JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the Original petitioner, whose W.P. (C) No. 2004 of 2010 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 24th March, 2011 and hence, the Original Petitioner has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. It appears that the Original Petitioner has prayed before the writ court to restrain the respondents from interfering with the title and possession of the petitioner, which was not accepted by the learned Single Judge. Moreover, prayer of this appellant for quashing and setting aside the order, dated 15th April, 2010 passed by the Collector, Dhanbad in Misc. Petition Case No. 5 of 2009, was also not allowed by the learned Single Judge, hence, the original petitioner has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Having heard counsels appearing for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstance of the case, it appears that this appellant is claiming that it is the owner of the property in question and it is also claiming to be in possession of the same. 4. It appears that under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, which has been brought into force from 1st January, 1946, there are varieties of provisions that when land is vested in the Government, if there is a fraudulent transfer after 1st January, 1946 in favour of any person or Trust, it can be verified by the concerned revenue authority under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. 5. A proceeding was initiated under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and ultimately, an order dated 11th July, 1978 was passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector (At Page No. 35 of the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal), wherein it has been held that property in question is vested in Government as per the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. This part of the order has been accepted by this appellant. 6. Looking to the order, dated 11th July, 1978, passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, it further appears that an amount has been fixed by the State Revenue authority as annuity, viz. Rs. 7,500/- per annum, and this part of the order was challenged by this appellant in an appeal, which was dismissed on 3rd February, 1982 (Annexure 3 to the memo of the Letters Patent Appeal). 7. Rs. 7,500/- per annum, and this part of the order was challenged by this appellant in an appeal, which was dismissed on 3rd February, 1982 (Annexure 3 to the memo of the Letters Patent Appeal). 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that as per the order dated 11th July, 1978, passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, the Trust in question is a genuine trust. 8. It appears from the facts of the case that the appeal preferred by this appellant against the order, dated 11th July, 1978, passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector was also dismissed vide Order dated 3rd February, 1982 (Annexure 3 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal). 9. Thus, the fact remains that as per order passed on 11th July, 1978 by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, land in question was already vested in the Government under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. This part of the order has attained its finality as this part of the order was never challenged by anyone, much less by this appellant. 10. It further appears from the facts of the case that some public as well as private interest litigations were filed for protection of the ownership and possession of the property in question ignoring or suppressing the order, dated 11th July, 1978, passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector. One such matter filed is a writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 6021 of 2008, which was disposed of vide order dated 8th October, 2009 and the direction was given by the learned Single Judge of this court to Deputy Commissioner to treat the petition as representation and decide the claim of the petitioner and the learned Single Judge further ordered to maintain status-quo till it is decided. 11. Thereafter, it appears that a detailed speaking order, dated 15th April, 2010 was passed by the respondent Revenue Authorities, viz. Collector, Dhanbad (Annexure 6 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) in Misc. Petition Case No. 5 of 2009 and it was held by the Collector, Dhanbad, by referring to the earlier order, that the property in question is already vested in the Government vide Order dated, 11th July, 1978, passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector. 12. Collector, Dhanbad (Annexure 6 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) in Misc. Petition Case No. 5 of 2009 and it was held by the Collector, Dhanbad, by referring to the earlier order, that the property in question is already vested in the Government vide Order dated, 11th July, 1978, passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector. 12. The Order, dated 15th April, 2010, passed by the Collector, Dhanbad was challenged by this appellant in the W.P.(C) No. 2004 of 2010 along with a prayer that Respondent may not interfere with the possession and title of the petitioner. 13. We see no reason to entertain this Letters Patent Appeal mainly for the following facts and reasons: (I) It appears from the facts of the case that despite the earlier round of litigation, second round of litigation is initiated. (II) It further appears from the facts of the case that as per the provision of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, proceedings were already initiated and it has been held by Land Reforms Deputy Collector, vide his order, dated 11th July, 1978, (page No. 35 of the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) that the land in question is already vested in the Government. The second point decided by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector is the annuity at the rate of Rs.7500/- per annum. (III) Looking to the order, dated 11th July, 1978, passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector to be read with provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act, the property in question is already vested in the Government. This aspect of the matter has also been accepted by the appellant. Even after the order passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, dated 11th July, 1978, the main part of the order, i.e. the land has already been vested in the Government, was never challenged. The appeal which was preferred by this appellant was for enhancement of the amount and later on this appeal was also dismissed on 3rd February, 1982 (Annexure 3 to the Letters Patent Appeal). (IV) Thus, after several years, now this appellant is again claiming to be the owner and in possession of the property. (V) Normally the claim of ownership of a property can be established by cogent and convincing evidences led before the competent Civil Court as per Section 15 of the Civil Procedure Code. (IV) Thus, after several years, now this appellant is again claiming to be the owner and in possession of the property. (V) Normally the claim of ownership of a property can be established by cogent and convincing evidences led before the competent Civil Court as per Section 15 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, suit is the remedy available to this appellant to establish his ownership and possession over the property in question. Much has been argued out by the counsel for the appellant to establish the ownership over the property in question by referring to several provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to decide the issue of the ownership of this appellant, for which there is remedy available to this appellant before a competent Civil Court. (VI) Similarly, issue of claim of the appellant with respect to possession over the property in question, can also be settled by leading cogent and convincing evidence before the competent Civil Court and as this remedy is available to the appellant, we are not inclined to exercise our powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and no writ of mandamus can be issued upon the respondents for this purpose, especially looking to the following: (a) Provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, Section 3 thereof and other sections. (b) Order, dated 11th July, 1978 (Page 35 of the Letters Patent Appeal), of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector and also looking to the Order, dated 3rd February, 1982 (Annexure 3 to Memo of this Letters Patent Appeal). (VII) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, reported in (1969) 3 SCC 769 in Paragraph No. 14 as under: “14. The High Court observed that they will not determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could only be determined after an affidavit in reply was filed by the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner’s right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner’s right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.” (Emphasis supplied) (VIII) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. B.D. Agarwal reported in (2003) 6 SCC 230 in Paragraph No. 28 as under: “28. A writ petition is filed in public law remedy. The High Court while exercising a power of judicial review is concerned with illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety of an order passed by the State or a statutory authority. Remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked for resolution of a private law dispute as contradistinguished from a dispute involving public law character. It is also well settled that a writ remedy is not available for resolution of a property or a title dispute. Indisputably, a large number of private disputes between the parties and in particular the question as to whether any deed of transfer was effected in favour of M/s Writers & Publishers Pvt. Ltd. as also whether a partition or a family settlement was arrived at or not, were pending adjudication before the civil courts of competent jurisdiction. Indisputably, a large number of private disputes between the parties and in particular the question as to whether any deed of transfer was effected in favour of M/s Writers & Publishers Pvt. Ltd. as also whether a partition or a family settlement was arrived at or not, were pending adjudication before the civil courts of competent jurisdiction. The reliefs sought for in the writ petition primarily revolved around the order of authentication of the declaration made by one of the respondents in terms of the provisions of the said Act. The writ petition, in the factual matrix involved in the matter, could have been held to be maintainable only for that purpose and no other.” (Emphasis supplied) (IX) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Real Estate Agencies v. State of Goa reported in (2012)12 SCC 170 in Paragraph No. 16 as under: 16. A reading of the order of the High Court would go to show that its refusal to interdict the developmental works undertaken or about to be undertaken is on the ground that the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy i.e. a suit for injunction. The writ court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is fully empowered to interdict the State or its instrumentalities from embarking upon a course of action to the detriment of the rights of the citizens, though, in the exercise of jurisdiction in the domain of public law such a restraint order may not be issued against a private individual. This, of course, is not due to any inherent lack of jurisdiction but on the basis that the public law remedy should not be readily extended to settlement of private disputes between individuals. Even where such an order is sought against a public body the writ court may refuse to interfere, if in the process of determination disputed questions of fact or title would require to be adjudicated. 17. However, there is no universal rule or principle of law which debars the writ court from entertaining adjudications involving disputed questions of fact. In fact, in the realm of legal theory, no question or issue would be beyond the adjudicatory jurisdiction under Article 226, even if such adjudication would require taking of oral evidence. 17. However, there is no universal rule or principle of law which debars the writ court from entertaining adjudications involving disputed questions of fact. In fact, in the realm of legal theory, no question or issue would be beyond the adjudicatory jurisdiction under Article 226, even if such adjudication would require taking of oral evidence. However, as a matter of prudence, the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, normally would not entertain a dispute which would require it to adjudicate the contested questions and conflicting claims of the parties to determine the correct facts for due application of the law. In ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., the precise position of the law in this regard has been explained in paras 16, 17 and 19 of the judgment in the course of which the earlier views of this Court in Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda and Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council has been referred to. 21. The High Court, in our considered view, ought not to have disposed of the writ petition at the stage and in the manner it had so done and, instead, ought to have satisfied itself that there was actually a serious dispute between the parties on the question of ownership or title. Only in that event, the High Court would have been justified to relegate the petitioner to the civil court to seek his remedies by way of a suit. (Emphasis supplied) (X) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Municipal Corpn., Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2015)16 SCC 689 in Paragraph No. 14 as under: “14. In the present case, we find that a disputed question of fact was raised by the parties with regard to the title over the land in question. The appellant Corporation on the one hand based its claim of title on payment of amount by depositing it in the court and possession of the land taken pursuant to the agreement reached between the appellant Corporation and the father of Respondent 2. On the other hand, the case of the second respondent is that the amount was not deposited by the appellant Corporation with regard to the land in question. On the other hand, the case of the second respondent is that the amount was not deposited by the appellant Corporation with regard to the land in question. In view of the fact that there is a disputed question of fact, we are of the view that it was not a fit case for the High Court to decide the question of mutation doubting the title in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and thereby reversing the concurrent finding of fact by the competent authorities.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. The aforesaid facts and reasons and the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 have been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing W.P.(C) No. 2004 of 2010 preferred by this appellant vide judgment and order, dated 24th March, 2011, and we see no reason to take any other view than what has been taken by the learned Single Judge. 15. There is no substance in the Letters Patent Appeal and the same is, hereby, dismissed. I.A. No. 948 of 2012 16. In view of the final order passed in this Letters Patent Appeal, this interlocutory application is disposed of.