Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. Their Workmen being represented by the Organizing Secretary
2018-09-27
AMITAV K.GUPTA, D.N.PATEL
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the Original Petitioner, whose writ petition, being W.P.(L) No. 3185 of 2003, was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order, dated 24th June, 2010, whereby the award, dated 6th September, 2002, passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Reference No. 38 of 1991 was upheld and hence, the Original Petitioner has preferred the present appeal. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad, has passed the aforesaid order for regularisation of the employees, for whom Reference was made mainly on the ground that these employees have worked for 190 days and 215 days, except an employee at Serial No. 17, whose name is Jiondra Yadav. 2. Having heard counsels appearing for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that fire broke out in one of the coal mines of the appellant. Steps were to be taken by the appellant Management for prevention of fire in future also, for which they engaged a Contractor, viz. “Kankanee Shramik Sahyog Samity Ltd.” (Hereinafter to be referred to as “Contractor”). 3. The purpose of engaging this Contractor was for digging out earth, planting and watering of saplings and employees of this Contractor used to carry out such work. This Contractor was engaged in the year 1987. 4. A Reference was made by the appropriate Government, under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for regularisation or otherwise of the employees of Contractor, being Reference No. 38 of 1991. 5. Evidences were led by both the parties, viz. Management as well as Workmen, and on the basis of evidences on record, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad has passed the aforesaid Award on 6th September, 2002 regularising the services of the employees, except the workman at Serial No. 17, whose name is Jiendra Yadav. 6. Being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by the Order dated 6th September, 2002, in Reference Case No. 38 of 1991, this appellant has preferred W.P.(L) No. 3185 of 2003, in which stay was granted on 9th July, 2003 against the operation, implementation and execution of the Award and later on, writ petition was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 24th June, 2010 and hence, Original Writ Petitioner has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 7.
7. Having heard counsels appearing for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that from the very beginning stand of this appellant-management, as is apparent from Paragraph Nos. 12, 15, 17 of the Written Statement (Annexure 1 to the memo of the Letters Patent Appeal), before the Central Government Industrial No.1, Dhanbad, was that the workers, for whom the Reference was made for regularisation, were employees of the Contractor. The contract was given for digging earth, planting and watering of plants. Evidence was also given by the Management Witnesses to this effect, especially by Management Witness No.1. There are also other documentary evidences on record, such as M-2 and M-2/1. 8. Looking to these evidences on record, it appears that the workers, for whom the Award for regularisation has been passed, were, in fact, the workers of the Contractor. 9. It further appears from the evidences on record that the Contractor was engaged because fire broke out in one of the coal mines of the appellant. Steps were to be taken by the appellant Management for prevention of fire in future also, for which they had engaged a Contractor. Workers of this Contractor were digging earth, planting and watering the saplings. These works have got nothing to do with the main work of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited. Nature of work appears to be purely adhoc in nature. Workers of the Contractor were never engaged for main and principal work of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited. It further appears from the evidences on record that the workers, who were employed by the Contractor, were doing the peripheral work and not the main work of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited. They have worked in one year for 190 days and in another year for 215 days. 10. These aspects of the matter have not been appreciated by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1 while deciding Reference No. 38 of 1991 nor by the learned Single Judge, while deciding W.P.(L) No. 3185 of 2003. Hence, the judgment and order dated 24th June, 2010 passed in W.P.(L) No. 3185 of 2003, deserve to be quashed and set aside. 11.
These aspects of the matter have not been appreciated by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1 while deciding Reference No. 38 of 1991 nor by the learned Single Judge, while deciding W.P.(L) No. 3185 of 2003. Hence, the judgment and order dated 24th June, 2010 passed in W.P.(L) No. 3185 of 2003, deserve to be quashed and set aside. 11. There is a conceptual error also committed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad, while passing Award dated 6th September, 2002 in Reference No. 38 of 1991 and also by the learned Single Judge while passing Judgment and Order dated 24th June, 2010 in W.P.(L) No. 3185 of 2003, to the effect that as few workers have worked for 240 days, they are entitled to regularisation. It would be pertinent to mention here that merely because workers have worked for more than 240 days, it does not mean that they are entitled for regularisation. This conceptual error committed by both Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad as well as by the learned Single Judge affects the very root of the case. There is no provision in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, that if any workman has worked for more than 240 days, automatically and mathematically, he becomes entitled for regularisation. Working for 240 days and regularisation has no causal connection at all. 12. Time and again the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided, in catena of decisions that a workman does not become entitled for regularisation merely because he has worked for 240 days. 13. It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 122, specially in Paragraph No.5 as under:- “5. We are unable to uphold the order of the High Court. There were no sanctioned posts in existence to which they could be said to have been appointed. The assignment was an ad hoc one which anticipatedly spent itself out. It is difficult to envisage for them the status of workmen on the analogy of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, importing the incidents of completion of 240 days’ work. The legal consequences that flow from work for that duration under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are entirely different from what, by way of implication, is attributed to the present situation by way of analogy.
The legal consequences that flow from work for that duration under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are entirely different from what, by way of implication, is attributed to the present situation by way of analogy. The completion of 240 days’ work does not, under that law import the right to regularisation. It merely imposes certain obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the service. It is not appropriate to import and apply that analogy, in an extended or enlarged form here.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava,, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 702 , specially in Paragraph No.17 as under:- “17. It is now well settled that only because a person had been working for more than 240 days, he does not derive any legal right to be regularised in service. (See Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra; Executive Engineer, ZP Engineering Divn. v. Digambara Rao; Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Bhola Singh; Manager, Reserve Bank of India v. S. Mani and Neeraj Awasthi.)” (Emphasis supplied) 15. It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. S.C. Pandey, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 716 , especially in Paragraph No.17 as under:- “17.
It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. S.C. Pandey, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 716 , especially in Paragraph No.17 as under:- “17. The question raised in this appeal is now covered by a decision of this Court in M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava wherein this Court clearly opined that: (1) when the conditions of service are governed by two statutes; one relating to selection and appointment and the other relating to the terms and conditions of service, an endeavour should be made to give effect to both of the statutes; (2) a daily-wager does not hold a post as he is not appointed in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and in that view of the matter he does not derive any legal right; (3) only because an employee had been working for more than 240 days that by itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service; (4) if an appointment has been made contrary to the provisions of the statute the same would be void and the effect thereof would be that no legal right was derived by the employee by reason thereof.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Post Master General, Kolkata v. Tutu Das (Dutta), reported in (2007) 5 SCC 317 , especially in Paragraph No.16 as under:- “16. The short order which was the subject-matter of decision of this Court in Debika Guha also stood overruled in Umadevi (3). We may at this stage also notice that the concept of 240 days to be the cut-off mark for the purpose of regularisation of services came up for consideration of this Court in Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra wherein it was clearly laid down that the completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year would be attracted only in a case where retrenchment has been effected without complying with the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, but would not be relevant for regularisation of service.” (Emphasis supplied) 17.
It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Dan Bahadur Singh, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 207 , especially in Paragraph No.18 as under:- “18. The next question which requires consideration is whether completion of 240 days in a year confers any right on an employee or workman to claim regularisation in service. In Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra it was held that the completion of 240 days’ work does not confer the right to regularisation under the Industrial Disputes Act. It merely imposes certain obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the services. In M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava (para 17) after referring to several earlier decisions it has been reiterated that it is well settled that only because a person had been working for more than 240 days, he does not derive any legal right to be regularised in service. This view has been reiterated in Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd. The same question has been examined in considerable detail with reference to an employee working in a government company in Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen and paras 34 and 35 of the Report are being reproduced below: (SCC p. 426) “34. Thus, it is well settled that there is no right vested in any daily wager to seek regularisation. Regularisation can only be done in accordance with the rules and not dehors the rules. In the case of E. Ramakrishnan v. State of Kerala this Court held that there can be no regularisation dehors the rules. The same view was taken in Kishore (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra and Union of India v. Bishamber Dutt. The direction issued by the Services Tribunal for regularising the services of persons who had not been appointed on regular basis in accordance with the rules was set aside although the petitioner had been working regularly for a long time. 35. In Surinder Singh Jamwal (Dr.) v. State of J&K it was held that ad hoc appointment does not give any right for regularisation as regularisation is governed by the statutory rules.”” (Emphasis supplied) 18. It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Shekhar Azad Krishi Evam Prodyogiki Vishwavidyalaya v. United Trades Congress, reported in (2008) 2 SCC 552 , especially in Paragraph No.12 as under:- “12.
It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Shekhar Azad Krishi Evam Prodyogiki Vishwavidyalaya v. United Trades Congress, reported in (2008) 2 SCC 552 , especially in Paragraph No.12 as under:- “12. A feeble attempt, however, was made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent 2 to state that he had been appointed against a permanent vacancy. In his written statement, he did not raise any such contention. It does not also appear from the records that any offer of appointment was given to him. It is inconceivable that an employee appointed on a regular basis would not be given an offer of appointment or shall not be placed on a scale of pay. We, therefore, have no hesitation in proceeding on the premise that Respondent 2 was appointed on daily wages. The Industrial Court in passing the impugned award proceeded on the premise that Respondent 2 had been working for more than 240 days continuously from the date of his engagement. It is now trite that the same by itself does not confer any right upon a workman to be regularised in service. Working for more than 240 days in a year was relevant only for the purpose of application of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 providing for conditions precedent to retrench the workmen. It does not speak of acquisition of a right by the workman to be regularised in service. 13. In Executive Engineer, ZP Engg. Divn. v. Digambara Rao it was held: (SCC p. 269, para 20) “20. It may not be out of place to mention that completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year may not by itself be a ground for directing an order of regularisation. It is also not the case of the respondents that they were appointed in accordance with the extant rules. No direction for regularisation of their services, therefore, could be issued.” (See also Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra and State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi.)” (Emphasis supplied) 19. It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttaranchal Forest Hospital Trust v. Dinesh Kumar, reported in (2008) 1 SCC 542 , especially in Paragraph Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 as under:- “6.
It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttaranchal Forest Hospital Trust v. Dinesh Kumar, reported in (2008) 1 SCC 542 , especially in Paragraph Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 as under:- “6. It is undisputed that the work of cleaning the hospital has been given to a contractor w.e.f. 17-8-1996. Materials were placed before the Labour Court to show that the workman was engaged for doing a part-time job and that he had worked for a few days in several months. The Labour Court itself on consideration of the documents and records produced noted as follows: “It is evident that the workman had worked in August 1996 — 16 days, July 1996 — 30 days, May 1996 — 30 days, April 1996 — 30 days, March 1996 — 29 days, February 1996 — 29 days, January 1996 — 31 days, December 1995 — 31 days, November 1995 — 20 days (full), October 1995 — 19 days (full), September 1995 — 25 days (full) @ Rs 35 per day. In addition to this, in November 1995 — 3 days, October 1995 — 9 days @ Rs 20 per day towards part-time work and in September 1995 — 3 days part-time @ Rs 5 per day, had worked.” 7. The basic difference between a person who is engaged on a part-time basis for one hour or few hours and one who is engaged as a daily wager on regular basis has not been kept in view either by the Labour Court or by the High Court. The documents filed clearly establish that the claim of having worked more than 240 days is clearly belied. 8. The stand of the appellant that the respondent was called for work whenever work was available, as and when required and that he was not called for doing any work when the same was not available has been established. The Labour Court itself noted that the workman was engaged in work by others as he was working in the appellants’ establishment for one hour or little more on some days. It is also seen from the documents produced before the Labour Court that whenever the respondent was working for full period of work he was being paid Rs 35 per day and on other days when he worked for one hour he was getting Rs 5. 9.
It is also seen from the documents produced before the Labour Court that whenever the respondent was working for full period of work he was being paid Rs 35 per day and on other days when he worked for one hour he was getting Rs 5. 9. In the aforesaid position, the inevitable conclusion is that the Labour Court and the High Court were not justified in directing the reinstatement with partial back wages.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. In view of the aforesaid decisions and looking to the paragraph No.5 of the award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad, a grave error, apparent on the face of record, has been committed to the effect that workers of Contractor has worked for 215 days and more than 190 days and therefore, they are entitled for regularisation. This is a wrong notion in the mind of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad, which runs counter to the principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as stated herein above, and hence Award dated 6th September, 2002 passed in Reference No. 38 of 1991 deserves to be quashed and set aside and as this aspect of the matter has also not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge, while deciding W.P.(L) No. 3185 of 2003, vide judgment and order dated 24th June, 2010, and therefore, the same also deserves to be quashed and set aside. 21. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad should have kept in mind that work for 240 days is not a magic bond by which a worker gets a right to be regularised. In fact regularisation can be done in accordance with law. There is bound to be a law, rules, regulations or policy decision of the employer for regularisation. There is no law under the Industrial Disputes Act, that those, who have worked for 240 days in a year, are entitled to regularisation. In the State of Jharkhand, we have come across such mistake committed by the Industrial Tribunals time and again. It is now high time for the Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts in the State of Jharkhand to carefully go through and follow the judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, few of which are quoted herein above. 22.
In the State of Jharkhand, we have come across such mistake committed by the Industrial Tribunals time and again. It is now high time for the Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts in the State of Jharkhand to carefully go through and follow the judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, few of which are quoted herein above. 22. It further appears from the facts of the case and evidences on record that the period, which is mentioned in Paragraph No. 5 of the Award in question, during which the workers of the Contractor has worked, runs from April, 1988 to December, 1988. Thus, from April to December, 1988, even if they had worked for 215 or 190 days, such type of workers of the Contractor cannot be regularised into the services of the principal employer. 23. Looking to the documents, viz. M-2, M-12/1, also, it appears that the concerned workers were workers engaged through Contractor and their work was to : (a) Dig out earth ; (b) plant saplings and (c ) watering the saplings They have nothing to do with the main work of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited. 24. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has argued at length about the recommendation of a Committee, as referred to in the award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad. This argument is of no help to the respondents because even if there is some recommendation, under the law, no order can be passed in favour of the workers for regularisation because they were workers of the Contractor and the Contractor was never engaged for the principal work of the employer. In the facts of the present case, even if there is a circular of the Management then also the workers are not entitled to be regularised. The Contractor was engaged only for peripheral work of this appellant and especially for a contingency which has arisen because fire broke out in the year 1987. Contractor was engaged for digging out earth for plantation and for watering the saplings and these workers had worked from April, 1988 to December, 1988, 215 days and 190 days as per Paragraph 5 of the award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad. Even if they had worked for 215 days or 190 days, they cannot be regularised in the services of the principal employer.
Even if they had worked for 215 days or 190 days, they cannot be regularised in the services of the principal employer. Regularisation and working for 240 days has no causal connection at all. 25. Working of 240 days has been mentioned in Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for calculation of the continuous service rendered by the workers. The concept of continuous service is altogether different. Unnecessarily, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1 as well as the learned Single Judge makes the concept of the continuous service as the sine-qua-non for regularisation. As stated herein above in the judgments delivered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, if any worker has worked for more than 240 days that does not mean that his services should be regularised. 26. This aspect of the matter has neither been properly appreciated by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad, while deciding Reference No. 38 of 1991 vide Award dated 6th September, 2002, nor by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P.(L) No. 3185 of 2003 vide Judgment and Order dated 24th June, 2010 and hence, we, hereby, quash and set aside the Award, dated 6th September, 2002, passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Reference No. 38 of 1991 as well as the judgment, dated 24th June, 2010, delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) No. 3185 of 2003. 27. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and disposed of. 28. Copy of this judgment and order will be sent by the Registrar of this Court to – (i) All the Presiding Officers of Industrial Tribunals, in the State of Jharkhand (ii) All the Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts, in the State of Jharkhand (iii) Director, Judicial Academy of the State of Jharkhand (iv) Labour Commissioner of the State of Jharkhand.