JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. 2. This petition challenges the legality and correctness of the order passed by the Divisional Social Welfare Officer-respondent No.6 in this petition. This order has been passed on 2.9.2004. 3. By the impugned order, the Divisional Social Welfare Officer has held that the respondent Nos.1 to 4 were duly appointed as employees by the petitioner and the respondent Nos.5 and 6 had also granted administrative approval on year to year basis to their appointments and that salary to these respondents were also paid by the petitioner till the period during which they were in service of the petitioner. This period was upto 31.3.1999 in the opinion of the Divisional Social Welfare Officer. However, as their services were illegally terminated and no notice of termination was even served upon them, these respondents were constrained to take recourse to various remedies available in law to them. The Divisional Social Welfare Officer conceded the fact that these respondents had filed writ petitions before the High Court and in the last petition that they filed before the High Court, they were permitted to withdraw the petition and they were given liberty to pursue such remedy as might be available to them in law. Thus, that petition was disposed of on 8.1.2004. Thereafter, an appeal was preferred before the Divisional Social Welfare Officer under the provisions of the Special School Code for Schools of handicapped, 1997 (in short, “the Code 1997”) challenging the action of the petitioner amounting to illegal termination of their services. 4. In the appeal so filed before the respondent No.6, reply was filed by the petitioner in which objection was taken as to the bar of limitation and as such the appeal being not tenable. 5. The Divisional Social Welfare Officer considered the appeal on the preliminary objection as well as on merits and found that the delay occurred in filing of the appeal was properly explained by the respondent Nos.1 to 4 and, therefore, invoking his power under Rule 55 of the Code 1997, he condoned the delay. Then on merits of the case, the respondent No.6 found that the respondent Nos.1 to 4 succeeded in establishing their case of illegal termination of service and thus he issued a direction to the petitioner to reinstate the respondents in service with immediate effect. Then on merits of the case, the respondent No.6 found that the respondent Nos.1 to 4 succeeded in establishing their case of illegal termination of service and thus he issued a direction to the petitioner to reinstate the respondents in service with immediate effect. The respondent No.6 also refused to grant approval to the appointment of new employees made by the petitioner. On these lines, the order dated 2.9.2004 was passed by the respondent No.6. It is the same order which is under challenge in the present petition. 6. Shri R.M. Ahirrao, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the appeal was filed before the respondent No.6 under the provision of Rule 77 of the Code 1997 and not under the provision of Rule 55. He submits that unlike the provision of Rule 55, there is no provision made in Rule 77 for condoning the delay and in this case, the appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation of 45 days and there being no provision made for condonation of delay, appeal was barred by limitation and ought to have been rejected on this ground alone by the respondent No.6. 7. Shri P.M. Mardikar, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 4 submits that as per the appeal memo, the appeal was filed under the provision of Section 83 of the Code 1997 and there is no period of limitation generally prescribed for filing of such an appeal. He also submits that even if it is assumed, just for the sake of argument, there was some delay in filing of the appeal, the delay could be considered as no delay in fact for the reason that the respondents were never communicated the order of their termination of services and they came to know for the first time about their termination when reply was filed by the petitioner to the writ petition filed by the these respondents, which was Writ Petition No. 404/2003. He submits that the High Court, by the order passed on 8th January, 2004, permitted the respondent Nos.1 to 4 to withdraw the petition with liberty to pursue such remedy as may be available to them under the law and this is how, the respondent Nos.1 to 4 preferred an appeal. These actions on the part of the respondent Nos.1 to 4, further submits learned counsel, explained the delay occurred in this case. 8. These actions on the part of the respondent Nos.1 to 4, further submits learned counsel, explained the delay occurred in this case. 8. Considering the argument canvassed on behalf of the both sides and also what has been found by the respondent No.6, we would have to first determine the date on which the respondent Nos.1 to 4 acquired knowledge about the termination of their services. The Divisional Social Welfare Officer has found that neither any communication was issued to the respondent Nos.1 to 4 terminating their services nor any notice about the same was given to them. There is no material available on record to find that this observation of respondent No.6 is incorrect. So, the question of acquisition of knowledge would have to be considered on the basis of some other material available on record. This material is certainly available in the pleadings of the parties in Writ Petition No.404/2003. So, let us consider those pleadings. 9. In the reply filed to Writ Petition No.404/2003, the petitioner categorically stated that the services of the respondent Nos.1 to 4 were terminated and some new employees were appointed in their respective places. This reply was filed some time in the month of March or April 2003. But, the writ petition remained pending till 8th January, 2004. So, it could be said that even though the respondent Nos.1 to 4 acquired knowledge about their alleged termination of service some time in March or April 2003, the pendency of the writ petition challenging the action of the petitioner which amounted to termination of their respective services would be considered as not letting the period of limitation run from the date of acquisition of the knowledge. This petition was disposed of by the High Court on 8th January, 2004. By this order passed on 8th January, 2004, the respondent Nos.1 to 4 were permitted to withdraw the petition in order to pursue the remedy available to them in law. So, it was this point of time i.e. 8th January, 2004, from which the limitation period began to run. 10. Before considering the bar of limitation, I think it necessary also to consider the argument of learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 4 that there is no provision whatsoever in Code 1997 which prescribes any period of limitation for filing an appeal. 10. Before considering the bar of limitation, I think it necessary also to consider the argument of learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 4 that there is no provision whatsoever in Code 1997 which prescribes any period of limitation for filing an appeal. The contention deserves to be rejected for the reason that there is substantive provision of law made in this Code and it is to be found in Rule 77. The statutory right of appeal has been created under this Rule and this right of appeal is available to challenge the order of termination and other orders specifically mentioned in this Rule. Rule 55 also provides for right of appeal but this right of appeal is there to enable the aggrieved employee to challenge the order by which head of the school or assistant head of the school is appointed. Rule 55 also provides for the power of the Appellate Authority to condone the delay. This Rule, is not available for challenging the action or order of termination of service of an employee. Such an order can be challenged only under Rule 77 and this Rule, unlike Rule 55, does not confer any power upon the Appellate Authority to condone the delay in fit cases. Rule 77 also lays down that if any appeal is to be filed under it, the limitation period for the same would be of 45 days. As regards Rule 83, I must say, it does not create any right of appeal and is irrelevant for deciding the issue involved in this petition. 11. So, it is clear that there is one Rule, Rule 55, which confers power upon the Appellate Authority to condone the delay, there is also another Rule, Rule 77, which also prescribes period of limitation, but does not provide for condonation of delay if the appeal is to be filed after the expiry of prescribed period of limitation. 11. So, it is clear that there is one Rule, Rule 55, which confers power upon the Appellate Authority to condone the delay, there is also another Rule, Rule 77, which also prescribes period of limitation, but does not provide for condonation of delay if the appeal is to be filed after the expiry of prescribed period of limitation. Such two different kinds of provisions in the Code of 1997 would make it clear that the framers of the Code were conscience of the fact that there were certain situations where a provision for condonation of delay was required to be made and in some other cases, same provision need not be made and that is the reason why these two Rules, Rule 55 and Rule 77, provide for the condonation of delay and exclude the power to condone the delay respectively. Therefore, the argument that there is no provision made in the Code 1997 prescribing a specific period of limitation for filing an appeal cannot be accepted and it is rejected. 12. Now, we have found that the appeal which has been preferred by the respondent Nos.1 to 4 was under Rule 77 and the period of limitation for the same is of 45 days. We have also found that this limitation, in the present case, would have started running and in fact did start running from 8th January, 2004 when the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.404/2003, gave liberty to respondent Nos.1 to 4 to pursue such remedy as available to them under the law. Counted from the date of 8.1.2004, the limitation period of 45 days expired on 22nd February, 2004. There is no material available on record from which it could be said that this period of limitation expired not on 22nd February, 2004, but some later date by which the appeal in the present case came to be filed by the respondent Nos.1 to 4. The appeal was filed on 8th March, 2004 and clearly, it was beyond the period of limitation. 13. These aspects of law applicable to the facts established on record were not at all considered by the Divisional Social Welfare Officer and the result is of order which is steeped in illegality and a finding contrary to law, insofar as the limitation aspect is concerned. Such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 13. These aspects of law applicable to the facts established on record were not at all considered by the Divisional Social Welfare Officer and the result is of order which is steeped in illegality and a finding contrary to law, insofar as the limitation aspect is concerned. Such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. There being no provision made by the framers of the Code 1997 to enable the Appellate Authority to condone the delay prescribed under Rule 77, there was no question of entertaining any request in that regard. In the present case, it appears that the request was only oral and not through a written application to condone the delay by the respondent No.6. 14. In the circumstances, I find that the impugned order is patently illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside by allowing this writ petition. 15. The Writ Petition is allowed. 16. The impugned order is quashed and set aside. 17. Appeal stands dismissed.