JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi, J.—The instant second appeal has been preferred by the defendant-appellant who is aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 22.1.2018, passed by Additional District Judge/F.T.C. No. 1, Jhansi in Civil Appeal No. 30/2014, Anil Rai v. Smt. Parwati Kushwaha and others, whereby the learned lower appellate Court has dismissed the appeal of defendant-appellant and has affirmed the judgment and order dated 14.4.2014 passed by Additional Civil Judge, Junior Division Jhansi decreeing the Original Suit No. 133/2009, Suraj Prasad and others v. Anil Rai, filed by the plaintiffs-respondents. 2. Heard Shri K.K. Tiwari appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellant and Sushri Rama Goel Bansal appearing for the plaintiffs-respondents on the point of admission. Perused the record. 3. vide order dated 23.7.2018, of this Court, the file of Second Appeal No. 1192 of 2003, had been summoned. I have also perused the same which shows that the aforesaid Second Appeal No. 1192 of 2003, filed by Shri Devi @ Devidas (defendant-appellant) in respect of the same disputed house, has already been dismissed by this Court, vide order dated 19.11.2003. The earlier order dated 23.7.2018 of this Court, summoning the record of aforesaid appeal is quoted below: “Smt. Rama Goel Bansal, learned counsel representing the plaintiffs-respondents has pointed out that there is concealment on the part of defendant-appellant as he has not disclosed the status of the Second Appeal No. 1192 of 2003, which was dismissed by an order dated 19.11.2003. The Court below, on the basis of the statement of the counsel representing the defendant-appellant, has proceeded as if the Second Appeal No. 1192 of 2003 is pending before this Court. There is a clear cut concealment by the defendant-appellant and based on the statement the impugned proceedings are being carried out. This matter requires consideration as to what would be the amount of cost to be fixed against the defendant-appellant in this case. Let it be placed before the appropriate Bench day after tomorrow i.e. 25.7.2018 for further orders alongwith connected Second Appeal No. 1192 of 2003.” 4. In the backdrop of the above quoted earlier order, it appears expedient to decide this second appeal on merits at the admission stage itself. 5. Let it be placed before the appropriate Bench day after tomorrow i.e. 25.7.2018 for further orders alongwith connected Second Appeal No. 1192 of 2003.” 4. In the backdrop of the above quoted earlier order, it appears expedient to decide this second appeal on merits at the admission stage itself. 5. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts in brief are that the plaintiffs-respondents namely Suraj Prasad and others, filed Original Suit No. 133/2009 against the defendant-appellant-Anil Rai for ejectment and payment of damages at the rate of Rs. 50/- per day for the unauthorized use of the disputed house No. 197 situated at Village Simraha Pargana, Tehsil and District-Jhansi. The plaintiffs case as per the plaint averments is that the house No. 197 is their ancestral house and they are the owners in possession of it and their fathers had deposited its house tax on 13.12.1957, 28.7.1965, 8.7.1965 and 27.8.1993. The aforesaid house was partitioned between the family of two brothers namely Sukke (father of the plaintiffs No. 1 to 3) and his brother Late Ram Prasad. The northern part of the house went to the share of Ram Prasad and after his death, his two daughters, namely Smt. Patari and Smt. Munni inherited the same. The daughters sold their shares to one Suresh Rai and gave possession to him, who is still the owner in possession of the share of Ram Prasad. Devi Das @ Devi, from whom the defendant Anil Rai is claiming to have purchased the disputed house, had no concern with that house and he had no right to sell the same to Shri Anil Rai. Therefore, the sale-deed executed by Devi Das of the disputed house, in favour of defendant Anil Rai, being void-abinitio, the defendant be dispossessed from the aforesaid house and he also be directed to pay the damages to the plaintiffs for the unauthorized use of their house at the rate of Rs. 50/- per day. It was also averred in the plaint that earlier Devi Das had filed O.S. No. 69/1996, Devi Das v. Kallu and others against them and Kallu Ram had filed O.S. No. 130/1996, Kallu Ram v. Devi Das in respect of the same house in which the learned trial Court had held that Devi Das has no title of the house. 6. The defendant filed written statement denying from the plaint averments. 6. The defendant filed written statement denying from the plaint averments. He stated that the house in question was the ancestral house of Devi Das @ Devi which he had inherited from his father Bankey. Suresh Rai is neither the owner nor in possession of the disputed house. In February, 1994 the father of plaintiff Nos. 4,5 and 6 and husband of Plaintiff No. 7, Late Kallu Ram had initiated a Case No. 35/2004, Kallu Ram and others v. Devi and others, under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in respect of the house in question which was dismissed on 29.4.2005 as the house in question was found to be in possession of Devi Das. The defendant is the bona fide purchaser of the aforesaid house. He has purchased it by paying full sale consideration to Devi Das. It was further averred in the written statement that in the O.S. No. 69/1996, Devi Das v. Kallu and others, and O.S. No. 130/1996, Kallu Ram and others v. Devi Das, too, the trial Court upheld the possession of Devi Das on the disputed house. To show the title of Devi Das on the disputed house, the defendant-appellant took the plea of ‘adverse possession’. In the written statement, it was averred that Kallu Ram etc., were continuously threatening Devi Das that they would dispossess him from the house in question, but Devi Das refused to evict the house and since then Devi Das was in possession of the aforesaid house openly in the knowledge of everyone. The plaintiffs did not take any action against Devi Das from January, 1990 to 29.3.2005, therefore, Devi Das acquired the ownership of the house by virtue of ‘adverse possession’ and he was fully authorized to sell the aforesaid house to the defendant/appellant. 7. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed nine issues, out of which issue Nos. 1,2,7,8 and 9, are relevant. All these issues have been decided together and the trial Court has recorded its finding that in earlier suits decided between the parties in respect of the same house, it has been already held that Devi Das was not the owner of the disputed house. The appeal filed by Devi Das was also dismissed, therefore, it cannot be held that Devi Das was the owner of the disputed house. The appeal filed by Devi Das was also dismissed, therefore, it cannot be held that Devi Das was the owner of the disputed house. Accordingly, it was held by the learned trial Court that Devi Das being not the owner of the disputed house, he had no right to sell it to the defendant-appellant. 8. The learned trial Court also observed that the defendant-Anil Rai has taken two self contradictory pleas in respect of the disputed house. On one hand, he has stated that Devi Das, from whom he has purchased the house had inherited it from his father Bankey and on the other hand he is claiming that Devi Das had perfected his title on the disputed house through ‘adverse possession’. Therefore, the learned trial Court was of the view that these two pleas are inconsistent to each other and cannot be taken simultaneously. 9. On the aforesaid ground, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents directing the defendant-appellant to vacate the house within three months. 10. Being aggrieved, the defendant-appellant filed Civil Appeal No. 30/2014. The learned lower appellate Court framed five points for determination and after a detailed discussion and appreciation of the entire evidence led by the parties and taking into consideration the findings earlier recorded by the Courts in respect of the same disputed house, in O.S No. 59/1995, O.S. No. 130/1995, Civil Appeal Nos. 89/1999 and 83/1999, litigated between the parties in respect of the same disputed house, came to the conclusion that the defendant-appellant has failed to prove the title of Devi Das on the disputed house either through inheritance or through adverse possession. 11. With regard to plea of adverse possession, the learned lower appellate Court relied on the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Degadewai (dead) through legal heirs v. Abbas @ Gulab Rustam Pinjari, 2017 (2) ARC 31, and held that adverse possession can always be claimed against the true owner of the property and the owner should be made a party in the suit, whereas in this case the defendant-appellant has categorically denied the ownership of plaintiffs, therefore, his plea of adverse possession taken by the defendant is self-contradictory. 12. In view of the above findings, the learned lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant/appellant and affirmed the impugned judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. 13. 12. In view of the above findings, the learned lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant/appellant and affirmed the impugned judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. 13. Now the defendant-appellant is before this Court by means of the present second appeal. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the impugned judgements passed by the Courts below being contrary to law and against the evidence available on record of the case are liable to be set-aside. It is contended that the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. initiated by Kallu Ram against Devi Das, were dismissed on 29.8.2005 because Devi Das was found to be in possession of the property in dispute. In two earlier Suits too, filed by Devi Das and Kallu against each other (O.S. No. 69/1996 and O.S. No. 130/1996), the possession of Devi Das was found on the disputed house by the Courts. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that as Devi Das was continuously in possession of the disputed house, in the knowledge of everyone, he perfected his title by way of adverse possession, due to which he became the owner of the property in dispute having full rights and title to transfer it to the defendant-appellant by way of sale-deed. 15. Learned counsel has further contended that the plaintiffs witness Jagdish Kushwaha (P.W.1), during his cross-examination, has admitted the fact that Devi Das was residing in the disputed house since 25-30 years. Smt. Phoolwati (D.W.2) who is the wife of Devi Das has also stated that she is residing in the house in question since her marriage and the defendant, after purchasing the house in question in the year 2005, is residing there without any interference. However, both the Courts below, without considering the evidence in a proper manner, have dismissed the suit and appeal only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. 16. Per contra, Ms. Rama Goel Bansal, learned counsel for the caveator-respondents has vehemently contended that there are concurrent findings of facts by both the Courts below in this case. She has submitted that as per the well-settled legal position, unless there is some perversity, the High Court should not interfere in the second appeal if there are concurrent findings. 17. Per contra, Ms. Rama Goel Bansal, learned counsel for the caveator-respondents has vehemently contended that there are concurrent findings of facts by both the Courts below in this case. She has submitted that as per the well-settled legal position, unless there is some perversity, the High Court should not interfere in the second appeal if there are concurrent findings. 17. It is further contended by learned counsel for the caveator-respondents that the defendant-appellant has taken two inconsistent pleas to show the title of Devi Das on the disputed house. Firstly, that Devi Das acquired its title by inheritance from his father Bankey and secondly through adverse possession. The contention of learned counsel is that adverse possession is always claimed against the true owner of the house and if the owner of the house was Devi Das himself, how can he claim adverse possession against himself? 18. Learned counsel has further contended that the scope of second appeal is very limited. It can be admitted only if a debatable substantial question of law is involved, whereas in the present case, all the issues relating either to facts or to law have already been decided by the Court’s below on the basis of well-settled legal position, after a detailed discussion of the evidence led by the parties and no arguable substantial question now remains to be discussed in the present second appeal. 19. Learned counsel has lastly contended that the Second Appeal No. 1192/2003, Devi @ Devi Das v. Kallu and others, filed against the earlier litigation between the parties in respect of the same disputed house has already been dismissed at the admission stage by this Court as far back as on 19.11.2003. However, the defendant-appellant concealed this fact from both the Courts below, which is clearly evident from a perusal of last paragraph of internal page 8 of the judgment dated 22.1.2018 passed by the lower appellate Court, therefore, this appeal is liable to be dismissed with heavy cost at the admission stage itself in view of the fact that the appellant has not come to this Court with clean hands. 20. 20. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the records, including the record of second appeal No. 1192 of 2003, which has been tagged by the office with the file of this appeal, this Court is of the considered view that the instant appeal is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage itself. 21. A careful perusal of both the impugned judgments passed by the learned Civil Judge in Original Suit and the learned lower appellate Court in the appeal filed by the defendant-appellant shows that both the Courts below, after a detailed discussion of each and every aspect of the matter, have recorded concurrent findings about the ownership of the disputed house. The issue regarding ownership of the house in question was already decided in favour of Kallu Ram in O.S. No. 69/1996 and O.S. No. 130/1996. Both the aforesaid suits were consolidated vide order dated 22.1.1998 and dismissed vide order dated 28.7.1999, passed by Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Jhansi. The suit filed by Devi Das was dismissed on the ground that Devi Das was not found the owner of the property and suit filed by Kallu Ram was dismissed on the ground that he was not found in possession of the property, though he was found to be the owner of the property. 22. Against the judgment and decree dated 28.7.1999 passed in the aforesaid consolidated suits, two Civil Appeals No. 81/1999 and 83/1999 were filed by both the parties. Both the appeals were consolidated and decided together vide judgment and decree dated 28.7.2003 passed by Additional District Judge, Jhansi whereby dismissing both the appeals and confirming the judgments and decree dated 28.7.1999 holding Kallu Ram as the owner of the property in question and Devi Das, as in possession of the property in question. 23. Devi Das filed Second Appeal No. 1192 of 2003 in this Court, challenging the judgment and decree dated 25.8.2003 passed by the lower appellate Court, in respect of the same house No. 197. The said second appeal was dismissed vide order dated 19.11.2003 and the judgment and decree of the Court below was affirmed. 24. The defendant-appellant not only concealed this fact from both the Courts below but tried to show that the second appeal is still pending. The said second appeal was dismissed vide order dated 19.11.2003 and the judgment and decree of the Court below was affirmed. 24. The defendant-appellant not only concealed this fact from both the Courts below but tried to show that the second appeal is still pending. Thus, it is clear that the defendant-appellant has not come to Court with clean hands. The defendant-appellant is claiming his right on the disputed house on the basis of a sale-deed executed in his favour by Devi Das. The ownership of Devi Das in the disputed house has already been adjudicated in the earlier suits between the same parties, holding that Devi Das had no title of the disputed house. The aforesaid finding attained finality as far back as in the year 2003 when the second appeal filed by Devi Das was dismissed by this Court. 25. The defendant-appellant has purchased the house in question from Devi Das in the year 2005, i.e. after the dismissal of the second appeal of Devi Das in the year 2003. Thus, undoubtedly, Devi Das, being not the owner of the house in question had no right to sell the same to the defendant-appellant in wake of the well-settled legal principles “nemo dat quod non habet” no one can transfer a better title than he himself has. Therefore, the sale-deed executed by Devi Das in favour of defendant-appellant is void abinitio having no legal sanctity. 26. In so far as the plea of adverse possession taken by the defendant-appellant is concerned, the essential requirements for acquiring title over a property by adverse possession are : 1. Continuity in adverse possession: The possession and occupation of the property by the trespasser/claimant must be continuous, uninterrupted and unbroken for the entire statutory period of limitation. 2. Hostile possession: The claimant must occupy the property for the full statutory period of limitation by knowing fully well that he/she does not have any legal right to possess/occupy that property. The intention of trespasser must be to acquire title to the property by adverse possession against the true owner. 3. Actual Possession: The adverse possession must be actual possession such as construction of house, erection of shed or some structure, fencing the property, grazing cattle in the land, farming and harvesting of crop in the land, planting cutting trees etc. for the entire period of statutory period of limitation. 4. 3. Actual Possession: The adverse possession must be actual possession such as construction of house, erection of shed or some structure, fencing the property, grazing cattle in the land, farming and harvesting of crop in the land, planting cutting trees etc. for the entire period of statutory period of limitation. 4. Exclusive Possession: The claimant must be in sole physical possession of the property against the legal claim, right and title of the true owner or the other claimants for the statutory period of limitation. 27. It is worth mentioning that according to the defendant-appellant’s own statement, the plaintiffs/respondents were continuously asking Devi Das to vacate the disputed house, but Devi Das was not vacating it, therefore, the plaintiffs-respondents had to approach the Court by filing suit for eviction of Devi Das and mense profit. Under aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be said that the possession of Devi Das was uninterrupted and undisturbed. 28. The appellant has taken two inconsistent pleas of acquiring the title by Devi Das through inheritance and through adverse possession, which are mutually destructive. 29. In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly and others, (2008) 7 SCC 85 , the Apex Court has held that a party is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other. 30. In view of the above discussion, I am of the considered view that both the Court’s below have rightly dismissed the suit and appeal of the plaintiff/appellant. 31. Concurrent findings of facts have been recorded by both the Courts below. 32. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of judgments has laid down the law that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by two Courts below should not be interfered by the High Court in Second Appeal, unless and until the findings are perverse. 33. In Shivah Balram Haibatti v. Avinash Maruthi Pawar, (2018)11 SCC 652 , the Apex Court has held as under : “...... These findings being concurrent findings of fact were binding on the High Court and, therefore, the second appeal should have been dismissed in limine as involving no substantial question of law.” 34. 33. In Shivah Balram Haibatti v. Avinash Maruthi Pawar, (2018)11 SCC 652 , the Apex Court has held as under : “...... These findings being concurrent findings of fact were binding on the High Court and, therefore, the second appeal should have been dismissed in limine as involving no substantial question of law.” 34. In a recent case of Narendra and others v. Ajabrao S/o Narayan Katare (dead) through legal representatives, (2018) 11 SCC 564, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under : “...interference in second appeal with finding of fact is permissible where such finding is found to be wholly perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such finding or where that finding is found to be against any settled principle of law or pleadings or evidence. Such errors constitute a question of law permitting interference in Second Appeal.” 35. In one more recent case Dalip Singh v. Bhupinder Kaur, (2018) 3 SCC 677 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that if there is no perversity in concurrent findings of fact, interference by the High Court in Second Appeal is not permissible. 36. Learned counsel for the appellant could not show any perversity or illegality in the findings recorded by both the Courts. 37. Moreso, a perusal of record shows that the defendant-appellant not only suppressed a very important fact from both the Courts below that the second appeal No. 1192 of 2003 in respect of the same disputed house, has already been dismissed on 19.11.2003 by High Court, but he has also tried to conceal this fact from this Court. 38. Para 29 of the affidavit filed with memo of the present appeal shows that the appellant has stated about filing of Second Appeal No. 1192 of 2003 but has stated that the aforesaid appeal is still pending. The affidavit has been sworn in on 15.4.2018. 39. Clearly the appellant has suppressed the fact that second appeal No. 1192 of 2003 was already dismissed on 19.11.2003 giving finality to the dispute between the parties and he has not come to the Court with clean hands. 40. Courts have consistently taken the view that any one who approaches the Court must give full and fair disclosure of all the material facts. The Courts must not allow anyone to abuse the Court process. 40. Courts have consistently taken the view that any one who approaches the Court must give full and fair disclosure of all the material facts. The Courts must not allow anyone to abuse the Court process. In case a litigant conceals anything material, such an action would lead to an inference of fraud and the doors of justice would be closed for a litigant whose case is based on falsehood or suppression of material facts. Fraud and justice never dwell together. They are alien to each other. Fraud pollutes the sanctity, regularity, orderliness and solemnity of judicial proceedings. 41. In view of the above, this appeal is liable to be dismissed with costs and accordingly it is dismissed with costs of Rs. 50,000/-. 42. The appellant is granted a time of two months to vacate the house in question and to deposit the amount of cost in the account of Registrar General of this Court which shall be paid to the plaintiffs-respondents as damages for the unauthorized use of their house by the defendant-appellant.