Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 2169 (RAJ)

Shankar Lal Sharma v. Rajesh Kulwal

2018-10-30

SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA

body2018
JUDGMENT Sanjeev Prakash Sharma. J. - This case has a long checkered history. The petitioner has been appearing in person in the cases which he has filed one after another before this Court and were dealt with and decided by various Benches of this Court from time to time. The case has travelled to Supreme Court twice. The petitioner being dissatisfied by orders of the Tribunal has preferred this writ petition wherein he has again raised several questions including levelling certain allegations of conspiracy and fraud and non compliance of the Court orders by the respondents and has prayed for challenging essentially the orders passed by the Industrial Tribunal dated 29.08.2012 and 14.09.2012 and also prayed for setting aside the order dated 25.08.2007 passed by the Labour Court with further prayer to direct the respondent to comply with the award passed by the Labour court dated 03.09.2003, notification dated 17.01.2006 and the order passed by the Division Bench dated 18.04.2006 in D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.831/2002 and released gratuity with interest to the petitioner and pension w.e.f. 01.07.2012. 2. As the petitioner has filed this petition in person, the averments made in the petition are not at seriatim and it appears that on account of the long litigation continuing for decades, as shall be noted as henceforth, the petitioner seems to have filed applications for taking on record documents one after the other in the present petition making it voluminous. Some documents have been filed several times by the petitioner. News cuttings relating to various decisions and passed orders in the writ petition have been filed one after the other making them repetitive. 3. Counsel for the respondent have filed their written brief giving out the synopsis of the various cases with a view to synchronize and for the purpose of giving out the facts of the case at seriatim. 4. I have gone through the various files and documents produced by the petitioner as well as by the respondent. 5. Certain facts and dates need to be noted for the correct proper disposal of this case, as noted herein below. 6. 19.09.1977:- The petitioner Shankar Lal Sharma was appointed as a Worker with the respondent-company as his services were terminated by the respondents on 08.08.1981. Upon reference made on 02.08.1982, the Labour Court has passed an award directing the reinstatement with backwages in favour of the petitioner. 6. 19.09.1977:- The petitioner Shankar Lal Sharma was appointed as a Worker with the respondent-company as his services were terminated by the respondents on 08.08.1981. Upon reference made on 02.08.1982, the Labour Court has passed an award directing the reinstatement with backwages in favour of the petitioner. S.B.C.W.P. No.2130/1985 was preferred by the respondent-company before this Court. On 01.08.1985, the award was passed holding termination as illegal and unjustified with direction to reinstate the petitioner with full salary to the extent of payment of backwages subject to deposit 50% of backwages within one month or paying the same to the petitioner. It appears that the respondent deposited 50% of the amount with the Government Challan before the Judge Labour Court on 28.02.1986. 7. 13.05.1993:- The writ petition No.2130/1985 came to be allowed. Award dated 01.08.1985 passed by the Labour court was set-aside and the disputed LCR No.25/82 was remanded back to the Labour Court for fresh adjudication in terms of the observations made by this Court within a period of 6 months. 8. 21.04.1994:- LCR No.25/82 was decided while passing of the award after framing issues and after recording evidence as per the remand order and the reference was answered in favour of the petitioner holding the termination as unjustified and illegal and with the further directions to reinstate and with continuation of service from the date he was reinstated and would be entitled to the pay scale and regular pay with effect from December 1981 i.e. from the month his junior were regularized. 9. 01.08.1994:- S.B.C.W.P. No.4127/1994 preferred by the respondent challenging the award dated 21.04.1994 and the operation thereof was stayed. Another writ petition No.2860/1995 was preferred by Shankar Lal Sharma, challenging the award dated 21.04.1994 wherein the Labour Court found that the petitioner having not been completed 240 days of service in last 12 months was challenged on the basis of wrongful computation. 10. 20.03.1997:- The High Court disposed off both the writ petition Nos.4127/1994 and 2860/1995. It is to be noticed of the fact that during the intervening period i.e. after the remand order passed earlier and before the decision of the Labour Court dated 21.04.1994, the petitioner had been removed from service on another ground of misconduct vide order dated 08.04.1992. 10. 20.03.1997:- The High Court disposed off both the writ petition Nos.4127/1994 and 2860/1995. It is to be noticed of the fact that during the intervening period i.e. after the remand order passed earlier and before the decision of the Labour Court dated 21.04.1994, the petitioner had been removed from service on another ground of misconduct vide order dated 08.04.1992. It was also noted that the termination order was sent for approval under Section 33(2)(b) and the Labour court rejected the approval application, and therefore there was no dismissal in the eye of law and taking note of above, the Court directed as under:- "As the matter stands now, I am of the considered view that the petitioner should be deemed to be in continuous service. On the question of the subsequent termination of his service, no formal approval having been taken within the meaning of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the net effect is that he continues in service and the subsequent order of termination of his services would not be deemed to be operative. While the final decision is to be arrived at by the Labour Court again on these two specified questions, I would make it clear that the petitioner Shankar Lal would be deemed to be in continuous service and it would not be construed that the Award as made by the Labour Court as regards directing reinstatement of the workman Shankar Lal Sharma has in any manner been set aside or recalled. Both the Writ applications stand disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs." 11. 08.11.2001:- Both the D.B. Special Appeals (Writ) Nos.589/1997 and 591/1997 preferred by the K.E.C. were dismissed with following directions:- "In this view of the matter, therefore, we do not find any merit or substance in the contentions of learned counsel for the appellant and we are of the view that the learned single Judge has rightly remanded the matter to the labour court for deciding the two points mentioned in the judgment date 20.3.1997 in the light of the observations made therein. These appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs." 12. These appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs." 12. 03.09.2003:- The Labour Court decided two points for which the matter was remanded and it was held that the workman Shakar Lal Sharma would be entitled to continue in service from 08.08.1981 with all benefits of service and allowances. The second point for which the matter was remanded regarding the subsequent termination, it was held that the termination was in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1947'). 13. 22.01.2004 D.B. Civil Review Petitions preferred by respondents were dismissed. 14. 28.07.2005:- Review petitions Nos.1274-1275 of 2005 filed by the petitioner Shankar Lal Sharma challenging the order dated 30.03.2005 were dismissed. 15. 14.02.2006:- It was stated that the award was complied with and the respondent was dismissed from service and the same is sub judice in D.B. Special Appeal No.1006/2002 and the D.B. Civil Writ Petition (Def.) No.1996/03 was rendered as having become infructuous. Civil Appeal No.2257-2258 of 2005 alongwith Civil Appeal Nos.2259-2260 of 2005 decided by Supreme Court vide order dated 30.03.2005 which reads as under:- "The Division Bench shall decide DBSAW No.1006 of 2002 without being influenced by any of the observations made by the Single judge, the Division Bench or by us regarding the approval to the application filed by the appellant under Section 33(2) (b) of the Act with regard to the subsequent dismissal of the respondentworkman. All contentions are left open to the parties in this regard. The Civil Appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside to the limited extent indicated in the judgment. No Costs." 16. 09.03.2006:- D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.1006/2002 against the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal rejecting the application of the respondent under Section 33(2) (b) as well as the order passed on 19.08.2002 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4618/99 upholding the order of the Industrial Tribunal, was allowed to the extent of setting aside the order passed by the Single Bench dated 19.08.2002 and directed the Tribunal to hear the parties afresh and decide the application under Section 33(2) (b) of the Act of 1947 afresh within 3 months. 17. 18.04.2006:- D.B. Civil Review Petition No.32/2006 in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.1006/2002 filed by the petitioner Shankar Lal Sharma was dismissed. 17. 18.04.2006:- D.B. Civil Review Petition No.32/2006 in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.1006/2002 filed by the petitioner Shankar Lal Sharma was dismissed. D.B. Civil Review Petition No.25/2006 in D.B.C.W.P. (D) No.1196/2003 was dismissed observing that the judgment passed on 14.02.2006 is in favour of the review petitioner Shankar Lal Sharma. 18. 03.02.2007:- The order of removal dated 08.04.1992 was approved by the Judge, Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur. 19. A writ petition No.1012/2007 was preferred by the petitioner challenging the order dated 03.02.2007, the same was disposed of by the Single Bench vide its order dated 13.06.2012 and the order dated 17.01.2007 and 03.02.2007 passed by the Industrial Tribunal whereby the termination order dated 08.04.1992, was quashed and set-aside and the matter was again remanded back to the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal vide its judgment dated 14.09.2012 has again approved the termination order dated 08.04.1992 which is a subject matter of challenge now in the present writ petition. 20. Apart from the aforesaid facts relating to the termination, dismissal and approval, there is another aspect of the case which relates to another reference made by the State Government vide notification dated 23.01.1991 with regard to the question where the action of the Manager, KEC, Jaipur in not declaring the petitioner-workman Shankar Lal Sharma as permanent and was illegal or unjustified and whether not granting the petitioner the entire benefits and allowances was legal and proper nor to get benefit the petitioner is entitled too. The said reference was answered by the Industrial Tribunal vide its award dated 06.07.1999 and following order was passed:- "46. As a result of foregoing discussions the following award is passed in this reference. "Not declaring Shri Shankar Lal Sharma workman as a permanent Labour by Manager, KEC International Jaipur is not legal and proper. Shri Shankar Lal Sharma is entitled to be declared permanent on the post of unskilled workman from the date of reference i.e. 23.1.1991 and also is entitled to get all benefits and amenities from 23.1.1991. When the other permanent employees are getting." The said order dated 06.07.1999 was challenged before this Court in S.B.C.W.P. No.5716/2001 which came to be decided on 12.12.2002 and the writ petition filed by the respondents was dismissed and the award was upheld. 21. When the other permanent employees are getting." The said order dated 06.07.1999 was challenged before this Court in S.B.C.W.P. No.5716/2001 which came to be decided on 12.12.2002 and the writ petition filed by the respondents was dismissed and the award was upheld. 21. At the same time, another writ petition No.5623/1999 came to be preferred by the petitioner for modification of award passed by the Industrial Tribunal praying that the benefits should be awarded to him from the date of payment and not from the date of initiation which came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 08.05.2002. 22. D.B. Special Appeal No.831/2002 was preferred by the petitioner Shankar Lal Sharma wherein by an interim order the respondents were directed to pay a sum of Rs. 25,000/-vide order dated 16.04.2003. The said appeal was ultimately decided on 18.04.2006 holding that the petitioner would be entitled to the consequential benefits and amenities as entitled upto date of reinstatement from dismissal of his service and application under Section 33 C (2) for the purpose of quantifying the consequential benefits was directed to be filed for the said purpose with directions to the Labour Court to decide within a period of three months. 23. It may be noted that there was no appeal preferred by the KEC against the award passed by the Labour Court relating to the reference which was answered in favour of the workman. 24. In terms of the order passed by the High Court in D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) vide order dated 18.04.2006, the Labour Court passed an order on 25.08.2007 under Section 33 C (2) and the same was rejected holding that the amount calculated comes to less than Rs. 25,000/- which has also been awarded by an interim order passed by the High Court earlier. The same was again challenged by the petitioner in S.B.C.W.P. No.6613/1998, which was dismissed as premature. It has also been noted that against the award passed by the Labour Court in favour of the petitioner, the Division Bench has also dismissed the appeal. It appears that in the state of aforesaid litigation which is mentioned herein above, there appears to have been contempt proceedings initiated on reference made by the Presiding Officer under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act as against the petitioner namely, D.B. Civil Reference Nos. 4/2006, 7/2006 and 8/2006. It appears that in the state of aforesaid litigation which is mentioned herein above, there appears to have been contempt proceedings initiated on reference made by the Presiding Officer under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act as against the petitioner namely, D.B. Civil Reference Nos. 4/2006, 7/2006 and 8/2006. It was noticed by the Division Bench that the contemnor has been sent to jail under Sections 353, 354 IPC which was initiated by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court who sent him to jail twice in this regard. The Division Bench noted the said facts and dropped the contempt proceedings vide its order dated 03.03.2008. Another contempt proceedings were initiated somewhere in 2007 by the Presiding Officer who passed the order dated 03.02.2007 and had approved the termination order on the remand. The contempt proceedings were dropped by the Court vide its order dated 03.03.2014. In the background of the aforesaid litigation and the facts as noted above, the entire gamut of petitioner's arguments are that he has been subjected to continuous harassment and exploitation at the hands of the respondent-company officials. 25. In the aforesaid background, the present writ petition has been preferred with the prayer that the order dated 25.08.2007 passed by the Labour Court and the order dated 29.08.2012 and 14.09.2012 passed by the Industrial Tribunal be quashed and setaside and the award passed by the Labour Court on 03.09.2003 notified on 17.01.2006 and the order passed by the Division Bench dated 18.04.2006 in D.B. Special Appeal No.831/2002 be implemented and gratuity of sum of Rs. 62,04,884/- alongwith compound interest be released and a pension amount from 01.07.2012 be also granted. 26. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner had preferred one writ petition No.5584/2013 challenging the same orders dated 29.08.2012 and 14.09.2012 passed by the Industrial Tribunal with a prayer to transfer the case to CBI. The High Court had dismissed the said writ petition vide order dated 15.04.2013. Learned counsel further submits that an appeal was preferred against the said order and the Division Bench in D.B. Special Appeal No.517/2013 dismissed the appeal vide its order dated 6.12.2013 upholding the order of the Single Judge. The respondents have further stated that a SLP was preferred against the order of Division Bench which was dismissed vide order dated 28.01.2015. Learned counsel further submits that an appeal was preferred against the said order and the Division Bench in D.B. Special Appeal No.517/2013 dismissed the appeal vide its order dated 6.12.2013 upholding the order of the Single Judge. The respondents have further stated that a SLP was preferred against the order of Division Bench which was dismissed vide order dated 28.01.2015. Recalling application was also dismissed by the Supreme Court vide its order dated 24.03.2015. Recalling petition was moved which too has been dismissed by the Apex Court on 05.12.2016 and in the circumstances it is stated that the orders dated 29.08.2012 and 14.09.2012 passed by the Industrial Tribunal granting approval of the termination of the petitioner have attained finality. As regards the compliance of the order dated 03.09.2003 is concerned, it is submitted that the same stood already complied with as it is apparent from the order of the Division Bench dated 14.02.2006 which also stands accounted for as per the adjudication of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and therefore the prayers made in the writ petition deserves to be rejected. 27. Having considered the aforesaid submissions as noted above, I find that initially after the matter having been reverted to the Labour Court in relation to the termination of petitioner on 08.08.1981 was held to be unjustified and he was directed to be reinstated with continuity of service and also entitled to pay scale for regular pay w.e.f. December 1981 with the High Court upholding that the petitioner should be deemed to be in continued service. The order passed by the High Court in S.B.C.W.P. No.4127/1994 and 2860/1995 preferred by both the petitioner as well as the respondents as quoted above clearly held the petitioner to be deemed to be continued in service and the effect of the subsequent removal from service vide order dated 08.04.1992 was held to be inoperative till the final decision is arrived at by the Labour Court in relation to the approval application. It was specifically held that the said action would not construe with the award made by the Labour Court regarding reinstatement has been set-aside or recalled. The D.B. Special Appeals were also dismissed on 08.11.2001. Review petitions were also dismissed. It was specifically held that the said action would not construe with the award made by the Labour Court regarding reinstatement has been set-aside or recalled. The D.B. Special Appeals were also dismissed on 08.11.2001. Review petitions were also dismissed. However, it appears that the petitioner was not allowed to continue and neither he was allowed to work nor he was paid any salary on the ground that he had been removed on 08.04.1992. Once the High Court had already held that the termination of service would not be deemed to be operative vide its order dated 20.03.1997 the respondents were required to continue to the petitioner on service. The subsequent litigation is in relation to the approval application while it is noticed that twice the labour court disapproved the subsequent removal of the petitioner workman, the matters were remanded back to the Tribunal by the Division Bench on 09.01.2006 and the order of removal was approved by the Judge Industrial Tribunal, the said order dated 03.02.2007 was quashed and set-aside and the matter was again remanded by the High Court vide its order dated 13.06.2012 and this time the Industrial Tribunal granted its approval in relation to the termination order dated 08.04.1992 vide its order dated 14.09.2012. In the meanwhile, award came to be passed in favour of the workman-petitioner declaring him permanent w.e.f. 23.01.1991 and entitled to get benefits from 23.01.1991. 28. The Shankar Lal had preferred writ petition No.5584/2013 challenging the orders dated 29.08.2012 and 14.09.2012. He also made allegations on the officers of the respondent-company for registering an F.I.R. and impleaded the Rajasthan High Court and Supreme Court with prayer to send the matter to CBI for investigation against many persons including judicial persons, presided over the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court. The Single Bench who has marked this case as an exception passed the order with following observations: "......In my considered opinion, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court for remitting the matter for investigation to CBI. Further the petitioner has not been able to make out a case of any prima facie offence having been committed. Aside of the above, it is trite that the writ jurisdiction of this Court is not exercised, if alternate and efficacious remedies are available to the petitioner. Further the petitioner has not been able to make out a case of any prima facie offence having been committed. Aside of the above, it is trite that the writ jurisdiction of this Court is not exercised, if alternate and efficacious remedies are available to the petitioner. Resort to the criminal processes is open to the petitioner and it is for him to either lodge an FIR - if allegations make out any cognizable offence or alternatively even file a criminal complaint which, when filed, would be addressed keeping in mind the provisions of law. I do not think it proper to make any observation on the contents or the merits of the writ petition lest it prejudice any rights that the petitioner may have to resort to the criminal processes available to him." 29. The said order has been upheld by the Division Bench as well as by Supreme Court. A look at the aforesaid order shows that this Court has nowhere examined the orders dated 29.08.2012 and 14.09.2012 passed by the Judge Industrial Tribunal whereby the Industrial Tribunal has approved the termination order dated 08.04.1992. Rather, the prayer made for investigation to CBI has been rejected and remedy has been left open for the petitioner to lodge an FIR. Submissions of learned counsel for the respondents that prayers were made with regard to the quashing of the orders of approval dated 14.09.2012 is thus not made out. It is apparent that the writ petition was considered only with regard to transfer the investigation to CBI alone. The Division Bench vide its judgment dated 06.12.2013 has not referred anywhere the orders of the Industrial Tribunal relating to grant of approval dated 14.09.2012. Rather the Division Bench has held that the judgments preferred by the petitioner are not relevant as they referred to provisions of Section 33 (2) (b) while relief is sought for investigation by CBI, and held as under:- "10. The judgments referred to and relied upon by the appellant are with reference to the provisions of Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 whereas in the writ application as well as in the intra-court appeal, the relief sought is for investigation of the matter by the CBI. Therefore, the judgments referred to and relied upon by the appellant, have no relevance with the controversy raised in the instant case." 30. Therefore, the judgments referred to and relied upon by the appellant, have no relevance with the controversy raised in the instant case." 30. It appears that the petitioner has preferred a writ petition (civil) D under Article 32 bearing No.42819/2012 before the Apex Court which came up for hearing on 28.01.2015 and following order was passed:- "The petitioner, who appears in person, seeks the implementation of the awards passed by the Labour Court on 29.08.2012 and 14.09.2012. Filing of a writ petition for the implementation of the awards, directly under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, cannot be accepted, save in exceptional circumstances. We find no exceptional reason in the present case. For the reasons indicated hereinabove, the writ petition, as also, the appeal against Registrar's order (dated 10.08.2013) are dismissed." 31. Thus the question before this Court is only limited to whether the present petition would be maintainable in relation to the orders passed by the Industrial Tribunal dated 29.08.2012 and 14.09.2012. 32. I have considered the objections of learned counsel for the respondent and find that in none of the proceedings as noted above, the Court examined the validity of the orders dated 29.08.2012 and 14.09.2012 in fact the Division Bench has specifically noticed that the orders of the Industrial Tribunal have not been challenged and the only question before the Single Judge, Division Bench and in the SLP was in relation to the question whether the investigation should be conducted by the CBI. The writ petition under Article 32 is also not for challenging the orders dated 29.08.2012 and 14.09.2012, hence this writ petition filed by the petitioner is held to be maintainable. 33. Taking notice of the provisions of Section 36, I find that objections raised by the petitioner relating to representation of the respondent by an Advocate was justified. An Advocate even though, he may be a member of the association would not lose his status as a Lawyer. The very purpose of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act is to maintain a level playing field amongst the parties and the Labour Court ought to have disallowed Alok Fatehpuria to represent the respondent once an objection was received under Section 36 by one of the parties. 34. The very purpose of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act is to maintain a level playing field amongst the parties and the Labour Court ought to have disallowed Alok Fatehpuria to represent the respondent once an objection was received under Section 36 by one of the parties. 34. Coming to the merits, I find that vide order dated 29.08.2012, the objections raised by the petitioner with regard to the representation of the respondent-KEC International by one Alok Fatehpuria was rejected. The petitioner had raised the objections on the ground that Alok Fatehpuria was an Advocate by a profession and in terms of Section 36 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, he could not be allowed to argue the case on behalf of KEC International and had requested to that Alok Fatehpuria and placed power of attorney before the Court by which he had been authorized to argue the case on behalf of KEC International. The said application was rejected by the Labour Court on the ground that Alok Fatehpuria was member and officer of the employer's association Rajasthan Executive Committee in terms of Section 36 (2), he could not represent the respondent-KEC International. 35. Vide order dated 14.09.2012 the Industrial Tribunal has granted the approval to the application moved under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Dispute Act moved by the respondents with regard to the termination order passed by them dated 08.04.1992. The Tribunal has held the Enquiry to be in accordance with principles of natural justice and fair. The petitioner has challenged the enquiry to be interfered on the ground that the representative of the employer was a legally qualified officer while the petitioner was not giving the said facility of appointing an Advocate. It is stated that he had prayed for appointing of an Advocate which was refused by the Enquiry Officer. He relies on the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in case of Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Ors. 1983 (1) SCC 124 . Further, he states that the Enquiry Officer appointed by the respondents was an Advocate who was appearing for the company. He relies on the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in case of Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Ors. 1983 (1) SCC 124 . Further, he states that the Enquiry Officer appointed by the respondents was an Advocate who was appearing for the company. The learned Labour Court has relied on judgment passed by the Supreme Court reported in FLR 1964 (9) (SC) 7, Saran Motors Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi v. Vishwanath & Anr., to held that the enquiry officer could be an Advocate of the employer itself. The petitioner has also objected that he was not having the copy of the standing orders of the company which has been found to be not acceptable on the ground that in the translation of the standing orders was placed during the course of enquiry and in the enquiry report copy with the said Hindi translation having been given to the workman is also noted. Notice was issued to him and served. Reply was given by the petitioner-workman and he was given opportunity to cross examine the witness. The Judge Industrial Tribunal has thereafter looked into the enquiry proceedings and found that the charge levelled against the workman was of not obeying his superior officers and abusing and threatening his superiors and not coming in time and also refused OS during work hours. Affidavit and evidence has also been recorded during the course of enquiry. The petitioner has submitted that the charge sheet issued was on account of malice and harassment as the petitioner had already raised the dispute relating to his earlier wrongful termination and the respondents were bent upon terminating his services one way or the other. 36. From the facts which have come on record, I find that the entire proceedings initiated against the petitioner are on account of inherent malice and bias developed on account of the earlier proceedings initiated by the petitioner relating to his earlier termination of 1981 against the management. It is noticed that the respondents had taken up the matter till the year 1994 with regard to his earlier termination and in between when there was no interim order passed in favour of the respondents, the petitioner was reinstated and again terminated by adopting the procedure of initiating a charge sheet levelling allegations. It is noticed that the respondents had taken up the matter till the year 1994 with regard to his earlier termination and in between when there was no interim order passed in favour of the respondents, the petitioner was reinstated and again terminated by adopting the procedure of initiating a charge sheet levelling allegations. It is in that background that the Division Bench passed an order on 20.03.1997 to continue the petitioner in service and the subsequent orders of termination dated 08.04.1992 was directed to be kept inoperative. It is also noticed that the petitioner was never allowed to join back despite of the order dated 20.03.1997 passed by the Division Bench and review petition was also dismissed vide order dated 08.11.2001 and 22.01.2004, respectively. One after the other litigation has been thrust upon by the respondents and the petitioner who appears to have been placed in the situation where he appears to have started making in coherent allegations not only against officers of the respondents but also the Presiding Officers resulting in the Presiding Officers initiating contempt proceedings against the petitioner. It is noticed that the same Presiding Officer who has initiated the contempt proceedings has alone approved the order of termination vide order dated 14.09.2012. All the contempt proceedings have been dropped by the High Court. Thus viewed, there has been a spate of litigation all the way from the labour court upto the Supreme Court and several times the matter has been remanded back. 37. One cannot but help noticing the side effects of continued litigation which takes its toll on the health and mental abilities of a litigant. Studies have been undertaken by psychologist and it has been noticed that the continued litigation has an effect on the mental equilibrium of a litigant. Continuous litigation has resulted in the petitioner making all kinds of allegations against the lawyers and the officers of the respondent but it is noticed that the petitioner to repose his faith in the Court. 38. Having noticed as above, this Court finds that the Division Bench's order dated 20.03.1997 restraining the respondents from not implementing the order dated 08.04.1992 has not been complied with. Accordingly, the order passed by the Labour Court dated 14.09.2012 is held to be contrary to the provisions of law. The termination order dated 08.04.1992 has not been passed legally. 38. Having noticed as above, this Court finds that the Division Bench's order dated 20.03.1997 restraining the respondents from not implementing the order dated 08.04.1992 has not been complied with. Accordingly, the order passed by the Labour Court dated 14.09.2012 is held to be contrary to the provisions of law. The termination order dated 08.04.1992 has not been passed legally. The enquiry conducted by the respondents was an eye wash and against the principles of natural justice while the respondents conducted the enquiry by an Advocate and their presenting officer was also having full knowledge of law, the petitioner was not given an equal treatment. The enquiry therefore cannot be said to be fair enquiry and the consequential order of termination was unjustified. The Constitutional Bench in case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma And Others, (2002) 2 Supreme Court Cases 244 , has examined the effect of Section 33 (2) (b) proviso of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, which held as under:- "14. Where an application is made under Section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if the order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of the employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement......" Thus viewed, when earlier the orders of approval were setaside and the matter was remanded, the petitioner was required to be treated in service. Having taken a view that the order of approval granted by the Tribunal is illegal and unjustified and the termination of the petitioner vide order dated 08.04.1992 was on account of victimization, the consequences will follow accordingly. 39. Accordingly, the order dated 29.08.2012 and 14.09.2012 are quashed and set-aside and the petitioner be deemed to be in service from the date the termination order was passed with all consequential benefits. The petitioner would be entitled to get his pay allowances treating him as permanent employee of the respondent in terms of the earlier award passed in his favour and also entitled to receive retiral benefits as per the provisions of law on attaining superannuation. The exercise for calculating the arrears shall be conducted by the respondents and release to the petitioner within a period of three months and shall be provided the calculation conducted. 40. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.