JUDGMENT : B.P. Dharmadhikari, J. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. 2. Petitioner, a student is aggrieved by procedure applied to his request for reassessment of marks and Direction No. 24/2015, has approached this Court with contention that said direction should be quashed and set aside. 3. The petitioner has appeared in 8th Semester examination of Engineering in Electronics and Power and after the results were declared, he found that he was given only 6 marks in Digital Signal Processing Subject. He applied for and obtained photocopy of his answer-sheet and then sought its revaluation. The result of revaluation changed marks of petitioner from 6 to 16. 4. The petitioner had given photocopy of answer-sheet to his Subject Teacher and she gave him 40 marks. The petitioner, therefore, enquired and found that his answer-sheet was examined by one moderator who awarded 49 marks. As this change was in excess of 19 marks, the answer-sheet was sent to second valuer who awarded him 26 marks. 5. In view of these marks, applying provisions of Ordinance No. 16 of 2007, “mean of closer of two examiners” has been worked out and, accordingly, 16 marks have been awarded to the petitioner. 6. Learned Advocate Shri Chawhan submits that Direction No. 24/2015 dated 16-12-2015 has been used to prejudice of the petitioner. Inviting attention to Section 54 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 1994 Act'), he contends that revaluation and awarding of marks ought to have been as per clause no. 20 of Ordinance No. 16 of 2007. Procedure prescribed therein required mean of 26 and 49 to be worked out and accordingly, petitioner should have been given 37.5 marks and not 16 marks. 7. Our attention is also invited to Section 28(ee) of 1994 Act to urge that it specifically prohibits the management council from delegating its power to make Ordinance to Vice-Chancellor. 8. He has read out Section 14(7) and 14(8) of 1994 Act to contend that present situation is not covered under Section 14(7) and as ordinance holds the field, Section 14(8) is not available to Vice-Chancellor. Without prejudice, he points out that draft of amendment to Ordinance 16 of 2007 was not submitted by Vice-Chancellor and hence even today, clause 20 in said Ordinance remains as it is i.e. in favour of the petitioner. 9. Learned Advocate Shri Kasat appearing for the respondent no. Without prejudice, he points out that draft of amendment to Ordinance 16 of 2007 was not submitted by Vice-Chancellor and hence even today, clause 20 in said Ordinance remains as it is i.e. in favour of the petitioner. 9. Learned Advocate Shri Kasat appearing for the respondent no. 1 – University states that Section 14(7) and 14(8) cannot be read disjunctively and in appropriate cases, Vice-Chancellor has been given power to meet emergent situation and for that purpose to issue directions which may have effect of amending Ordinance. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon the case of Ramdeobaba Sarvajanik Samiti and anr. Vs. Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University and anr. reported at 2011(6) Bom.C.R. 768 . 10. He also relies upon reply-affidavit and documents accompanying it to show that need of such amendment was examined and countenanced by Board of Examination as also Academic council. As the modification was to be made effective from winter, 2015 examination, considering short time left, the Vice-Chancellor has correctly taken recourse to provisions of Section 14(8). He also adds that petitioner has taken advantage of these provisions and his legal right, if any, is circumscribed thereby. He cannot therefore after taking advantage challenge the same. He has prayed for dismissal of writ petition. 11. No arguments have been advanced on Direction No. 22 of 2016 and parties state that consideration of arguments above in relation to Direction No. 24 of 2015 is sufficient to resolve the controversy. 12. Perusal of judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramdeobaba Sarvajanik Samiti and anr. Vs. Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University and anr. (supra) reveals that said Division Bench in paragraph no. 4, has considered the provisions of Section 14(7) of 1994 Act principally. The earlier consideration shows the arguments advanced by Vice-Chancellor that when matter involves amendment of ordinance, he cannot exercise that power. However, that Division Bench was not required to answer this question. Because of this belief, Vice-Chancellor in that matter attempted to justify recourse to Section 14(7) only. The Division Bench has taken note of this argument and observed that though the ordinance could have been made and was available, it did not include and regulate the new course in question. However, that Division Bench was not required to answer this question. Because of this belief, Vice-Chancellor in that matter attempted to justify recourse to Section 14(7) only. The Division Bench has taken note of this argument and observed that though the ordinance could have been made and was available, it did not include and regulate the new course in question. Entire subject of granting permission to introduce a new course and laying down scheme for examination is a matter governed by ordinance and in this situation, when there was no ordinance, the Division Bench finds that in relation to such “new course”, the Vice-Chancellor was justified in exercising powers under Section 14(8) of 1994 Act. 13. Section 14(8) opens with words which show that it operates only when there is no ordinance on a matter which is required to be regulated by ordinance. Before us, it is not in dispute that in view of Section 54(1), it is management council which has been given power to make, amend or repeal ordinance. Subsection (2) also obliges management council not to make any ordinance on a matter connected with maintenance of the standards of teaching and examinations unless draft thereof is proposed by Academic Council. Section 28(ee) stipulates that management council cannot delegate its power to make or amend or repeal ordinances to Vice-Chancellor. Section 29 deals with Academic Council and under subsection (2), Vice-Chancellor is its Chairman. 14. Section 14(8) read with Section 54(1) and 54(2) and Section 28(ee) show that when Ordinances exists, Vice-Chancellor cannot exercise any power in relation thereto. 15. Section 14(7) deals with emergent situation and subjective satisfaction of Vice-Chancellor on reasonable grounds showing such emergency is sufficient to enable Vice-Chancellor to take recourse to it. 16. In facts looked into in the case of Ramdeobaba Sarvajanik Samiti and anr. Vs. Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University and anr. (supra), as 'new course' was not governed by ordinance, there was no ordinance and hence, the Division Bench has accepted recourse to Section 14(8). That Division Bench was not required to look into the provisions of Section 28 and then Section 54(1) and 54(2) of 1994 Act as ordinance on 'new course' was not in existence. 17. In present case, Ordinance No. 16 of 2007 prescribed procedure for providing photocopies and also for redressal mechanism, exists and holds the field. That Division Bench was not required to look into the provisions of Section 28 and then Section 54(1) and 54(2) of 1994 Act as ordinance on 'new course' was not in existence. 17. In present case, Ordinance No. 16 of 2007 prescribed procedure for providing photocopies and also for redressal mechanism, exists and holds the field. Clause 20 therein stipulates that when marks awarded by subsequent examiner vary on either side by more than 16%, the answer-book is to be reassessed by another examiner. In such contingencies, average of the higher two examiners is to be considered to award the marks to examinee. Thus after original evaluation, one get marks allotted by two more examiners and out of these three sets of marks, two which are on higher side are to be looked into to find out average. If this provision is applied in case of petitioner, the petitioner gets average of 49+26 i.e. 37.5 marks. 18. Impugned Direction No. 24 of 2015 alters the situation to the prejudice of petitioner. It stipulates that when marks awarded by subsequent examiner vary on either side by more than 19%, the answer-book is to be reassessed by second examiner. After such reassessment by second examiner, “the mean of the closer two examiners” is to be worked out to award marks to examinees. In other words, two examiners who have awarded marks which are in close proximity of each other only become relevant. Here, petitioner was given 6 marks by original examiner. The first re-examiner gave him 49 marks and the second/subsequent re-examiner awarded him 26 marks. Respondents found that 26 is more close to 6 as compared to difference between 26 and 49. Therefore, average of 6 and 26 has been worked out and 16 marks have been awarded to the petitioner. 19. The working and the arrangement therefore, show an amendment substituting the scheme in existing clause 20 of Ordinance No. 16 of 2007. It is not an act of filling in any lacuna and we, find that such a power is denied to Vice-Chancellor by Section 28(ee) read with Section 54(2) of 1994 Act. 20. The papers produced on record by Nagpur University also do not show compliance with later part of Section 14(8), namely, placing before management council draft of amendment ordinance. Advocate Kasat has sought time to verify this aspect. 20. The papers produced on record by Nagpur University also do not show compliance with later part of Section 14(8), namely, placing before management council draft of amendment ordinance. Advocate Kasat has sought time to verify this aspect. However, in view of our answer supra, we find it not necessary. The Vice-Chancellor, in present matter in the face of clause 20 of Ordinance No. 16 of 2007, does not possess power to issue Direction No. 24 of 2015. 21. Accordingly, we strike down Direction No. 24 of 2015 and direct respondents to proceed under clause 20 of Ordinance No. 16 of 2007 and award the petitioner necessary marks within one week from today. 22. Rule made absolute accordingly. No costs.