JUDGMENT : 1. Two items of immovable properties standing in the name of one M.Esthoor constitute the subject matter of the instant second appeal. One item of property admeasures 9 Ares or thereabouts in re-survey No.515/14, 17 in Kadiapattanam village, Kalkulam Taluk, Manavalakurichi Sub District in Kanyakumari district. The other item of immovable property admeasures 64.5 Ares or thereabouts comprised in Re.S.Nos.335/6, 7, 8 in Noondakara-B village, Agasteeswaran Taluk, Rajakkamangalam Sub District in Kanyakumari District. Both these items of immovable properties are described as garden land with coconut trees. These two items of properties standing in the name of one M.Esthoor shall hereinafter be collectively referred to as 'suit properties' for the sake of brevity and convenience. For the sake of clarity, these two items of suit properties with four boundaries as described in the records of court below are set out hereunder : Sl. No. 1 2 District: Kanyakumari Kanyakumari Sub District: Manavalakurichi Rajakkamangalam Taluk: Kalkulam Agasteeswaram Village: Kadiapattanam Noondakara - B Re. Sy.No. 515/14, 17 335/6,7,8 Extent: 9 Ares 64.5 Ares Description of property. Garden land with Coconut Trees. Garden land with coconut trees. Boundaries: North: Property of Velayudha Perumal. Property of Velayudha Perumal. South: Ice Plant Ice Plant East : Plaintiff's and defendants' property. Property of a Doctor West : Ammancoil Property Plaintiff's and Defendants' property. 2. It is not in dispute before this Court that the above said Esthoor had 7 sons and 4 daughters in all. The genesis for this lis commenced more than a quarter century ago in 1992. In other words, the genesis for this litigation commenced more than two and half decades ago. To be precise, it commenced on 19.3.1992 when one E.Dennis, one of the seven sons of the aforesaid Esthoor filed a partition suit in O.S.No.257 of 1992 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Padmanabhapuram. As there is a second round of litigation about which there shall be discussion infra, this O.S.No.257 of 1992 on the file of District Munsif Court, Padmanabhapuram shall be referred to as 'senior suit' in this judgment. (To be noted, this senior suit was subsequently transferred to District Munsif Court, Eraniel and was renumbered as O.S.No.303 of 1995). In the senior suit, Dennis sought for division by metes and bounds and separate possession of 1/9th share in the suit properties. 3. (To be noted, this senior suit was subsequently transferred to District Munsif Court, Eraniel and was renumbered as O.S.No.303 of 1995). In the senior suit, Dennis sought for division by metes and bounds and separate possession of 1/9th share in the suit properties. 3. The plaint was predicated on the ground that suit properties were purchased in the name of his father M.Esthoor from and out of the earnings of members of the family. Immediate and proximate cause or in other words cause of action for filing of the senior suit (as it unfurls from the plaint) was that M.Esthoor's son-in-law L.Celestine was influencing M.Esthoor to get suit properties conveyed by sale deeds in Celestine's name for a very nominal price. 4. To be noted, in this suit filed by one of the sons of M.Esthoor (E.Dennis), the other six sons and one unmarried daughter were arrayed as defendants 2 to 8, while M.Esthoor himself was arrayed as defendant No.1. Aforesaid Celestine (son-in-law of M.Esthoor) was arrayed as defendant No.9. From the plaint averments, it comes to light that three daughters of M.Esthoor were not arrayed as defendants as they had been given in marriage with Sridhana and jewels, for which the spending was made from the common family earnings and assets. This suit was decreed ex parte on 20.09.1993. Half a decade later, i.e., 5 years later, to be precise, on 28.4.1998, L.Celestine filed a suit in O.S.No.102 of 1998 on the file of the 'Principal District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Eraniel' (hereinafter referred to as 'trial court' for the sake of brevity and convenience), seeking cancellation of judgment and decree dated 20.9.1993 made in the senior suit. This suit being O.S.No.102 of 1998 shall hereinafter be referred to as 'junior suit' for the sake of convenience and clarity. Alongside the junior suit, two sisters who were not made parties to the senior suit, i.e., Everstol and Prema Mary filed a suit in O.S.No.101 of 1998 on the file of the same trial court. In this suit, plaintiffs arrayed their two sisters and seven brothers as defendants. This suit being O.S.No.101 of 1998 shall hereinafter be referred to as 'partition suit filed by two sisters' for the sake of convenience, as the prayer in this suit was for partition and separate possession of 1/11th share each. 5. In this suit, plaintiffs arrayed their two sisters and seven brothers as defendants. This suit being O.S.No.101 of 1998 shall hereinafter be referred to as 'partition suit filed by two sisters' for the sake of convenience, as the prayer in this suit was for partition and separate possession of 1/11th share each. 5. Junior suit and the partition suit filed by two sisters were taken up together by trial court. After full contest in trial court, in and by judgment and decree dated 04.02.1999, trial court dismissed the partition suit filed by two sisters and decreed the junior suit. With regard to dismissal of partition suit filed by two sisters, the matter was not carried in appeal by two sisters (plaintiffs therein) and there is no dispute or disagreement before this court that dismissal decree was given quietus as far as partition suit filed by two sisters concerned. 6. With regard to junior suit being decreed, E.Dennis carried the matter in appeal by way regular first appeal under Section 96 of the 'Code of Civil Procedure, 1908' (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC' for brevity). This regular first appeal is A.S.No.45 of 1999 on the file of 'Sub Court, Padmanabhapuram' (which shall hereinafter be referred to as 'first appellate court' for the sake of convenience and clarity). To be noted, pending first appeal, E.Dennis died and his legal heirs were brought on record as appellants. After full hearing and contest, the first appellate court allowed the first appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court in the junior suit. This is vide judgment and decree dated 23.6.2003 made by the first appellate court. 7. Aggrieved, L.Celestine (son-in-law of M.Esthoor) filed the instant second appeal in this court and the instant second appeal was admitted by this court on 08.11.2004 on two substantial questions of law, which read as follows : "1.Whether appellate court can reverse the findings of the trial court without assigning any reasons? 2. Whether partition suit filed after execution of sale deed is maintainable in law? " 8. Before the judgment of the first appellate court is examined, it is necessary to notice that the junior suit was filed primarily on the ground that decree in the senior suit was obtained by fraud and suppression. 2. Whether partition suit filed after execution of sale deed is maintainable in law? " 8. Before the judgment of the first appellate court is examined, it is necessary to notice that the junior suit was filed primarily on the ground that decree in the senior suit was obtained by fraud and suppression. It is the specific case of Celestine in the junior suit that after filing of the senior suit, there was a compromise and therefore, he did not contest the senior suit though he was arrayed as defendant No.9 in the senior suit. On this basis, the junior suit was laid contending that decree in the senior suit was obtained by fraud and suppression. 9 First appellate court after examination of evidence came to the conclusion that this version of Celestine cannot be believed as Celestine has filed vakalat in the senior suit and thereafter applications for setting aside were also taken out and the same were also dismissed. All this is articulated in great detail by first appellate court. That portion of the judgment which is of relevance is as follows : xxx xxx xxx 10. In the final hearing of the second appeal before this court, Mr.A.Arumugam, learned counsel was before this court on behalf of the appellant and Mr.N.Sivakumar, learned counsel appeared on behalf of respondents 1 to 5. 11. It was submitted on behalf of appellant that it is not necessary to file an application for setting aside the ex parte decree as the case of the appellant before the trial court in the junior suit is that the decree in the senior suit was obtained by fraud and suppression. It was also urged that the ex parte decree does not contain any discussion. Fraud and suppression were predicated primarily on the ground that after filing of the senior suit on 19.03.1992, there was a compromise. Therefore, the appellant before this court did not contest the senior suit though he was defendant No.9 and this factum of compromise had been suppressed in obtaining ex parte decree, is his say. 12. In response to the above, learned counsel for respondents submitted that there is no detail about the compromise and even the date of compromise has not been given. 12. In response to the above, learned counsel for respondents submitted that there is no detail about the compromise and even the date of compromise has not been given. Learned counsel for respondents submitted emphatically that the moment a suit is filed alleging fraud and suppression, exemplified facts and details have to be pleaded and given in the plaint, but in the instant case, in the junior suit, there is only one line to the effect that the plaintiff in the senior suit undertook to withdraw the suit. It is the emphatic submission of respondents that there is no further averment with regard to absence of discussion in the decree in the senior suit. 13. Learned counsel for respondents submitted that it is not a title suit, it is a partition suit where all parties are plaintiffs or in other words, the concept of plaintiffs and defendants is not there and the moment the shares are accepted, there is no impediment whatsoever for the trial court to decree the suit as prayed for. It was also pointed out by respondents that this decree in the senior suit in the trial court was passed way back in 1993, i.e., 20.9.1993, to be precise, before the law regarding ex parte decrees evolved in its obtaining form today. Most importantly, learned counsel for respondents pointed out that the sale in favour of Celestine was vide sale deed dated 20.03.1992 (Ex.A.11), which is pending senior suit. It is not before the senior suit as the senior suit was admittedly filed on 19.3.1992. It was also urged by learned counsel for respondents that the alleged compromise pending senior suit was in the presence of one Justin, who acted as mediator. Justin was examined in the junior suit. The deposition of Justin would reveal that he did not give any specific date and Justin had not also said anything beyond saying that the plaintiff in the senior suit undertook to withdraw the suit. In other words, there is no details regarding the purported compromise as pleaded. 14. Learned counsel for respondents also urged that C.M.P.(MD)No.4292 of 2018 taken out by respondents 1 to 5 under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC for marking five additional documents may please be allowed. To be noted, the appellant had also taken out CMP (MD)No.8024 of 2016 for marking additional document. 14. Learned counsel for respondents also urged that C.M.P.(MD)No.4292 of 2018 taken out by respondents 1 to 5 under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC for marking five additional documents may please be allowed. To be noted, the appellant had also taken out CMP (MD)No.8024 of 2016 for marking additional document. Obviously, this CMP taken out by appellant was also taken out under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC and the same was allowed by this court on 09.04.2018. Vide this C.M.P, appellant wanted to mark the plaint in the senior suit. The application was allowed and the plaint has been marked now as Ex.A.26. Paragraph 9 of the said order is relevant which reads as follows : "9. Be that as it may, before I proceed further, it may also be necessary to notice two dates. O.S.No.257 of 1992 was filed on 19.03.1992 in the aforesaid Court. However, O.S.No.102 of 1998 (out of which the instant main second appeal arises) was filed only on 29.02.1998. Moreso, the copy sought to be marked is a copy of the plaint in O.S.No.257 of 1992, served on the 9th defendant, who is the appellant before me. Therefore, I necessarily leave open the question as to why the plaint was not filed, much less marked in the trial Court. I reserve the right of the respondents in this regard for canvassing this aspect of the matter in the main second appeal. " 15. Adverting to paragraph 9, learned counsel for respondents pointed out that the appellant chose to file junior suit without even the plaint in the senior suit which is the most critical and crucial document. However, reverting to Order XLI Rule 27 CPC petition taken out by respondents 1 to 5 in the instant second appeal, i.e., C.M.P.(MD)No.4292 of 2018, no counter affidavit has been filed in the same. That counter affidavit has not been filed in the same would mean that there is no objection or opposition for receiving the documents. Once documents are received, the question as to marking of documents arises. In the instant case, all the five documents sought to be marked by respondents 1 to 5 vide this C.M.P are certified copies of records of courts below. Five documents are as follows : "1.Order in I.A.No.392/1997 in O.S.No.303/1995 2. Affidavit and Petition filed in I.A.No.1447/1994 in O.S.No.257/1992. 3. Vakalat filed by the 9th Defendant in O.S.No.257/1992 4. In the instant case, all the five documents sought to be marked by respondents 1 to 5 vide this C.M.P are certified copies of records of courts below. Five documents are as follows : "1.Order in I.A.No.392/1997 in O.S.No.303/1995 2. Affidavit and Petition filed in I.A.No.1447/1994 in O.S.No.257/1992. 3. Vakalat filed by the 9th Defendant in O.S.No.257/1992 4. Affidavit and Petition filed by the 1st Defendant in I.A.No.143/1995 in O.S.No.257/1992. 5. Affidavit and Petition filed by the 6th Defendant in I.A.No.392/1997 in O.S.No.303/1995." 16. As all five documents are certified copies of court records, this Court is of the view that it is not necessary to take recourse to Rule 28 for marking documents. In the light of the nature of documents, these documents 1 to 5 supra are marked and the same are assigned numbers Exs.B.3 to B.7 respectively. This is so as already two exhibits, i.e., Exs.B.1 and B.2 have been marked in the trial court in the junior suit. 17. In the light of the aforesaid rival submissions, this Court now proceeds to examine the case laws that were pressed into service. 18. Learned counsel for appellant pressed into service A. Sankaranarayanan Vs. Mani reported in 2009 (3) CTC 814 and contended that finding of facts recorded by trial court should prevail over that of the first appellate court. Attention of this court was drawn to paragraph 14 of A.Sankaranarayanan case. In A.Sankaranarayanan case, the issue that was being tested was whether marriage between two individuals was actually solemnized or not. With regard to such factual background in A.Sankaranarayanan case, learned Single Judge of this court referred to a judgment of Supreme Court in Jagdishsingh Vs. Maduridevi reported in AIR 2008 SC 2296 and relevant portion in A.Sankaranarayanan case reads as follows : “14......The Court below has also considered the conduct of the parties and held that the evidence of the defendant is not believable as against the evidence of the plaintiff. Maduridevi reported in AIR 2008 SC 2296 and relevant portion in A.Sankaranarayanan case reads as follows : “14......The Court below has also considered the conduct of the parties and held that the evidence of the defendant is not believable as against the evidence of the plaintiff. In this connection it is useful to refer the recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Jagdishsingh v. Maduridevi, AIR 2008 SC 2296 : 2008 (10) SCC 497 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that when the Court of original jurisdiction has considered the oral evidence and recorded the findings after issuing demeanour of witness and having applied his mind, the Appellate Court will be to keep that in mind and exercise proper care and caution while disturbing the said findings of the Court below. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also said that the Trial Court has got the chance of seeing and hearing the witnesses......” 19. The above would show that the fact scenario in A.Sankaranarayanan case is completely different. More over, unlike in A.Sankaranarayanan case, nothing turns on demeanor of witnesss in the trial court in the instant case. More over, the principle in Jagdishsingh case is that the appellate court should keep in mind and exercise proper care and caution while disturbing the findings of court below. It is not as if the findings of fact recorded by trial court will always prevail over the first appellate court as contended by learned counsel for appellant. Therefore, A.Sankaranarayanan case does not help the appellant in this case. 20. Learned counsel for appellant referred to E.Yesodammal Vs. E.Govindan reported in 2010 (2) CTC 705 . E.Yesodammal case turns on Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and a perusal of the judgment shows that it does not help the appellant in the instant case as whether Esthoor (father) is the real owner or whether suit properties were purchased in his name from and out of joint family income is not what this appeal turns on. 21. Learned counsel for appellant pressed into service Annapoorni Vs. Janaki reported in 1995-1-L.W. 141 and submitted that the decree obtained against express provision of law can be set aside at any time even though a regular appeal was not filed in time. 21. Learned counsel for appellant pressed into service Annapoorni Vs. Janaki reported in 1995-1-L.W. 141 and submitted that the decree obtained against express provision of law can be set aside at any time even though a regular appeal was not filed in time. Annapoorni case is one where the High Court found that the court below has completely failed to apply its mind to the relevant provision of law, i.e., Hindu Succession Act and passed a decree. More over, Annapoorni case pertains to rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 and striking off pleadings. To be noted, Annapoorni case opens with a preface that 'This is an extraordinary case demanding this Court's invoking its suo motu powers under section 115 C.P.C. and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in order to prevent perpetuation of grave and gross injustice caused by trial court overlooking an express provision of law. Opening paragraph in Annapoorni case reads as follows : “This is an extraordinary case demanding this Court's invoking its suo motu powers under section 115 C.P.C. and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in order to prevent the perpetuation of grave and gross injustice caused by the trial court's overlooking an express provision of law.” There are no such circumstances in the instant case and therefore, Annapoorni case also does not help the appellant. 22. Learned counsel for appellant pressed into service N.Maheswari Vs. Mariappan and others reported in 2013 (2) CTC 388 and said that merely because defendants remained ex parte, court below cannot pass a decree mechanically and such a decree can be set aside by means of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This aspect of the matter has already been discussed supra. N.Maheswari case arose out of a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction. In that suit, trial court after framing three issues did not discuss anything with regard to those issues by evaluating evidence. In N.Maheswari case, learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that trial court has simply decreed the suit in slipshod manner against second defendant also when plaintiff himself admitted that he is not pressing the suit against second defendant. There are no such circumstances in the instant case. On the contrary, the instant case arose out of a partition suit and shares were not disputed. Therefore, a preliminary decree came to be passed. There are no such circumstances in the instant case. On the contrary, the instant case arose out of a partition suit and shares were not disputed. Therefore, a preliminary decree came to be passed. In this view of the matter, N.Maheswari case also does not help the appellant. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant pressed into service Wadi Vs. Amilal & Ors. reported in JT 2002 (6) SC 16. This does not help the appellant in any manner. On the contrary, it helps the respondents as respondents have taken out an application under Order XLI Rule 27 being C.M.P.(MD) No.4292 of 2018 which has already been dealt with supra. As Wadi case is one where the Court laid down principles for dealing with an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC. The court viewed Order XLI Rule 27 CPC after laying down principles in the facts of that case, i.e., Wadi case and held that Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is an enabling provision and that in that case the petition has not been filed to cure the lacuna or fill up the gap in the case. Therefore, Wadi case also does not help the appellant. On the contrary, it helps the respondents. 24 Finally, appellant's counsel pressed into service an oft-quoted judgment being S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 . Learned counsel for appellant relied on S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu case to say that a litigant who approached the Court is bound to produce all documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. It was urged that the decree sought to be set aside is vitiated by fraud. S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu case also does not help the appellant in the instant case. The reason is, as already alluded to supra, whenever fraud is pleaded, exemplified pleadings are necessary. The facts in great detail have to be set out in the plaint. In the instant case, other than one stray sentence that plaintiff agreed to withdraw the suit, there is absolutely no pleadings whatsoever on fraud. Further to be noted, as already alluded to supra, one Justin who is said to have acted as mediator was also examined in the court below and he also did not throw any light on the alleged compromise. To state with clarity and specificity, even the date of compromise has not been mentioned. Further to be noted, as already alluded to supra, one Justin who is said to have acted as mediator was also examined in the court below and he also did not throw any light on the alleged compromise. To state with clarity and specificity, even the date of compromise has not been mentioned. Even deposition of Justin is merely to the effect that plaintiff undertook to withdraw the suit and therefore, Celestine remained ex parte that too after filing vakalat and it has now been marked as Ex.B.5. Therefore, S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu case does not aid or help the appellant in any manner in this case. 25. There is one more aspect of the matter that has been pointed out by Mr.N.Sivakumar, learned counsel for respondents. Learned counsel pointed out that if there was really a compromise, that too in a partition suit, the same can even be filed at the execution stage and recorded. 26. Be that as it may, learned counsel for respondents pressed into service P.Kaliammal Vs. V.Rathinammal reported in 2017 (2) CTC 160 authored by a learned Single Judge of this Court. Learned counsel for respondents pressed into service P.Kaliammal case to exhort that exemplified pleadings are imperative whenever fraud is pleaded. Learned counsel for respondents also pointed out that this principle is adumbrated in Order VI Rule 4 CPC. Rule 4 of Order VI CPC reads as follows : "4.Particulars to be given where necessary.-In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading." 27. In P.Kaliammal case, this principle has been reiterated by a learned Single Judge of this Court. This is articulated in paragraph 7 of P.Kaliammal case and the same read as follows : "7.Order 6, Rule 4, CPC specifically mandates the Plaintiff who pleads misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence, those particulars must be necessarily exemplified with dates." 28. I am in full agreement with the view of the learned Single Judge in P.Kaliammal case and the principle that exemplified pleadings are required whenever fraud is pleaded and that this principle is indisputable. 29. I am in full agreement with the view of the learned Single Judge in P.Kaliammal case and the principle that exemplified pleadings are required whenever fraud is pleaded and that this principle is indisputable. 29. Learned counsel for respondents is absolutely correct in pointing out that the plaint is bereft of such pleadings. 30. This takes us to two substantial questions of law on which the instant second appeal was admitted. To be noted, the two substantial questions of law have already been extracted and reproduced supra. 31. With regard to first substantial question of law as to whether the appellate court can reverse the findings of the trial court without assigning any reasons, this question has been couched in a language which is in generic terms. Therefore, the question has to be necessarily applied to the facts of this case and the judgment of the first appellate court has to be looked into. 32. From the narration and discussion supra, it will be clear that the first appellate court has certainly given enough and more reasons for reversing the judgment of trial court. It cannot be gainsaid that first appellate court has not given any reasons for reversing the findings of the trial court. Therefore, there is no difficulty whatsoever in answering substantial question of law No.1 against the appellant and in favour of respondents by holding that first appellate court has certainly assigned reasons in the instant case for reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court. 33. With regard to substantial question of law No.2, the admitted facts and admitted chronology in the instant case straight away answers this question. It is an admitted position that the suit being O.S.No.257 of 1992 was filed in trial court on 19.3.1992. It is also admitted case between parties that sale deeds under which suit properties were alienated are vide sale deed dated 19.3.1992 marked as Ex.A.10 and sale deed dated 20.03.1992 marked as Ex.A.11. To be noted, vide Exs.A.10, item No.1 of the suit properties was alienated and vide Ex.A.11, item No.2 of the suit properties was alienated. Therefore, the admitted chronology and the records placed before this court which are indisputable shows that partition suit was not filed after execution of sale deed. To be noted, vide Exs.A.10, item No.1 of the suit properties was alienated and vide Ex.A.11, item No.2 of the suit properties was alienated. Therefore, the admitted chronology and the records placed before this court which are indisputable shows that partition suit was not filed after execution of sale deed. Therefore, substantial question of law No.2 automatically stands answered against the appellant and in favour of respondents as partition suit has not been filed after execution of the sale deed. 34. In the light of the narrative supra and in the light of both substantial questions of law on which the instant second appeal was admitted being answered against the appellant and in favour of respondents, the instant second appeal fails and the same is dismissed. C.M.P.(MD)No.4292 of 2018 stands ordered marking the documents as stated in this judgment. Considering the proximity of relationship between parties, the parties are left to bear their respective costs.