JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner seeks for a Writ of Mandamus directing the first respondent to conduct an investigation on Ext.P1 complaint after registering an FIR, in accordance with law. The petitioner says that he is a member of Ernakulam – Angamly Arch Diocese. Further, the petitioner has a case that the Diocese itself is considered as a constructive public trust. According to the petitioner, the administration of the Diocese, including the alienation of ecclesiastical properties are being carried out as per the provisions of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, (for short, Code of Canons) and also the local law of the Diocese, (in short, the By-laws). 2. It is the further case of the petitioner that the 3rd respondent, being the Arch Bishop of the Diocese, is the trustee of the ecclesiastical properties of the Diocese. The Writ Petition proceeds on the averments that the Arch Bishop of the Diocese is the trustee of the properties of the Diocese. The 4th respondent herein is a Priest and has been serving as the finance officer of the Diocese. The 5th respondent is one of the Pro-Vicar Generals of the Diocese. According to the petitioner, the 6th respondent is a self-declared real estate agent in Kochi. 3. The Diocese wanted to establish a Medical College at Aluva, for which they wanted to acquire properties. Consequently, through five sale deeds dated 30.04.2015 and 29.05.2015, the Diocese acquired properties worth Rs.58,78,25,930/- by availing a loan of Rs.58.2 crores from the South Indian Bank, Market Road Branch, Ernakulam. Subsequently, the proposal for setting up of the Medical College could not be materialised and resultantly, the Diocese had paid an amount of Rs.6 crores by way of interest alone for the loan. 4. In order to tide over the financial crisis and to reduce the financial overload, the Finance Council of the Diocese, in its meeting held on 18.03.2016, agreed to the proposal of the 4th respondent to sell the land situated at Kalamassery and Kundannoor, and accordingly, the Finance Council entrusted respondents 4 and 5 to execute the sale deeds in accordance with other terms and conditions. Later, the Consulters' Forum, in its meeting held on 6.7.2016, accepted the proposal made by the 4th respondent to sell its plots near Karunalayam, Naipunya School, BMC, Nilampathinjamugal and Maradu, and gave its consent with specific conditions as to how the sale should take place. The conditions inter alia included: (i) The properties shall be sold out only at an average price of Rs.9,00,000/- per cent. (ii) These 5 properties shall be sold out only as single units numbering 5. The total extent of properties to be sold out was fixed as 301.76 cents. The Diocese accordingly expected to raise an amount of Rs.27,15,84,000/- through the said sale. 5. It is alleged that even prior to the aforesaid decision of the Consulters' Forum, respondents 3 to 5 had hatched a criminal conspiracy to make illegal gains for themselves and authorised one Sri.Ajas for selling the said properties having a total extent of 330.48 cents in Vazhakkala, Poonithura and Thrikkakara Villages, vide letter dated 21.06.2016. The average value of the said land was fixed as Rs.9,05,000/- per cent. 6. The petitioner further alleges that subsequently, R3 to R5 again hatched a criminal conspiracy and engaged the 6th respondent secretly in the place of the said Ajas, with the intention to misappropriate the major sale proceeds. Within a short span of time from 11.08.2016 to 05.09.2017, they divided these properties by violating the specific directions of the Consulters' Forum into 36 plots and executed 36 sale deeds for a total consideration of Rs.13,51,44,260/-. Even out of the said sale consideration noted in the sale deeds, Diocese received an amount of Rs.9,13,36,600/- only, which also included an amount of Rs.1,14,00,000/- received from unknown persons. 7. It has been further alleged that one of the main items of the properties, which is situated near Bharathmatha College having an extent of 60.29 cents, having a market value of Rs.28,00,000/- per cent, was sold out to the 6th respondent for a meager price of Rs.6,62,962/- only. According to the petitioner, his enquiry has revealed that out of the sale consideration of Rs.3,99,70,000/- shown in the document, the Diocese received an amount of Rs.14,00,000/- only from the 6th respondent. It is alleged that the 6th respondent has not paid the balance amount of Rs.3,85,70,000/-, and a false acknowledgment has been made regarding the receipt of the money. 8. It is alleged that the 6th respondent has not paid the balance amount of Rs.3,85,70,000/-, and a false acknowledgment has been made regarding the receipt of the money. 8. It is alleged that respondents 3 to 6, who were entrusted with five items of properties of the Diocese, for its sale with specific conditions and directions that the sale must be as single units for a total sale consideration of Rs.27,15,84,000/-, was sold out by respondents 3 to 6 in total violation of the directions, thereby they committing criminal breach of trust. It is alleged that the properties were shown to be sold out for a throw away price of Rs.13,51,44,260/-, that too after dividing it into 36 plots. 9. Even though consent was given by the Consulters' Forum to sell the property on 6.7.2016 only, the 4th respondent had issued letter dated 21.06.2016 to Sri. Ajas for the sale of the property. It is alleged that the 4th respondent was forced to admit before the Financial Council in its meeting on 13.09.2017 that he could obtain Rs.26 crores, out of which an amount of Rs.8,00,00,000/- only could be credited in the accounts of the Diocese. 10. When allegations of misappropriation and Criminal breach of trust broke out from the above transactions through social and print medias, the 5th respondent was forced to appoint an In-house Inquiry Committee to inquire into the allegations regarding the misappropriation of money. The committee conducted a detailed inquiry and submitted its report completely accusing respondents 3 to 6. According to the petitioner, the findings of the inquiry committee clearly reveal the commission of offences under Sections 120B, 406 and 415 IPC by respondents 3 to 6. 11. At the same time, even though the reports of the Committee was very serious in nature, there is not even a suggestion to take action to prosecute the culprits. According to the petitioner, he being a member of the Diocese can complain about the gross misappropriation and criminal breach of trust committed by respondents 3 to 6. Consequently, he preferred Ext.P1 complaint before the first respondent on 16.02.2018. According to the petitioner, he being a member of the Diocese can complain about the gross misappropriation and criminal breach of trust committed by respondents 3 to 6. Consequently, he preferred Ext.P1 complaint before the first respondent on 16.02.2018. Even though the first respondent had received a complaint in hand, he was not ready and willing to issue a receipt by stating that he had instructions from higher-ups against the issue of a receipt in case of complaints against respondents 3 to 6 in connection with the information contained in the complaint. It is also alleged that even the 2nd respondent, who is the Commissioner of Police, Kochi has made it clear that the police will not lodge a FIR against the 3rd respondent or any other person associated with him in connection with the Syro Malabar Church Land deal issue. It is in this context this writ petition has been filed seeking interference by this Court through a writ of mandamus as aforesaid. 12. Even though the writ petition has not been admitted, respondents wanted to appear before this Court. Respondents 3 to 6 have chosen to engage separate lawyers for them. 13. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri. Raman Pillai and learned counsel Sri. Joby Cyriac for the petitioner, learned Senior Public Prosecutor Sri. Suman Chakravarthi for respondents 1 and 2, learned Senior Counsel Sri. S. Sreekumar for the 3rd respondent, learned counsel Sri. N.A. Muraleedharan for the 4th respondent, learned counsel Sri. Varghese C. Kuriakose for the 5th respondent, and learned counsel Sri. K.V. Sabu for the 6th respondent. 14. This Court had to hear the matter on the last four posting dates. Objections were forwarded by all the learned counsel for the respondents. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor has submitted that the complaint was received on 16-2-2018 and even though the complainant was asked to wait for the receipt, the complainant departed. It is also submitted that receipt was prepared on 17.02.2018 and still that receipt is with the learned Public Prosecutor, since the complainant has not turned up to take the receipt. It is also submitted that the first respondent had never mentioned that there was standing instructions not to register any crime against R3 to R6. It has been pointed out that so far no crime has been registered, because of the fact that the matter is one of a “civil nature”. 15. It is also submitted that the first respondent had never mentioned that there was standing instructions not to register any crime against R3 to R6. It has been pointed out that so far no crime has been registered, because of the fact that the matter is one of a “civil nature”. 15. The learned Senior Counsel Sri. S. Sreekumar and the other learned counsel for respondents 4 to 6 have argued that the writ petition is not maintainable and it is purely the prerogative of the police to decide whether any cognizable offence is involved or not. If the police decides that no cognizable offence is made out and this is not a matter in which crime has to be registered, then the only course open to the complainant is to approach the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court concerned with a complaint under Section 190 Cr.P.C. In such case, the learned Magistrate can either forward the complaint to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or to proceed to the stage of Section 200 Cr.P.C. to have an inquiry. 16. Another argument forwarded by all the learned counsel for respondents 3 to 6 is that Diocese is a juridical person and it can acquire and alienate properties. When it is a juridical person, it is contended that any outsider cannot represent the juridical person. It is argued that in case any irregularities or misconduct is traced out relating to the ecclesiastical properties or temporal properties, as the case may be, it is for the higher ups of the religious order to interfere in the matter and the same cannot be dragged to a court of law. precisely, it is argued that as per the Code of Canons, it is for the Pope of Vatican to control the affairs of the ecclesiastical or temporal properties of the Diocese. 17. precisely, it is argued that as per the Code of Canons, it is for the Pope of Vatican to control the affairs of the ecclesiastical or temporal properties of the Diocese. 17. It has been further argued that a similar complaint was preferred by another person styling himself as a member of the Diocese, before the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-VIII, Ernakulam, with a request to forward the matter to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It is pointed out that in that case the learned Magistrate had chosen not to forward the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.; whereas, the learned Magistrate had chosen to proceed to the stage of Section 200 Cr.P.C. Dissatisfied with the said attitude of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate-VIII, Ernakulam, the said complainant had approached this Court through O.P.(Crl) 64 of 2018. Precisely, in the said O.P.(Crl), the prayer was that this Court had to step in for directing the learned Magistrate to go back to the stage of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Since it was not permissible and such an order could not be passed, this Court has dismissed the Original Petition. It was held therein that in case the learned Magistrate wants to have an investigation through police, it is open to the Magistrate to do so by invoking the power under Section 202 Cr.P.C. It was also found that even though the term 'investigation' is used under Section 202 Cr.P.C., in legal parlance, it cannot be an investigation; whereas, it can only be an 'inquiry' being conducted by the Magistrate through another machinery. 18. It has been argued that when the said complaint in which the facts are almost pari materia to the facts contained in Ext.P1 complaint, is being entertained by the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-VIII, Ernakulam, to direct the police to register a crime in this case will lead to a situation, wherein this Court is directing the police to register a second FIR in the matter. 19. It has been further argued that when the copies of this Writ Petition have not been served on respondents 3 to 6, there is gross violation of principles of natural justice, and they could not file objections of thereon in the matter. It is argued that they want to controvert the allegations levelled against them in Ext.P1. 20. 19. It has been further argued that when the copies of this Writ Petition have not been served on respondents 3 to 6, there is gross violation of principles of natural justice, and they could not file objections of thereon in the matter. It is argued that they want to controvert the allegations levelled against them in Ext.P1. 20. This Court has to consider whether the allegations raised by the writ petitioner in Ext.P1 complaint constitutes any of the offences alleged. It has to be considered whether the allegations in the complaint prima facie disclose any cognizable offence. This Court has to consider whether respondents 3 to 6 or at least the 3rd respondent is amenable to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts in India in case the complaint discloses cognizable offences under the Indian Penal Code, or whether he should be left to the discretion of the 'Pope' of Vatican to decide whether he should be punished or not. 21. This Court has to further consider whether the authority given by the Consulters' Forum and the Finance Council to respondents 3 to 5 to sell out the properties created a trust on the part of respondents 3 to 5 in dealing with the property. Precisely, this Court has to decide as to what was the status of respondents 3 to 5 when they were entrusted with the power to deal with the properties. 22. This Court is also of the view that Diocese is a juridical person. There cannot be a different view in the matter, when the said question has been settled through various judicial pronouncements. Even though the writ petitioner has stated that the Diocese is in the nature of constructive trust, it cannot be said that the Diocese is a constructive trust; whereas it is a juridical person. The said juridical person can acquire and sell properties. At the same time, Diocese is the juridical person and not the 3rd respondent, 'Major Arch Bishop'. Cardinal or Major Arch Bishop, as the case may be, is not the Diocese. Diocese is entirely a different person. The authority of the 3rd respondent at the most is only to represent the Diocese, as the Diocese is not a living person. It is the 3rd respondent, who has to represent the Diocese in its transactions, for and on behalf of the Diocese, and not on his own behalf. 23. Diocese is entirely a different person. The authority of the 3rd respondent at the most is only to represent the Diocese, as the Diocese is not a living person. It is the 3rd respondent, who has to represent the Diocese in its transactions, for and on behalf of the Diocese, and not on his own behalf. 23. The properties of the Diocese cannot, at any stretch of imagination, be treated as the properties of the 3rd respondent. The properties involved in the case were acquired by the Diocese by the funds of the Diocese, which is nothing but contributions raised from all the Churches coming under the Diocese. Those properties were not acquired by respondents 3 to 5 with their separate income. Therefore, the properties can only be considered as the properties of the Diocese, and not as the properties of respondents 3 to 5. 24. It has been argued by all the learned counsel for respondents 3 to 6 that the 3rd respondent can do anything as he pleases regarding the property of the Diocese, and there cannot be a question against his authority in dealing with the property according to his whims and fancies. When this Court wanted a clarification whether anybody can question the acts of the 3rd respondent in dealing with the properties of the Diocese, it was replied that nobody can question the 3rd respondent in his actions and he is free to do anything with regard to the properties of the Diocese. In order to consider whether the 3rd respondent could claim such an immunity, this Court put a query as to whether the 3rd respondent could be considered as 'king, who could do no wrong'. The answer by the learned Senior Counsel for the 3rd respondent was an emphatic 'yes'. 25. The law is above all. Law should be equal to all. Law should be equal to the rich and the poor. There cannot be any favoured class from among the equals. The old saying that all are equals and some are more equals, cannot have any application when question of entitlement of legal rights is being considered. 26. All the learned counsel for both sides have invited the attention of this Court to various Code of Canons. 27. The Constitution of the Consulters' Forum is discernible from Canon 271. The old saying that all are equals and some are more equals, cannot have any application when question of entitlement of legal rights is being considered. 26. All the learned counsel for both sides have invited the attention of this Court to various Code of Canons. 27. The Constitution of the Consulters' Forum is discernible from Canon 271. As per the said Canon, the Eparchial Bishop must establish a College of Eparchial Consulters that is competent in those functions determined by law. Therefore, it is evident that it is mandatory on the part of the Eparchial Bishop to establish a College of Eparchial Consulters. If the Eparchial Bishop has to be considered as a king or sovereign, why should he be burdened with such a task? 28. Canon 263 deals with the Finance Council. The Eparchial Bishop is to erect a Finance Council consisting of a President, who is the Eparchial Bishop himself, and of some suitable persons who are experts if possible, also in civil law. There also the Canon recognize the importance of the civil law to be observed. Canon 263(2) says that the Eparchial Finance Officer by virtue of the law itself, is a member of the Finance Council. Therefore, it is evident that respondents 3 and 4 are the members of the Finance Council, and the 3rd respondent is the President of the Finance Council. No doubt, when matters relating to civil or criminal law relating to a property of a Diocese in India arise, it is for the courts in India to deal with the matter. 29. Canon 1035 deals with the alienation of ecclesiastical goods, which constitute by legitimate designation of the stable patrimony of a juridic person, and requires the following:- “1. a just cause, such as urgent necessity, evident advantage, piety, charity, or a pastoral reason; 2. a written appraisal by experts of the asset to be alienated; 3. in cases prescribed by law, written consent of the competent authority, without which the alienation is invalid,” 30. Canon 1035(2) says that a written appraisal by experts of the assets to be alienated, is required. So, there must be a proper valuation and a written report from the experts is a prerequisite for the alienation of such a property. Written consent of the competent authority is required, without which the alienation is invalid. Canon 1035(2) says that a written appraisal by experts of the assets to be alienated, is required. So, there must be a proper valuation and a written report from the experts is a prerequisite for the alienation of such a property. Written consent of the competent authority is required, without which the alienation is invalid. Article 110(d) of the by-laws clearly shows that the properties of the Diocese, Churches, etc. shall not be alienated without the written consent of the 'Curia'. 31. Article 214 of the by-laws says that alienation of property exceeding an amount of Rs.10 Lakhs, upto Rs.25 Crores is to be done only with the consent of the Finance Council and the College of Eparchial Consultors. It is not disputed that the Finance Council as well as the Consultors' Forum, which were bodies constituted as per the Canons, had authorised respondents 3 to 5 to sell the properties on specific terms and conditions. This is not a case where in the 3rd respondent on his own had decided to sell the properties according to his whims and fancies; whereas, the authority derived by the 3rd respondent was through the resolutions of the Finance Council and the Consultors' Forum. In such case, much discussion is not required to conclude that the 3rd respondent as well as the respondents 4 and 5, who were dealing with the sale of the properties, were purely trustees in respect of the properties owned by the Diocese. Therefore, the question whether the Diocese as a whole is a trust or not, is not the question to be considered. The status of respondents 3 to 5 in dealing with the sale of the property is the question to be considered. No doubt, they were mere trustees as far as the properties entrusted to them for sales by the Diocese, are concerned. 32. HALSBURY, 4th Edn. Vol.48, para 501 page 272 says: “When a person has property or rights which he holds or is bound to exercise for or on behalf of another or others or for the accomplishment of some particular purpose or particular purposes, he is said to hold the property or rights in trust for that other or those or for that purpose or those purposes and he is called a trustee.” 33. Further, HALSBURY, 4th Edn. Further, HALSBURY, 4th Edn. Vol.48, para 597, page 331 says: “A resulting trust is a trust arising by operation of law in the following cases, namely (1) where an intention to put the property into trust is sufficiently expressed or indicated, but the actual trust either is not declared in whole or in part or fails in whole or in part; (2) where property is purchased in the name or placed in the possession of a person ostensibly for his own use, but really in order to effect a particular purpose which fails; and (3) where property is purchased in the name or placed in the possession of a person without any intention that he is to hold it in trust, but the retention of the beneficial interest by the purchaser or disposer is presumed to have been intended.” 34. Canon 1039 says that for any alienation, consent is required for those concerned. 35. Annexure-3 appended to Exhibit-P1 clearly shows that the 3rd respondent has admitted that for purchasing a property, advance amount was given and unfortunately, the purchase could not be completed as planned. It has been further admitted that as compensation, they willingly offered to give 5 Acres of land as a gift to the Arch Diocese. It has been stated by him, that “They also agreed to repay an amount of Rs. 18 Crores, which they owed to us.” The said amount was spent from the Diocese' funds. This is the way in which the matter has been dealt with. Even though the 3rd respondent has admitted that they had agreed to return the amount of Rs. 18 Crores, to the Diocese, no documents are there showing any such liability. The amount of Rs. 18 Crores is being considered as a paltry amount by the 3rd respondent. 36. It has been further admitted in Annexure-3 appended to Exhibit-P1 by the 3rd respondent that the “procurator informed that the sale of property (5 plots) is almost over at the average rate of Rs. 9.05 lakhs per cent and through which, we have acquired Rs. 26 Crores.” According to him, they could acquire an amount of Rs. 26 Crores through the said sale of 5 plots. It has been further stated that “in the sale deed they deposited Rs. 9.05 lakhs per cent and through which, we have acquired Rs. 26 Crores.” According to him, they could acquire an amount of Rs. 26 Crores through the said sale of 5 plots. It has been further stated that “in the sale deed they deposited Rs. 8 Crores rupees in our account and the rest of money they have to give us.” Therefore, it is the admitted case that an amount of Rs. 8Crores only came to the accounts of the Diocese even when the properties were allegedly sold for an amount of Rs. 26Crores. 37. The 4th respondent has preferred Annexure-23 appended with Exhibit-P1 as submissions before the Enquiry Committee. In Annexure-23, it has been admitted that the Finance Council has been aware of the fact that 6th respondent owed amounts to the Diocese for the sale of its 5 plots at an average rate of Rs. 9.05 lakhs per cent, amounting to Rs. 26 Crores. It was further admitted that the property in front of the Bharath Matha College was purchased by the 6th respondent himself and the Arch Diocese has to obtains. Rs. 3,99,70,000/- as its value. InAnnexure-23, the 4th respondent has no case that the said amount was ever paid by the 6th respondent, whereas, it has been clearly admitted that such an amount is due to Diocese from the 6th respondent. It has been further stated that the 6th respondent is not in a position to pay the said amount and therefore, he has transferred 17 Acres of land to the Arch Diocese as security for discharging his obligation under Annexure-16 resolution of the Curia. It has been further stated that the Diocese has paid an amount of Rs. 25 lakhs to the 6th respondent for the purpose of transferring the lands at Munnar in favour of the Arch Diocese. 38. At the same time, the petitioner has pointed out that those sale deeds obtained from the 6th respondent allegedly by way of security were in respect of properties purchased by the Diocese from the 6th respondent for value and consideration. Huge amounts were paid for the purchase of the property, for which also the Diocese availed loan from the Bank. Therefore, it is evident that all such transactions are shady. Cloud has been caste upon all those transactions. Of course, it is for respondents 3 to 6 to remove those cloud. 39. Huge amounts were paid for the purchase of the property, for which also the Diocese availed loan from the Bank. Therefore, it is evident that all such transactions are shady. Cloud has been caste upon all those transactions. Of course, it is for respondents 3 to 6 to remove those cloud. 39. A questionnaire was issued to the 3rd respondent by the Enquiry Committee. The said questionnaire is Annexure-20A appended to Exhibit-P1. A specific question was put to R3 as to whether the 6th respondent was inducted in the deal by the 3rd respondent. Annexure-20A answer appended with Exhibit-P1 clearly shows that he has admitted that he was instrumental in bringing the 6th respondent in the deal. In the answer, he has expressed a wish that all the amounts due from the 6th respondent would be paid by the 6th respondent. This Court is not going much deep into the matter, since this Court is of the view that, at the present stage, it is not fair to go in detail into all the irregularities and illegalities allegedly committed in the matter. What has to be considered at this stage is whether the allegations in Exhibit-P1 complaint are sufficient to bring out the ingredients of any cognizable offences. 40. The learned Senior Counsel for the 3rd respondent has invited the attention of this Court to the decision in Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and others [( 2008 3 SCC 542 ] to argue that by exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to direct an investigation in a crime, wherein vague allegations were there, the High Court ought to have extended an opportunity to the proposed accused in the case to challenge the proceedings. When such an opportunity was not extended, it was held that the same was in violation of the principles of natural justice. In paragraph 51 of the decision in Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and others [( 2008 3 SCC 542 ] it was held: “51. The order directing the investigation on the basis of such vague and indefinite allegations undoubtedly is in the teeth of principles of natural justice. It was, however, submitted that the accused gets a right of hearing only after submission of the charge-sheet, before a charge is framed or the accused is discharged vide Sections 227 and 228 and 239 and 240 CrPC. It was, however, submitted that the accused gets a right of hearing only after submission of the charge-sheet, before a charge is framed or the accused is discharged vide Sections 227 and 228 and 239 and 240 CrPC. The appellant is not an accused and, therefore, it was not entitled for any notice from the High Court before passing of the impugned order. We are concerned with the question as to whether the High Court could have passed a judicial order directing investigation against the appellant and its activities without providing an opportunity of being heard to it. The case on hand is a case where the criminal law is directed to be set in motion on the basis of the allegations made in anonymous petition filed in the High Court. No judicial order can ever be passed by any court without providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person likely to be affected by such order and particularly when such order results in drastic consequences of affecting one's own reputation. In our view, the impugned order of the High Court directing enquiry and investigation into allegations in respect of which not even any complaint/information has been lodged with the police is violative of principles of natural justice.” The decision in Divine Retreat Centre (Supra) has been followed by the Apex Court, in State of Panjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and others [ (2011) 14 SCC 770 ]. 41. From the opening words of paragraph 51 of Divine Retreat Centre (Supra) itself, it is evident that it was a case wherein an investigation was ordered on the basis of vague and indefinite allegations. It was in that context, it was held that an opportunity ought to have been granted to the proposed accused to challenge the proceedings. The said decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, when cogent allegations are levelled against respondents 3 to 6 in Ext.P1. Specific allegations have been raised. Specific instances have been pointed out. It has been detailed as to how recklessly the transactions were made. Those allegations in Ext.P1 clearly point towards a probable case of conspiracy hatched among R3 to R6. Apart from that, it has been specifically pointed out that even the amounts shown in the documents have not fully gone to the Bank Accounts of the Diocese. It has been detailed as to how recklessly the transactions were made. Those allegations in Ext.P1 clearly point towards a probable case of conspiracy hatched among R3 to R6. Apart from that, it has been specifically pointed out that even the amounts shown in the documents have not fully gone to the Bank Accounts of the Diocese. It has been alleged that the amount covered by the sale deed executed in favour of the 6th defendant has not come to the Bank Accounts of the Diocese. 42. According to the learned counsel for the 6th respondent, the 6th respondent cannot be found fault with any manner, and no amount is due to the Diocese from the 6th respondent. At the same time, admissions before the Enquiry Committee by the 3rd respondent and the 4th respondent show otherwise. According to them, huge amounts are due from the 6th respondent, and it is their wish and belief that he would make that payment. When they are expressing such a wish and entertaining such a belief, presently, the 6th respondent maintains a case that no amount is due to the Diocese from him and what all amounts due towards the transactions were transferred by him to the Bank accounts of the Diocese. When such contradictions are there, is it not a matter to be investigated into ? 43. Another argument forwarded by the learned Senior Counsel for the 3rd respondent is that when the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-VIII, Ernakulam is conducting an inquiry in the complaint preferred by another person, almost on the very same allegations as contained in Exhibit-P1, the registration of a crime in this case will be as good as the registration of a second First Information Report, which is not permissible in law. 44. The learned Senior Counsel has invited the attention of this Court to the decision in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [ (2001) 6 SCC 181 ]; wherein it was held that on an incident, a second First Information Report is not legally sustainable. It was held that even if subsequent transactions connected with the main transaction occur, the investigating agency should investigate those transactions also based on the original First Information Report, and in such case, a second First Information Report cannot be registered. 45. It was held that even if subsequent transactions connected with the main transaction occur, the investigating agency should investigate those transactions also based on the original First Information Report, and in such case, a second First Information Report cannot be registered. 45. When the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court is dealing with a complaint and is conducting an inquiry and even when the said court chooses to have an investigation through the Police under Section 202 Cr.P.C. the net result will be either a dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C. or taking of cognizance by issuing process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. In either case, even if the police is registering a crime in this matter, it cannot be treated as a second First Information Report. Even if the court takes a decision to issue process under Section 204 Cr.P.C., it can only be treated as a case on a private complaint. Even on the same set of facts, the Police can register a crime and conduct an investigation, and in such case, the same will not militate against the private complaint. 46. The learned Senior counsel for the 3rd respondent has argued that the petitioner has to wait till a decision is rendered by the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-VIII, Ernakulam or the present matter also can be taken into the said case pending before the said court. It is a private complaint filed by a different person. It is not permissible under law for the petitioner to intrude into the said private complaint. There is no provision enabling such a course of action. The petitioner cannot be directed to wait till a final decision comes in the other private complaint. 47. Regarding the lack of proper opportunity to respondents 3 to 6, this Court is of the view that they cannot presently lament by saying that no sufficient opportunity was given to them. On the last four posting dates, they were fighting tooth and nail before this Court to protect the interests of respondents 3 to 6. Presently, they cannot be heard to say that they were not given an opportunity, and principles of natural justice have been violated by this Court. 48. As pointed out by this Court earlier, Ext.P1 complaint in this case cannot be treated as one containing vague allegations. Presently, they cannot be heard to say that they were not given an opportunity, and principles of natural justice have been violated by this Court. 48. As pointed out by this Court earlier, Ext.P1 complaint in this case cannot be treated as one containing vague allegations. It pinpoints specific facts and incidents to note down the offences allegedly committed by respondents 3 to 6. Of course, it is a matter for investigation and proof. At this stage, this Court is not expected to make an opinion as to whether those incident had actually happened. It has to be investigated into. 49. Regarding opportunity, this Court is of the view that, in fact, respondents 3 to 6 were not entitled to any such opportunity before this Court. Considering the seriousness of the matter and the public importance pointed out, this Court had given sufficient opportunity to respondents 3 to 6 to forward their arguments. 50. When a complaint is filed before a Magistrate, it is open to the Magistrate to consider the matter under Section 190 Cr.P.C. or to forward the complaint for investigation to the police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. In both such occasions, the proposed accused will have no right of audience. Even when a police report is filed before a court for taking cognizance, the accused cannot have a say. It is for the court to consider the final report and the documents sent along with it, even to frame a charge under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. At the most, the accused can point out irregularities or illegalities in the final report and the documents sent along with it. At the same time, the accused cannot produce any documents or forward any further arguments at that stage. In such case, even when a crime has not been registered in this case, this Court is not bound to give any such opportunity to respondents 3 to 6. Even then, sufficient opportunity was given to them. 51. Another argument forwarded by the learned Senior counsel for the 3rd respondent and also the learned counsel for the 5th respondent is that, when the copies of this writ petition were not served on them, they could not file any counter. Is it safe on the part of a prospective accused to file a statement regarding the defence to be taken by him? Is it safe on the part of a prospective accused to file a statement regarding the defence to be taken by him? Denial of such an opportunity will be for the better interest of the accused in our present system of criminal justice dispensation. Therefore, they cannot lament that they could not file an objection. If they are called upon to file an objection, it would necessarily frustrate the defence that could be taken by them in subsequent stages, if such stages are coming. 52. The learned Senior Counsel for the 3rd respondent has invited the attention of this Court to the decision in Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra and others ( 2004 (7) SCC 768 ) and argued that, if a police officer, before whom a complaint is preferred by a person, turns a deaf ear or blind eye and is not taking care of the complaint, the only course open to the complainant is to approach the Magistrate court concerned with a private complaint. Other decisions are also there on the subject. The attention of this Court is invited to Minu Kumari and another v. State of Bihar and others ( 2006 (4) SCC 359 ), Hari Singh v. State of U.P. ( 2006 (5) SCC 733 ), Aleque Padamsee and others v. Union of India and others ( 2007 (6) SCC 171 ) and Doliben Kantilal Patel vs. State of Gujarat and another ( 2013 (9) SCC 447 ). 53. This Court is of the view that on the pronouncement of the judgment of the Apex Court by its constitution bench in Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. [2013 (4) KLT 632 (SC)], the legal position has been settled. Therefore, the earlier decisions noted above could only be dealt with in accordance with the findings entered by the Apex Court in Lalita Kumari (supra). Law has been settled on that aspect. Till then, the only way out of a complainant whose complaint was not being attended to by the police, whether the complaint discloses a cognizable offence or not, was to have recourse to a private complaint before the Magistrate's court concerned. The position has been changed after Lalita Kumari (supra). 54. In Lalita Kumari (supra), it was held in paragraph 111:- 111. The position has been changed after Lalita Kumari (supra). 54. In Lalita Kumari (supra), it was held in paragraph 111:- 111. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold: (i) Registration of F.I.R. is mandatory under S.154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. (ii) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. (iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the F.I.R. must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further. (iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the F.I.R. if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence. (v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.” 55. As held in Lalita Kumari (supra), when the complaint preferred by a person before a police officer reveals a cognizable offence, the police officer has no other go than to register a crime. If he has anything reasonably to suspect whether it involves a cognizable offence or not, then only, it is open to him to have a preliminary enquiry merely for the purpose of noting down whether a cognizable offence has been revealed or not. If facts are clear in the complaint, the police officer concerned cannot turn a blind eye or deaf ear towards such a complaint. He is duty bound in such cases to register the crime. 56. We need not think about the way out in case the police is not registering a crime even when a cognizable offence is revealed in the complaint. We need not search for the way out anywhere; that is also contained in the decision. When it is the mandate of the Supreme Court by its Constitutional Bench, the non-compliance of the said mandate will necessarily invite contempt. We need not search for the way out anywhere; that is also contained in the decision. When it is the mandate of the Supreme Court by its Constitutional Bench, the non-compliance of the said mandate will necessarily invite contempt. 57. The learned counsel for the 5th respondent has invited the attention of this Court to the decision in Riju Prasad Sarma v. State of Assam and others [2015 KHC 4448 (SC)] wherein it was held in paragraph 9:- “9. On behalf of the appellants, a number of judgments have been cited in course of reply to the aforesaid stand of the respondents in respect of locus / status. No doubt, the concept of locus was seriously diluted in the majority of cited cases which were noticeably in the nature of Public Interest Litigation. But the writ petitions filed before the learned single judge or even before the Division Bench claimed rights in the petitioners as administrator or as lawful representative of religious endowment or the deity and were not in the nature of PIL. In any case, in view of strong and categorical denial made by the respondents to the right of the Debutter Board to represent the deity of Maa Kamakhya in writ petition No. 923 of 2005, the Division Bench could not have ignored the issue of rights and status. Hence, in our considered view it was necessary for the Division Bench on being called upon through pleadings, to decide the locus or status of the appellants representing the Debutter Board. In its wholesome writ jurisdiction, the Division Bench could not have shut its eyes and ears to such a serious dispute arising in the context of a public religious endowment relating to Maa Kamakhya temple in the Nilachal hills of Assam at Guwahati, which is highly revered by the Hindus residing anywhere since several centuries.” 58. On the basis of Riju Prasad Sarma (supra), the learned counsel for the 5th respondent has argued that the question of locus standi of the complainant to maintain this complaint has also to be enquired into and considered. According to the learned counsel, when Diocese is a juridical person, an outsider cannot challenge the acts of the Diocese. Of course, the Diocese is a juridical person. According to the learned counsel, when Diocese is a juridical person, an outsider cannot challenge the acts of the Diocese. Of course, the Diocese is a juridical person. But, what has been challenged in Ext.P1 is not the acts of the Diocese; whereas, it is the acts allegedly committed by respondents 3 to 6 to frustrate the Diocese and all the persons interested in the Diocese. A Diocese can only be considered as the jurisdictional limit within which the Archbishop concerned is exercising his jurisdiction and nothing more. It is an Apex Body of all the churches coming under it and therefore, it cannot be said that a member of any of the churches coming under it cannot have an interest in the affairs of the Diocese. The Diocese may not be able to say anything because it is not a living thing. At the same time, its interest has to be protected. Apart from respondents 3 to 6, none of the members of the Diocese has a case that the complainant has no locus standi in the matter. It is a matter that has to be investigated into. Let the matter be investigated. 59. Another argument forwarded by the learned counsel for the 5th respondent is based on Canon 119 of the Code of Canons, which says that Eparchial Bishop represents the Eparchy in all its juridic affairs. It is true that the 3rd respondent has to represent the Eparchy in all its juridic affairs. At the same time, it is only in a representative capacity he can represent the Diocese. As pointed out earlier, he is not the Diocese; whereas, he can only represent the Diocese. Therefore, the interest of the Eparchial Bishop and the interest of the Diocese are distinct and separate. It is for the 3rd respondent to safeguard all the interests of the Diocese when he is entrusted with the properties of the Diocese. He cannot recklessly deal with the property, and simply say that Diocese has lost money. If there is deliberate recklessness or deliberate acts by which loss has been caused to the properties of the Diocese or to the Diocese, it can invite the offence of criminal breach of trust. If misappropriation is alleged, it can invite the offence of criminal misappropriation. If there is deliberate recklessness or deliberate acts by which loss has been caused to the properties of the Diocese or to the Diocese, it can invite the offence of criminal breach of trust. If misappropriation is alleged, it can invite the offence of criminal misappropriation. If conspiracy is allegedly hatched for misappropriation or for committing criminal breach of trust, it will invite the offence under Section 120B of the IPC. 60. The allegations contained in Ext.P1 are sufficient to invite the offences under Sections 120B, 406 as well as 415 IPC. It is a matter to be investigated into. This is not the end of the road as far as respondents 3 to 6 are concerned. Even if a crime is registered, they can well challenge the FIR itself; because they are not being heard on these offences at present. Even after that stage, if a final report comes, it is open to them to challenge the final report itself. 61. Along with Ext.P1 complaint, all the documents which point towards the possible commission of the said offences are also annexed by the complainant. The allegations in the complaint along with the documents appended with it prima facie reveal the possibility of the commission of cognizable offences under Sections 120B, 406 and 415 of the IPC. It is idle on the part of the 1st respondent to contend that the complaint is of a civil nature. The 1st respondent is not justified in treating the said complaint as one of civil in nature. Therefore, there is no other alternative for this Court than to issue a writ of mandamus as prayed for. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the 1st respondent is ordered to register a crime in the matter and to conduct an investigation properly and impartially. It is made clear that the Investigating Officer should conduct the investigation truly, correctly and impartially, that too quite untrammeled by any of the observations made by this Court in this judgment.