ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by respondent no.1 in W.P (S) no.5132 of 2001. The writ petition was preferred by respondent no.1 in this Letters Patent Appeal. The writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the punishment of dismissal of respondent no.1 was quashed and set aside and hence, the original respondent no.1 has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Factual Matrix: • The respondent is the original petitioner who was working as Constable in Central Reserve Police Force. • The respondent (original petitioner) applied for leave for the period running from 6th March, 2000 to 4th May, 2000, which was granted and the purpose of leave was sought for marriage of the respondent. • During the period for which the leave was granted, no marriage of respondent was solemnized. • During the period of leave and further absenteeism leave of 70 days, it is alleged by this appellant that in place of brother of the respondent, who had applied for the post of Constable in the erstwhile State of Bihar, this respondent had affixed his photo at the application of his brother, he appeared in the long jump test etc., and because of impersonation later on the respondent (original petitioner) was arrested on 29th May, 2000 and he was enlarged on bail vide order dated 3rd July, 2000. • After release from the custody and during pendency of the criminal case, the respondent reported on duty. • By now, the respondent reported after 70 days of unauthorized absenteeism. Thus, the respondent not only enjoyed the sanctioned leave of 60 days, but, he also enjoyed 70 days unauthorized absenteeism and meanwhile committed the offence for which a criminal case was also instituted under Sections 418, 419, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. • There is acquittal from the criminal charges as the offences were not proved “beyond reasonable doubt”. • Charge-sheet was issued on 29th August, 2000 upon respondent no.1 (Annexure-1). • Departmental enquiry was started and after examining the witnesses during the departmental proceeding it was concluded that charges leveled against the respondent-delinquent were held as proved. The charges were as under- - Unbecoming of the Constable in Central Reserve Police Force - Dereliction in duty - Negligence in performing the duty etc. • Departmental enquiry was started and after examining the witnesses during the departmental proceeding it was concluded that charges leveled against the respondent-delinquent were held as proved. The charges were as under- - Unbecoming of the Constable in Central Reserve Police Force - Dereliction in duty - Negligence in performing the duty etc. • Thus, the charges on civil sides and on criminal sides are entirely different. The charges have been held as proved in the departmental proceeding. • Disciplinary authority passed an order on 8th January, 2001 (Annexure-3 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) after giving adequate opportunity of being heard and the punishment of dismissal was passed. • Departmental appeal was preferred by respondent (original petitioner) and departmental appeal was also dismissed vide order dated 16th October, 2001 (Annexure-6 to the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition being W.P.(S) no. 5132 of 2010). • Being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by the order of dismissal, the writ petition was preferred by respondent no.1 being W.P.(S) no. 5132 of 2010 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 24th February, 2012 and hence, the respondent no.1 has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. Reasons: 3. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that too much reliance was placed by respondent no.1 (original petitioner) as well as on the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge about the acquittal from the criminal charges which was under Sections 418, 419, 471 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. It ought to be kept in mind that charges levelled against the respondent as delinquent are different than those under the Indian Penal Code levelled against the respondent no.1 as an accused. 5. The charges on civil sides are: (a) Dereliction in duty (b) Unbecoming of the Constable in the Central Reserve Police Force, (c) Negligence in performing the duty, (d) Unauthorized absenteeism etc., which are entirely different from charges levelled against this respondent no.1 on criminal side which are as under- (a) Section 418 – cheating with a knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to person whose interest offender is bound to protect and punishment made thereunder. (b) Section 419 – punishment for cheating by personation and punishment made thereunder. (b) Section 419 – punishment for cheating by personation and punishment made thereunder. (c) Section 468 – there was a charge of forgery for cheating upon respondent no.1. (d) Section 471 – there was a charge for using as genuine a forged document. Thus, the charges on civil sides and criminal sides were entirely different. 6. Charges on criminal sides might have been held as “not proved” because charges on criminal sides are to be proved on a strict basis of evidence which is popularly known as proof of a charge beyond all reasonable doubts. 7. Charges on civil sides – in a departmental proceedings are to be proved on the basis of preponderance of probability. 8. Thus, in the facts of the present case, as per Inquiry Officer’s report the charges levelled against this appellant-delinquent respondent no. 1, has been held as proved. 9. We are not sitting in an appeal against the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer. Suffice to say at this stage that on the basis of evidences on record, a subjective satisfaction was arrived at by the Inquiry Officer, based upon objective facts on record, which is known as evidence on record. We are not inclined to take any other view than what is taken by the disciplinary authority. 10. It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 as under: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.” (emphasis supplied) 11. It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. SRTC v. Har Narain Singh reported in (1998) 9 SCC 220 as under: “A disciplinary enquiry was held against the respondent who was a bus conductor in the appellant’s Corporation. The Assistant Regional Manager of the appellant himself conducted the enquiry and found that the charges against the respondent are proved. He issued a show-cause notice on punishment to the respondent. After considering the reply given by the respondent he imposed a punishment of dismissal from service on the respondent. The respondent preferred an appeal before the Regional Manager which was dismissed. The respondent then preferred a claim before the Labour Tribunal. The Labour Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. Thereafter, the respondent preferred a petition before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal at Lucknow. The Tribunal dismissed the respondent’s petition and held that there is no illegality in the conduct of the enquiry. It also held that the reasons given by the enquiry officer cannot be said to be perverse or against merit on record. From this judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 11-10-1985 the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. It also held that the reasons given by the enquiry officer cannot be said to be perverse or against merit on record. From this judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 11-10-1985 the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. A Single Judge of the High Court re-appreciated the evidence led in the enquiry and quashed the order passed by the Tribunal as also the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in doing so because the High Court was not sitting in appeal over the findings given by the disciplinary authority. The re-examination of the evidence led in the disciplinary proceedings was not warranted. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court are, therefore, set aside and the order of the Tribunal is restored. The appeal is allowed accordingly.” (emphasis supplied) 12. It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 as under: “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil.) 8. xxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx 9. Several witnesses were examined to prove the charge. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil.) 8. xxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx 9. Several witnesses were examined to prove the charge. One of them was H.S. Sharma who conducted the preliminary enquiry and to whom the respondent had made a statement broadly admitting the facts which constituted the subject-matter of the second charge. I.M. Rawal, who was the cashier and I.C. Ojha, the officiating Branch Manager were also examined. Based upon their evidence, the enquiry officer found the respondent to be guilty of the second charge and that has been accepted by the disciplinary authority. The High Court has interfered with the said finding without expressly holding that the said finding of guilt was erroneous. The High Court has proceeded as if it was sitting in appeal over the departmental enquiry and interfered with the finding on a vague assumption that the respondent must have acted bona fide in an “increasing customer-friendly atmosphere”. There was no justification for the Division Bench to interfere with the finding of guilt.” (emphasis supplied) 13. It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of SBI v. Narendra Kumar Pandey reported in (2013) 2 SCC 740 as under: “25. The High Court, in our view, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not justified in interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the appointing authority after a full-fledged inquiry, especially when the Service Rules provide for an alternative remedy of appeal. It is a well-accepted principle of law that the High Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority. Of course, its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct an error of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of the principles of natural justice. In SBI v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde this Court held that the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence acting as a court of appeal. We have, on facts, found that no procedural irregularity has been committed either by the Bank, presenting officer or the inquiring authority. Disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the Service Rules.” (emphasis supplied) 14. In SBI v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde this Court held that the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence acting as a court of appeal. We have, on facts, found that no procedural irregularity has been committed either by the Bank, presenting officer or the inquiring authority. Disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the Service Rules.” (emphasis supplied) 14. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements and as we are not sitting in an appeal against a conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer, the charges levelled against this respondent no.1 has been held as proved which are dereliction in the duty, negligence in preferring the duty, unbecoming of the Constable in Central Reserve Police Force etc., his conduct is unbecoming of the Constable in Central Reserve Police Force which is a disciplined force. 15. Looking to the procedure followed by the Inquiry Officer there is no procedural lacuna in holding departmental proceeding. Moreover, as per the Inquiry officer’s report it cannot be said that it is based upon no evidence on record. 16. Looking to the orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority, there is no procedural lacuna in holding departmental enquiry, it cannot be said that the Enquiry Officer’s report is based upon no evidence on record. Thus, there is no illegality in holding the departmental proceeding. 17. Now, once the departmental proceedings have been initiated in accordance with law and there is no procedural lacuna, the only question left out to be looked out by this Court is quantum of punishment. Looking to the fact that Central Reserve Police Force is a disciplined force and respondent no.1-delinquent was working as a Constable and he has remained unauthorizedly absent for 70 days and moreover during the period of absenteeism he was arrested on 29th May, 2000 for varieties of charges levelled against him, thereafter, he was enlarged on bail as he has allegedly assisted his brother, the punishment inflicted upon respondent no.1 by disciplinary authority dated 8th January, 2001 cannot be labelled as shockingly disproportionate punishment nor it can be said to be unreasonably excessive punishment. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent and hence, we hereby, quash and set aside the judgment and order passed in W.P. (S) No.5132 of 2001 dated 24th February, 2012. 18. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and disposed of. 19. In view of the final order passed in this Letters Patent Appeal, I.A. No. 2525 of 2012 stands disposed of.