ORDER : 1. The appellant seeks appointment on compassionate ground in terms of Clause 9 of the National Coal Wage Agreement-VII (NCWA-VII). His mother had passed away while in service of Central Coalfields Limited (C.C.L.) on 6th January, 2006, as recorded in the judgment of the learned First Court. The appellant-writ petitioner had made a representation praying for appointment on compassionate ground. As such representation did not yield any result, he had approached this Court by filing a writ petition, which was registered as W.P.(S) No. 2597 of 2011. That writ petition was disposed of, it is submitted by learned counsel for the parties, with a direction that an officer of the Coal Company was to consider the representation of the writ petitioner to be filed and thereafter pass a reasoned order. His plea for compassionate appointment was ultimately rejected. The second writ petition of the appellant-writ petitioner in which prayer was made for invalidation of the order of rejection coupled with plea for his appointment on compassionate ground was also rejected primarily on the ground of delay. The appellant has come up in appeal assailing the order of rejection passed by the learned Single Judge on 17th February, 2017. 2. The provision for compassionate appointment, as we have already indicated, is contained in Clause 9.3 of the N.C.W.A.-VII. The said clause stipulates :- “9.3.0 Provision of Employment to Dependants 9.3.1 Employment would be provided to one dependant of workers who are disabled permanently and also those who die while in service. The provision will be implemented as follows. 9.3.2 Employment to one dependant of the worker who dies while in service In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment/payment of monetary compensation would be governed by para 9.5.0. 9.3.3 the dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependant of the deceased. 9.3.4 the dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. 9.3.4 the dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment.” 3. The respondent Coal Company resists this appeal on an additional ground apart from delay. Their submission is that at the time of death of the mother of the appellant, father of the appellant was also serving the Coal Company. He superannuated in the year 2014. Learned counsel for the C.C.L. has submitted that as a policy the Coal Company does not indulge in such practice which they term as “double employment”. In the relevant clauses of the N.C.W.A., which we have quoted in the preceding paragraph of this judgment, there is no specific provision relating to “double employment”. However, the provision for compassionate appointment is preserved for dependants. The term dependant has been defined in Clause 9.3.3, which is to include spouse, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. That is the list of relatives in the first line of dependants. It is also specified that if no such direct dependant is available for employment, then next degree relatives specified in the same clause could qualify for such appointment in the event they are wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased. The other aspect which we would have to address for adjudication of this appeal is the test to be applied for determining whether a person would come within the ambit of expression “dependant”, if such person comes within the list of relatives specified in that clause. The NCWA stipulates dependants on the basis of their relationship with the deceased employee. But no provision is there on financial status of the claimant, except that only one dependant would have the benefit of employment through this route. In our opinion, to be eligible for appointment on compassionate ground, one has to be a “dependant” of the deceased employee. The term dependant would have to be construed in its natural meaning to imply that the specified person relied on the deceased for his or her maintenance at the time of death of the deceased or permanent incapacity. In our opinion, to be eligible for appointment on compassionate ground, one has to be a “dependant” of the deceased employee. The term dependant would have to be construed in its natural meaning to imply that the specified person relied on the deceased for his or her maintenance at the time of death of the deceased or permanent incapacity. This construction in our opinion would be suitable in the context of this case, as there may be other situations where the statute might prescribe a specific meaning to this term. In the case of the appellant his father was working at the time of death of his mother and his father continued to serve the Coal Company for further period of eight years. As his father was engaged in service, we are unable to accept the submission of the appellant that the son was independent of the father but dependant only on the mother. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that the mother in her service records had disclosed the appellant as her dependant. But this disclosure automatically does not make the appellant dependant on the mother. A working father would be deemed to be the guardian of a minor child and even a child on attaining majority can be treated as dependant on his father as well even if the mother is also employed, provided the father is otherwise earning. The other factor on which reliance was placed by the appellant was on minutes of the meeting of Joint Consultative Committee of the Coal Companies and their Trade Unions dated 16th April, 2008, though the meeting itself was held on 8th November, 2007. The following decision was taken by the Joint Consultative Committee:- “On persistent demand of all the union members at various meetings/forums, it was decided to re-examine and reconsider the cases of double employment on its merit. It was also informed that such cases will be assigned seniority below the cases of compassionate appointment pending on date. In this regard, the Union members submitted that as these cases are quite old they may be assigned seniority from 01.04.07. The suggestion of the union members was agreed to.” This decision by itself does not create any right but only speaks of reconsideration of the rejected cases on the ground of double employment. In this regard, the Union members submitted that as these cases are quite old they may be assigned seniority from 01.04.07. The suggestion of the union members was agreed to.” This decision by itself does not create any right but only speaks of reconsideration of the rejected cases on the ground of double employment. There is a co-ordinate Bench decision delivered in W.P.(S) No. 1288 of 2005 dated 2nd July, 2012 in which the impact of this agreement was considered. It was held in this judgment :- “7. With regard to learned counsel for the petitioner’s prayer that the respondents may be directed to consider his case under the policy decision dated 16.04.2008, we are of the considered opinion that in the facts of the case, no such direction can be given to the respondent-authority because of the reason that the employee died in the year 2002 and this policy decision came into existence on 16.04.2008. Therefore, while answering the referred issue, we are dismissing the writ petition of the petitioner as no useful purpose will be served by sending the matter back to the learned Single Judge after answering the question referred above.” 5. So far as the present appeal is concerned, the mother of the appellant died before the said decision dated 16th April, 2008 was taken and hence the aforesaid decision of the Co-ordinate Bench covers the case of the appellant also. The appellant has further referred to one Ghanshyam Mahto whose plea of such double employment was rejected by this Court but eventually he was given appointment by the Coal Company. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the Coal Company submits that this was a one off case in which the employer suspected foul play and vigilance enquiry has been directed. In any event, the case of Ghanshyam Mahto cannot be treated to be a precedent on the basis of which the aforesaid clause of N.C.W.A.-VII followed by the Joint Consultative Committee decision ought to be construed. The appellant has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coalfields Limited, reported in 2007 (4) JLJR 144 (SC). In the case of Mohan Mahto (supra), it was brother of the applicant was the employee and the ground of rejection on that count was found to be improper. The appellant has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coalfields Limited, reported in 2007 (4) JLJR 144 (SC). In the case of Mohan Mahto (supra), it was brother of the applicant was the employee and the ground of rejection on that count was found to be improper. But so far as the present appeal is concerned, the father of the appellant was directly employed by the Coal Company and the appellant being the claimant for employment had remained dependant on him for eight years after his mother’s death. There is no material to establish except his deceased mother’s declaration, that the appellant’s status as his father’s dependant had lapsed. The delay in filing the appeal has also not been cogently explained. 7. The appeal is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.