JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. 1. It is now a well enshrined rule, which is guided more by prudence than formalism, that Courts must proceed with great caution and circumspection when asked to interfere in disciplinary proceedings. The reason for this is twofold; firstly, internal disciplinary matters are an employer's prerogative and secondly, an employee who is aggrieved by the proceedings generally has well defined avenues for redressal, statutorily or under the applicable civil laws. But, among the primary causes that persuades such intervention by the Court is when the process seems to be not in conformity to procedural and substantive fairness. 2. The compliance of the immutable principles of natural justice and adherence to processual integrity is not merely a desideratum, but is a forensic imperative, which imposes an inflexible code of fair procedure including within its fold, as being the primary, the right to be given a fair hearing and the opportunity to present and prove one's case through logically probative evidence. 3. In the facts that has been presented in this proceedings, we notice that the challenge to the disciplinary proceedings, at the hands of the respondent herein, who was the applicant before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, was that the orders removing him from service had been issued without following the unexpendable procedure mandated in law and in violation of the principles of natural justice, particularly, that he was not given an opportunity of presenting his version against the allegations. The learned Tribunal assessed the materials on record and found that the respondent was not even furnished with a statement of imputation or charge sheet and that even without doing so, the petitioners have proceeded to issue the impugned order removing him from service. This was viewed by the Tribunal as being in violation of the prescriptions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the impugned order was quashed, directing that the respondent be reinstated in service with 50% backwages, but reserving with the petitioners herein the liberty to initiate fresh proceedings with respect to the allegations made against the respondent. 4. This Original Petition has been filed by the State of Kerala and its functionaries assailing the order of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal to the extent to which it has set aside the order of dismissal of the respondent and has directed them to reinstate him with 50% back wages. 5. 4. This Original Petition has been filed by the State of Kerala and its functionaries assailing the order of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal to the extent to which it has set aside the order of dismissal of the respondent and has directed them to reinstate him with 50% back wages. 5. We have heard the learned Government Pleader appearing for the petitioners and Sri. M.P. Prakash, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 6. Our assessment of the various contentions and allegations in this Original Petition will be essentially confined to an examination as to whether the learned Tribunal was right in holding that the disciplinary proceedings initiated and completed against the respondent was not tenable in law and whether it was in violation of statutory imperatives, including the principles of natural justice, as has been found by it. Our evaluation of these issues will have to be guided more by the factual factors involved because the primary allegation appears to be that the respondent was not even served with a copy of the memo of charges, which finally lead to order of dismissal. 7. For this purpose, we will refer to the most essential and constitutive facts. 8. While the respondent was working as a Senior Accountant in the Sub-Treasury, Calicut, an allegation was raised against him and four others that they were suspected to have embezzled an amount of Rs.66,52,206/- by following a particular modus operandi. The accusation was that this amount was withdrawn by the respondent, with the help and assistance of the four others, through 12 bogus bills in the form of Sales Tax Refund repayment orders. This allegation led to Annexure A1 order, dated 22.11.2004, being issued by which the respondent was placed under suspension. It appears that the four others also placed under suspension similarly. Later, on the orders of the Government, which is seems to have been made on 25.01.2008 pursuant to a decision taken by the Suspension Review Committee, the respondent was reinstated in service, by order dated 16.06.2009, a copy of which has been placed on record as Annexure A2. As per the directions given by the Government, the respondent was ordered to be posted in a non-sensitive post and he thus was allotted Kattakkada Sub Treasury. As per the directions given by the Government, the respondent was ordered to be posted in a non-sensitive post and he thus was allotted Kattakkada Sub Treasury. However, after about 15 months after he joined Kattakada, he was again placed under suspension through Annexure A3 order on the allegation that he had assaulted and attacked an attender by name V. Sanalkumar. This order is dated 01.11.2010 and we see from the pleadings that the respondent continued to be under suspension thereafter until the impugned order was passed by the learned Tribunal. 9. Subsequent to his suspension as above, the Authorities issued Annexure A4 order appointing an enquiry officer with respect to the embezzlement charge against him. The respondent issued Annexure A5 letter, within a couple of weeks thereafter, asserting that he had not received the charge memo. We however see from the pleadings that there two documents on record, namely, Annexures A6 and A7, which are information received by the respondent under the Right to Information Act and a letter issued by the Sub Treasury Officer to the Director of Treasuries respectively. In these two documents [with which we deal in detail in the latter part of the judgment] it is seen alleged that even though attempts were made to serve the chargesheet on the petitioner personally, which was not successful because he refused to accept the same or that he evaded it deliberately. 10. After this, the respondent says he received Annexure A8, dated 06.07.2011, which is a notice notifying him of the date of enquiry, issued by the Enquiry Officer, in the embezzlement case. He says he replied to Annexure A8 by issuing Annexure A9 wherein he requested that the enquiry against him be deferred until the criminal case registered against him was disposed of. This letter of the respondent is dated 21.07.2011. 11. While the matters stood so, the respondent says he received Annexure A10, which is a notice issued by the enquiry officer appointed in the assault case. Annexure A10 is dated 10.11.2011 and it appears that the respondent replied to it by asking for some more time. This was followed by Annexure A11 letter, issued by the enquiry officer, allotting a fresh date for the enquiry as 08.03.2012. The respondent, thereafter, issued Annexure A12 dated 21.03.2012 alleging that he had not been served the charge memo and imputation of charges in the assault case either. This was followed by Annexure A11 letter, issued by the enquiry officer, allotting a fresh date for the enquiry as 08.03.2012. The respondent, thereafter, issued Annexure A12 dated 21.03.2012 alleging that he had not been served the charge memo and imputation of charges in the assault case either. 12. While the proceedings thus dragged on, it transpires that the Government issued Annexure A13 dated 26.04.2012, instructing the Concerned Authority to review the disciplinary action against the respondent and to complete it as expeditiously as possible. The respondent thereupon issued Annexure A14, again complaining that he had not been issued with the charge memo. Annexure A14 is dated 26.06.2012, which was followed by issuance of Annexure A15 by the Authorities, which is the charge memo relating to the assault case and the statement of allegations with respect to it. As per Annexure A16 letter issued thereafter, the respondent was allowed to go through the records to prepare his defence in the assault case and vide Annexure A17 report, the respondent asked for more time. This letter is dated 10.09.2012. 13. While the proceedings were so poised, the Government again issued Annexure A18 order asking the Authority to complete the disciplinary action. This order is dated 01.01.2013 and presumably, on receipt of the same, the respondent issued Annexure A19 request to the Authorities, which does not carry the full date but only shows as the 21st day of 2013, requesting that he be reinstated in service. This request does not appear to have been acted upon, but the Treasury Director thereafter issued Annexure A20 order to the respondent informing him that a decision had been taken to dismiss him from service and he was asked to show cause why such action should not be taken against him. This order is dated 05.02.2013, to which the respondent replied through Annexure A21 dated 27.02.2013. He followed this by making Annexure A22 complaint, dated 02.03.2013, to the Government requiring that the Treasury Director be removed from his enquiry proceedings alleging bias, but the pleadings suggest that the respondent did not pursue that request any further. 14. As per the respondent, he then received Annexure A23 proceedings dated 22.04.2013 under which he was allowed to peruse the relevant records. 14. As per the respondent, he then received Annexure A23 proceedings dated 22.04.2013 under which he was allowed to peruse the relevant records. The respondent says that when he went to the office of the Authority in response to the directions in Annexure A23, he was given eight volumes of records and he was asked to take transcriptions of the same on the same day, namely, 10.05.2013. He says that since this was humanly not possible he made Annexure A24 request that he be given more time to do so. He says that, however, this request was rejected through Annexure A25 communication dated 18.06.2013. 15. The pleadings reveal that subsequent to the above, the respondent issued Annexures A26 and A27 letters to Treasury Director and the Government Secretary, Finance Department respectively, both dated 15.07.2013, making various allegations and asserting that he was not served the memo of charges with respect to the charge of embezzlement. Notwithstanding all these allegations made by the respondent, he was issued with Annexure A28 order dated 10.06.2016 under which he was dismissed from service. The respondent challenged this dismissal by filing an appeal under Rule 23 of the KCS (CC&A) Rules 1960. The Government called him through Annexure A30, dated 27.10.2017, for a personal hearing. After such hearing, the Government rejected the respondent's appeal through Annexure A31 dated 13.11.2015. 16. The respondent challenged the above mentioned orders of dismissal and rejection of appeal before the learned Tribunal on various grounds, but primarily on the accusation that the entire proceedings were vitiated because he had not been served copies of the memo of charges at any point of time before which he was dismissed from service. The learned Tribunal, after an assessment of the facts aforesaid, concluded that the assertion of the respondent is justified and, therefore, ordered that he be reinstated in service with 50% backwages, but gave liberty, as mentioned already, to the Authorities to continue with fresh proceedings against him on the allegations made earlier against him. 17. We have narrated the above sequence of facts in some detail because it is only on the bedrock of the factual circumstances can it be assessed whether the conclusion of the learned Tribunal was just or otherwise. 18. We notice that the facts are not greatly in dispute in this case. 17. We have narrated the above sequence of facts in some detail because it is only on the bedrock of the factual circumstances can it be assessed whether the conclusion of the learned Tribunal was just or otherwise. 18. We notice that the facts are not greatly in dispute in this case. It is virtually conceded by the petitioners that the statement of allegations against the respondent was not served on him because he refused to do so. The learned Government Pleader relies on Annexures A6 and A7, which we have already referred to in detail, to show that at least two attempts were made by the concerned Authorities to serve the statement of allegations and charge sheet on the respondent by effecting personal service on him at his residence. In Annexure A6, the allegation is that the respondent refused to accept the same but that he read it and said that he will come and collect it at his convenience. In Annexure A7, which is a letter issued to the Director of Treasuries returning the charge memo, it has been further stated that the subsequent attempt to serve the statement of allegations on the respondent was also unsuccessful because he persistently and willfully kept away from the residence. 19. The question before the Tribunal was, therefore, whether, in these set of conceded circumstances, the conclusion of the disciplinary action, leading to Annexures A28 and A30 against the respondent was justified, when admittedly, the statement of allegations was not served on respondent. The learned Tribunal found that this was impermissible and therefore, set aside the entire disciplinary proceedings. 20. The learned Government Pleader challenges these findings of the learned Tribunal, on the ground that, it was only on account of the wilful and persistent refusal of the respondent to accept the charge memo, even though it was attempted to be served on him personally more than once, that the petitioners were constrained to complete the disciplinary action against him. He further says that the disciplinary action was not solely against the respondent, but also against the four others and that they had co-operated in the proceedings leading to the final orders against the respondent. 21. Sri. M.P. Prakash, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently refuted these allegations and relies on the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in Dr. Ramesh Chandra Tyagi Vs. 21. Sri. M.P. Prakash, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently refuted these allegations and relies on the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in Dr. Ramesh Chandra Tyagi Vs. Union of India and Others [ (1994) 2 SCC 416 ] and Union of India and Others Vs. Dinanath Shantaram Karekar and Others [ (1998) 7 SCC 569 ], to drive home the contention that it is not enough that attempts are made to serve the charge sheet on the delinquent, but that the law mandates that it be actually served and that such actual service must be proved and established. We have examined these two judgments very intently. The declaration of law by the Honourable Supreme Court in Dr. Ramesh Chandra Tyagi case (cited supra) is available in paragraph 7 of the said judgment, which reads as under : 7. ..........................But that is writ large on the face of it. No charge-sheet was served on the appellant. The Enquiry Officer himself stated that the notices sent were returned with endorsement 'left without address' and on other occasion, 'on repeated visits people in the house that he has gone out and they do not disclose where he has gone. Therefore, it is being returned'. May be that the appellant was avoiding it but avoidance does not mean that it gave a right to Enquiry Officer to proceed ex parte unless it was conclusively established that he deliberately and knowingly did not accept it. The endorsement on the envelope that it was refused, was not even proved by examining the postman or any other material to show that it was refusal by the appellant who denied on oath such a refusal. No effort was made to serve in any other manner known in law.........................” In Dinanath Shantaram Karekar's case (cited supra), this position was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of the said judgment, which according to us, requires a full reading and is, therefore, extracted as under : “10. Where the disciplinary proceedings are intended to be initiated by issuing a charge-sheet, its actual service is essential as the person to whom the charge-sheet is issued is required to submit his reply and, thereafter, to participate in the disciplinary proceedings. So also, when the show-cause notice is issued, the employee is called upon to submit his reply to the action proposed to be taken against him. So also, when the show-cause notice is issued, the employee is called upon to submit his reply to the action proposed to be taken against him. Since in both the situations, the employee is given an opportunity to submit his reply, the theory of "Communication" cannot be invoked and "actual service" must be proved and established..........................” 22. The position of law, therefore, appears to be ineluctable that it is not merely sufficient that attempts are made to serve the charge sheet on the delinquent, but that every effort should have been taken, including through substitute methods, to ensure that there was personal communication of the same to him. This is important because it was only after the charges are communicated to the charge sheeted officer can he prepare himself to place a defence against such accusations. 23. In the backdrop of the facts that we have noticed above, it is perspicuous that, even as per the petitioners, though they had deputed two persons on two different dates, i.e. on 29.12.2005 and 06.01.2006, to serve the chargesheet on the respondent personally by visiting him, it was not served on him. The insinuation in Annexures A6 and A7 is certainly that on the first occasion, even though the respondent was available at his residence, he refused to accept the same. However, as regards the second attempt, it is clear from the said documents that he was not available at his residence and therefore, that it was returned unserved. The facts in Ramesh Chandra Tyagi (supra), are similar or even analogous to the present case. As their Lordships have declared, even if the respondent was avoiding acceptance of notice, as is alleged in Annexures A6 and A7, the Enquiry officer could not have proceeded ex parte unless it was conclusively established that the respondent was deliberately and intentionally refusing to accept it. 24. In this case, it is incontrovertible that there is no such evidence on record and the allegation in Annexures A6 and A7, that the respondent refused to accept the chargesheet was not even tested in the said inquiry. The statements in those letters may be well serving and in the absence of some evidence to establish that they are true and credible, those documents cannot come to the aid of the Authorities to support their action in proceeding against the respondent ex parte. The statements in those letters may be well serving and in the absence of some evidence to establish that they are true and credible, those documents cannot come to the aid of the Authorities to support their action in proceeding against the respondent ex parte. This is more so because the materials on record, particularly, Annexures A5, A12, A22, A26 and A27 would indicate that the respondent was consistently complaining to various Authorities that he had not been given the charge sheet, even though the inquiry against him was being proceeded ex parte. 25. Therefore, in the undisputed factual scenario that the respondent was not served with the charge memo in the embezzlement case, even assuming that he refused to do so when it was served on him through a messenger, in our firm view, would not be sufficient to empower the enquiry officer to proceed exparte against him and therefore, the finding of the learned Tribunal that the final orders of removal of the respondent is untenable, specifically because of such reason, is completely justified. 26. That being so concluded, the learned Tribunal, we notice, had, after finding the proceedings as being vitiated for the above reasons, went on to order that the respondent be reinstated in service with 50% backwages. 27. The learned Government Pleader assails this part of the directions on several grounds. According to him, even taking that the findings of the Tribunal that the orders of dismissal against the respondent are not tenable in law, it was not permissible for the learned Tribunal to have, thereafter, ordered 50% of backwages to be paid to him. The learned Government Pleader relies on the provisions of Sub Rules 1 and 2 to Rule 56A of Part I of the KSR to contend that even in cases where an enquiry is set aside, not on merits but for technical reasons, then it should be left to the competent Authority to determine in what manner and by what method the period of suspension should be regulated. According to the learned Government Pleader, it was not permissible and justified on the part of the learned Tribunal to cause an order that the respondent be paid 50% of backwages, especially, when it had reserved liberty to the authorities to continue further proceedings against him in terms of law. The specific prescription of the above referred rule is extracted below : “56A. The specific prescription of the above referred rule is extracted below : “56A. (1) Where the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of an officer is set aside by a Court of Law and such officer is reinstated without holding any further inquiry the period of absence from duty shall be regularised and the officer shall be paid pay and allowances in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule(2) or sub-rule (3) subject to the directions, if any, of the court. (2) Where the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of an officer is set aside by the court solely on the ground of noncompliance with the requirements of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, and where he is not exonerated on merits, the pay and allowances to be paid to the officer for the period intervening between the date of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement including the period of suspension preceding such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, and the date of reinstatement shall be determined by the competent authority and the said period shall be regularised, in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-rule (4), (5) and (7) of Rule 56. (3) If the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of an officer is set aside by the court on the merits of the case, the period intervening between the date of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement including the period of suspension preceding such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, and the date of reinstatement shall be treated as duty for all purposes and he shall be paid the full pay and allowances for the period, in which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be. (4) The payment of allowances under sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible. (5) Any payment made under this rule to an officer on his reinstatement shall be subject to adjustment of the amount, if any, earned by him through an employment during the period between the date of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and the date of reinstatement. (5) Any payment made under this rule to an officer on his reinstatement shall be subject to adjustment of the amount, if any, earned by him through an employment during the period between the date of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and the date of reinstatement. Where the emoluments admissible under this rule are equal to or less than those earned during the employment elsewhere, nothing shall be paid to the officer.” 28. Sri. M.P. Prakash, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent challenges these contentions of the learned Government Pleader by relying on the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari Vs. The District Board, Agra [ AIR 1964 SC 1680 ], Deepali gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapad Mahavidyalaya [D.ed] and others [ (2013) 10 SCC 324 ], Rajkumar Vs. Director of Education and Others [(2016) 5 SCC 541], Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. ltd., Rae Bareli and another Vs. Badri Nath Dixit and others [ (1991) 3 SCC 54 ] and two judgments of this Court in Financial Service Executives Welfare Association and another Vs. LIC of India and others [ILR 2015 (1) Ker. 225] and E.S. Nambiar Vs. Union Bank of India [ 1991 2 KLT 354 ]. We have examined these judgments quite closely. The ratio of these judgments is inescapable that once the disciplinary proceedings are set aside on account of the demonstrated violation of the requirements of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, the Officer should be reinstated and placed back in the same position as he was at the time when he was placed under suspension. The specific declaration of the Honourable Supreme Court in Deepali Gundu (supra) is available in para 22 therein, which is emphatic and hence is extracted to enable full reading as under: “22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi judicial body or Court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. Denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the concerned employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.” According to Sri. M.P. Prakash, the conclusive position of law from the above precedents is that the respondent is entitled to reinstatement and full salary, for the period under which he was illegally kept out of service and he asserts, therefore, that the directions of the Tribunal to grant him at least 50% of salary after reinstatement is completely fair and irreproachable. 29. Even though we notice these submissions of the learned Government Pleader and Sri. M. P. Prakash, it is also certain that the learned Tribunal, even after finding the disciplinary action against respondent as being vitiated in law on account of non-serving of the charge memo, has reserved liberty explicitly to the Authorities to continue with further proceedings against him, presumably on account of the gravity of offences alleged against him. M. P. Prakash, it is also certain that the learned Tribunal, even after finding the disciplinary action against respondent as being vitiated in law on account of non-serving of the charge memo, has reserved liberty explicitly to the Authorities to continue with further proceedings against him, presumably on account of the gravity of offences alleged against him. We, therefore, have to examine whether these directions of the learned Tribunal have been issued in proper perspective and whether it was proper for the Tribunal, after reserving liberty to the Authorities to initiate and continue further proceedings against the respondent, to order reinstatement and further direct the Authorities to pay him 50% back wages. 30. We have peripherally examined the allegations against the respondent for the limited purpose above said, but we are not in any manner concluding or saying that these are true. We are only saying that we find the allegations to be very grave in nature, especially because it involves embezzlement of public funds. It may be true that the enquiry found the respondent to be at fault and that others, who were arrayed along with him as delinquents, were exonerated. This by itself does not, however, mean that merely because the enquiry proceedings have been found to be vitiated by the Tribunal, that the respondent can claim that he is completely and honourably exonerated on merits. This is more so because there is no challenge against the order of the Tribunal at the hands of the respondent. He, virtually, therefore, concedes that further action can be taken against him in terms of law, on the basis of the allegations that have been levelled against him earlier. 31. Axiomatically, the only question that thus survives before us is whether the learned Tribunal was correct in ordering reinstatement of the respondent with 50% backwages. We have to, in order to resolve this issue, examine the rigour of Rules 56A, Part I of the KSR, extracted above closely. 32. It is leculent from the literal mandate of the Rules that it applies where the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement is set aside by a court and where the officer is reinstated without holding any inquiry. Sub-rule (1) provides that in such an event, the period of absence of duty shall be regularised and the officer shall be paid pay and allowance in terms of sub-rule (2) or (3). Sub-rule (1) provides that in such an event, the period of absence of duty shall be regularised and the officer shall be paid pay and allowance in terms of sub-rule (2) or (3). Sub-rule (3) relates to setting aside of the punishment by a court on the merits of the case, whereas sub-rule (2), which is extracted above, is attracted to a case where the punishment is set aside solely on the ground of noncompliance with the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, but not on merits. In such an event, sub-rule (2) provides that pay and allowances for the period intervening between the date of punishment, including the period of suspension, and the date of reinstatement shall be determined by the competent authority and that the said period shall be regularised as per sub-rules (4), (5) and (7) of Rule 56. 33. A combined reading of these Rules makes the position clear. 34. These provisions would apply only if the punishment is set aside by a court of law for technical reasons and where the officer is re-instated without holding any further inquiry. In such a scenario, the Rule provides that the pay and allowances for the period during which the officer was kept out of service shall be as determined by the competent Authority. Obviously, therefore, these provisions would not apply if a further inquiry is expected. 35. In the case at hand, it is without doubt that the learned Tribunal itself permitted fresh inquiry proceedings against the respondent and his re-instatement was ordered only subject to such fresh inquiry. It is, thus needless to say that the provisions of Rule 56A would not, stricto jure, apply to this case at all and the power vested with the competent Authority, under sub-rule (2) of Rule 56A to determine the pay and allowances, will not be applicable in this case at all. The submissions of the learned Government Pleader in this regard are, therefore, without merit. 36. Our above discussions and the aforenoted precedents guide us to conclude that when an inquiry is vitiated on account of violation of natural principles or infraction of the constitutional imperatives of Article 311(2), then the courts are not powerless to order re-instatement or to order backwages. 36. Our above discussions and the aforenoted precedents guide us to conclude that when an inquiry is vitiated on account of violation of natural principles or infraction of the constitutional imperatives of Article 311(2), then the courts are not powerless to order re-instatement or to order backwages. However, this issue will have to be examined on a case-to-case basis, taking into account all the relevant factors and there cannot be a single yardstick in all cases. 37. In the particular and singular facts that we have noticed in this case, we are, however, of the considered view that the directions of the learned Tribunal to re-instate the respondent and paying 50% of the back wages is misdirected because once the respondent is reinstated in service and paid 50% of the back wages and if the further proceedings initiated against him conclude in an order finding him guilty, there would be fresh controversy as to what would be the position of the 50% of the wages now paid to him, and if on the contrary, he is to be found not guilty, the 50% wages now denied to him will be a bone of fresh contention in future. No provision with regard to these two eventualities have been made in the order impugned herein. 38. Viewed from that perspective, we are of the opinion that it will be better, taking into account the fact that the Tribunal has permitted further proceedings to continue against the respondent and since the said directions are unchallenged by the respondent, that he be ordered to be continued in suspension for a specified period, within which time the enquiry proceedings itself be completed, with a rider that if the enquiry is not completed within the time frame that we fix herein, the respondent will be entitled to reinstatement with full wages. We are of the certain opinion that this would be best way forward for both parties, since the issues of back wages and its arrears would be resolved unambiguously once the disciplinary proceedings conclude one way or the other. 39. We are of the certain opinion that this would be best way forward for both parties, since the issues of back wages and its arrears would be resolved unambiguously once the disciplinary proceedings conclude one way or the other. 39. In the such circumstances and in the overview of our observations above, we order this Original Petition vacating the directions of the learned Tribunal in O.A.(EKM) No. 26 of 2016, dated 09.01.2017, to reinstate the respondent and to pay him 50% of backwages and modifying it, by ordering the petitioners herein to complete fresh disciplinary action against the respondent in terms of law, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. If such proceedings are not completed within the period granted herein, then the respondent would be deemed to be reinstated into service with full backwages and arrears w.e.f. the last date on which the six months period expires. We command the respondent to co-operate with the proceedings, to be initiated and pursued against him and we caution him that any failure on his part or any deliberate attempt on his side to unnecessarily delay or procrastinate the proceedings would be viewed by us very seriously and any such attempt at his part will even cause the benefits granted to him herein to be denied to him. 40. Consequently, the respondent will remain under suspension until this period of six months expires and he will be entitled to be paid subsistence allowance, along with its eligible arrears for the entire period prior to this judgment while he was kept under suspension, under the mandate of the applicable Regulations. The eligible subsistence allowance and the arrears of subsistence allowance shall be paid to the respondent within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The current subsistence shall, however, be paid to him immediately in terms of law. This Writ Petition is thus ordered but without making any order as to costs and leaving the parties to suffer their respective costs.