JUDGMENT : Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The instant First Appeal From Order has been preferred under Section 39(1)(VI) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 [hereinafter referred to as the Act] against the judgment and order dated 27.11.2014 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Raebareli in Misc. Case No. 222 of 2012 whereby the objections raised by the appellant under Section 30/33 of the Act have been rejected. 3. At the out set, it is relevant to point out that this case has a chequered history as the parties are litigating before the different forums since 1991 when M/s Universal Insulator Ceramic Limited preferred a claim petition before the Arbitrator claiming Rs. 1482.66 lacs under different heads and the matter reached to the Apex Court as the judgment and order dated 8.7.2003 passed by the High Court was challenged in Special Leave Petition (Civil) no. 22995 of 2003. Thereafter multiple proceedings were initiated by both the contesting parties.The instant appeal is pending since last three years and hearing of the case has been postponed on several occasions on one pretext or the other. Ultimately, the parties started final hearing in the matter and concluded their arguments. However, we are pained to observe that Mr Pawan Upadhyaya, who has argued the matter on behalf of the appellant did not attend the proceeding when other side was giving reply to the arguments advanced by him. During the course of arguments, Mr Ashok Kumar Bhargava, who is the Chairman of the appellant’s company was present in court and he insisted that he may be permitted to make the submission in the case though Miss Ruhi Gill, Advocate appearing for the appellant was very much present in the Court. As per rules, no litigant can be allowed to address the court unless he withdraws the power given by him to the Advocate but looking to the zeal and insistence of Mr Ashok Kumar Bhargava, we permitted him to address the court, who de novo narrated the entire history of the case and took about two hours of the court to conclude his submission. 4. 4. In short, the facts of the case are that Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as UPSEB) and PICUP jointly promoted Electrical Complex at Jagdishpur, Raebareli and invited technical entrepreneurs to set-up units in the complex for manufacture of electrical equipment and hardware including High Tension Insulators required for Power development, distributions etc. by UPSEB. 5. Pursuant to the aforesaid invitation, the appellant-Company set up a factory. Although UPSEB had assured 50% purchase of the production UPSEB floated two tenders for purchase of 11 KV Tongue & Clevis Type Disc insulators 11 KV pin insulators and 11 KV Sanded Top insulators and appellant was forced to participate in the tenders and UPSEB signed two contracts with the appellant: “(i) No. 6511-SP(T)Y/ESPC(1)16 Universal Insulators dated 23.04.1980 for 11 KV Tongue & Clevis Type Disc insulators having strength of 4500 kg – 10000 numbers @ Rs. 103/-per piece) (ii) No. 0512-SP(T)Y/ESPC(1)/17 Universal Insulators dated 23.04.1980 for 6,00,000 nos of 11 KV pin insulators @ Rs. 25 per piece and 10,000 nos. of 11 KV Sanded top insulators @ 27/- per piece.’ 6. Certain disputes regarding payments etcetera arose between the parties and when it could not be resolved, it was referred to sole Arbitrator in the year 1991 by the Chairman of UPSEB appointing Mr. R.D. Maheshwari, Chief Engineer (Retd.) UPSEB as an Arbitrator by the letter No. 9321LS88 dated 25.10.1991. After appointment of aforesaid Arbitrator, six claims were preferred by the appellant before the Arbitrator. Several rounds of litigation, even after appointment of Arbitrator took place between the parties and time and again, it reached to the Apex Court. 7. Several Arbitrators were changed during the pendency of arbitration proceeding and finally Hon’ble D.K. Trivedi, J. (since retired)passed the award dated 29th September, 2012. Aggrieved by the award, an application was preferred by the appellant under Section 30/33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 whereby the award was challenged on various grounds and one of the main grounds before the trial court relates to the misconduct of the proceeding by the learned Arbitrator. It was also contended before the trial court that award was not as per terms of reference and it has not decided the matter, which was referred to the Arbitrator. It was also contended before the trial court that award was not as per terms of reference and it has not decided the matter, which was referred to the Arbitrator. Regarding misconduct, the main contention before the trial court was overlooking of terms and conditions of contract between the parties by the Arbitrator and it has also been contended that the Arbitrator has made the award solely on the basis of unsigned, incomplete and illegal chart given to the Arbitrator during hearing by the Counsel of UPSEB, The award of interest part was also challenged before the Trial court. 8. It was also the contention of the appellant before the Trial court that a Civil Revision was preferred by the respondent bearing No. 44 of 1996 before High Court against the order dated 18.3.1996 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Raebareli, whereby Arbitrator, namely, Mr. R.D. Maheshwari was removed from functioning as an Arbitrator and parties were directed to submit three names each for appointment of one arbitrator to resolve the dispute between the parties. 9. During the pendency of the revision, Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as UPPCL) at the instance of opposite party no. 1 constituted a committee consisting of highly placed officers of the Corporation and the Committee admitted the liability to make payment according to its own calculation by report dated 11.12.2000. This report was also scrutinized by the Committee comprising four directors of UPPCL and this committee submitted its report dated 10.7.2001. Both these committees admitted the liability of the UPSEB and claim of the appellant. It is said that Government Orders were also issued by the State Government for making the payment to the appellants after amicably settling the dispute between the parties. It is contended by the learned Counsel that these reports of committees were not considered by the Arbitrator at all, although reference of the reports have been given by the Arbitrator when facts were narrated in the Award but later on, these reports were ignored by the Arbitrator, which is a clearcut misconduct on the part of Arbitrator though there was direction of Apex Court to consider the same. 10. The Trial court after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that there is no misconduct on the part of Arbitrator in passing the award. 10. The Trial court after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that there is no misconduct on the part of Arbitrator in passing the award. It has been observed by the Trial court that the Arbitrator has minutely considered all the relevant facts and material available on record and thereafter came to the conclusion that appellant himself agreed to reduce the rate of insulators from Rs. 25 to Rs. 15/-and agreement was modified by the order dated 18.1.1984 and when appellant himself agreed to reduce the rate from Rs. 25 to Rs. 15/-for supply of insulators, then it cannot be allowed to raise this point. This fact has vividly been considered by the Arbitrator and partial claim of the appellant was also allowed and, therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings and that the award is against the terms and conditions of contract. The learned Trial court also did not find the contention of the appellant acceptable regarding acceptance of Balance-sheet, which was not proved or signed by any official of UPPCL. The Trial court also did not find any force in the assertion of the appellant with regard to interest although no specific finding has been returned by the Trial court regarding the interest that was to be awarded by the Arbitrator. 11. Although the Arbitrator did not consider the above referred two reports of different committees but learned Trial court after considering the evidence upon record came to the conclusion that same was not required as Apex Court has clearly directed that Arbitrator will decide the matter without being guided by any of the order of the previous Arbitrators or of High Court. Therefore, the assertion of the appellant that the Trial court without evaluating the evidence on record and considering the misconduct of the Arbitrator upheld the award, is untenable. 12. Here, it is important to mention that all the pleas which were raised before the Court below have not been raised here and the appellant has confined his arguments to a limited extent, which are mentioned hereinafter. 12. Here, it is important to mention that all the pleas which were raised before the Court below have not been raised here and the appellant has confined his arguments to a limited extent, which are mentioned hereinafter. Initially six claims were made by the appellant before the Arbitrator and 7th claim was raised through an amendment, but before this Court claims are being pressed which pertains to the difference of amount, which was agreed upon to be paid and actually paid as per far and far rate agreement (Claim No. 1) and interest thereon (Claim No.2). Claim No. 7 which relates to payment of interest during the pendency of arbitral proceedings has also been seriously raised. 13. It may be clarified that the third claim pertains to the loss, which has been shown in the Balance-sheet from 1980-91. The fourth claim relates to the gain and loss occurred to the appellant in reference to loan from Bank & Financial Institutions.The fifth claim is in respect of loss in the business due to act of the respondent. The sixth claim pertains to Rs. 69 Lacs which was required for the purposes of rehabilitation of the company as observed by BIFR. The seventh claim, which was included through an amendment in the claim petition is in relation to the interest @ 18% from the date of arbitration alongwith expenses of arbitration. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant has confined his arguments only in relation to Claim Nos. 1, 2 and 7. The main contention of the appellant is that the Arbitrator has misconducted himself as he went beyond the terms of contract. It has been argued by learned Counsel that the learned Arbitrator based its award upon a paper that was not proved by any of the parties and it was filed by the respondent before the Arbitrator during the arbitration proceeding, which was neither signed nor verified by any of the officials of the respondent but the authenticity of this paper has been accepted by the Arbitrator without any proof. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is regarding the non-consideration of two reports given by different committees. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is regarding the non-consideration of two reports given by different committees. It has been argued by learned counsel that two committees submitted reports accepting the claim of the appellant and several GO’s were also issued in this regard for making payment after settling the matter between the parties, then these papers ought to have been considered by the learned Arbitrator, moreso when there was a direction of the Apex Court and it was left open upon the Arbitrator by the Apex Court to see whether these reports are binding upon the respondent or not. The last contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the learned Arbitrator has committed an error with regard to grant of interest and this aspect of the matter has also not been dealt by the court below while passing the impugned order. It has been submitted by the learned counsel that Arbitrator has awarded interest from the date on which he was appointed as an Arbitrator in the matter by the Apex Court in the year 2011 whereas arbitration proceeding has commenced in the year 1991 and claim of the appellant regarding the payment relates to the year 1981. Therefore, it has been urged that interest ought to have been given from the date on which deprivation of the money has been made by the respondent. Further, awarding interest @ 12% is also without any basis and it should have been @ 18% which was prevalent at the relevant time. It has also been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant that appellant’s company is a small scale industry and it is covered by MSME Act 2006 under which interest @ 21% was being granted including compound interest. 15. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, first of all, we deem it proper to refer two orders passed by the Apex Court. In Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 22995/2003, the Apex Court passed following order on 19.01.2004:- “We see no reason to interfere. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. We, however, clarify that by the impugned order it is held that the Revision has become infructuous. Thus the order dated 30th March, 1996 appointing Mr. S.K. Rai as Arbitrator stands. Arbitrator must now proceed. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. We, however, clarify that by the impugned order it is held that the Revision has become infructuous. Thus the order dated 30th March, 1996 appointing Mr. S.K. Rai as Arbitrator stands. Arbitrator must now proceed. However, parties will undoubtedly be entitled to place before the Arbitrator whatever material they want and it will be for the Arbitrator to decide whether or not Petitioners are bound by the Report of the Committee.” 16. A perusal of the aforesaid order shows that it was left open for the Arbitrator to consider and decide whether respondents are bound by the report of the Committee or not. 17. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme court passed the order dated 5.12.2008 in Civil Appeal Nos. 7186-7189 of 2008 arising out of SLP© Nos. 27491-27494 of 2008, and the operative portion of the order reads as under:- “6(iv) It is needless to say that all questions are left open and the Arbitrator will decide the matter and make his award on merits uninfluenced by any observation made by the High Court or previous Arbitrator.” 18. On the strength of the aforesaid order of the Apex Court, it has been argued by the respondent that by the aforesaid order, it was left open to the Arbitrator to decide the matter independently without taking into consideration any observation made by the High Court or previous Arbitrator. In these circumstances, in the event, the learned Arbitrator did not find it feasible to consider the two reports of different committees, then it cannot be said to be a misconduct on the part of the learned Arbitrator as asserted by the appellant. A perusal of the Award makes it amply clear that the learned Arbitrator has passed the Award after gingerly considering all the material which was placed before him. It is relevant to point out here that two reports of different committees never settled the issue finally and Five Member Committee report only discussed the claim of the appellant and it has been observed by the committee that on the basis of report, payment to the appellant may be processed. The committee did not decide the matter between the parties rather it only considered the claim of the appellant and the report of the Five member committee cannot be said to be binding upon the respondent. The committee did not decide the matter between the parties rather it only considered the claim of the appellant and the report of the Five member committee cannot be said to be binding upon the respondent. It may be added that the Four Members Committee report which was subsequently constituted for considering the Five Member Committee report is also of no avail to the appellant as it has not given any conclusive finding rather it has been observed by the committee that five member committee has not given any conclusive proof regarding the liability of the respondent. It also comes out from the record that the Corporation did not accept the committee report and no meeting has been held between the parties for deciding the matter amicably and when matter was not decided amicably then how it can be said that these committee reports are binding upon the respondents as alleged by the appellant. 19. It may be clarified here that it has been urged by the respondent that when part of the Award was acceptable to the appellant, then application under Section 30/33 of the Act before the Trial court was not maintainable and appellant ought to have moved application under Section 15 of the Act for modifying the Award. Before this Court, it has been argued that this appeal has been filed for modifying the Award, which is not permissible as such a relief was not claimed before the trial court. Therefore, the appellant is debarred from claiming said relief at the appellate forum. 20. It is pertinent to mention that while defending the award, it has been urged by the respondent-Corporation that all the relevant factors have been taken into consideration by the Arbitrator and he has not gone beyond the terms of contract as alleged. Upon the second modification of the contract/ agreement in the year 1984, Arbitrator, while making the award has clearly observed that first modification that was made in the year 1981 was made for the benefit of the appellant and the Arbitrator has also awarded a substantial amount to the appellant, which was claimed by the appellant and thereby it cannot be said that Arbitrator misconducted in the proceeding partly or respondent is responsible for the loss suffered to the appellant. Admittedly, after reduction in the rate, supplies were made by the appellant and the company-appellant also accepted the payments and as such the appellant is barred from claiming difference in rates. Here, it would be relevant to mention that it has been brought to our notice that during the proceeding before Trial court, the awarded amount was deposited by the respondent, which was accepted by the appellant, hence appellant is precluded from challenging the award on this ground alone. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that after the order passed in Civil Revision No. 44/96 dated 10.04.2005, meeting of the Board of Directors was convened and in the meeting dated 29.4.2003, it was resolved that the matter be decided through an Arbitrator and it was also decided that in reference to G.O. No. 5994-P.3/2002.24 dated 09.12.2002, Government be informed that without any award by the arbitrator, making of payment would not be proper. After such decision, all the Government Orders issued by the Government in this context and reports of both Five members and Four members committee becomes redundant. Therefore, reliance of the appellant on the reports of the committee and government orders, is wholly misconceived. 22. Initially, we have mentioned that this case has a long history of litigation and as such before proceeding any further, it would be apt to clarify here that there was several rounds of litigation which took place between the parties even after matter was referred to the Arbitrator. Short summary of the cases filed by both the parties against each other, is as follows:- 1. Civil Judge, Senior Division, Rae Bareli passed an order on 18.3.1996 whereby Arbitrator Sri R.D. Maheshwari was removed. 2. Civil Judge, Senior Division passed the order dated 30.3.1996, appointing Mr. R.K. Rai as new Arbitrator. 3. UPSEB preferred Civil Revision No. 44 of 1996 against the order of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, which was dismissed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 10.7.2003 rendering the revision infructuous. 4. Hon’ble Apex Court by order dated 19.1.2004 declined to interfere in the SLP filed by the UPPCL erstwhile UPSEB against the appellant and upheld the appointment of Sri S.K. Rai as Arbitrator and also directed the Arbitrator to proceed with the matter. 5. 4. Hon’ble Apex Court by order dated 19.1.2004 declined to interfere in the SLP filed by the UPPCL erstwhile UPSEB against the appellant and upheld the appointment of Sri S.K. Rai as Arbitrator and also directed the Arbitrator to proceed with the matter. 5. Arbitrator Sri S.K. Rai passed an interim award dated 24.2.2004 which was confirmed by Civil Judge, Senior Division, Rae Bareli by its order dated 28.8.2004. 6. A civil revision was preferred against this order by UPSEB, which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 18.7.2008 passed in Civil Revision No. 155 of 2004. 7. As already narrated above, two orders were also passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter with specific directions and by the final order of the Apex Court, Justice D.K. Trivedi [since retired] was appointed as Arbitrator who finally gave the award. 23. At this juncture, it would be useful to mention that for the purposes of disposal of the instant appeal, orders passed by the Apex Court are relevant and for convenience, same have been reproduced herein above. 24. As regard the assertion of the appellant with regard to passing of the Award beyond purview of contract is not tenable as appellant himself agreed to a lower rate from Rs. 25/-to Rs. 15/-and on the basis of agreement reached between the parties, contract was modified second time in the year 1984 and the Arbitrator has passed its award on the basis of this modification, so it cannot be said that Award has been passed beyond the terms of contract. Although the second modification, which was done on 18.1.1984, appellant agreed to receive the payment @ Rs.15/-for the supply of 80,000 insulators that was made in between February 1982 to May 1982 but the Arbitrator did not consider it proper and found that rate cannot be reduced retrospectively and accordingly granted the rate @ Rs. 25/-for the 80,000 insulators which were delivered in between February 1982 to May 1982. It may be noted that the Arbitrator was considerate enough and has taken into consideration all the aspects of the matter and has conclusively observed that it cannot be accepted that rates were reduced under the pressure of the respondent. Although, it was the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that 80,000 insulators which were supplied in between February 1982 to May 1982, should have been @ Rs. Although, it was the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that 80,000 insulators which were supplied in between February 1982 to May 1982, should have been @ Rs. 15/-and after supply of these insulators, payment has also been received by the appellants and they are not entitled @ Rs. 25/-as has been agreed originally but the learned Arbitrator did not accept the contention of the respondent and has given award in favour of appellant as far as the supply relates from February 1982 to May, 1982 is concerned. No doubt far and far rates agreement was reached between the parties for supply of insulators @ Rs. 25/-but in case any modification has taken place with the agreement of the parties and contract has been amended accordingly, then it cannot be said that on the basis of original contract far and far rates payment should be made and payment ought to be made @ Rs. 25/-and not @ Rs. 15/-. Learned arbitrator has vividly considered all these points and has also considered the result in reduction of rate from Rs. 25/-to Rs. 25/-. In these circumstances, the finding of the Arbitrator is as per terms of the contract and same cannot be said to be perverse and it is wrong to say to term that the Arbitrator has mis-conducted himself. Therefore, the case laws, namely, in the cases of Food Corporation of India Vs. Chandu Construction reported in 2007 (4) SCC Pg. 697; Sharma and Associates Contractors Private Limited Vs. Progressive Constructions Limited reported in 2017 (5) SCC 743 ; Ramnath International Construction (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India reported in 2007(2) SCC 453; Sathyanarayana Brothers (P) Ltd. Vs. T.N. Water Supply & Drainage Board reported in 2004 (5) SCC 314 ; K.P. Poulose Vs. State of Kerala and another reported in 1975 (2) SCC 236 and Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. Annapurna Construction reported in 2003 (8) SCC 154 , are not applicable in the present case. 25. A perusal of the record shows that the Arbitrator has passed its award on the basis of a balance-sheet submitted by the respondent which has not been signed by any Officer of the respondent and as per own admission of the respondent this Balance-sheet was not totally correct as some of the supplies were made to the places which now belongs to State of Uttarakhand. Learned Arbitrator has specifically observed that this paper has not been disputed by the appellant and no other Balance-sheet has been provided by the appellant to controvert this paper. It has been submitted by the appellant before the arbitrator that all the papers and Balance-sheet had been burnt by the employee of BIFR. Even before this Court, appellant has utterly failed to place any paper or Balance-sheet, which can controvert the Balance-sheet filed by the respondent before the Arbitrator. In our view, Arbitrator was very much in his competence to accept any paper which is reliable and there is no other document to controvert the same. In such an eventuality, if the Arbitrator has based his decision upon a Balance-sheet that was provided by the respondent and no ambiguity has been shown from the side of appellant and no other evidence has been produced to controvert, it is incorrect to say that the Arbitrator has fell into an error. Even otherwise, this Balance-sheet has not been disputed by the appellant before the Arbitrator and as such it cannot be questioned. Although few papers were filed by the appellant before the Arbitrator alongwith Balance-sheet till 1991 but these papers were not found reliable by the Arbitrator and the reason given for not relying on these papers are also cogent and same cannot be doubted. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the learned Arbitrator overlooked the material evidence before it and relied upon a paper, which was not proved. For this reason, this Court is of the view that contention as raised by the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the reliance of the Arbitrator upon a balance-sheet provided by the respondent, is not acceptable and same is hereby rejected. 26. As much emphasis has been laid by the appellant on the reports of two Committees, referred to above, we have gone through these reports and we are unable to agree with the assertion of the learned Counsel for the appellant that any amount or claim has been accepted by the committees. 26. As much emphasis has been laid by the appellant on the reports of two Committees, referred to above, we have gone through these reports and we are unable to agree with the assertion of the learned Counsel for the appellant that any amount or claim has been accepted by the committees. Five members committee report dated 11.12.2000 has only considered the claim of the appellant but in the end, it has been specifically observed by the committee that before taking final decision in the matter, lasting effect of the decision is also to be taken into consideration whereas four members Directors’ committee of UPPCL in its report dated 10.7.2001 has reached to the conclusion that Five Member Committee has not even ascertained any amount for out of court settlement but instead of that four member committee observed that in view of opinion of Legal Remembrancer of the State Government, a decision can be taken for payment of Rs. 37.448 Lacs which is the difference of rates alongwith interest. After perusal of the report of these committees, it is wrong to say that any inference has been drawn by the Committees or any decision has been taken by these Committees for making the payments rather it has been said that out of court settlement be considered. 27. Moreover, after perusal of report of two committees, it cannot be said that there was any settlement between the parties and at any point of time UPPCL agreed to make such payments. As in the meeting dated 29.4.2003, the Board of Directors did not accept these reports and also did not accede to the request of Government and resolved that it would not be proper to make payments without the decision of the Arbitrator and as such at present it is not feasible to make payment. After the aforesaid decision of the Directors, in our opinion, reports of committees become redundant and have no value. Therefore, if the learned Arbitrator did not consider these reports, although reference of these reports has been made in the Award, same cannot be said to be misconduct by any stretch of imagination. As per direction of the the Apex Court dated 5.12.2008, the learned Arbitrator was free to apply his own independent mind and was not to be guided either by any order passed by this Court or of the previous Arbitrators. As per direction of the the Apex Court dated 5.12.2008, the learned Arbitrator was free to apply his own independent mind and was not to be guided either by any order passed by this Court or of the previous Arbitrators. It may be clarified that perhaps reliance upon reports was also placed pursuant to the order of this Court passed in Civil Revision No. 44/1996, which later on was rendered infructuous in view of the issuance of subsequent government order. However, after Apex Court’s order dated 5.12.2008, the learned Arbitrator was free to consider the evidence produced before it and certainly he was not bound by any report of the Committee. Had these committee reports were considered, then Arbitrator might have been influenced by them and could not have taken decision on the basis of evidence that is produced before the Arbitrator. In these circumstances, the position would have been different if there was some conclusive determination and decisions were taken by the said Committees. Even, the Board of Directors resolved in its XXIX meeting dated 29.4.2003 that it would not be proper to make payment without there being any decision of the Arbitrator. 28. Before considering the interest part, we would like to observe that the respondent-Corporation has accepted the Award and his assertion that petition under Section 30/33 of the Act was not maintainable and the appellant would have approached under Section 15 of the Act, is wholly misconceived and unacceptable. Section 15 of the Act reads as follows: “15. Power of Court to modify award. The Court may by order modify or correct an award- (a) where it appears that a part of, the award is upon a matter not referred to arbitration and such part can be separated from the other part and does not affect the decision on the matter referred; or (b) where the award is imperfect in form, or contains any obvious error which can be amended without affecting such decision; or (c) where the award contains a clerical mistake or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission.” 29. Learned Counsel for the respondent has placed its reliance on Sub-Section (a) of Section 15 and has argued that appellant ought to have moved before the Trial court under Section 15 of the Act for modifying the award as some part of the award is acceptable to the appellant. Learned Counsel for the respondent has placed its reliance on Sub-Section (a) of Section 15 and has argued that appellant ought to have moved before the Trial court under Section 15 of the Act for modifying the award as some part of the award is acceptable to the appellant. The said suggestion of the respondent has no force in law as even if, certain part of award is acceptable to a party then for setting aside of the other part with which he is aggrieved, then he has remedy only under Section 30/33 of the Act and not under Section 15 of the Act. The bare reading of the provision says that where a part of award is upon a matter not referred to arbitration and if such part can be separated from the other part without affecting the decision on the matter referred then award can be modified. In the present case, Award has been passed only in relation to the matter referred to the arbitrator and the Arbitrator has not passed any award, which was not referred to it. 30. It may be clarified here that the present Appeal has been filed for setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 27.11.2014 and the second prayer is for modification of the award. These reliefs could not have been asked for under-Section 15 of the Act rather application preferred under Section 30/33 before the trial court concerned was rightly preferred and if, certain part of award has been accepted by the appellant then appellant was well within its right to get the award modified so far as it relates to the part which is not acceptable to him, which, of course, can only be done under Section 30 of Act as relief relates to a matter referred to the Arbitrator and not for the matter, which has been not refereed, as envisaged under Section 15 of the Act. 31. During the course of arguments, it has also been contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that a new plea cannot be taken by the appellant at the appellate stage for modification of the Award and to substantiate his assertion reliance has been placed on Siddu Venkappa Devadiga Vs. Smt. Rangu S. Devadiga and others reported in AIR 1977 SC 890 (Para 8, Smt. Chander Kali Bail and others Vs. Smt. Rangu S. Devadiga and others reported in AIR 1977 SC 890 (Para 8, Smt. Chander Kali Bail and others Vs. Jagdish Singh Takhur and another reported in AIR 1977 SC 2262 (Para 6), Chevalier I.I. Iyyappan and another Vs. The Dharmodayan Co., Trichur reported in AIR 1966 SC 1017 (Para 8), T.A. Krishnaswamy Vs. State of Madras reported in AIR 1966 SC 1022 (Para 4). 32. In our considered view, the aforesaid cases are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as the appellant has not modified the relief clause before this Court rather there is a change of language in the prayer clause. Before the Trial court, it was urged by the appellant that some part of the Award is correct whereas relief was asked on the basis of claim not accepted by the learned Arbitrator. In the present appeal too, the appellant has firstly prayed for setting-aside the award dated 27.11.2014 but in essence from the very beginning it was the stand of the appellant that some part of the award is acceptable to it. So, the appellant has not taken a new stand in appeal as such contention of the learned counsel is not good enough to be accepted. 33. Contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that during the proceeding before the Trial court, the appellant has accepted the awarded amount, accordingly, they are not entitled to question challenge the correctness of the award. This contention of the learned counsel is not tenable for the reason that it was the respondent, who willingly moved an application for deposition of awarded amount before the Trial court and only thereafter appellant accepted the awarded amount with reservation that it will not affect its right of challenge. 34. To clarify it further, it would be relevant to mention that an application dated 31.10.2013 was moved by the respondent before the Civil Judge, Senior Division for permitting them to deposit the awarded amount. Thereafter an application dated 10.1.2014 in this context was also moved by the appellant that UPPCL may be directed to deposit the amount by Cheque/DD, which is acceptable to them with the condition it would not prejudice its legal rights and without surrendering any claim made in the case. 35. Thereafter an application dated 10.1.2014 in this context was also moved by the appellant that UPPCL may be directed to deposit the amount by Cheque/DD, which is acceptable to them with the condition it would not prejudice its legal rights and without surrendering any claim made in the case. 35. Needless to mention here that the amount deposited through cheque was accepted by Sri Ashok Kumar Bhargava, Managing Director of the Company on 7.2.2014 and an endorsement was made by the recipient on the letter of Power Corporation dated 6.2.2014 that it is being received under protest without prejudice to their legal claims and without surrendering any claim made in the Misc. Case No. 222 of 2012, pending before the Civil Judge, Senior Judge, Rae-Bareli.For this reason, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is not acceptable and is accordingly rejected. 36. After the above discussions, now the question remains regarding the interest which has been awarded by the Arbitrator. A perusal of the award shows that the interest has been awarded by the Arbitrator from the date of its appointment by the Apex Court, which in our view is wholly unjust and erroneous and that is an error apparent on the face of record. In the case at hand, interest has been awarded from 1.8.2011 whereas the dispute for the first time was referred way back in the year 1991 whereas as per award, supplies that were made relates to February 1982 to May 1982. Payment was made @ Rs. 15/-instead of Rs. 25/-. The primary contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that deprivation of the amount relates back to the year 1982 and accordingly from the date of deprivation, interest ought to have been given. 37. We find force in the above contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. It may be clarified here that the appellant has shown their readiness to accept the interest from 1.7.1982. From the observations made by the Arbitrator, it can be gathered that payment was made immediately after the supply of insulators, not delayed by more than two-three months except for one case, where delay is of nine months. Accordingly, this Court is agreeable to the said date i.e. 1.7.1982, from which interest is being claimed and comes to the conclusion that interest ought to have been awarded from 1.7.1982 rather from 1.8.2011. 38. Accordingly, this Court is agreeable to the said date i.e. 1.7.1982, from which interest is being claimed and comes to the conclusion that interest ought to have been awarded from 1.7.1982 rather from 1.8.2011. 38. The next contention of learned counsel for the respondent that the learned Arbitrator was having no jurisdiction to award interest either prior to reference or during the pendency of the arbitral proceeding as well as future interest from the date of award till its realization is also not acceptable as the controversy in this context has already been set at rest by the Apex Court in the case of Executive Engineer Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division, Orissa and others Vs. N.C. Budharaj (deceased) by LRs. And others reported in (2001) 2 SCC 721 . In this case, two judgments, on the question of the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to grant interest for the period prior to the reference were referred to the Larger Bench, which removed all the doubts in this regard and held that under Section 29 of the Act, the Arbitrator is competent enough to give pre-reference interest, pendente-lite interest as well as interest from the date of award till its realization. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:- “The submission that the Arbitrator cannot have jurisdiction to award interest for the period prior to the date of his appointment or entering into reference which alone confers him power is too stale and technical to be countenanced in our hands, for the simple reason that in every case the appointment of an Arbitrator or even resort to Court to vindicate rights could be only after disputes have cropped up between the parties and continue to subsist unresolved and that if the Arbitrator has the power to deal with and decide disputes which cropped up at a point of time and for the period prior to the appointment of an Arbitrator, it is beyond comprehension as to why and for what reason and with what justification the Arbitrator should be denied only the power to award interest for the pre-reference period when such interest becomes payable and has to be awarded as an accessory or incidental to the sum awarded as due and payable, taking into account the deprivation of the use of such sum to the person lawfully entitled to the same. For all the reasons stated above, we answer the reference by holding that the Arbitrator appointed with or without the intervention of the court, has jurisdiction to award interest, on the sums found due and payable, for the pre-reference period, in the absence of any specific stipulation or prohibition in the contract to claim or grant any such interest. 39. In the instant case, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that rate of interest that was given by Arbitrator is without any basis and it ought to be @18% per annum with quarterly interest. The learned Counsel also submitted that the appellant-company was small scale industry and was covered by MSME Act 2006 and papers in this regard were also submitted before the learned Arbitrator, who failed to given any reason for not accepting the interest @ 18% rather without assigning any reason has awarded 12% interest. 40. From the facts, it can be inferred that dispute was going on between the parties since 1981 from the very inception of the factory as well as agreement between the parties. The dispute was finally referred to Arbitrator in the year 1991 and several round of litigation took place between the parties and ultimately, the learned Arbitrator could give his award only in the year 2012. In our considered opinion, the learned Arbitrator was well within its right to decide rate of interest after taking into consideration all the facts regarding the dispute and span of the dispute. An Arbitrator is not required to give a detailed reason for awarding rate of interest. It has been specifically observed by the learned Arbitrator that appellant company was also responsible for not providing the insulators within stipulated time and by the first amendment in the agreement, which was done in the year 1981, benefit was extended to the appellant company as it was very much in favour of the appellant. It is also not disputed that even after amendment in the agreement in the year 1984, supplies were made by the company prior to 1984 @ Rs. 15/-and payment was also accepted by the company. The company has also approached several times to the Government and it can very well be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, that from the side of Government pressure was being exerted to get the matter compromised in favour of the appellant. 41. 15/-and payment was also accepted by the company. The company has also approached several times to the Government and it can very well be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, that from the side of Government pressure was being exerted to get the matter compromised in favour of the appellant. 41. In the above scenario, if interest @ 18% has not been awarded by the learned Arbitrator, then it cannot be said to be perverse or unjustified and if the learned Arbitrator has not given reason for awarding 12% interest, same cannot be termed as misconduct. It appears that the learned Arbitrator might have considered that the Award was being made in the year 2012 whereas dispute has arisen in the year 1981 and the duration taken for resolving the dispute may have also weighed in the mind of the Arbitrator. 42. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that rate of interest i.e. @12% awarded by the learned Arbitrator does not deserve to be interfered and the appellant is only entitled to receive interest from the date of deprivation, as referred above, and that will be @ 12%. Consequently, the instant appeal is allowed in part so far as it relates to payment of interest and as far as relief sought for quashing of the award is concerned, it is refused as we find no infirmity or illegality in the impugned Award. However, date of interest that has been fixed by the learned Arbitrator i.e. from the date of his appointment, is hereby modified and it is ordered that interest will be paid from the date of deprivation i.e. 1.7.1982. The respondents are directed to calculate the interest and pay the same amount within a period of two months’ from today failing which appellant would be entitled for 9% additional interest on the amount so calculated. Parties to bear their own costs.