JUDGMENT : 1. The writ petitioner was a constable in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and joined service in January, 2006. He was transferred to 169 Battalion of C.R.P.F. at Durgapur from 178 Battalion at Jammu & Kashmir in July, 2012. 2. On or about 24th December, 2013 the writ petitioner was issued a charge-sheet, (first charge-sheet). 3. The first charge was for being absent without leave from 18th August, 2013 to 25th October, 2013. The second charge was desertion from his post from 1st November, 2013 till 11th November, 2013. 4. In respect of the said first charge-sheet an inquiry was conducted and punishment of stoppage of three increments for a period of three years without cumulative effect, was imposed on the writ petitioner by the C.R.P.F. Authorities. 5. Thereafter on or about 27th March, 2013 the authorities received a complaint that he was involved in a quarrel with the personnel of 165 Battalion and tried to strike such personnel with dagger (Khukri) at Tangasole in course of rotational duty. 6. The authorities did not take out separate proceedings in respect of the said incident. 7. Thereafter, on 9th July, 2014 a second charge sheet was issued to the writ petitioner. 8. The charges herein were : (a) absence without the leave from 6th January, 2014 to 24th January 2014. (b) Desertion from post on 30th June, 2014. (c) Using abusive language and quarrelling with other C.R.P.F. personnel on 15th April 2014. (d) Against charge no. 4 it was stated that the writ petitioner was a habitual offender and the 2 charges under the first charge-sheet was referred and third incident which was not inquired into was also recorded. 9. The Heading of the said 4th charge clearly indicated that it is referring to a past conduct and, therefore, did not constitute an independent charge requiring another formal inquiry. 10. When the inquiry officer commenced the inquiry and asked the writ petitioner to enter a plea the latter pleaded a ‘guilty’. The authorities despite such admission chose to lead evidence and the same was recorded by the inquiry officer. The writ petitioner declined and refused to cross-examine any witnesses examined by the authorities. He also did not examine any witness of his own. After the evidence was recorded and on being asked by the inquiry officer, the writ petitioner once again pleaded ‘guilty’. 11. The writ petitioner declined and refused to cross-examine any witnesses examined by the authorities. He also did not examine any witness of his own. After the evidence was recorded and on being asked by the inquiry officer, the writ petitioner once again pleaded ‘guilty’. 11. The inquiry report was served on the writ petitioner in a second show cause notice, to which the petitioner chose not to make any representation. Thus, by an order dated 8th November 2014 passed by the disciplinary authority he was “dismissed from service”. 12. On 4th December, 2014 the writ petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority. In the second paragraph at page 3 of the appeal, the writ petitioner submitted as follows;- “So far as Article of Charge No. III is concerned I submit that as I was in a drunken condition when the incident as alleged in Article of Charge No. III took place. I submit that knowing fully well that I consume liquor my fellow brothers instigated me and for which I had to take the recourse of threatening them”. 13. He also contended that in the affidavit in reply before this Court he was not aware that leaving station during suspension was not permitted. He further stated that he was compelled to leave station in view of threats from extremists to his family located in Assam and a demand for ransom which he had to meet. In support of this he has annexed his bank statement to his affidavit in reply showing withdrawal of a sum of Rs.50,000/- in August, 2013. 14. In the background of the aforesaid facts the writ petitioner has contended before me as follows:- (a) By reason of a similarity between charges in the first charge sheet and charge no. 4(a) of the second charge sheet as also a similarity between charge no. 2 of the first charge sheet and charge no. 4(b) of the second charge sheet, there has been “double jeopardy” in imposition of two punishment for the self-same charges. (b) The 2nd charge-sheet must be read is a whole. Even if three charges may be different from the first charge-sheet, the former is vitiated by reason of the two charges in the first charge-sheet and a 4th charge in the second charge sheet being similar. There is also therefore non-application of mind in issuance of second charge sheet. (b) The 2nd charge-sheet must be read is a whole. Even if three charges may be different from the first charge-sheet, the former is vitiated by reason of the two charges in the first charge-sheet and a 4th charge in the second charge sheet being similar. There is also therefore non-application of mind in issuance of second charge sheet. (c) By reason of argument (b) above and even otherwise, the punishment of “dismissal of service” imposed on the writ petitioner is wholly and shockingly disproportionate to the actual charges. (d) That there was no second show cause notice issued to him prior to imposition of the said punishment as he was not served the copy of the inquiry report and finally, (e) That in course of the appeal the writ petitioner was not heard in person. 15. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the C.R.P.F. Authorities has sought to refute the aforesaid arguments both by reference to the facts of the case as well as decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 16. In respect of the first argument (a) and (b) advanced by the writ petitioner this Court finds that Article IV of the second charge sheet in its description clearly records that it is a reference to past misconduct and does not constitute a charge in itself. There was no proposal to rein-quire into the incidents mentioned in i.e. Article 4(a), (b) and (C). 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has been relied upon the case of Lt. Governor, Delhi and Others vs. H.C. Narinder Singh reported in (2004) 13 Supreme Court Cases 342. It was held by the Supreme Court in that case that once a charge is enquired into and punishment imposed a second show cause and a proposal for punishment in respect of the same charge amounts to double jeopardy. 18. On the contrary learned counsel appearing on behalf of the authorities has relied upon a case of Union of India and Others vs. Bishamber Das Dogra reported in (2009) 13 Supreme Court Cases 102 . Paragraphs 28 and 30 of the said judgment are set out herein below;- “28. In Govt. of A.P. v Mohd. Taher Ali this Court rejected the contention that unless the past conduct is a part of charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment observing that: 5. Paragraphs 28 and 30 of the said judgment are set out herein below;- “28. In Govt. of A.P. v Mohd. Taher Ali this Court rejected the contention that unless the past conduct is a part of charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment observing that: 5. …… there can be no hard-and-fast rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has not been mentioned in the charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration by the punishing authority. Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often [necessary] only to reinforce the opinion of the said authority. In fact in Taher Ali case the argument had been advanced that if the disciplinary authority wanted to consider the past service record of the employee, it should be a part of the charge-sheet. Though in K. Manche Gowda this Court said that it should be so indicated in the second show-cause notice only for the purpose of imposing punishment. Thus it is not necessary that it should be a part of the charge-sheet.” “30. In view of the above, it is evident that it is desirable that the delinquent employee may be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past conduct would be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment. But in case of misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, even in the absence of statutory rules, the authority may take into consideration the indisputable past conduct/service record of the employee for adding the weight to the decision of imposing the punishment if the facts of the case no require”. 19. Applying the aforesaid dicta, I am of the view that Article 4(a) and (b) of the second charge sheet must be seen in the context of the opening sentences of Article 4 thereof. It was a mere reference to a past conduct and therefore cannot amount to a fresh charge. 20. In terms of Bishamber Das Dogra’s case (supra) it is very desirable and that disciplinary authority mentions the past conduct of the delinquent. Such mention of past conduct would be a prior notice to the delinquent concerned as regard the proposal for inquiry and the likely punishment. This according to me is in aid compliance of the principles of natural justice. This cannot be interpreted as to mean a proposal to inquire a fresh into a past conduct. Such mention of past conduct would be a prior notice to the delinquent concerned as regard the proposal for inquiry and the likely punishment. This according to me is in aid compliance of the principles of natural justice. This cannot be interpreted as to mean a proposal to inquire a fresh into a past conduct. I am therefore not inclined to accept the arguments (a) and (b) advanced by the writ petitioner. 21. The decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lt. Governor, Delhi and Others Vs Narinder Singh (supra) has no application of the facts of the case. 22. In so far as the next argument of the writ petitioner that the punishment imposed on him is totally disproportionate to the facts of the case, I am unable to accept the same. It appears to me that the punishment imposed for the charges admitted by the writ petitioner in the second charge sheet and having pleaded guilty to the same and in the light of his past conduct in charges 4(a), (b) and (c), the said punishment is neither disproportionate nor shocking. 23. The Central Reserve Police Force (C.R.P.F.) is admittedly a disciplined force entrusted with responsibility akin to that of the principal armed forces of the country. The C.R.P.F. is, therefore requires its personnel to follow the highest standard of discipline. No deviation there from can be accepted. The writ petitioner has pleaded guilty to the charges. Hence the punishment imposed under the second charge-sheet considering and the past conduct of the writ petitioner, is according to me not liable to be interfered with. 24. In so far as the next argument that the inquiry report was not furnished to the writ petitioner, I find from the record that it was duly sent to him on 21st October, 2014 and the same has been recorded in the order of the disciplinary authority. There is no contemporaneous evidence or submission made to this effect before the appellate authority. Hence, I am not inclined to accept this argument. 25. The writ petitioner lastly contended that he should have been heard personally before the appellate authority. He, therefore, pleads violation of principles of natural justice. I am not persuaded with this argument either as the writ petitioner has not been demonstrated any prejudice by reason of his not being personally heard. 26. 25. The writ petitioner lastly contended that he should have been heard personally before the appellate authority. He, therefore, pleads violation of principles of natural justice. I am not persuaded with this argument either as the writ petitioner has not been demonstrated any prejudice by reason of his not being personally heard. 26. The principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straight -jacket formula. Not every infraction of procedure and rules are justiciable. The effect of infraction of rules and violation of natural justice must be tested in the light of the exceptions that are required to be read into them. A person alleging violation of a rule or principles of Natural Justice must demonstrate how he has been prejudiced by such violation. He must show actual prejudice caused to him by reason of the violation. The prejudice theory is now an essential and crucial part of the Natural justice doctrine. 27. The aforesaid prejudice theory has been sufficiently explained and enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala vs. S.K. Sharma reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 . Paragraph11, 28 and 32 of the said decision is set out hereunder;- 11. It is not brought to our notice that the State Bank of Patiala (Officers') Service Regulation contains provision corresponding to Section 99 CPC or Section 465 Cr.P.C. Does it mean that any and every violation of the regulations renders the enquiry and the punishment void or whether the principle underlying Section 99 CPC and Section 465 Cr.P.C. is applicable in the case of disciplinary proceedings as well. In our opinion, the test in such cases should be one of prejudice, as would be later explained in this judgment. But this statement is subject to a rider. The regulations may contain certain substantive provisions, e.g., who is the competent authority to impose a particular punishment on a particular employee/officer. Such provisions must be strictly complied with. But there may be any number of procedural provisions which stand on a different footing. We must hasten to add that even among procedural provisions, there may be some provisions which are of a fundamental nature in the case of which the theory of substantial compliance may not be applicable. Such provisions must be strictly complied with. But there may be any number of procedural provisions which stand on a different footing. We must hasten to add that even among procedural provisions, there may be some provisions which are of a fundamental nature in the case of which the theory of substantial compliance may not be applicable. For example, take a case where a rule expressly provides that the delinquent officer/employee shall be given an opportunity to produce evidence/material in support of his case after the close of evidence of the other side. If no such opportunity is given at all in spite of a request there for, it will be difficult to say that the enquiry is not vitiated. But in respect of many procedural provisions, it would be possible to apply the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice, as the case may be. The position can be stated in the following words: (1) Regulations which are of a substantive nature have to be complied with and in case of such provisions, the theory of substantial compliance would not be available. (2) Even among procedural provisions, there may be some provisions of a fundamental nature which have to be complied with and in whose case, the theory of substantial compliance may not be available. (3) In respect of procedural provisions other than of a fundamental nature, the theory of substantial compliance would be available. In such cases, complaint/objection on this score have to be judged on the touchstone of prejudice, as explained later in this judgment. In other words, the test is: all things taken together whether the delinquent officer/employee had or did not have a fair hearing. We may clarify that which provision falls in which of the aforesaid categories is a matter to be decided in each case having regard to the nature and character of the relevant provision. 28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109 : 65 TLR 225] way back in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109 : 65 TLR 225] way back in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr.[ (1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272 ]) The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [ (1982) 1 SCC 271 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [ (1981) 1 SCC 664 ].) As pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [ (1969) 2 SCC 262 ], the dividing line between quasi-judicial function and administrative function (affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable-a fact also emphasised by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [(1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : 1985 AC 374, HL] where the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing-applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called-that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat the very proceeding-which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India [ (1984) 3 SCC 465 ] . There may also be cases where the public interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between “no notice”/“no hearing” and “no adequate hearing” or to put it in different words, “no opportunity” and “no adequate opportunity”. To illustrate-take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 All ER 66 : (1963) 2 WLR 935]). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid-or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr [1980 AC 574 : (1979) 2 All ER 440 : (1979) 2 WLR 755, PC]). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704]) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi [ (1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62] ) it would be a case falling in the latter category-violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice-in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct-in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. It would not be correct-in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid. “32…… Justice means justice between both the parties the interests of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counterproductive exercise.” 28. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that failure on the part of an authority or management to comply with a part of the rules in question would not automatically vitiate the entire process of inquiry. 29. Examples of such non-compliance are inter alia non supply of documents asked for by the delinquent employee, non supply of inquiry report, not allowing the delinquent employee to cross-examine witnesses. Violation of otherwise well establishment rules of natural justice as indicated above have been dealt with in this aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Sharma (supra). It is indeed trite law now that mere non-supply of an inquiry report would not vitiate an inquiry unless prejudice is shown by the employee concerned by reason of such non-supply. Even in the case of non-supply of documents or denial of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness may not by themselves vitiate the inquiry concerned unless prejudice is shown and indicated by the delinquent employee. These are now laid down as exceptions to the doctrine of Natural Justice. The prejudice theory in administrative law is an extension of the principles of natural justice and consequence of non-compliance thereof. These are now laid down as exceptions to the doctrine of Natural Justice. The prejudice theory in administrative law is an extension of the principles of natural justice and consequence of non-compliance thereof. The said prejudice theory must be invariably read into as an integral part of the service jurisprudence in the country. 30. In the facts of the case, I hold that there was no prejudice caused to the writ petitioner by not hearing him personally in course of the proceedings before the appellate authority. In the event no specific ground has been urged in the writ petition towards such grievance by the writ petitioner. 31. For the reasons aforesaid, I am not inclined to accede to the prayers of the writ petitioner. The inquiry held by the C.R.P.F. Authority and punishment imposed are upheld. W.P. 19460(W) of 2016 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Urgent photostat1 certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties, upon completion of requisite formalities.