JUDGMENT : In the present writ petition, the petitioner has primarily prayed for quashing the auction sale of the mortgaged property of the petitioner and also for quashing the alleged calculation, statement of account and demand of Rs. 31.79 crore made thereon. It has further been prayed for issuance of direction upon the respondent authorities to produce the valuation report. 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner was engaged in the business of manufacturing of chemical products and for the purpose of financial assistance, it approached the respondent-Bihar State Credit & Investment Corporation (BICICO) for sanction of term loan of Rs. 85 lakhs out of which the BICICO sanctioned the loan of Rs. 79 lakhs. The petitioner furnished securities against the said loan by hypothecating and mortgaging the movable and immovable properties. According to the petitioner, though the respondent-BICICO while releasing the part loan, issued cheques of Rs. 25 lakhs, yet the same got dishonored for insufficient fund. On 14.09.1998, the petitioner wrote to the Industrial Development Commissioner, Government of Bihar complaining about the failure on the part of BICICO in disbursal of loan and in making adjustment in release of the loan amount towards interest, whereupon the Director of Industries, Government of Bihar, vide letter 06.11.1998 sought report from the BICICO. However, no report was given and due to such act of the BICICO, the factory of the petitioner suffered closer for want of capital. The loan account of the petitioner became irregular in the year 1999 and till 31.03.2000, the amount receivable as per BICICO’s notice dated 05.04.2000 was Rs. 69,04,278/- which included interest of Rs. 44,04,278/-. The petitioner was asked to settle outstanding amount of Rs. 1,02,00,000/- under the OTS-2009 vide letter dated 29.12.2010, however, the petitioner could not avail the same as it had gone financially crippled by that time. Again on 19.08.2015, OTS-2015 was floated by the respondent-BICICO under which the payable amount was Rs. 1,58,00,000/-, however, the petitioner was not aware of the said scheme and hence, it could not avail the same. On 31.03.2016, the respondent-BICICO sent reminder to the petitioner to deposit the outstanding dues as on 31.03.2016 amounting to Rs. 31,79,10,000/- out of which the principal was Rs. 79 lakhs. Thereafter, the respondent-BICICO issued notice no. 1,58,00,000/-, however, the petitioner was not aware of the said scheme and hence, it could not avail the same. On 31.03.2016, the respondent-BICICO sent reminder to the petitioner to deposit the outstanding dues as on 31.03.2016 amounting to Rs. 31,79,10,000/- out of which the principal was Rs. 79 lakhs. Thereafter, the respondent-BICICO issued notice no. 331 dated 09.09.2016 under Section 29 and 30 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as “SFC Act”) to the petitioner to discharge the full liability, failing which the mortgaged property would be auctioned. The petitioner replied the said notice on 21.09.2016 showing its eagerness for one time settlement of the loan amount with reduced interest burden and requested the respondent-BICICO to allow three months’ time to finalize the matter and in the meantime to put the advertisement for sale of mortgaged assets on hold. The respondent no. 2 – the Manager, BICICO, Patna vide letter dated 03.10.2016, informed the petitioner that no OTS scheme was prevailing as on date, therefore, they would be unable to consider the petitioner’s offer for waiving the entire interest burden. The respondent-BICICO evaluated the value of the mortgaged property through a registered valuer at Rs. 71.42 lakhs which was found below the existing principal outstanding loan amount of Rs. 79 lakhs, therefore the minimum reserve price was fixed at Rs. 79 lakhs. On 06.12.2016, the respondent-BICICO published the sale notice in Hindi Newspaper “Prabhat Khabar”, Ranchi, “Hindustan”, Patna and English Newspaper “The Times of India”, Patna. Seven tenderers participated in the auction process and the tenders were opened on 12.01.2017 by the tender committee in terms with the NIT in the presence of the seven tenderers. Out of all the participants, the respondent no. 4 – M/s Bhawani Enterprises, Patna offered the highest bid of Rs. 1,51,00,000/-, whereas M/s Dilasa Commodities Pvt. Ltd. (the intervenor) offered Rs. 81,00,000/-. The respondent no. 4-the auction purchaser was called on 25.01.2017 by the respondent-BICICO for negotiation and finalization of the sale, and the initial offer made by the respondent no. 4 was accepted by the respondent-BICICO. Thereafter, as per the provisions of the SFC Act, the respondent-BICICO, vide letter dated 17.02.2017 offered the petitioner to retain the property in question on payment of equal amount as offered by the respondent no. 4. 4 was accepted by the respondent-BICICO. Thereafter, as per the provisions of the SFC Act, the respondent-BICICO, vide letter dated 17.02.2017 offered the petitioner to retain the property in question on payment of equal amount as offered by the respondent no. 4. The petitioner vide letters dated 20.02.2017 and 27.02.2017 proposed for final settlement of the outstanding dues for an amount of Rs. 1,51,00,000/- i.e., the amount offered by the respondent no. 4 for auction purchase of the immovable property of the petitioner. The respondent-BICICO turned down the request of the petitioner vide letter no. 546 dated 03.03.2017 as there being no one time settlement policy in existence under the SFC Act. Thereafter, the respondent no. 4-the auction purchaser paid the entire amount of Rs. 1,51,00,000/- to the respondent-BICICO and on 28.11.2017, the peaceful and vacant possession of the factory premises (the mortgaged property) was handed over to the respondent no. 4 and the inventory was duly prepared. Since then the respondent no. 4 has been in possession of the premises and has also got the electricity connection in its name. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent-BICICO ought to have accepted the proposal made by the petitioner as the petitioner wants to settle the entire outstanding loan for Rs. 1,51,000,00/- as against the principal outstanding dues of Rs. 79,00,000/- and interest charged thereon to the tune of Rs. 31 crores. It is further submitted that the valuation of the mortgaged property has been made by the respondent-BICICO without making any physical verification of the said property as no valuer ever visited the factory premises at any point of time especially in view of the fact that as per the instruction of the respondent no. 3 made vide letter dated 25.05.2016, the petitioner was all along present in the said premises in the first week of June 2016. Moreover, the copy of the valuation report has not been furnished to the petitioner. It is also submitted that the petitioner has been charged interest to the extent of Rs. 31 crores against the principal amount of Rs. 79 lakhs which is highly exorbitant and arbitrary. The petitioner was not given any notice for auction of the mortgaged property due to which the petitioner was out of station during the relevant time. The respondent-BICICO cannot hand over the property to the respondent no. 31 crores against the principal amount of Rs. 79 lakhs which is highly exorbitant and arbitrary. The petitioner was not given any notice for auction of the mortgaged property due to which the petitioner was out of station during the relevant time. The respondent-BICICO cannot hand over the property to the respondent no. 4 without considering the proposal of the petitioner made vide its letters dated 20.02.2017 and 27.02.2017. The petitioner, however, received letter dated 03.03.2017 during the pendency of the writ petition, whereby the offer of the petitioner was turned down. It is further submitted that in the year 2015, the respondent-BICICO came up with One Time Settlement-2015 (Term Loan) scheme valid from 17.08.2015 to 31.01.2016 prescribing that all the borrowers/loanees/companies in liquidation/promoters/ guarantors of the units who had applied for OTS-2002/OTS-2004/OTS-2006/OTS-2009/2013 or any other settlement scheme in past but could not liquidate the dues as per the criteria laid down in the respective schemes, were at liberty to apply for OTS-2015 (Term Loan) scheme as a new case. The petitioner was not aware of such OTS scheme and the respondent-BICICO also did not intimate about the same. The petitioner had taken loan in the year 1993 and its account got irregular in the year 1999, however, the action was taken by the respondent-BICICO after a huge delay in the year 2017 with a malafide motive to earn exorbitant interest which is opposed to the public policy. It is further submitted that on the one hand, the respondents themselves agreed to settle the loan for Rs. 1.02 crore under one time settlement scheme in the year 2010 and on the other hand, it charged Rs. 31.79 crore against the petitioner in the year 2016. 4. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner, puts reliance on the following judgments : i. “Central Bank of India Vs. Ravindra”, (2002) 1 SCC 367 , ii. “Kanchan Udyog Ltd. Vs. United Spirits Ltd.”, (2017) 8 SCC 237 and iii. “Kerala Financial Corpn. Vs. Vincent Paul”, (2011) 4 SCC 171 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 (the auction purchaser) submits that the petitioner has surreptitiously entered into an agreement for sale with intervenor i.e., M/s Dilasa Commodities Pvt. Ltd. for an amount of Rs. 1.58 crore to deceive the auction sale carried out by the BICICO in favour of the respondent no. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 (the auction purchaser) submits that the petitioner has surreptitiously entered into an agreement for sale with intervenor i.e., M/s Dilasa Commodities Pvt. Ltd. for an amount of Rs. 1.58 crore to deceive the auction sale carried out by the BICICO in favour of the respondent no. 4 through a transparent process. The intervenor, who was an unsuccessful bidder and had quoted an amount of Rs. 81,00,000/- only, neither pursued the matter thereafter nor challenged the auction process/sale before any court of law and with a malafide intention has entered into an agreement with the petitioner to purchase the mortgaged property which was already sold by way of auction to the respondent no. 4. This apparently shows a collusive effort to somehow disturb the auction sale process. The respondent no. 4 has purchased only the land with existing building on ‘as is where is basis’ with the boundary wall and iron-gate and has thereafter paid the auction amount to the BICICO and is thus entitled for transfer of title in its favour. The movable property as per the inventory prepared and signed on 28.11.2017, has been given on ‘jimmenama’ to the respondent no. 4 who is ready to shift the same to the respondent-BICICO as and when it is called to do so. The respondent-BICICO has auctioned many other properties through the same process as followed in the present case and the possession of the same have been handed over to the concerned auction purchasers as well as the title of the auctioned properties have also been transferred in favour of the successful purchasers well in time, whereas in the present case, the same is being delayed only due to collusive efforts of the petitioner with the intervenor. The letter dated 17.02.2017 issued by the BICICO is valid and in consonance with the provisions of SFC Act. The petitioner has already got the opportunity to accept the offer of BICICO and to make the payment as offered by the respondent no. 4, however, the petitioner failed to do so and now when the respondent no. 4 (the auction purchaser) has paid the auction price in full and is in possession of the property, the petitioner cannot claim any relief from this Court particularly when the petitioner itself is at fault for this situation. 4, however, the petitioner failed to do so and now when the respondent no. 4 (the auction purchaser) has paid the auction price in full and is in possession of the property, the petitioner cannot claim any relief from this Court particularly when the petitioner itself is at fault for this situation. It is further submitted that an administrative action is amenable to judicial review only if the action taken in exercise of discretion available to the administrative authorities is extremely unreasonable and arbitrary. The High Court, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, is not supposed to act as an appellate authority while reviewing the quasi-judicial administrative action. Thus, the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court may not be exercised in the fact situation of the present case. It is further submitted that apparently to disturb the sale process, earlier the petitioner brought the intervenor into picture during the auction sale process who offered unreasonably low bid in order to reduce the value of the property which remained unsuccessful and now the petitioner has entered into an agreement for sale with the intervenor on 28.04.2017 in order to jeopardise the cause of the respondent no. 4, which may not be permitted. Surprisingly, the intervenor who offered a bid of 81 lakhs only during the auction sale process is ready to buy the property from the petitioner directly at Rs. 1.78 crore which itself goes to show the connivance of the petitioner and intervenor in deceiving the public entity-BICICO and the auction purchaser i.e, the respondent no. 4. Earlier also, the assets of M/s BDP Industries Private Limited, M/s Rudra Steels Private Limited and Chemicals Private Limited were sold by the BICICO through the same sale notice which led to sale of the assets of the petitioner in favour of the respondent no. 4 which goes to show that the sale process was transparently carried out in accordance with law. It is further submitted that the BICICO has duly followed the provisions of Section 29 and 30 of the SFC Act and has correctly auctioned the property in question. The respondent no. 4 and the BICICO are not in dispute on any issue and the respondent no. 4 is not willing to take any refund from BICICO, rather it offered the bid with a bonafide intention to purchase the property and was declared successful. The respondent no. The respondent no. 4 and the BICICO are not in dispute on any issue and the respondent no. 4 is not willing to take any refund from BICICO, rather it offered the bid with a bonafide intention to purchase the property and was declared successful. The respondent no. 4 has invested its hard earned money which is in jeopardy only due to the litigation generated by the petitioner in connivance with the intervenor and, therefore, the respondent no. 4 being the auction purchaser should also be compensated by the petitioner by imposing exemplary cost upon it. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 4, in support of his argument puts reliance on the following judgments : i. “ITC Limited Vs. Blue Coast Hotels Ltd. & Ors.” (Civil Appeal Nos. 2928-2930 of 2018) ii. “U.P. Financial Corporation Vs. Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.”, (1993) 2 SCC 299 iii. “Central Bank of India Vs. C.L Vimla & Ors.”, (2015) 7 SCC 337 iv. “U.P. Financial Corporation & Ors. Vs. Naini Oxygen & Acetylene Gas Ltd. & Anr.” (1995) 2 SCC 754 7. The learned counsel for the respondent-BICICO submits that the petitioner had taken loan of Rs. 79 lakhs on the agreed terms and condition that in case of default it would be liable to pay the contracted interest of 20% per annum besides penal interest. The petitioner after availing loan, never cared to repay the same and continued enjoying without discharging its responsibility to liquidate the dues. It is further submitted that the respondent-Corporation receives money under the Refinance Scheme of IDBI for disbursement of loan to the industrialists and from time to time it uses to give opportunity to the bonafide industrialists to liquidate their loan under One Time Settlement Scheme (OTS), wherein various relaxations including relaxation in interest are given so that the bonafide entrepreneurs who do not have any dishonest intention, may repay the loan. It is also submitted that under the OTS schemes floated in the year 2004, 2006 and 2009, the petitioner was requested to settle the dues, however, it did not care to respond to such requests. The unit of the petitioner was put to auction in the year 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, but the Corporation did not receive any prospective offer and thus, the same failed. The unit of the petitioner was put to auction in the year 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, but the Corporation did not receive any prospective offer and thus, the same failed. It is only the petitioner’s fault due to which the outstanding dues swelled up to Rs. 31.79 crores. Ultimately, the mortgaged assets were again put to auction in the year 2016 after proper valuation at a reserve price of Rs. 79 lakhs against which the Corporation received the highest offer of Rs. 1.51 crores from the respondent no. 4. The respondent-Corporation before settling the offer in favour of the respondent no. 4, provided an option to the petitioner/its Directors to pay the amount equivalent to the highest offer in order to avoid the auction sale, but the petitioner did not choose to avail the said offer and thus, the auction was finalized in favour of the respondent no. 4. There is no procedural irregularity in the process of auction and thus the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. It is further submitted that the entire consideration amount has been received from the respondent no. 4 and the possession of the property has been handed over to it. The intervenor also participated in the auction process, but did not succeed and now with an intention to frustrate the auction process, has entered into a private agreement with the petitioner which itself is illegal. Though the petitioner has put challenge to the valuation of the property, yet as per its own statement, it has now entered into an agreement with the intervenor to sell the property for an amount of Rs. 1.56 crores which is marginally higher than the auction price. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent-BICICO puts reliance on the following judgments : i. “Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr.” reported in (2002) 3 SCC 496 ii. “Kerala Financial Corpn. Vs. Vincent Paul” reported in (2011) 4 SCC 171 iii. “Punjab Financial Corporation Vs. Surya Auto Industries” reported in (2010) 1 SCC 297 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent-BICICO never followed the required procedure before putting the property on auction sale. “Punjab Financial Corporation Vs. Surya Auto Industries” reported in (2010) 1 SCC 297 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent-BICICO never followed the required procedure before putting the property on auction sale. It has been contended that no physical verification of the said property was made before preparing the valuation report and the same is merely a table work. It is further submitted that no notice has been given to the petitioner by the respondent-BICICO about the auction of the property. 10. I have perused the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 primarily on the scope of judicial review by the High Court in the matters of recovery of loan by the State Financial Corporations. 11. In the case of “Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd.” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : 10. It is true that the appellant-corporation is an instrumentality of the State created under the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. The said Act was made by the Parliament with a view to promote industrialisation of the States by encouraging small and medium industries by giving financial assistance in the shape of loans and advances, repayable within a period not exceeding 20 years from the date of loan. We agree that the corporation is not like an ordinary money-lender or a Bank which lends money. It is a lender with a purpose — the purpose being promoting the small and medium industries. At the same time, it is necessary to keep certain basic facts in view. The relationship between the corporation and the borrower is that of creditor and debtor. The corporation is not supposed to give loans once and go out of business. It has also to recover them so that it can give fresh loans to others. The corporation no doubt has to act within the four corners of the Act and in furtherance of the object underlying the Act. But this factor cannot be carried to the extent of obligating the corporation to revive and resurrect every sick industry irrespective of the cost involved. Promoting industrialisation at the cost of public funds does not serve the public interest; it merely amounts to transferring public money to private account. But this factor cannot be carried to the extent of obligating the corporation to revive and resurrect every sick industry irrespective of the cost involved. Promoting industrialisation at the cost of public funds does not serve the public interest; it merely amounts to transferring public money to private account. The fairness required of the corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it. While not insisting upon the borrower to honour the commitments undertaken by him, the corporation alone cannot be shackled hand and foot in the name of fairness. Fairness is not a one way street, more particularly in matters like the present one. The above narration of facts shows that the respondents have no intention of repaying any part of the debt. They are merely putting forward one or other ploy to keep the corporation at bay. Approaching the courts through successive writ petitions is but a part of this game. Another circumstance. These corporations are not sitting on King Solomon’s mines. They too borrow monies from Government or other financial corporations. They too have to pay interest thereon. The fairness required of it must be tempered — nay, determined, in the light of all these circumstances. Indeed, in a matter between the corporation and its debtor, a writ court has no say except in two situations: (1) there is a statutory violation on the part of the corporation or (2) where the corporation acts unfairly i.e., unreasonably. While the former does not present any difficulty, the latter needs a little reiteration of its precise meaning. What does acting unfairly or unreasonably mean? Does it mean that the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can sit as an appellate authority over the acts and deeds of the corporation and seek to correct them? Surely, it cannot be. That is not the function of the High Court under Article 226. Doctrine of fairness, evolved in administrative law was not supposed to convert the writ courts into appellate authorities over administrative authorities. The constraints — self-imposed undoubtedly — of writ jurisdiction still remain. Ignoring them would lead to confusion and uncertainty. The jurisdiction may become rudderless. 11. The obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. The constraints — self-imposed undoubtedly — of writ jurisdiction still remain. Ignoring them would lead to confusion and uncertainty. The jurisdiction may become rudderless. 11. The obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. This doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi-judicial authorities are bound to observe. It is true that the distinction between a quasi-judicial and the administrative action has become thin, as pointed out by this Court as far back as 1970 in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India. Even so the extent of judicial scrutiny/judicial review in the case of administrative action cannot be larger than in the case of quasi-judicial action. If the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decisions and orders of quasi-judicial authorities it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative authorities. In the matter of administrative action, it is well known, more than one choice is available to the administrative authorities; they have a certain amount of discretion available to them. They have “a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred”. (Lord Diplock in Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Metropolitan Borough Counsel of Tameside.) The Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of administrative authorities in such cases. Only when the action of the administrative authority is so unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, can the Court intervene. To quote the classic passage from the judgment of Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation : “It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word ‘unreasonable’ in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with the discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with the discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting ‘unreasonably’. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority.” 12. In the case of “Naini Oxygen & Acetylene Gas Ltd.” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : 21. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Corporation is an independent autonomous statutory body having its own constitution and rules to abide by, and functions and obligations to discharge. As such, in the discharge of its functions, it is free to act according to its own light. The views it forms and the decisions it takes are on the basis of the information in its possession and the advice it receives and according to its own perspective and calculations. Unless its action is mala fide, even a wrong decision taken by it is not open to challenge. It is not for the courts or a third party to substitute its decision, however more prudent, commercial or businesslike it may be, for the decision of the Corporation. Hence, whatever the wisdom (or the lack of it) of the conduct of the Corporation, the same cannot be assailed for making the Corporation liable. 23. We are, therefore, of the view that this is not a matter where the High Court should have stepped in and substituted its judgment for the judgment of the Corporation which should be deemed to know its interests better whatever the sympathies the Court had for the prosperity of the Company. In matters commercial, the courts should not risk their judgments for the judgments of the bodies to whom that task is assigned. 13. In matters commercial, the courts should not risk their judgments for the judgments of the bodies to whom that task is assigned. 13. In the case of “Central Bank of India” (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court after appreciating the fact that total consideration amount was paid by the auction purchaser and was put in possession of the auctioned property, has held that the equity and good conscience will come into place and it would not be proper at this stage to set aside the sale, as has been done by the High Court without taking into consideration all these facts. It has further been held that the High Court was in error in setting aside the sale on the ground of the negligence of the Recovery Officer since the auction-purchaser had nothing to do in holding the auction, rather he deposited the money after bonafide participation in the auction process and suffered for a long time to pay a price by participating in the auction proceedings. 14. In the case of “Punjab Financial Corpn.” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the proceedings initiated by the Corporation and action taken for recovery of the outstanding dues cannot be nullified by the courts except when such action is found to be in violation of any statutory provision resulting in prejudice to the borrower or where such proceeding/action is shown to be wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair. The court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the action of the Corporation and substitute its decision for the one taken by the Corporation. 15. In the case of “Haryana Financial Corpn.” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that fairness cannot be a one-way street. The State Financial Corporations borrow money from the government or other financial institutions and are required to pay interest thereon. Where the borrower has no genuine intention to repay the loan and adopts pretexts and ploys to avoid payment, he cannot make the grievance that the Corporation was not acting fairly, even if requisite procedures have been followed. It has further been held that the fairness required of the Corporations cannot be carried to the extent of disabling them from recovering what is due to them. Unless its action is mala fide, even a wrong decision by it is not open to challenge. It has further been held that the fairness required of the Corporations cannot be carried to the extent of disabling them from recovering what is due to them. Unless its action is mala fide, even a wrong decision by it is not open to challenge. It is not for the courts or a third party to substitute its decision which may, however, be more prudent, commercial or businesslike than the decision of the Corporation. In the matter of action by the Corporation in exercise of the powers conferred on it under Section 29 of the SFC Act, the scope of judicial review is confined to two circumstances i.e., (a) where there is statutory violation on the part of State Financial Corporation, or (b) where State Financial Corporation acts unfairly i.e., unreasonably. While exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court should not sit as an appellate authority over the acts and deeds of the Corporation. Similarly, the courts other than the High Courts are not to interfere with the action under Section 29 of the SFC Act unless the aforesaid two situations exist. 16. In the case of “Karnataka State Industrial Investment and Development Corporation LTD. Vs. Cavalet India LTD.” reported in (2005) 4 SCC 456 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus : 19. From the aforesaid, the legal principles that emerge are : (i) The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not sit as an appellate authority over the acts and deeds of the financial corporation and seek to correct them. The Doctrine of fairness does not convert the writ courts into appellate authorities over administrative authorities. (ii) In a matter between the corporation and its debtor, a writ court has no say except in two situations; (a) there is a statutory violation on the part of the corporation or (b) where the corporation acts unfairly i.e., unreasonably. (iii) In commercial matters, the courts should not risk their judgments for the judgments of the bodies to which that task is assigned. (iv) Unless the action of the financial corporation is mala fide, even a wrong decision taken by it is not open to challenge. It is not for the courts or a third party to substitute its decision, however more prudent, commercial or businesslike it may be, for the decision of the financial corporation. (iv) Unless the action of the financial corporation is mala fide, even a wrong decision taken by it is not open to challenge. It is not for the courts or a third party to substitute its decision, however more prudent, commercial or businesslike it may be, for the decision of the financial corporation. Hence, whatever the wisdom (or the lack of it) of the conduct of the corporation, the same cannot be assailed for making the corporation liable. (v) In the matter of sale of public property, the dominant consideration is to secure the best price for the property to be sold and this could be achieved only when there is maximum public participation in the process of sale and everybody has an opportunity of making an offer. (vi) Public auction is not the only mode to secure the best price by inviting maximum public participation, tender and negotiation could also be adapted. (vii) The financial corporation is always expected to try and realize the maximum sale price by selling the assets by following a procedure which is transparent and acceptable, after due publicity, wherever possible and if any reason is indicated or cause shown for the default, the same has to be considered in its proper perspective and a conscious decision has to be taken as to whether action under Section 29 of the Act is called for. Thereafter, the modalities for disposal of seized unit have to be worked out. (viii) Fairness cannot be a one-way street. The fairness required of the financial corporations cannot be carried to the extent of disabling them from recovering what is due to them. While not insisting upon the borrower to honour the commitments undertaken by him, the financial corporation alone cannot be shackled hand and foot in the name of fairness. (ix) Reasonableness is to be tested against the dominant consideration to secure the best price. 17. The State Financial Corporations have been created by a Parliamentary legislation with a view to promote the small and medium industries by giving financial assistance in the shape of loans and advances. The Corporation finances such industries by raising the fund from the government or other financial institutions and it has to pay interest on it. Thus, the Corporation cannot be regarded as an ordinary money lending bank. The Corporation finances such industries by raising the fund from the government or other financial institutions and it has to pay interest on it. Thus, the Corporation cannot be regarded as an ordinary money lending bank. The corporation is not supposed to give loan and sit idle and if that be the position, then the whole purpose of creating the Corporation would frustrate. It has to recover the dues so as to give loan to other industries. Being the State Instrumentality, the Corporation has to act fairly, however, that does not mean that no borrower would be compelled to honour his commitment. The court’s interference in the action of the Corporation should be to the extent if the Corporation acts unfairly i.e., unreasonably or the action suffers from malafide as well as on the ground of violation of any provision of the SFC Act. It is well settled that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution should not sit in appeal on the decision of the Corporation. 18. The judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Kerala Financial Corpn.” (supra) has been relied upon by both the sides. In the said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that since Kerala Financial Corporation had initiated proceedings under Section 29 of the SFC Act without any rules or guidelines framed by the State thereunder, till such formation of rules or guidelines or orders, the sale of properties would be guided by the following directions : (i) The decision/intention to bring the property for sale shall be published by way of advertisement in two leading newspapers, one in vernacular language having sufficient circulation in that locality. (ii) Before conducting sale of immovable property, the authority concerned shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor, fix the reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or any part of such immovable secured asset by any of the following methods : (a) by obtaining quotations from the persons dealing with similar secured assets or otherwise interested in buying such assets; or (b) by inviting tenders from the public; or (c) by holding public auction; or (d) by private treaty. Among the above modes, inviting tenders from the public or holding public auction is the best method for disposal of the properties belonging to the State. Among the above modes, inviting tenders from the public or holding public auction is the best method for disposal of the properties belonging to the State. (iii) The authority concerned shall serve to the borrower a notice of 30 days for sale of immovable secured assets. (iv) A highest bidder in public auction cannot have a right to get the property or any privilege, unless the authority confirms the auction-sale, being fully satisfied that the property has fetched the appropriate price and there has been no collusion between the bidders. (v) In the matter of sale of public property, the dominant consideration is to secure the best price for the property to be sold. This can be achieved only when there is maximum public participation in the process of sale and everybody has an opportunity of making an offer. It becomes a legal obligation on the part of the authority that property be sold in such a manner that it may fetch the best price. (vi) The essential ingredients of sale are correct valuation report and fixing the reserve price. In case proper valuation has not been made and the reserve price is fixed taking into consideration the inaccurate valuation report, the intending buyers may not come forward treating the property as not worth purchase by them. (vii) Reserve price means the price with which the public auction starts and the auction-bidders are not permitted to give bids below the said price i.e. the minimum bid at auction. (viii) The debtor should be given a reasonable opportunity in regard to the valuation of the property sought to be sold, in absence thereof the sale would suffer from material irregularity where the debtor suffers substantial injury by the sale. 19. On perusal of the record, it appears that a loan of Rs. 79 lakhs was disbursed to the petitioner by the BICICO, however, its account gone irregular in the year 1999. Under One Time Settlement Schemes floated in the year 2004, 2006 and 2009, the petitioner was offered to repay the dues, however, it did not take recourse of the same. On 09.09.2016, notice no. 331 was issued to the petitioner under Section 29 and 30 of the SFC Act to discharge the full liability, failing which the property was to be auctioned, however, the petitioner failed to discharge the liability. On 09.09.2016, notice no. 331 was issued to the petitioner under Section 29 and 30 of the SFC Act to discharge the full liability, failing which the property was to be auctioned, however, the petitioner failed to discharge the liability. The respondent-BICICO evaluated the mortgaged property by an independent valuer at Rs. 71.42 lakhs, however, the minimum reserve price for auction sale was fixed as Rs. 79 lakhs being the outstanding principal amount of loan. The respondent-BICICO published the sale notice on 06.12.2016 in three newspapers namely “Prabhat Khabar”, Ranchi edition, “Hindustan”, Patna edition and “The Times of India”, Patna edition. A public auction was conducted on 12.01.2017 in which seven bidders participated and the respondent no. 4 offered the highest bid of Rs. 1,51,00,000/-, whereas the intervenor offered Rs. 81,00,000/-. On 17.02.2017, the petitioner was offered to purchase the property on the rate offered by the respondent no. 4, however, it replied the offer by putting an additional condition that the respondent-BICICO should settle the entire liability at Rs. 1,51,00,000/- only. When the petitioner failed to retain the property on payment of the auctioned amount, the sale was confirmed in favour of the respondent no. 4 after taking the entire consideration amount and was put to possession of the same. 20. In pursuance of the order dated 17.05.2018 passed by this Court, the respondent-BICICO has brought on record the valuation report of the property by filing supplementary counter affidavit dated 05.07.2018 stating inter alia that one Dilip Kumar Sinha, Engineer and a Valuer registered with the department of Income Tax, Government of India was entrusted to evaluate the property, who valued the building at Rs. 45,23,300/- and after deducting 30% towards repair and maintenance and 50% towards depreciation, the valuer opined that the building is worth Rs. 15,83,150/-. The value of the property including the land was thus quantified at Rs. 71,42,396/- (Rs. 15,83,150/- + Rs. 55,59,246/-) say Rs. 71,42,000.00. As per the valuation report, the valuer assessed the value of plants and machinery as zero and when after taking over possession, it was found that there were some movable assets in the premises, the same was given to the respondent no. 4 on Jimmenama and the respondent-BICICO reserved its right to put the same on sale and fetch its value which is to be adjusted against the left over dues of the petitioner. 21. 4 on Jimmenama and the respondent-BICICO reserved its right to put the same on sale and fetch its value which is to be adjusted against the left over dues of the petitioner. 21. The aforesaid facts clearly reveal that the respondent-BICICO has acted in conformity with the guidelines of the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down in the case of “Kerala Financial Corpn.” (supra) and the petitioner was given opportunity to purchase the property on the auction price, however, it did not agree on the terms and conditions of the respondent-BICICO, rather put its own condition and thus, it was the petitioner itself who was at fault in not purchasing the property on the auction price. So far as the objection of the petitioner regarding the valuation report is concerned, even if it is assumed to be true, the own contention of the petitioner is that it has now agreed to sale the said property to the intervenor for an amount of Rs. 1,58,00,000/- whereas the respondent no. 4 has purchased the same in the public auction at approximately similar price in which the intervenor also participated. The right of the respondent no. 4 vis-a-vis the claim of the intervenor stands on higher footing, thus no interference is warranted merely on such assertion of the petitioner and the intervenor. Moreover, as per the agreement entered into between the petitioner and the intervenor dated 28.04.2017, it appears that out of the total consideration amount of Rs. 1,58,00,000/-, the value of the plant and machinery has been fixed as Rs. 60,00,000/- which clearly reflects that the price paid by the respondent no. 4 for the said property excluding the plant and machinery was reasonably high. The specific contention of the respondent-BICICO is that the plant and machinery are the property of the Corporation which shall be adjusted against the left over dues of the petitioner. 22. In a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “ITC Limited” (supra), it has been observed as under : “the undisputed facts of the case are that a loan was taken by the debtor which was not paid, the debtor did not respond to a notice of demand and made a representation which was not replied to in writing by the creditor. The creditor, however, considered the proposals for repayment of the loan as contained in the representations in the course of negotiations which continued for a considerable amount of time. Several opportunities were in fact availed of by the debtors for the repayment of the loan after the proceedings were initiated by the secured creditor. The debtor failed to discharge its liabilities and eventually undertook that if the debtor fails to discharge the debt, the creditor would be entitled to take realize the secured assets.” 23. The next limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent-BICICO has committed huge delay in taking action against the petitioner with a malafide intention to realize unreasonably huge amount of interest from it. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has put reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “Central Bank of India” (Supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, has held as under : “True it is that once a suit is filed in the court, so far as Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code is concerned, the relationship of parties ceases to be governed by contract between the parties and comes to be governed by Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. Still the submission has to be repelled for several reasons. Firstly, the bank can afford to wait or delay the filing of the suit only during the period of limitation which delay would not be illegitimate. Secondly, nothing prevents the debtor, even during the period of this delay, to pay or tender the amount of interest as and when it falls due and thereby prevent its capitalisation. Thirdly, the court is not powerless to deny the bank’s claim for interest, if in the facts and circumstances of a given case the court is persuaded to hold that filing of the suit was delayed for the purpose of deliberately gaining an unfair advantage over adverse financial condition of the defendant.” 24. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that any bank cannot be allowed to delay the filing of the suit merely for raising interest. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that any bank cannot be allowed to delay the filing of the suit merely for raising interest. However, since the present case relates to the State Financial Corporation which is regarded differently from a bank in general and the facts also reveal that previously on several occasions, the respondent-BICICO preceded to sale the property which, however, failed as it did not receive any prospective offer due to low valuation of the property, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment cannot be applied in the case of the petitioner. 25. In the case of “Punjab Financial Corporation” (supra), the Punjab and Haryana High Court while observing that the Corporation even after taking over the possession of the mortgaged property did not proceed to recover the dues within a reasonable time, held charging of compound interest to be unfair and directed the Corporation to charge simple interest over the outstanding loan after expiry of the six months from the date of taking over the mortgaged property. When the matter went up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that the High Court ignored the fact that that the borrower had adopted not only a recalcitrant attitude in the matter of payment of the outstanding dues, but also failed to avail concessions offered by the Corporation by reducing the rate of interest and rescheduling the payment of outstanding dues and did not take benefit of the schemes notified by the Corporation for restoration of unit on payment of the principal amount with 10% outstanding interest. It was further held that the High Court was in error in suo-motu directing the Corporation to charge simple interest when the borrower had not challenged the terms of the agreement. 26. In the present case also, the petitioner has not challenged the terms of the agreement and thus, the charging of interest will be governed by the same. So far as challenge to the calculation of dues made by the respondent-BICICO is concerned, this Court is not inclined to enter into the calculation arrived at by the respondent-BICICO as the same is based on the terms and conditions of the loan agreement as agreed by the parties. 27. So far as challenge to the calculation of dues made by the respondent-BICICO is concerned, this Court is not inclined to enter into the calculation arrived at by the respondent-BICICO as the same is based on the terms and conditions of the loan agreement as agreed by the parties. 27. Further argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the BICICO had not taken reasonable step to mitigate its losses and on the mitigation principle, the BICICO is not entitled to commit contractual wrong. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “Kanchan Udyog” (supra). I have gone through the said judgment which relates to the claim of any anticipated damage under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 on the default of the other party. The Hon’ble Apex Court after taking into consideration the fact of that case, held that the appellant would not entitled to any anticipated profit as it would amount to give benefit for its own lapses. In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with the contract between the private parties where both of them had their own responsibilities under the contract and thus, the mitigation principle was applied while denying the benefit to the appellant of that case. However, in the present case, the fact situation is entirely different. Here, the petitioner had taken loan from the BICICO on the agreed terms and conditions which also provided for specific procedure for realization of the dues as prescribed under the SFC Act. So far the claim of anticipated damage under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act is concerned, the party claiming the damage is required to prove that the damages were caused due to the default of the other party and if it is proved that the party claiming the damage has not taken the required step for mitigating the damage, the claim of damage is liable to be rejected. However, in the present case, the BICICO has not claimed any damage, rather it has claimed the principal as well as interest over the outstanding loan amount as per the agreed terms and conditions of the contract. 28. However, in the present case, the BICICO has not claimed any damage, rather it has claimed the principal as well as interest over the outstanding loan amount as per the agreed terms and conditions of the contract. 28. It appears from the record that against the refusal to grant an interim order in the matter by this Court, the petitioner preferred L.P.A No. 154 of 2017. The learned Division Bench of this Court, vide order dated 20.04.2017, ordered for maintaining status-quo on the condition of depositing Rs. 1.51 crores by the petitioner with the Registrar General of this Court. Pursuant to the said direction, the petitioner deposited the amount. Subsequently, when the petitioner sought withdrawal of the L.P.A. as well as the amount deposited by it, the Hon’ble Division Bench vide order dated 10.10.2017 though allowed the withdrawal of the L.P.A., yet directed that the said amount shall remain with the Court which shall be settled towards final liability, if any, of the appellant (the petitioner herein) arising out of the present writ petition. 29. The learned counsel for the intervenor has submitted before this Court that the amount has been deposited by the intervenor as per the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 28.04.2017 executed with the petitioner for sale of the property and if any adverse order is passed against the petitioner, the amount lying with the Registrar General of this Court may be ordered to be disbursed to the intervenor. I do not find any substance in the argument of the intervenor. Since the intervenor, even after knowing the fact that the case is pending before this Court which could be decided either way, has taken the risk of depositing the amount on behalf of the petitioner, treating the same to be the consideration value of the property in advance on the strength of an agreement to sale, it has to face the consequence on the principle of “buyer beware”. It is important to note that the petitioner took privilege of the order of status-quo passed by the learned Division Bench and subsequently sought withdrawal of the L.P.A. and the amount and thus the learned Division Bench taking into consideration the conduct of the petitioner passed the order that the amount deposited by the petitioner shall be settled towards the final liability of the petitioner arising out of the present writ petition. No person can be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same breath. Moreover, the order dated 10.10.2017 passed in L.P.A. No.154 of 2017 has not been challenged by the petitioner and the same has attained finality. 30. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that its case may be considered on the ground of equity since it has deposited Rs. 1.51 crores before this Court towards the property in question. The said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be acceded to. The factual context of the case reveals that the petitioner was given several opportunities by the respondent-BICICO to settle its dues through the OTS schemes which were in vogue, however, it failed to avail the benefit of the same. Moreover, even after giving the option to the petitioner to purchase the property on the auction price, it failed to avail said opportunity, rather put the counter offer to the BICICO to settle the entire dues for Rs. 1.51 crores. Here, I am prompted to quote the well-known maxims qui acquitatem quaereret, acquitatem agendum est means “a person who seeks equity must do equity” and qui ad acquitatem venit, puris manibus veniendum est means “a person who comes into equity must come with clean hands. 31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief under the equitable writ jurisdiction as it failed to prove any malafide and unreasonableness in the action of the respondent-BICICO. 32. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. The Registrar General is directed to release the amount in favour of the respondent-BICICO, which shall be adjusted against the outstanding dues of the petitioner. I.A. No.8561 of 2017, I.A. No.9087 of 2017, I.A. No.9317 of 2017, I.A. No.9445 of 2017, I.A. No.1208 of 2018 and I.A. No.7794 of 2018 also stand disposed of accordingly.