JUDGMENT : Heard learned Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Manish Mishra, Advocate appearing for the petitioner. 2. Heard Mr. Lalan Kumar Singh, J.C. to G.P.-I counsel appearing for the respondent –State. 3. Heard Mr. Ashutosh Anand, Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 and 4. 4. In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs : (i) For quashing the order dated 07.11.2009 as contained in Annexure-16 to the writ petition passed under the seal and signature of the Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand, whereby the petitioner's application filed under Section 87/88 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 has been rejected by the Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand. (ii) For quashing the notice dated 06.11.2009 bearing No. 785 (Annexure-17) by which the respondent Employees' State Insurance Corporation directed the U.T.I. Bank to attach the Bank account of the petitioner company to the tune of Rs.7,01,914/- (the amount claimed by the respondent E.S.I.C. from the petitioner company), in view of the fact that the said notice had been sent while the Order of the Hon'ble High Court passed in W.P. (C) No. 1670 of 2009 had specifically prohibited the initiation of any coercive steps towards the recovery of any amount from the petitioner towards contribution to E.S.I.C. till 09.11.2009. (iii) For quashing the notice of demand to defaulter dated 13.10.2009 bearing No.725 received by the petitioner company on 13.11.2009 from the respondent E.S.I.C. directing the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.7,01,914/- within fifteen days, failing which recovery would he made as per the procedure provided in Section 45(c) to 45(I) of the E.S.I.C. Act. (iv) For issuance of a direction upon the respondents that the petitioner company is entitled to be granted exemption under Sections 87 and 88 of the ESI Act as petitioner company has investing more than the ESI Contribution i.e. to be recovered from the contribution i.e. to be recovered from the contribution towards providing superior benefits in comparison to the benefits provided under the ESI Act. 5. Counsel for the petitioner on facts has submitted as follows :- (a) The petitioner being carved out of the Towns Division of M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. And was primarily incorporated into a separate entity inter-alia to undertake business of erection, construction and maintenance of the township etc. 5. Counsel for the petitioner on facts has submitted as follows :- (a) The petitioner being carved out of the Towns Division of M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. And was primarily incorporated into a separate entity inter-alia to undertake business of erection, construction and maintenance of the township etc. (b) As of now, more than 1400 persons are employed in the petitioner company and almost all of them were earlier the employees of M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. (c) After coming into existence of the petitioner company, a large number of employees of Tata Steel Limited became the employees of the petitioner and were granted facilities and benefits as available to them in Tata Steel Limited including the medical facilities and the medical cards issued to them were not changed. The petitioner provided all the benefits which are required to be provided to its employees through one of the most superior hospital located at Jamshedpur which is named as Tata Main Hospital. (d) M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. has been applying for exemption under the provisions of Sections 87 and 88 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 continuously on year to year basis. After bifurcation of the State of Jharkhand w.e.f. 15.11.2000, application for exemption was filed before the State of Jharkhand and majority of the employees of JUSCO i.e. the petitioner was at the relevant period, the employees of M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. covered under the aforesaid application for exemption filed by Tata Steel Ltd. w.e.f. 01.04.2004. The petitioner has also separately applied for exemption under Sections 87 and 88 of the Employees' State Insurance Act a copy of the said application is annexed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. (e) In the meantime, for the main work of M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. for the period from 15.11.2000 onwards since the hearing of application for exemption and was completed in December 2005 the State of Jharkhand vide notification dated 14.09.2006 allowed the exemption application of M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. under Section 88 for its main works and granted exemption for the period from 15.11.2000 to 07.08.2005. This exemption also covers the employees of the petitioner company since they were employees of Tata Steel prior to 25.08.2003. This notification has been annexed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition. This exemption also covers the employees of the petitioner company since they were employees of Tata Steel prior to 25.08.2003. This notification has been annexed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition. (f) The application for exemption filed by the petitioner was pending for consideration before the appropriate Government and in the meantime, the petitioner received letter dated 07.09.2007 from the Government of Jharkhand asking for counter comments of the comments made by the Employees State Insurance Corporation on the application for exemption filed by the petitioner (Annexure-7). (g) During the pendency of the consideration of the application for exemption, demand notices were issued to the petitioner vide demand letter dated 11.12.2007 for the period April 2004 to April 2007 which included the period for which exemption was sought for by the petitioner company. (h) The petitioner challenged the action of the respondent before this Court by filing application being W.P.(C) No. 1670 of 2008. During the pendency of the writ petition the application of the petitioner for exemption under Sections 87 and 88 of the said Act was decided by the Government and the respondent Employees' State Insurance Corporation issued a demand notice dated 18.09.2009 and the said demand was in the nature of a certificate and was issued to the Recovery Officer who proceeded further to recover the amount during the attachment process. A copy of this demand has been annexed as Annexure-11 to the writ petition. (i) In these background facts an interlocutory application was filed in W.P. (C) No. 1670 of 2008 and vide order dated 15.10.2009 this Court was pleased to direct the Labour Secretary, Government of Jharkhand to decide the applicability of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 to the petitioner before the next date of hearing in the writ application. (j) The petitioner was served with letter dated 16.10.2009 under the signature of Joint Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand who direct the petitioner that 21.10.2009 was the date fixed for hearing the application of the petitioner for exemption before the Special Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand. Pursuant to said letter dated 16.10.2009 the petitioner duly appeared before the Special Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand on 21.10.2009 and filed detailed representation with full facts. Pursuant to said letter dated 16.10.2009 the petitioner duly appeared before the Special Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand on 21.10.2009 and filed detailed representation with full facts. (k) Thereafter the petitioner received another letter dated 22.10.2009 informing the petitioner that next date of hearing was 28.10.2009. The petitioner was directed to appear on the said date along with all the required and relevant documents. The petitioner accordingly appeared before the Special Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand on 28.10.2009 and on all dates and thereafter the proceedings were concluded by the said authority. The Special Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training had heard the matter and reserved the judgment. (l) It is stated by the petitioner that all of a sudden the petitioner company was communicated vide order dated 07.11.2009 (received by the petitioner on 11.11.2009) under the seal and signature of Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand that application for exemption of the petitioners has been rejected although the hearing was done and concluded by the Special Secretary of the Department. (m) The petitioner has been highly prejudiced by the impugned order as the many of the materials on record and the judgments cited have not been taken care of while passing the impugned order. 6. Although, number of points have been raised in this writ petition, but counsel for the petitioner has confined his argument to the point as to whether the impugned order could have been passed by some other authority other than the person who heard the matter. The counsel for the petitioner has made specific statement at paragraph Nos. 41, 42, 43 and 44 of the writ petition wherein, it has been specifically mentioned that the application for exemption filed by the petitioner was heard by the Special Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand, but the impugned order has been surprisingly passed by the Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand who never had any occasion to hear the application for grant of exemption. This aspect of the matter has not been controverted by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in the counter-affidavit. This aspect of the matter has not been controverted by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in the counter-affidavit. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that as the matter was heard by the Special Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand, the impugned order could not have been passed by the Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand. Counsel for the petitioner submits that if the matter is remanded for fresh consideration no further document will be filed before the authority concerned and the case may be decided on the basis of materials available on record after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties. In support of the contention, counsel for the petitioner has relied upon three judgments reported in (2014) 6 SCC 564 by referring to paragraph No. 20, which reads as follows :- "In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized to be effect that the very person/officer, who accords the hearing to the objector must also submit the report/take decision on the objection and in case his successor decides the case without giving a fresh hearing, the order would stand vitiated having been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice." 7. Counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgment reported in (2015) 10 SCC 241 by referring to paragraph No. 9 of the said judgment which reads as under :- "The importance of Section 5-A cannot be overemphasized. It is conceived from natural justice and has matured into manhood in the maxim of audi alteram partem i.e. every person likely to be adversely affected by a decision must be granted a meaningful opportunity of being heard. This right cannot be taken away by a side wind, as so powerfully and pellucidly stated in Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P. So stringent is this right that it mandates that the person who heard and considered the objections can alone decide them; and not even his successor is competent to do so even on the basis of materials collected by his predecessor. Furthermore, the decision on the objections should be available in a self-contained, speaking and reasoned order; reasons cannot be added to it later as that would be akin to putting old wine in new bottle. Furthermore, the decision on the objections should be available in a self-contained, speaking and reasoned order; reasons cannot be added to it later as that would be akin to putting old wine in new bottle. We can do no better than commend a careful perusal of Union of India v. Shiv Raj, on these as well as cognate considerations. "8. The petitioner also refers to the Constitutional Bench judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1959 SC 308 by referring to paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 of the judgment which is quoted hereinbelow for ready reference :- "30. But such a hearing given by the Secretary, Transport Department, offends the principle of natural justice that the authority empowered to decide the dispute between the opposing parties must be one without bias, and the proceeding and the hearing given, in violation of that principle are bad. 31. While the Act and the Rules framed thereunder impose a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure prescribed by the Rules impose a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Minister to decide. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. Therefore the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basis principle of judicial procedure." 9. Counsel for the petitioner also relies upon two orders/judgments of this Court passed in W.P. (C) No. 2213 of 2009 and W.P. (C) No. 122 of 2010 disposed of vide order dated 24.11.2011 on the identical issue under similar circumstances, matter was remitted to the Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand, who in turn was directed to dispose of the application by reasoned order in accordance with law within a stipulated time framed. 10. It is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 24.11.2011 passed in W.P. (C) No. 2213 of 2009 and W.P. (C) No. 122 of 2009 has attained finality and the same has not challenged by the respondents. 11. 10. It is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 24.11.2011 passed in W.P. (C) No. 2213 of 2009 and W.P. (C) No. 122 of 2009 has attained finality and the same has not challenged by the respondents. 11. Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 admits the legal position and submits that instead of entering into the merits of the case, the matter may be remanded to the competent authority to pass fresh order on the point of exemption as claimed by the petitioner after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 12. Counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 submits that so far as impugned order is concerned, there is no provision under the Act to give exemption with retrospective effect in view of Section 91 (A) of the Act. It is submitted by counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 that this amendment has been carried out in the year 2010 w.e.f. 01.06.2010. 13. After considering the argument advanced on behalf of the parties and after considering the materials on record, this Court is inclined to set-aside the impugned order dated 07.11.2009 (Annexure-16 to the writ petition) passed under the seal and signature of Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand and remit the matter to the competent authority for passing fresh order after hearing the petitioner in accordance with law on account of following facts and reasons :- (a) It is an admitted fact that the matter was heard and order was reserved by the Special Secretary, Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand and the final order was passed by the Principal Secretary, Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand without giving any opportunity of hearing before the Principal Secretary, Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand. (b) It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the judgments relied upon by the petitioner that the order should be passed by the person who hears the arguments failing which the order will amount to gross violations of the principles of natural justice and fair play. (b) It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the judgments relied upon by the petitioner that the order should be passed by the person who hears the arguments failing which the order will amount to gross violations of the principles of natural justice and fair play. (c) The petitioner has been highly, prejudiced by the fact that the matter was heard and order was reserved by the Special Secretary, Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand but the final order was passed by the Principal Secretary, Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand as the said authority while passing the impugned order has not considered many vital aspects of the matter including the judgments which the petitioner had placed before the authority before whom they had argued the matter. (d) There is no dispute that under similar circumstances W.P. (C) No. 2213 of 2009 and W.P. (C) No. 122 of 2010 disposed of vide order dated 24.11.2011 on the identical issue under similar circumstances, matter was remitted to the Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand, who in turn was directed to dispose of the application by reasoned order in accordance with law within a stipulated time frame. (e) So far as the contention of the counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in regards to amendment in Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 by inserting Section 91-A in Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 is concerned, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner is not at fault when the matter was heard by one authority and final order was passed by another authority without any hearing by the authority who had passed the order. The order which may be passed by the authority will not be an order on any fresh application but the same will be passed on the same application and materials which are already on record. (f) Further, counsel for the petitioner has agreed that no further document will be filed before the authority concerned and the case will be decided on the basis of materials available on record after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties. 14. Accordingly, this writ application is allowed and the impugned order dated 07.11.2009 (Annexure-16 to the writ petition) passed under the seal and signature of Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand is hereby quashed. 14. Accordingly, this writ application is allowed and the impugned order dated 07.11.2009 (Annexure-16 to the writ petition) passed under the seal and signature of Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the competent authority who shall fix a date of hearing in the matter in the month of March and pass a reasoned and speaking order in accordance with law on the basis of materials already available on record within a period of six months thereafter. 15. It is made clear that this Court has not entered into the merits of the case. Appeal allowed.