ORDER : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 10.04.2017 passed by the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in A.T.A No. 771(18) 2016 whereby the learned Tribunal has directed the petitioner to refund a sum of Rs. 25,93,021/- within a period of 15 days from the date of the order to the respondent-establishment failing which the amount would carry interest @ 12% per annum till the date of payment/realization. 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the respondent-establishment is a school and has two units, one at Burdwan Compound, Lalpur, Ranchi having P.F Code No. JH/6640 and the other at Bariatu, Ranchi having P.F Code No. JH-6640-A. A complaint dated 05.07.2005 was received from Class-IV employees of M/s DAV Nandraj Public School, Bariatu, Ranchi regarding non-extension of PF benefits from the date of their joining. In terms of the said complaint, a squad of Enforcement Officers were deputed for inspection which verified the attendance register and salary register and submitted the report dated 16.09.2005 stating that the school was maintaining two separate registers, one for permanent staff and another for temporary staff. After getting the report, the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Ranchi initiated a proceeding under Section 7A of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous provisions Act, 1952 (in short, “the Act, 1952”) and passed the order of assessment on 05.04.2006 to the tune of Rs. 14,35,570/- towards provident fund and allied dues as well as Rs. 7,85,495/- towards the interest payable under section 7Q of the Act, 1952 against the unit at Lalpur and a sum of Rs. 3,05,375/- towards the provident fund and allied dues as well as Rs. 66,581/- towards interest under section 7Q of the Act, 1952 against the unit at Bariatu Ranchi. Thereafter, the respondent-establishment filed a petition under section 7B of the Act, 1952 for review of the order of assessment passed under section 7A of the Act, 1952 which was also rejected vide order dated 03.07.2006. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent-establishment moved in appeal before the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (in short Tribunal) by filing A.T.A No. 641/(3)/2006 which was finally disposed of on 29.07.2008 remanding the matter to the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Ranchi to conduct a fresh enquiry and determine the provident fund dues after identification of beneficiaries i.e. permanent and temporary employees. Accordingly, a fresh proceeding was initiated with due notice to the respondent-establishment vide letter dated 04.09.2008 and finally vide order dated 29.07.2011, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (C&R), Ranchi disposed of the proceeding by assessing the dues of Rs.12,057/- against the respondent-establishment. Subsequently, the respondent-establishment filed an application before the Tribunal for refund of the excess amount paid to the petitioner, which was registered as A.T.A No. 771(18) 2016 and the same was disposed of vide the impugned order dated 10.04.2017 directing the petitioner organization to refund the excess amount within a period of 15 days failing which the same shall carry interest of 12% per annum till the date of realization. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the amount directed to be deposited vide order dated 29.07.2011 was over and above the amount already deposited by the respondent-establishment and thus the learned Tribunal by misconstruing the said order, directed the petitioner-organization to refund the balance amount already paid by the respondent-establishment. 4. To appreciate the contention of the petitioner, I have gone through the record. The learned Tribunal had remanded the matter to the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner by observing that since no identification of beneficiary had been made, a fresh inquiry was required to be conducted for determination of provident fund dues after identification of beneficiaries. Thereafter, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ranchi examined the matter afresh in the light of the observation of the Tribunal. In the order dated 29.07.2011, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ranchi observed that the hearing was conducted for 125 employees out of which the establishment claimed that 63 were already enrolled, the name of the eight employees were mentioned twice and the rest 54 persons were never employed by them. It has further been observed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner that no record was made available either by the complainant or by the Enforcement Officer for identification of the employees who worked in the establishment during the notice period and as such there was no other option but to rely upon the documents given by the establishment and to identify the name of those employees who had been paid wages by the establishment but were not enrolled as EPF members. Thereafter, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ranchi identified 22 persons and the dues against the establishment was assessed as Rs.12,057/-. 5. The relevant part of the order dated 29.07.2011 is quoted hereinbelow:- “It is to be pointed out here that the assessed dues of Rs.12057/- (Rs. Twelve thousand and fifty seven only) is for dues not remitted at the time of making of original 7A order dated 08.04.2006 for the notice period mentioned above. The department will be at liberty to re-open the case as and when any information regarding deprivation/non-extension of membership in any manner is received corroborated with any cognizable, maintainable and reliable document or evidence.” 6. It thus appears that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (C&R), Ranchi has specifically observed in the order dated 29.07.2011 that only 22 persons were identified after remand, who were paid wages by the establishment but were not enrolled as PF member and as such the liability was fixed for Rs.12,057/- only. However, in the last paragraph of the order dated 29.07.2011, the liberty was granted to the department to re-open the case as and when any information is received with sufficient evidence regarding deprivation of membership. The said order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (C&R), Ranchi has not been challenged by the petitioner, rather the same has been misconstrued in the manner that the dues assessed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (C&R), Ranchi in the order dated 29.7.2011 was over and above the amount already deposited. Otherwise also, in the case of H.P. State Forest Corporation Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner reported in (2008) 5 SCC 756 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the amount due from the corporation will be determined only with respect to those employees who are available and whose entitlement can be proved by evidence. I find force in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that if the amount is allowed to be retained by the RPFC, it can’t be paid to the beneficiaries since only 22 employees were identified by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner. 7. I am therefore of the considered view that after the order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ranchi dated 29.07.2011, the petitioner has no power to retain the amount recovered from the respondents as the same would be “unjust enrichment”. 8. 7. I am therefore of the considered view that after the order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ranchi dated 29.07.2011, the petitioner has no power to retain the amount recovered from the respondents as the same would be “unjust enrichment”. 8. In the case of M/s. Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandal Ltd. versus Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs reported in 2005 (3) SCC 738 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “31. Stated simply, ‘Unjust enrichment’ means retention of a benefit by a person that is unjust or inequitable. ‘Unjust enrichment’ occurs when a person retains money or benefits which in justice, equity and good conscience, belong to someone else. 32. The doctrine of ‘unjust enrichment’, therefore, is that no person can be allowed to enrich inequitably at the expense of another. A right of recovery under the doctrine of ‘unjust enrichment’ arises where retention of a benefit is considered contrary to justice or against equity.” 9. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction conferred under the Act, 1952 while passing the impugned order since it had initiated the proceeding akin to the Court having original jurisdiction. The stand of the respondents is that after the order dated 29.07.2011, the establishment represented the petitioner-organization to refund the excess amount, however the same was not responded and thus an application was filed before the Tribunal for the appropriate direction. As per Section 7-I of the Act, 1952, any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government, or an order passed by the Central Government, or any authority, under the proviso to sub-section 3, or sub-section 4 of section 1, or section 3, or sub-section (1) of section 7A, or section 7B [except an order rejecting an application for review referred to in sub-section 5 thereof], or section 7C, or section 14B, may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such notification or order. 10. In the present case, though the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ranchi in the order dated 29.07.2011 assessed the dues of the petitioner to the tune of Rs. 12,057/-, no direction for refund was passed. Thus, the remedy available before the respondent-establishment was either to prefer review petition under section 7B of the Act, 1952 or an appeal before the Tribunal. In the present case, though the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ranchi in the order dated 29.07.2011 assessed the dues of the petitioner to the tune of Rs. 12,057/-, no direction for refund was passed. Thus, the remedy available before the respondent-establishment was either to prefer review petition under section 7B of the Act, 1952 or an appeal before the Tribunal. On the application of the petitioner, the learned Tribunal, while observing that no fresh order under Section 7C of the Act, 1952 was passed, ordered for release of the excess amount of Rs. 25,93,021/- to the respondents. 11. Thus, I do not find any infirmity in the order of the Tribunal directing for refund of an amount of Rs. 25,93,021/-. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that all the authorities such as Central Provident Fund Commissioner, Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner, Deputy Provident Fund Commissioner, Regional provident Fund Commissioner or any Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner are the quasi-judicial authorities under the Act, 1952 and thus they cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging an order passed by the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi. The quasi-judicial authorities are required to adjudicate the liability of the employer under the said Act and, thus, they cannot be said to be the aggrieved parties. Only the employer or the employee can be said to be the aggrieved party on the given facts of the case. 13. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel for the respondents has put reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail Vs. Spl. Director, Enforcement Directorate and Another reported in (2007) 8 SCC 254 . In the said case, the issue was as to whether a Special Director appointed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 can prefer appeal before the High Court against the order of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board. Ismail Vs. Spl. Director, Enforcement Directorate and Another reported in (2007) 8 SCC 254 . In the said case, the issue was as to whether a Special Director appointed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 can prefer appeal before the High Court against the order of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board. The Hon’ble Apex Court after going through section 5 of the Act, 1973 observed that a notification was required to be issued by the Central Government delegating specific functions under the Act and thus held that for the purpose of exercising the functions of the Central Government, the officer concerned must be specifically authorized and in absence of that, an adjudicating authority exercising quasi-judicial power cannot prefer appeal against the order of Board. 14. In the present case, the respondents have failed to show any such provision in the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952 similar to Section 5 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 thus the same will not squarely apply to the present case. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon the judgment of different High Courts wherein while relying on the judgment rendered in the case of Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail (supra.), it has been held that the Provident Fund Commissioner exercising quasi-judicial power cannot prefer writ petition against the order of Tribunal. 16. Per contra, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner/Regional Provident Fund Commissioner is not just vested with quasi-judicial power rather he is also entrusted with the power to efficiently administer the scheme so as to protect the interest of the subscribers/beneficiaries. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also puts reliance on an unreported judgment dated 21st January, 2013 passed by the learned Single Judge of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court rendered in the case of Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner Vs. M/s Sai Construction Company (W.P. No. 4948 of 2011) wherein while relying on the Division Bench judgment of that court rendered in L.P.A No. 320 of 2012, it was held that section 5-D of the EPF Act confers power to the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner to efficiently administer the scheme framed under the Act, 1952 and therefore the said authority as well as the other authorities vested with such powers under EPF Act have the right to file the writ petition so as to protect the interest of the subscribers/beneficiaries. 17. 17. It appears that there are diverse opinions of the different High Courts on the issue as to whether the Provident Fund Commissioner can prefer writ petition against the order of Tribunal which needs interpretation of the relevant provisions of law. 18. Since the case of the petitioner has failed on merit itself, the issue with regard to the jurisdiction of the Provident Fund Commissioner to prefer appeal against the order of Tribunal is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present writ petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed.