JUDGMENT : Manish Pitale, J. 1. By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the judgment and order dated 18-12-2015 passed by the Industrial Court, Maharashtra (Nagpur Bench), Nagpur in Complaint ULP No. 216 of 2010, whereby the complaint filed by the petitioner has been dismissed. By the said complaint, the petitioner had prayed for grant of time scale of pay due from the date when he completed 180 days of continuous employment with the respondent-Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "respondent-Corporation"). It was the claim of the petitioner that as per settlement and interpretation of the same by the Courts, he was entitled to grant of the said relief. 2. The facts leading to the present petition are that the petitioner was employed as an unskilled labour with the respondent-Corporation from 6-10-1988 and his services were terminated on 4-7-1991, which he had challenged by filing a complaint before the Labour Court. By order dated 31-1-1998, the complaint was allowed and the petitioner was granted relief of reinstatement with full back wages. The respondent-Corporation challenged the same by filing the revision petition before the Industrial Court, which was dismissed on 29-8-2001. 3. The respondent-Corporation challenged the said order of the Industrial Court by filing Writ Petition No. 3697 of 2001. By the judgment and order dated 27-11-2009, the said writ petition was partly allowed and the orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court were modified to the extent that the petitioner was held as not entitled to back wages. The rest of the order of the Labour Court as confirmed by the Industrial Court, granting reinstatement and continuity of service was maintained by this Court. Accordingly, the petitioner stood reinstated and he continued in service. 4. On 4-5-2010, the petitioner filed Complaint ULP No. 216 of 2010 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, claiming that the respondent-Corporation had indulged in unfair labour practice by taking work from the petitioner continuously while depriving him of time scale of pay to which he was entitled. The petitioner adduced evidence in support of his complaint. But, by the impugned judgment and order, the said complaint stood dismissed. 5. Mr. The petitioner adduced evidence in support of his complaint. But, by the impugned judgment and order, the said complaint stood dismissed. 5. Mr. A.J. Pathak, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that as per Settlement No. 8856 of the respondent-Corporation, as soon as an employee like the petitioner completed 180 days of continuous service, he became entitled to grant of time scale of pay. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner in the present case completed the said period of 180 days in April, 1989 and that he was entitled to the relief of time scale of pay from the said period. It was further submitted that the petitioner was entitled to regularization under section 4-C of the Industrial Employment Standing Order for having completed more than 180 days of continued employment in a financial year with the respondent-Corporation. It was contended that in the earlier round of litigation, this Court had found that the petitioner had proved that he had worked for more than 240 days in one calendar year on the basis of which he was granted relief. On this basis, it was contended that the writ petition deserved to be allowed and the relief claimed in the complaint before the Industrial Court ought to be granted to the petitioner. 6. On the other hand, Mr. V.G. Wankhede, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Corporation, submitted that the Industrial Court was justified in dismissing the complaint of the petitioner because for grant of time scale of pay under the aforesaid Settlement No. 8856, as per the judgment and order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Premlal, reported in 2007(II) CLR 501, twin requirements were to be satisfied by the employee. According to the learned counsel, apart from the first requirement of having completed 180 days of service in a financial year, the employee was also expected to satisfy the requirement of clause 19 of the 1985 Settlement, which stipulated inter alia that such a workman/employee should have been subjected at least once to a competent selection committee. It was contended that in the present case the petitioner did not satisfy the second requirement and that therefore, his claim was rightly rejected by the Industrial Court. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. It was contended that in the present case the petitioner did not satisfy the second requirement and that therefore, his claim was rightly rejected by the Industrial Court. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The petitioner has essentially placed reliance on the clauses of the Settlement arrived at between the respondent-Corporation and the Union of Workmen, which initially in clause 49 of the Settlement stipulated that all employees working for 180 days continuously would be entitled for time scale of pay and other benefits. But thereafter, upon considering demands of the Union, by Resolution No. 8856 (Settlement), Clause 49 of the Settlement dated 28-5-1956 was cancelled and it was stipulated that employees/workmen completing 180 days services in a financial year would be entitled for grant of time scale of pay. It was further stipulated in the Settlement of 1985 that absorption of daily rated worker after completion of 180 days would be governed by Clause 19, which specifically required that absorption of such workmen would be subject to their selection at least once by competent selection committee and availability of clear vacancy. This very Settlement and the implication of deletion of Clause 49 of the 1956 Settlement, as also the clauses of the subsequent Settlement came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Premlal (supra). Upon taking into consideration the aforesaid clause, although the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the clause pertaining to grant of time scale of pay operated in a different field as compared to clause 19 of 1985 Settlement, which pertained to absorption of daily rated workmen, yet the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 10 of the said judgment held as follows. "10. However, as stated above, we are required also to consider the effect of Resolution No. 8856 dated 31-8-1978 passed by the Corporation under which Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement stood cancelled. It is true that the Union had agreed to the cancellation of Clause 49. "10. However, as stated above, we are required also to consider the effect of Resolution No. 8856 dated 31-8-1978 passed by the Corporation under which Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement stood cancelled. It is true that the Union had agreed to the cancellation of Clause 49. However, the Union had also placed their demand for substitution of Clause 49 and the Corporation agreed to that substitution vide Resolution No. 8856 passed by the Corporation under which persons in employment casually or on daily wages as on the date of the Resolution as also those who were to be employed thereafter, were entitled to be appointed temporarily in ephemeral vacancies in the time scale of pay on completion of 180 days aggregate service in a financial year. Under the said Resolution they were entitled to the benefits admissible to regular employees on time scale of pay subject to their satisfying the conditions prescribed for the entitlement. As stated above, in the present case the workmen are not seeking absorption. They are seeking benefits admissible to regular employees on time scale of pay. In the present case, the workmen seek benefits admissible to those employees on time scale of pay. In the present case, the respondent-workmen are in service after 31-8-1978. In the circumstances, notwithstanding cancellation of Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement the workmen herein would be entitled to all benefits admissible to regular employees working in the Corporation on time scale of pay provided they satisfy the eligibility criteria of having worked for aggregate service of 180 days and subject to their satisfying all the conditions prescribed for their entitlement in terms of the above Resolution No. 8856 read with Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement." 8. The last few sentences of the above quoted paragraph clearly show that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that notwithstanding deletion of clause 49 of 1956 Settlement, workmen would be entitled to time scale of pay and other benefits admissible to regular employees working with the respondent-Corporation provided that they satisfy the eligibility criteria of having worked for aggregate of 180 days and subject to their satisfying all the conditions prescribed for their entitlement in terms of the Resolution No. 8856 read with clause 19 of 1985 Settlement. Thus, it becomes clear that the workman/employee is required to satisfy twin requirements of having worked for aggregate 180 days in a financial year with the respondent-Corporation and condition stipulated in clause 19 of the 1985 Settlement. This position has been followed by this Court in the judgment and order dated 6-3-2012 passed in Writ Petition No. 3466 of 2011 and connected writ petitions and further in a bunch of writ petitions i.e. Writ Petition No. 1453 of 2012 and connected petitions in order dated 21-1-2013. 9. Applying the said position of interpretation of the aforesaid Settlement, to the facts of the present case, it becomes evident that the petitioner would not be entitled to grant of relief as sought by him in his complaint before the Industrial Court. It is an admitted position on facts that although the petitioner was appointed on 6-8-1988 as an unskilled labour and he continued in employment for 180 days in a financial year, he was never subjected to selection even once by competent selection committee on availability of clear vacancies. There is no material to show that the petitioner ever underwent process of selection through competent selection committee, throughout his career till his retirement in the year 2015. Thus, the petitioner failed to satisfy the second limb of the requirement under the said Settlement as interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Premlal (supra). It was contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that he could not be deprived of relief on the default on the part of the respondent-Corporation to ask him to be subjected to selection through competent selection committee. Although, there appears to be some substance in the said submission to the extent that the petitioner was deprived of an opportunity to be selected through said selection process, it does not follow that the petitioner would be entitled to the relief as claimed by him. To grant relief to the petitioner on such default of the respondent-Corporation would be presuming that if the petitioner had been subjected to such process of selection through competent selection committee, he would necessarily have been selected. Even otherwise, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner ever made any grievance in respect of the said complaint of not being subjected to selection through competent selection committee. Even otherwise, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner ever made any grievance in respect of the said complaint of not being subjected to selection through competent selection committee. In such a situation, it would not be possible to accept the contention of the petitioner that since the respondent-Corporation failed to provide him an opportunity to go through the process of selection through competent selection committee, the said Corporation was liable to grant him time scale of pay from the date when he completed aggregate 180 days of employment in a financial year with the respondent-Corporation. 10. The Industrial Court in the impugned order has taken note of the said requirement under the aforesaid Settlement and it has correctly held that the petitioner would not be entitled to relief as he failed to satisfy the requirement of Clause 19 of the 1985 Settlement. 11. In view of above, there is no merit in the writ petition and accordingly it stands dismissed.