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2018 DIGILAW 2146 (RAJ)

Mangi Lal v. State of Rajasthan

2018-10-26

NIRMALJIT KAUR, VINIT KUMAR MATHUR

body2018
JUDGMENT : Vinit Kumar Mathur, J. The present criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellants against the judgment and order of conviction dated 05.03.2013, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No.4, Bikaner in Sessions Case No.25-A/2012 (22/2010) whereby the accused-appellants have been convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default thereof to further undergo one month's simple imprisonment. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on the basis of a Parcha Bayan of deceased Leela on 26.10.2009 an FIR was registered. In the said Parcha Bayan Kumari Leela disclosed that from her childhood she is staying with her Mama and Mami (maternal uncle and aunt). Her parents are no more in this world. She has studied upto 8th standard. The inhabitants of her mohalla namely Mohni Devi, Mangi Lal, Jetha Ram and Kishna Ram had complained on 20.10.2009 that she has spoiled the kids of Mohni Devi and had a quarrel with her on that day. On 23.10.2009 at around 4:30-5:00 PM, Mohni Devi, Mangi Lal, Jetha Ram and Kishna Ram after scaling the wall came to her house and Mangi Lal poured kerosene on her body and Mohni Devi ignited fire with matchstick. When her body was in flames, she tried to extinguish the fire by throwing herself on the ground. While she was crying, her Nani (grandmother) and the neighbour Tilaram besides other persons came on the spot and tried to extinguish the fire. She further stated that her Mama and Mami (maternal uncle and aunt) were at their work place and were informed on telephone. She was taken to Nokha Hospital in the Taxi by Poornanand Maharaj where after giving first aid she was referred to the PBM Hospital, Bikaner. While she was taken to the Bikaner her Mama and Mami also came there and she informed them that she was burnt by pouring kerosene on her body by Mohni Devi and Others. On the basis of aforesaid Parcha Bayan (Ex.P-1), a formal FIR bearing No.370/2009 was registered against the accused persons for the offences under Sections 307 & 452/34 IPC. During the treatment, Leela expired. 3. After completion of investigation police filed a charge-sheet for the offences under Sections 306 IPC only against the two accused persons i.e. Mohni Devi and Mangi Lal. 4. During the treatment, Leela expired. 3. After completion of investigation police filed a charge-sheet for the offences under Sections 306 IPC only against the two accused persons i.e. Mohni Devi and Mangi Lal. 4. Learned Trial Court after hearing learned counsel for the parties framed the charge against the accused-appellants for the offences under Sections 302 IPC vide order dated 04.08.2010 and the same was read over and explained to them but they denied the charge and sought for trial in the matter. 5. The framing of charge for the offence under Section 302 IPC by the learned trial Court was not challenged by the accused-appellants. Thus, the appellants were tried for the offence under Section 302 IPC. 6. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and 14 documents were exhibited. 7. The accused-appellant Mangi Lal was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and he was confronted with the evidence adduced during the course of trial to which he denied and stated that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case and stated that he had a relationship with Leela. Leela had illicit relations with a number of persons of the village. She was a person with loose character. For this reason his mother had threatened Leela which resulted in frustration and thus, she burnt herself. 8. Accused Mohni was also examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and she was confronted with the evidence adduced during the course of trial to which she denied and stated that she is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case and stated that Leela had illicit relationship with her son Mangi Lal. She has spoiled her son. She had complained to Leela for her conduct and for this reason she got annoyed and burnt herself. 9. Learned trial Court after hearing the arguments from both the sides, taking into consideration the statements of witnesses and after going through the same, convicted and sentenced the accused-appellants vide judgment dated 05.03.2013. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Public Prosecutor and perused the record. 11. 9. Learned trial Court after hearing the arguments from both the sides, taking into consideration the statements of witnesses and after going through the same, convicted and sentenced the accused-appellants vide judgment dated 05.03.2013. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Public Prosecutor and perused the record. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that out of four persons named in the dying declaration, police has not filed challan against Jetha Ram and Kishna Ram and only two persons namely Mangi Lal and Mohni Devi were charge-sheeted for the offence under Section 306 IPC. He has further stated that from a bare perusal of the dying declaration and the statements of prosecution witnesses particularly Ram Pal (PW-2), Basanti (PW3), Bhanwari Devi (PW-8) and Poornanand (PW-9), it reveals that allegations are against four persons having identical roles attributed to them but the police found the allegations to be incorrect against two persons namely Jetha Ram and Kishna Ram and thus filed charge-sheet for the offence under Section 306 IPC only against the appellants Mohni Devi and Mangi Lal. There is no reason that despite all the four persons named and assigned similar roles two have been left out which creates a doubt in the entire prosecution story. He has further submitted that for the same set of evidence, two persons have not been proceeded and the charge for the offence under Section 302 IPC against only two persons have been framed. This shakes the credibility of the prosecution story. 12. He further submits that it has come in the investigation that walls of the house of deceased were quite high and scaling the same by the accused persons is not possible. The Investigating Officer has also found that there are no signs of the wall of the house of the deceased had been scaled and as per the site plan also, possibility of scaling the wall of the deceased is ruled out. 13. Learned counsel argues that as per the statement of Investigating Officer, three persons who are the neighbours who reached on the spot when the deceased was burnt were not disclosed the names of the accused persons by deceased Leela and Poornanand Maharaj was disclosed the names by the deceased after reaching the hospital. This shows that accused persons have been implicated in the present case after a thoughtful consideration by Leela. This shows that accused persons have been implicated in the present case after a thoughtful consideration by Leela. 14. Learned counsel took us to the entire testimony of witnesses and submitted that there is considerable improvement in the statements of these witnesses and more particularly since PW-1 Chunni and PW-2 Rampal and PW-8 Bhanwari Devi are very close relatives of the deceased, their testimonies cannot be relied upon as they are the interested witnesses in the present incident. 15. He further submitted that since there is no eye-witness in the present case and the dying declaration is recorded after a period of three days, the same is not worth reliance. The incident took place on 23.10.2009 and as per the statement of PW-9 Poornanand and PW-8 Bhanwari Devi, the deceased was talking to them. There was no reason why the dying declaration was recorded on 26.10.2009 after a delay of three days. He further submitted that immediately after reaching the hospital, she was in the company of her Mama Rampal (PW-2) and Mami Bhanwari Devi (PW-8), the possibility of tutoring and prompting cannot be ruled out. It is also a fact that the relationship between the deceased and the accused party were quite inimical and the accused persons were keeping a grudge against the deceased Leela. It has also come in the Parcha Bayan (dying declaration) of the deceased that on 20.10.2009 i.e. three days prior to the incident the accused persons had complained and protested against the behaviour of the deceased Leela and in the process, the neck of the deceased was throttled, causing difficulty to the deceased in swallowing. Therefore, the learned counsel submits that the dying declaration in the present case is not worth credence. Not only this, he further submits that dying declaration is not corroborated by any evidence worth credence in the present case. Therefore, the learned trial Court was not right in convicting the appellants for the offence under Section 302 IPC. 16. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor while supporting the judgment and order of conviction vehemently argued that in view of the dying declaration made by deceased Leela, the prosecution had been able to prove the charges levelled against the accused-appellants beyond all reasonable doubts. 16. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor while supporting the judgment and order of conviction vehemently argued that in view of the dying declaration made by deceased Leela, the prosecution had been able to prove the charges levelled against the accused-appellants beyond all reasonable doubts. He has further submitted that the statements of PW-1 Chunni, PW-2 Rampal, PW-3 Basanti, PW-8 Bhanwari Devi and PW-9 Poornanand, it is clear that the accused persons have been named as the deceased told them that she was burnt by the accused persons after pouring kerosene on her. He has further submitted that there is no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration as the same was recorded by PW-12 Satpal Verma, Civil Judge (Jr. Division) & Judicial Magistrate, Bikaner after taking the certificate of fitness from the Doctor on duty. He further submitted that in the dying declaration deceased Leela has categorically named the accused persons which leaves no room of doubt in the present case. 17. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that as per the postmortem report of the deceased and the statement of Doctor, the cause of death is also burning, therefore, the prosecution had been able to complete the chain of events successfully indicting the accused persons guilty of the charge levelled against them. The corroboration of ocular evidence with the dying declaration and the postmortem report clearly clinches the issue that the accused persons are the only persons who have committed the offence and have thus rightly been convicted by the learned trial Court. Therefore, no interference in the judgment dated 05.03.2013 is warranted in the present case. 18. In order to minutely examine the witnesses, we note that in the statement of PW-1 Chunni, she has stated that deceased was her grand-daughter and while she was sitting in the courtyard, Mangi Lal, Jetha Ram, Kishna Ram and Mohni Devi after scaling their boundary wall came to their house and poured kerosene on Leela and thereafter she was burnt. She was taken to Nokha Hospital. 19. In the cross-examination, this witness has stated that she had not seen Mangi Lal, Jetha Ram, Kishna Ram and Mohni Devi as she was drying the cow dungs in the backyard. She stated that she reached the spot after hearing the crying of the deceased Leela and when she reached the spot, there was nobody except Leela. 20. 19. In the cross-examination, this witness has stated that she had not seen Mangi Lal, Jetha Ram, Kishna Ram and Mohni Devi as she was drying the cow dungs in the backyard. She stated that she reached the spot after hearing the crying of the deceased Leela and when she reached the spot, there was nobody except Leela. 20. Pw-2 Rampal has deposed that the deceased was his niece. She studied till 8th standard. He and his wife went for work at around 9:00 AM. At around 5:00 PM, he was informed on telephone that Leela has been burnt by Mangi Lal, Jetha Ram, Mohni Devi and Kishna Ram. She was taken to Nokha Hospital by Poornanand Maharaj in the taxi. Leela told her that Mangi Lal, Mohni Devi, Jetha Ram and Kishna Ram has burnt her. From Nokha Hospital, she was referred to PBM Hospital, Bikaner. 21. Pw-3 Basanti has stated that when she went to Leela's house she was lying in a burnt condition and on asking, she stated that she has been burnt by Mohni Devi, Mangi Lal, Jetha Ram and Kishna Ram. Thereafter she could not muster courage to ask any further details and she went back to her house. 22. Pw-4 Tila Ram stated that at around 5:00 PM while he was going for milking his buffalo, the grandmother of the deceased was crying and when he reached the spot, he saw that Leela was in flames and he then tried to extinguish the fire by sand and there was nobody else present on the spot. 23. Pw-5 Sahi Ram, PW-6 Sugan Singh and PW-7 Gawara Devi who are neighbours of the deceased Leela have not supported the prosecution story, therefore, have been declared hostile. 24. Pw-8 Bhanwri Devi has stated that she was called at home by calling her on telephone. She went to Govt. Hospital along with her husband from where they went to Bikaner. Leela informed her that she was burnt by Mohni Devi, Jetha Ram and Kishna Ram and one more person whose name she does not remember. Leela was admitted in the Bikaner Hospital where she was in good condition for three days and thereafter she was talking irrational and ultimately during the course of treatment she died. 25. In the cross-examination, this witness has stated that her mother-in-law Chunni Devi (PW-1) is deaf. Leela was admitted in the Bikaner Hospital where she was in good condition for three days and thereafter she was talking irrational and ultimately during the course of treatment she died. 25. In the cross-examination, this witness has stated that her mother-in-law Chunni Devi (PW-1) is deaf. The accused persons had fight with the deceased Leela, 2-3 days prior to the incident and Leela was beaten. What was the reason for giving beatings is not known to her. She is also not aware that Leela was of loose character. 26. Pw-9 Poornanand has stated that while Leela was being taken to the Hospital, she told him that Jetha Ram, Mangi Lal, Mohni Devi and Kishna Ram had burnt her. She was admitted to Nokha Hospital where in the presence of the Doctor also she gave the same statement. She was referred to Bikaner. 27. Pw-11 Doctor Sanjeev Buri who has conducted the autopsy of the deceased Leela has submitted that the cause of death is septicemia shock due to burn injuries sustained by Smt. Leela which were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 28. Pw-12 Satpal Verma was working as Civil Judge (Jr. Division) & Judicial Magistrate, Bikaner who had recorded the statement (dying declaration) of deceased Leela on 26.10.2009. He stated that he had gone to the Burn Unit of PBM Hospital, Bikaner and after taking the certificate from duty Doctor with respect to fitness of Leela, he recorded her statement and same is under his signatures. 29. Ex.P-11 is the dying declaration which was recorded on 26.10.2009 at around 1:35 PM. 30. Ex.P-9 is the postmortem report wherein the cause of death is shown as septicemia shock due to burn injury sustained ante mortem, sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. 31. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submission made at bar and minutely gone through the record of the case. 32. A bare reading of the dying declaration (Ex.P-11), statements of PW-1 Chunni, PW-2 Rampal, PW-3 Basanti, PW-8 Bhanwari Devi and PW-9 Poornanand shows that four persons namely Mangi Lal, Mohni Devi, Jetha Ram and Kishna Ram have been named and the burn injury have been attributed to them. It is a fact that there is no eye-witness to the incident and whatever the prosecution witnesses have deposed, it is the information divulged by deceased Leela. It is a fact that there is no eye-witness to the incident and whatever the prosecution witnesses have deposed, it is the information divulged by deceased Leela. It also emerges from the facts that the incident took place on 23.10.2009. We also note that Leela was talking normally with all the above said prosecution witnesses as she has disclosed the names of accused persons to the above said witnesses. It has also come on record that there was animosity between the accused persons and the deceased. The accused Mangi Lal and deceased were also having a relationship which was not liked by the mother of Mangi Lal i.e. Mohni Devi. On 20.10.2009 also there was a heated altercation between the deceased Leela and accused persons, Leela had received injuries in the neck and due to strangulation of her neck, she was feeling difficulty in taking the food. 33. The independent witnesses residing in the neighbourhood of the deceased have not supported the case of the prosecution and thus, have been declared hostile. In the circumstances, the dying declaration of deceased Leela is of significant importance and is required to be examined by us in order to reach the truth in the matter. In the dying declaration, the deceased has mentioned four names who have crossed the boundary wall, poured kerosene and lit the fire on the body of the deceased. 34. The fact that the relationship were strained between the accused persons and the deceased as noted by us in the preceding para coupled with the fact that immediately after the incident she was in the company of her Nani (grandmother), Mama and Mami (maternal uncle and aunt) and they were there through out till 26.10.2009. We fail to understand that when she was talking to these prosecution witnesses why the statement of Leela was not recorded immediately but there is no satisfactory explanation for not recording the statement of Leela for three days i.e. from 24.10.2009 to 26.10.2009. 35. We are gainfully benefited by the observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish Ambanna Bansode Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) AIR SC 1626, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: "12. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. 35. We are gainfully benefited by the observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish Ambanna Bansode Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) AIR SC 1626, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: "12. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction on the same without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 (SCC pp.480-81, paras 18-19) (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. [See: Munnu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104 ] (ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See: State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, (1985) 1 SCC 552 ) and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 SCC 211 )) (iii) The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See: K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618 ]) (iv) Where a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [See: Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P., (1974) 4 SCC 264 ] (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [See: Kake Singh v. State of M.P., (1981) Supp1 SCC 25] (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. [See: Ram Manorath v. State of U.P, (1981) 2 SCC 654 ] (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, (1980) Supp1 SCC 455] (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See: Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar, (1980) Supp1 SCC 769] (ix) Normally, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [See: Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P, (1988) Supp1 SCC 152] (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [See: State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan, (1989) 3 SCC 390 ] (xi) Where there are more than one statements in the nature of dying declaration, the one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of the dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See: Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700 ] 13. In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of the alleged dying declaration in the instant case has to be considered. Of course, if the plurality of the dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See: Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700 ] 13. In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of the alleged dying declaration in the instant case has to be considered. The dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must, like any other evidence, satisfy the court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (See Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P, (1993) Supp1 SCC 327)." 36. On the similar lines, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P., (2011) AIR SC 1562 held as under: "20. This now brings us to the submissions with regard to the dying declaration. Factually, it is to be noticed that the Tehsildar, who recorded the dying declaration appeared as PW-6, he has clearly stated that although no doctor was present in the hospital, he was informed by the pharmacist that Rishipal Singh was in a fit state to make a statement. He, thereafter, isolated the injured Rishipal Singh and recorded his statement. He further stated that he wrote down word by word what Rishipal Singh had stated. The contents of the statement were read to the injured who stated that he understood and accepted the same. Only thereafter, he put his thumb impression on the statement. It is undoubtedly true that the statement has not been recorded in the question and answer form. It is also correct that at the time when the statement was recorded Rishipal Singh was in a "serious condition". 21. This Court in Laxman case (supra) has enumerated the circumstances in which the dying declaration can be accepted. It is undoubtedly true that the statement has not been recorded in the question and answer form. It is also correct that at the time when the statement was recorded Rishipal Singh was in a "serious condition". 21. This Court in Laxman case (supra) has enumerated the circumstances in which the dying declaration can be accepted. We may notice here the observations made in the Paragraph 3, which are as under:- The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a Magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a Magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise." 37. In this background the dying declaration is examined by us and we are of the view that there was enough time for tutoring and falsely implicating the accused persons. 38. Looked at from another angle we also cannot loose sight of the fact that the incident which took place on 20.10.2009 at the hands of the accused persons was one of the factor which played as a role of catalyst and the possibility of the deceased having enroped the accused persons in such a situation cannot be ruled out. 39. Looked at from another angle we also cannot loose sight of the fact that the incident which took place on 20.10.2009 at the hands of the accused persons was one of the factor which played as a role of catalyst and the possibility of the deceased having enroped the accused persons in such a situation cannot be ruled out. 39. Pw-10 Shrawandas who is the Investigating Officer too has stated in his statement that while he was working as SHO, P.S. Nokha, he investigated the matter and during the course of investigation he has inspected the site, prepared the memos, took the statement of witnesses and after investigation, he found the role of accused Mangi Lal and Mohni Devi in commission of the offence under Section 306 IPC. Therefore, a charge-sheet for the offence under Section 306 IPC was filed against them. He stated that nobody can come in the house of deceased Leela by scaling the boundary wall. He has prepared the site plan, according to which there were no signs of anybody having come inside after jumping the wall. He further stated that three persons who reached the spot of incident were not told the names of the accused persons by deceased Leela. 40. In addition to the absence of satisfactory explanation for not recording the statement of Leela for three days, as per the statement of witnesses, two persons namely Jetha Ram and Kishna Ram have not been proceeded by police on the same set of evidence and only two persons have been chargesheeted. Further, the police has only found the case for the offence under Section 306 IPC and the presence of the accused persons on the spot itself is ruled out by the Investigating Officer. The dying declaration recorded after three days smacks of tutoring, prompting and implicating of the accused persons in the present set of facts and since the deceased was in the company of her close relatives, the same does not inspire confidence much less the same is not getting corroboration from other evidence. Hence, it will not be safe to convict the appellants on the basis of dying declaration. 41. Hence, it will not be safe to convict the appellants on the basis of dying declaration. 41. Since we have disbelieved the dying declaration of Leela, the statements of other prosecution witnesses also loose significance as they were made on the basis of whatever told about incident by Leela and there is no independent eye-witness of the incident making corroboration of dying declaration. 42. The false implication in the present case has also a nexus as Mangi Lal was having relationship with the deceased which was disliked by his family and, therefore, a protest and complaint was made to the deceased Leela by Mohni Devi, the mother of Mangi Lal. 43. Taking into consideration the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court and the discussion made herein above, the dying declaration (Ex.P-11) which is the basis of conviction in the present case by the learned trial Court, is in our opinion not a clinching evidence corroborated by other evidence to prove the charge for the offence under Section 302 IPC against the present appellants. There is no satisfactory explanation for not recording the statement of deceased for three days when she was talking to other prosecution witnesses, this gives room for maneuvering and tutoring. In the circumstances, the implication, improvisation and enroping the accused persons cannot be ruled out. The chain of events in the present circumstances is not complete which leads to the only conclusion that the accused-appellants are guilty of the offence alleged and none else. 44. The dying declaration (Ex.P-11) is not getting required corroboration from the other evidence to prove the offence alleged against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubts. The deceased Leela was scolded by Mohni Devi three days prior to the incident for spoiling her son and was called a lady of loose character making her upset, annoyed and frustrated, therefore, the possibility of having burnt herself in these circumstances cannot be ruled out. 45. Hence, the conclusion arrived at by learned trial Court convicting the accused-appellants for the offence under Section 302 IPC is incorrect and not sustainable. 46. In view of whatever stated above, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of conviction dated 05.03.2013, passed by learned trial Court. The appellants are acquitted of the charge levelled against them. They be released forthwith if not required in any other case.