contents of this text of Section 202(1) of the Code unmistakably attest that the investigation that can be directed by the Magistrate, to be undertaken by a police officer would essentially be in the form of an enquiry for the singular purpose of enabling him to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint of an offence, of which he is authorised to take cognizance. This irrefutably is at the pre-cognizance stage and thus logically before the issuance of process to the accused and his attendance in response thereto. This irrefutably is at the pre-cognizance stage and thus logically before the issuance of process to the accused and his attendance in response thereto. As adverted to hereinabove, whereas Section 311 of the Code empowers a court at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding, to summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined, if construed to be essential to be just decision of the case, Section 319 authorises a court to proceed against any person, who though not made an accused appears, in course of the inquiry or trial, to have committed the same and can be tried together. These two provisions of the Code explicitly accoutre a court to summon a material witness or examine a person present at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding, if it considers it to be essential to the just decision of the case and even proceed against any person, though not an accused in such enquiry or trial, if it appears from the evidence available that he had committed an offence and that he can be tried together with the other accused persons. 47. On an overall survey of the pronouncements of this Court on the scope and purport of Section 173(8) of the Code and the consistent trend of explication thereof, we are thus disposed to hold that though the investigating agency concerned has been invested with the power to undertake further investigation desirably after informing the court thereof, before which it had submitted its report and obtaining its approval, no such power is available therefor to the learned Magistrate after cognizance has been taken on the basis of the earlier report, process has been issued and the accused has entered appearance in response thereto. At that stage, neither the learned Magistrate suo motu nor on an application filed by the complainant/informant can direct further investigation. Such a course would be open only on the request of the investigating agency and that too, in circumstances warranting further investigation on the detection of material evidence only to secure fair investigation and trial, the life purpose of the adjudication in hand. 48. Such a course would be open only on the request of the investigating agency and that too, in circumstances warranting further investigation on the detection of material evidence only to secure fair investigation and trial, the life purpose of the adjudication in hand. 48. The unamended and the amended sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code if read in juxtaposition, would overwhelmingly attest that by the latter, the investigating agency/officer alone has been authorised to conduct further investigation without limiting the stage of the proceedings relatable thereto. This power qua the investigating agency/officer is thus legislatively intended to be available at any stage of the proceedings. The recommendation of the Law Commission in its 41st Report which manifestly heralded the amendment, significantly had limited its proposal to the empowerment of the investigating agency alone. 49. In contradistinction, Sections 156, 190, 200, 202 and 204 CrPC clearly outline the powers of the Magistrate and the courses open for him to chart in the matter of directing investigation, taking of cognizance, framing of charge, etc. Though the Magistrate has the power to direct investigation under Section 156(3) at the precognizance stage even after a charge-sheet or a closure report is submitted, once cognizance is taken and the accused person appears pursuant thereto, he would be bereft of any competence to direct further investigation either suo motu or acting on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant. The direction for investigation by the Magistrate under Section 202, while dealing with a complaint, though is at a post-cognizance stage, it is in the nature of an inquiry to derive satisfaction as to whether the proceedings initiated ought to be furthered or not. Such a direction for investigation is not in the nature of further investigation, as contemplated under Section 173(8) of the Code. If the power of the Magistrate, in such a scheme envisaged by CrPC to order further investigation even after the cognizance is taken, the accused persons appear and charge is framed, is acknowledged or approved, the same would be discordant with the state of law, as enunciated by this Court and also the relevant layout of CrPC adumbrated hereinabove. Additionally had it been the intention of the legislature to invest such a power, in our estimate, Section 173(8) CrPC would have been worded accordingly to accommodate and ordain the same having regard to the backdrop of the incorporation thereof. Additionally had it been the intention of the legislature to invest such a power, in our estimate, Section 173(8) CrPC would have been worded accordingly to accommodate and ordain the same having regard to the backdrop of the incorporation thereof. In a way, in view of the three options open to the Magistrate, after a report is submitted by the police on completion of the investigation, as has been amongst authoritatively enumerated in Bhagwant Singh [Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] the Magistrate, in both the contingencies, namely; when he takes cognizance of the offence or discharges the accused, would be committed to a course, whereafter though the investigating agency may for good reasons inform him and seek his permission to conduct further investigation, he suo motu cannot embark upon such a step or take that initiative on the request or prayer made by the complainant/informant. Not only such power to the Magistrate to direct further investigation suo motu or on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant after cognizance is taken and the accused person appears, pursuant to the process, issued or is discharged is incompatible with the statutory design and dispensation, it would even otherwise render the provisions of Sections 311 and 319 CrPC, whereunder any witness can be summoned by a court and a person can be issued notice to stand trial at any stage, in a way redundant. Axiomatically, thus the impugned decision annulling the direction of the learned Magistrate for further investigation is unexceptional and does not merit any interference. Even otherwise on facts, having regard to the progression of the developments in the trial, and more particularly, the delay on the part of the informant in making the request for further investigation, it was otherwise not entertainable as has been rightly held by the High Court." 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that sub-section (8) was a significant addition to Section 173 Cr.P.C., after the 41st Report of the Law Commission of India to the old Code, which intended that the officer-in-charge of the police station to be empowered to conduct further investigation, but there was no intention that such authorization for further investigation was being extended to the magistrate, as the court is seized of the proceedings. 8. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Reeta Nag Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, (2009) 9 SCC 129 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that once a charge-sheet is filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. and either charge is framed or the accused are discharged, the magistrate may, on the basis of a protest petition, take cognizance of the offence complained of or on the application made by the investigating authorities permit further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The magistrate cannot suo motu direct a further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The relevant paras 25 and 26 of the said judgment read as under:- "25. What emerges from the abovementioned decisions of this Court is that once a chargesheet is filed under Section 173(2) CrPC and either charge is framed or the accused are discharged, the Magistrate may, on the basis of a protest petition, take cognizance of the offence complained of or on the application made by the investigating authorities permit further investigation under Section 173(8). The Magistrate cannot suo motu direct a further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC or direct a reinvestigation into a case on account of the bar of Section 167(2) of the Code. 26. In the instant case, the investigating authorities did not apply for further investigation and it was only upon the application filed by the de facto complainant under Section 173(8) was a direction given by the learned Magistrate to reinvestigate the matter. As we have already indicated above, such a course of action was beyond the jurisdictional competence of the Magistrate. Not only was the Magistrate wrong in directing a reinvestigation on the application made by the de facto complainant, but he also exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the said application filed by the de facto complainant." 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent refuted the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners on the ground that it is reflected in the order-sheet dated 27.04.2018 that the charge-sheet is filed, and file was posted for arguments on cognizance. Therefore, cognizance qua petitioner no.2, who was charge-sheeted in a supplementary charge-sheet has not yet been taken, and therefore, the judgment in Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel (supra) shall not apply. 10. Therefore, cognizance qua petitioner no.2, who was charge-sheeted in a supplementary charge-sheet has not yet been taken, and therefore, the judgment in Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel (supra) shall not apply. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in Sri Indranil Mukherjee Vs. The State of West Bengal & Another (CRR 2115 of 2017 decided on 07.09.2018), in which, as per learned counsel for the respondent, the judgment in Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel (supra) has been distinguished. Relevant portion of the judgment in Sri Indranil Mukherjee (supra) reads as under:- "I find from the material on record placed before me that the investigating agency has perfunctorily conducted investigation without taking into account the medical evidence by not sending the accused Ramkrishna Ghosh in the charge sheet despite allegation levelled against him. The learned Magistrate has also overlooked the police papers placed on the Case Dairy while taking cognisance against one charge sheeted accused and committed error by rejecting the application for further investigation. In rebuttal Mr. Kallol Kumar Basu, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 relied on the decision in case of Athul Rao vs. State of Karnataka & Anr., (2017) 9 SCALE 161 wherein the Investigating Officer had submitted charge sheet after investigation and then also filed a supplementary charge sheet on the subsequent date in which the charges were framed and cognizance were taken as a consequence of which the case was set down for trial. In my humble opinion it was in that set of fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court relying on the decision of the case of Amrut Bhai (supra) observed in paragraph 8 that the question as to whether after framing of the charges and taking cognizance, it is open to the Magistrate to direct further investigation either suo motu or on an application filed by the complainant/informant, it is no more res integra and analysing the decisions in Amrut Bhai (supra) it has been held that neither the Magistrate suo motu nor on an application filed by the complainant/informant can direct further investigation. Further investigation in a given case may be ordered only on the request of the investigating agency and that too, in circumstances warranting further investigation on the detection of material evidence only to secure fair investigation and trial, the light purpose of adjudication in hand. Further investigation in a given case may be ordered only on the request of the investigating agency and that too, in circumstances warranting further investigation on the detection of material evidence only to secure fair investigation and trial, the light purpose of adjudication in hand. In that view of the matter the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cited decision turned down the prayer for further investigation. I am of the considered view that the Hon'ble Supreme Court decisions in Atul Rao and Amrut Bhai (supra) are quite distinguishable from the present facts and circumstances of the case. Relying on the aforesaid decisions, Mr. Ayan Basu appearing for the State opposite party submitted that though opinion of the I.O. is not binding on the Magistrate but the accused not sent up in the Final Report can be prosecuted at the stage of trial on the basis of evidence to be adduced by the prosecution. In the instant case as it is revealed from the materials on record that the charge sheet has been submitted against one accused and another accused was not sent up who allegedly assaulted the complainant. It was the complainant who approached the learned Magistrate only after having the information and notice with regard to the submission of the charge sheet. Therefore, it was expedient on the part of the learned Magistrate to have disposed of the application for further investigation under Section 173 (8) of the Code. Bestowing an anxious consideration to the facts situation of the case and in respectful consideration of the larger bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwant Singh and in case of Samaj Parivartan Samudaya and Ors. (supra), I am of the considered opinion that the Magistrate has ample power to direct further investigation after submission of the charge sheet by the police even when cognizance has been taken on the charge sheet because the decision in Amrut Bhai case (supra) is on a different set of facts as it was at culminating stage of argument. (supra), I am of the considered opinion that the Magistrate has ample power to direct further investigation after submission of the charge sheet by the police even when cognizance has been taken on the charge sheet because the decision in Amrut Bhai case (supra) is on a different set of facts as it was at culminating stage of argument. Therefore, I hold that the submission of a report under Sub- Section 173(2) does not preclude the power of the Magistrate to direct further investigation by the investigating agency and submission of supplementary charge sheet thereon notwithstanding the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence on a police report submitted under the said provision although such power may be precluded at the culminating stage of trial after cognisance has been taken on framing of charge against the accused on the basis of the Final Report. Thus, in the larger interest of the justice and for fair trial, it is imperative for the Magistrate to grant further investigation because if the order impugned is allowed to be sustained, it will amount to arming the police with unbridled power to exonerate any person from the periphery of the investigation and it would be playing into the hands of the I.O. who submitted the charge sheet against one accused exonerating another by not sent up him in the charge sheet with an ulterior design. Ergo, I direct learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bidhannagar to decide on the final report of the Investigating Agency on consideration of the police papers placed in the Case Diary before he takes cognizance on the final report. In consequence thereof the order impugned stands set aside. Accordingly, the revisional application is disposed of. Urgent certified photocopy of this Judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities." 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in his rejoinder arguments, has submitted that once the cognizance is taken, no second cognizance can be taken. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Prasad Shrikant Purohit Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 440 . The relevant paras 69, 70, 74 and 75 of the said judgment read as under:- "69. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Prasad Shrikant Purohit Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 440 . The relevant paras 69, 70, 74 and 75 of the said judgment read as under:- "69. Reliance was then placed upon the decision in Dilawar Singh, (2005) 12 SCC 709 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 727] in particular para 8. The said para 8 reads as under: (SCC p. 713) "8. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that a court takes cognizance of an offence and not of an offender holds good when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under Section 190 CrPC. The observations made by this Court in Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar, (1967) AIR SC 1167 : 1967 CrLJ 1081 were also made in that context. The Prevention of Corruption Act is a special statute and as the Preamble shows, this Act has been enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of corruption and for matters connected therewith. Here, the principle expressed in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant would apply which means that if a special provision has been made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from the general provisions. (See Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. State of A.P, (1966) AIR SC 828, State of Bihar v. Yogendra Singh, (1982) 1 SCC 664 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 142 and Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 Therefore, the provisions of Section 19 of the Act will have an overriding effect over the general provisions contained in Section 190 or 319 CrPC. A Special Judge while trying an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, cannot summon another person and proceed against him in the purported exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC if no sanction has been granted by the appropriate authority for prosecution of such a person as the existence of a sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence qua that person." 70. By relying upon the said part of the decision in Dilawar Singh case, (2005) 12 SCC 709 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 727 it was contended that taking "cognizance of an offence" cannot be the universal rule and that under special circumstances such cognizance of offence would be qua that person, namely, the offender. It is true that in the said decision while dealing with the requirement of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act with reference to an offence under Section 13(2) of the said Act, this Court did say that in the absence of a sanction under Section 19 the taking of cognizance of the offence qua that person cannot be held to have been made out. When we apply the said decision, it must be stated that it was laid down in the context of an offence under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act which Act specifically stipulates the requirement of prior sanction under Section 19 for proceeding against a public servant by way of a sanction and, therefore, it was held that Section 19 of the Act will have an overriding effect over the general provisions contained in Section 190 or 319 CrPC. For the fulfilment of the requirement to be complied with under Section 2(1)(d) of MCOCA, for ascertaining a "continuing unlawful activity" in the absence of any such restriction as stipulated under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act under the provisions of MCOCA we have found that Section 190 CrPC will have every effect insofar as taking of cognizance by a competent court is concerned as stipulated under Section 2(1) (d) and, therefore, as held by us on compliance with the said requirement under Section 190 CrPC, namely, cognizance of the offence by the competent Magistrate, that part of the requirement under Section 2(1)(d) will get automatically fulfilled. 74. In Salap Service Station [1994 Supp (3) SCC 318 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1713] the question as to what is the implication of a supplementary report filed by the investigating agency under Section 173(8) CrPC was considered. While dealing with the same, it has been stated as under in para 2: (SCC p. 319) "2. It may be mentioned here that in the supplementary charge-sheet allegations are to the effect that there was violation of Direction 12 of the Control Order. While dealing with the same, it has been stated as under in para 2: (SCC p. 319) "2. It may be mentioned here that in the supplementary charge-sheet allegations are to the effect that there was violation of Direction 12 of the Control Order. The question of taking cognizance does not arise at this stage since cognizance has already been taken on the basis of the main charge-sheet. What all Section 173(8) lays down is that the investigating agency can carry on further investigation in respect of the offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been filed. The further investigation may also disclose some fresh offences but connected with the transaction which is the subject-matter of the earlier report. The purpose of sub- section (8) of Section 173 CrPC is to enable the investigating agency to gather further evidence and that cannot be frustrated. If the materials incorporated in the supplementary charge-sheet do not make out any offence, the question of framing any other charge on the basis of that may not arise but in case the court frames a charge it is open to the accused persons to seek discharge in respect of that offence also as they have done already in respect of the offence disclosed in the main charge-sheet. The rejection of the report outright at that stage in our view is not correct." The above statement of law with particular reference to Section 173(8) CrPC makes the position much more clear to the effect that the filing of the supplementary chargesheet does not and will not amount to taking cognizance by the court afresh against whomsoever again with reference to the very same offence. What all it states is that by virtue of the supplementary charge-sheet further offence may also be alleged and charge to that effect may be filed. In fact, going by Section 173(8) it can be stated like in our case by way of supplementary charge-sheet some more accused may also be added to the offence with reference to which cognizance is already taken by the Judicial Magistrate. In fact, going by Section 173(8) it can be stated like in our case by way of supplementary charge-sheet some more accused may also be added to the offence with reference to which cognizance is already taken by the Judicial Magistrate. While cognizance is already taken of the main offence against the accused already arrayed, the supplementary charge-sheet may provide scope for taking cognizance of additional charges or against more accused with reference to the offence already taken cognizance of and the only scope would be for the added offender to seek for discharge after the filing of the supplementary charge-sheet against the said offender. 75. In CREF Finance Ltd, (2005) 7 SCC 467 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1697 para 10 is relevant wherein this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 471) "10. Cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender and, therefore, once the court on perusal of the complaint is satisfied that the complaint discloses the commission of an offence and there is no reason to reject the complaint at that stage, and proceeds further in the matter, it must be held to have taken cognizance of the offence. One should not confuse taking of cognizance with issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate peruses the complaint with a view to ascertain whether the commission of any offence is disclosed." The said statement of law reinforces the legal position that cognizance is always of the offence and not the offender and once the Magistrate applies his judicial mind with reference to the commission of an offence the cognizance is taken at that very moment." 12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties as well as perusing the record of the case, alongwith the precedent laws cited at the Bar, this Court finds that the precedent laws of Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel (supra) and Reeta Nag (supra), as cited by learned counsel for the petitioners, are distinguishable from the present facts, and in fact, the present ambit is near to the judgment in the matter of Sri Indranil Mukherjee (supra), in which the judgment in the matter of Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel (supra) has also been considered. 13. 13. In the present case, the cognizance of the offence was taken by the learned court below on 30.01.2018 upon the chargesheet submitted against petitioner No.1, whereby the cognizance of the offences under Sections 304B and 498A IPC was taken and the matter was committed to the court of sessions for trial, and while the investigation remained pending, a supplementary charge-sheet was submitted by the prosecution on 27.04.2018 against the mother-in-law, upon which the learned court below has directed further investigation in the matter invoking the power under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. 14. Though technically after cognizance, the learned court below could not have sent the matter for further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., but such technicality cannot defeat the fact that at the time of cognizance on 30.01.2018, petitioner No.2 was not an accused and has been arrayed as an accused in the supplementary charge-sheet only on 27.04.2018, and therefore, would not fall within the ambit of the precedent law of Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel (supra). 15. This Court, after perusing the complete record of the case, is of the considered opinion that the learned Magistrate had ample powers to direct further investigation after submission of the supplementary charge-sheet by the police subsequently, even when cognizance has been taken on the first charge-sheet at an earlier stage. 16. The very fact that a supplementary charge-sheet has been filed negates the applicability of the concept of ending of the powers under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. with the trial court, after cognizance. The powers of the learned trial court after cognizance against a particular offender is no doubt not available against the same offender, but if supplementary charge-sheet is submitted and another offender is included in the array of accused persons, then looking into this subsequent development, the learned Magistrate could not be precluded from exercising the powers under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. to direct further investigation by the investigating authority. The reason why such powers can be exercised is that the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence upon the report submitted by the police, and thereafter, further investigation has resulted into filing of supplementary charge-sheet; and once investigation was kept open and supplementary charge-sheet has been submitted, then in the interest of justice and fair trial, it was imperative for the learned Magistrate to accept the prayer for further investigation in the matter, and if such power is curtailed by this Court, then it will amount to arming the police with unbridled power to exonerate or implicate any person from the periphery of the investigation and it would be playing into the hands of the investigating officer, who submitted the charge sheet against one accused, while implicating or exonerating another in supplementary charge-sheet against him on the next occasion. The impugned orders are thus well within the realm of law. 17. In light of the aforesaid observations, the present misc. petition stands disposed of.