ORDER Yadav, J.--1. This order shall govern the final disposal of Writ Appea l16/2013 and Writ Appea 36/2013. 2. Both these appeals under section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 are directed against the order dated 30.10.2012 passed in Writ Petition No. 4654/2007(s). 3. That Writ Appeal No. 16/2013 is at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh and its functionaries; whereas, Writ Appeal No. 36/2013 is by the employee. 4. The writ petition at the instance of employee, employed as Constable (Trade Man) in Special Armed Force was directed against the removal order, as the employee was found guilty of the charges of having accepted Rs.1,20,000/- from one Arvind Singh Jatav s/o Late Panchu Jatav for the purpose of securing his job in the SAF. The appeal and revision against the said order were also dismissed on 15.2.2007 and 11.6.2007, which were also challenged in the writ petition. 5. Learned Single Judge on a finding that the alleged transaction was of 20.11.2001 whereas the complaint was lodged by the complainant on 4.6.2005 with no cogent explanation as to the delay, except that despite repeated demand the amount was not returned, further found that except oral testimony of the complainant with no corroboration with substantial material, faulted with the findings of the enquiry officer being perverse. Learned Single Judge observed “Apart from the oral evidence, there is no other evidence to support the misconduct. The oral evidence has to be considered after taking other surrounding facts.” 6. It is held in “Union of India v. H.C. Goel [ AIR 1964 SC 364 ]” that : “23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by the appellant is a reasonably possible view this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him. In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence illegally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well founded because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.” 7. Thus, even if the argument led on behalf of the State is accepted that the scope of judicial review is very limited in a writ petition yet in a case where the findings are apparently perverse or not supported by cogent material evidence, it will be within the competence of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with such finding. 8. In the case at hand, evidently, the charge against the petitioner has been that in the year 2001 he took money from the complainant to secure job for him. The complaint was that since the job was not secured, the complainant sought return of said amount which when allegedly denied led the complainant file complaint with the Commandant which culminated into the charge sheet and a departmental enquiry was held. The report submitted by the Enquiry Officer as is evident therefrom was based on guess work. The complaint was that since the job was not secured, the complainant sought return of said amount which when allegedly denied led the complainant file complaint with the Commandant which culminated into the charge sheet and a departmental enquiry was held. The report submitted by the Enquiry Officer as is evident therefrom was based on guess work. The Enquiry Officer observed: fo'ys"k.k vkjksi Ø-1 ds laca/k esa vfHk;kstu lk{kh Ø-1 us izn'kZ i= 1,] 1ch] 1lh esa LIk"V :i ls izekf.kr fd;k gS fd vkjksih }kjk f'kdk;rdrkZ lhrkjke ls mlds yM+ds dks iqfyl esa HkrhZ djkus ds fy, :-1]00]000@& fy, x, gSaA f'kdk;rdrkZ vfHk;kstu o lk{kh Ø- 2 us vius dFku esa ys[k djk;k gS fd vkjksih us HkrhZ ds fy, tks :- fy, Fks esjs iq= dh ukSdjh u yxus ds dkj.k vkjksih ls ckj&ckj :i;ksa dh ekax dh xbZ rks vkjksih us f'kdk;rdrkZ dks MkW- vEcsMdj ukxfjd lgdkjh e;kZfnr cSad Xokfy;j ds :- 15]000@& ,oa :-25]000@& ds pSd fn,A tks izn'kZ 2 ch gSA vkjksih us Hkh f'kdk;rdrkZ dks mDr pSd nsuk vius dwV ijh{k.k esa Lohdkj fd;k gSA vkjksih us lhrkjke dks pSd nsuk crkSj dtZ crk;k gS] fdUrq eSa vkjksih ds rdZ ls lger ugha gw¡A D;ksafd vkjksih us vius dwV ijh{k.k esa pSd nsus dk Li"V [kqyklk ugha fd;k gSA blfy, vkjksih dk ys[k iw.kZr% rdZghu ikrk gw¡A vkjksih }kjk pSd nsus ls Li"V gks tkrk gS fd f'kdk;rdrkZ ds e/; ysu&nsu gqvk gSA eSa tkWpdrkZ vf/kdkjh bl fu"d"kZ ij igqaprk gwW fd f'kdk;rdrkZ us vkjksih ls tc ckj&2 vius :i;s okil ekaxs rks vkjksih us mls dqN le; Vkyus ds fy, 2 pSd ns fn,A vkjksih dks vius [kkrs ds ckjs esa iw.kZr% tkudkjh Fkh fd mles iSlk ugha gSA blfy, lhrkjke dk cSad ls iSlk ugha fey ldrk FkkA vfHk;kstu lk{kh Ø- 3 us Hkh crk;k gS fd vkjksih us esjs firkth ls :i;s fy, FksA vkjksih ds dgus ij 5oh cVk- eqjSuk o 18oh cVk- f'koiqjh esa eSausaa HkrhZ ns[kh fdUrq ikl ugha gqvk vkSj vkjksih us vkt rd jde :- 1]00]000@& okil ugha dh gSA vfHk;kstu lk{kh Ø- 4 dk dFku egRoiw.kZ gS D;ksafd og buds ysu&nsu dk izR;{k xokg gSA vfHk;kstu lk{kh 4 us vius dFku esa crk;k fd lhrkjke us vius yM+ds dh ukSdjh yxokus ds fy, vkjksih jkeflag dks mlds 'kkldh; vkokl 13oh okfguh folcy fldUnj dEiw Xokfy;j esa :- 1]00]000@& esjs lkeus fn, FksA jkeflag us dgk Fkk fd vc vki fpUrk u djsa le>ks vkids cPps dh ukSdjh yx xbZA fdUrq :- okil ugha fd;s vkSj uk gh cPps dh ukSdjh yxokbZA vfHk;kstu lk{kh 4 us izfrijh{k.k esa crk;k fd lhrkjke dks eSaus viuh ?kjsyw cpr ls :- 1]00]000@& fn;s Fks tks ckn esa lhrkjke us eq>s ykSVk fn, gSaA vkjksih }kjk vius cpko esa izLrqr fd;k x;k dFku cpko nLrkost Ø- EXD-1 to EXD-1D rd rF;ghu ikrk gwWA cfYd cpko nLrkost EXD-1B ls ;g izekf.kr gksrk gS fd vkjksih }kjk iqfyl esa HkrhZ djkus ds uke ij vU; yksxksa ls Hkh :i;s fy;s x;s gS vkSj jde okilh ds uke ij mUgsa Hkh pSd fn;s gSa tks ckmUl gq;s gSaA iSjk vr% ihMCY;w&1] 2] 3 o 4 ds dFkuksa o nLrkost Ø- 1&,] 1ch] 1lh] 2] 2,] 2ch] 2lh] 3 o 4 ds }kjk vkjksih ij yxk;k x;k vkjksi izekf.kr ikrk gwaA 9. These findings as rightly held by learned Single Judge are not based on any cogent material evidence. In view whereof the indulgence by learned Single Judge is upheld. Consequently, Writ Appeal No. 16/2013 stands dismissed. 10. Learned Single Judge while setting aside the order of removal and directing for reinstatement declined to grant back wages by taking into consideration past conduct and punishment suffered. Learned Single Judge observed: “11 (III)..........however, he would not be entitled any back wages on the principle of “no work, no pay”. 11. It is against aforesaid order employee/petitioner has filed this appeal (WA.36/2013) contending, inter alia, that past conduct being not the part of charges, it was beyond the jurisdiction of writ Court to have embarked upon the past conduct. It is urged that since the removal order has been set aside and the petitioner having not held guilty of the charges levelled against him and was kept away from the service, he is entitled for full back wages with continuity in service. The State, however, has opposed the contention. It is submitted that the petitioner having not worked for the period of removal he is rightly denied the wages on the principle of “no work no pay”. 12. In “Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, HimmatNagar (Gujarat) and another [ (1996) 11 SCC 603 ]”, it is observed by their Lordships : “3. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop.” 13. In the case at hand, as the findings in the domestic enquiry are found perverse and the removal having been set aside; and as informed that, for the members of Special Armed Force, the M.P. Police Regulation and M.P. Fundamental Rules are applicable. The claim of the petitioner for backwages on his reinstatement is, therefore, liable to be considered by the competent authority as per FR54A. Let a decision be taken within three months from the date of communication of this order. 14. Both the appeals are disposed of in above terms. No costs.