JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - The appellant is the defendant No. 1, who lost before both the learned Courts below, has filed this Regular Second Appeal. The parties shall be referred to as the plaintiff and defendants. 2. The case of the plaintiff before the learned Courts below was that late Sh. Chhota Ram S/o Sh. Naraina was the owner in possession of the land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 34/86, Khasra Nos. 183, 188, 191, 194 and 195, Kitas 5, measuring 00-42-21 Hectares, situated in Mauza Dharamkot (hereinafter referred to as the suit land). He (Chhota Ram) had three daughters. Prior to his death, Chhota Ram was ill and bed-ridden and died in the year 2003, leaving behind plaintiff, defendant No. 1, defendant No. 3, his widow Smt. Brahmi Devi and his third daughter Kanta had pre-deceased him and defendants No. 4 to 7 are her sons and daughters. It was averred that even though the plaintiff was married to Lal Singh and settled in Village Harpalpur in Punjab, but she used to visit her parental house and participate in family function and other events. As per law, on the death of Chhota Ram, she alongwith two sisters was entitled to inherit the estate of late Sh. Chhota Ram, but the defendant No. 1 claiming herself to be the sole owner of the estate on the basis of mutation No. 240 dated 29. 2. 2003 which was attested on the basis of some alleged Will of her father. It was the specific case of the plaintiff that she was neither summoned nor afforded any opportunity of being heard at the time of mutation and her father had otherwise no reason to execute the Will by excluding her and other heirs from their legitimate right. On the strength of these allegations, the plaintiff sought a decree for declaration of her title alongwith other legal heirs of her deceased father in the suit land and also challenged the mutation and the Will being fraudulent and illegal and further claimed possession. 3. The defendants No. 1 and 2 resisted and contested the suit by raising preliminary objections regarding maintainability, cause of action, estoppel and limitation. 3. The defendants No. 1 and 2 resisted and contested the suit by raising preliminary objections regarding maintainability, cause of action, estoppel and limitation. On merits, the contesting defendants contended that since deceased Chhota Ram had no male issue, therefore, marriage of defendant No. 1 was solemnized with Amarjeet Singh with the understanding that he shall stay back in the house as ''Ghar Jamai'' and look after and maintain his parents-in-law. It was further contended that after the marriage, Amarjeet Singh started residing in the family and was looking after and serving deceased Chhota Ram and defendant No. 2 Smt. Brahmi Devi and being satisfied with the services of Amarjeet Singh and out of love and affection, the deceased on 10. 5. 2000 while in a sound state of mind, executed a Will in favour of defendant No. 1 by scribing it through Sh. Rajinder Sharma, Advocate, Badrinagar in the presence of two attesting witnesses. It was also contended that the plaintiff had never looked after and maintained Sh. Chhota Ram after her marriage and had been residing in Punjab. It was further contended that the plaintiff had the knowledge of the attestation of mutation and despite this, she did not choose to appear before the authorities. These defendants further claimed that the original Will was examined by the A. C. 2nd Grade, Paonta Sahib, but the same was not returned. However, the defendant No. 1 had obtained a photocopy of the document and after receiving summons of the suit, defendant No. 1 searched for the original Will in the Patwar-khana as well as in the house, but the same could not be traced and only a photocopy of the same was found in the house and the same was being produced. Accordingly, the defendants No. 1 and 2 prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. The defendants No. 4 to 7 supported the case of the plaintiff by claiming that the Will was false and fictitious document. They also claimed that the mutation of inheritance was attested in their absence and without their knowledge. 5. The plaintiff filed replication to the written statement filed by defendants No. 1 and 2 and reaffirmed the averments made in the plaint and denied those made in the written statement. She further contended that the defendants had intentionally withheld the original Will as the same was shrouded with suspicious circumstances. 6. 5. The plaintiff filed replication to the written statement filed by defendants No. 1 and 2 and reaffirmed the averments made in the plaint and denied those made in the written statement. She further contended that the defendants had intentionally withheld the original Will as the same was shrouded with suspicious circumstances. 6. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues on 02. 10. 2011: "1. Whether the plaintiff is co-owner in possession of the suit land, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether Chhota Ram never executed any valid Will in favour of defendant No. 1, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the mutation No. 240 dated 29. 2. 2003 attested on the basis of Will showing defendant No. 1 in possession of the suit land is illegal, null and void? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant No. 1, as alleged? OPP 5. Whether Chhota Ram executed valid Will dated 10. 5. 2000 in favour of the defendant No. 1, as alleged? OPD 6. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 7. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit? OPD 8. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by her own act, conduct and acquiescence? OPD 9. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD 10. Whether the defendants No. 3, 7 and 8 are not the daughters of Chhota Ram? OPD 11. Relief. 7. The learned trial Court after recording the evidence and evaluating the same decreed the suit of the plaintiff by declaring the plaintiff to be entitled to succession to the estate of late Chhota Ram alongwith defendants as co-owner in possession of the suit land and further held the Will dated 10. 5. 2000 and consequent mutation No. 240 dated 29. 2. 2003 to be illegal, null and void. 8. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the appellant/defendant No. 1 preferred an appeal before the learned first Appellate Court, who vide judgment and decree dated 28. 2. 2017 dismissed the same. 9. It is against the judgments and decrees concurrently passed by both the learned Courts below that the appellant/defendant No. 1 has come up in second appeal by contending that the judgments rendered by the learned Courts below are perverse and, therefore, not sustainable in the eyes of law. 10. 2. 2017 dismissed the same. 9. It is against the judgments and decrees concurrently passed by both the learned Courts below that the appellant/defendant No. 1 has come up in second appeal by contending that the judgments rendered by the learned Courts below are perverse and, therefore, not sustainable in the eyes of law. 10. It is vehemently contended by Mr. G. S. Rathour, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No. 1 that the plaintiff being out of possession could not have maintained the suit and further the suit having been filed beyond the period of limitation could not have been decreed as admittedly the succession opened in the year 2000 and the mutation was attested in 2003 while the suit came to be filed in the year 2009, therefore, the judgments and decrees rendered by the learned Courts below are perverse. 11. At the outset, it may be observed that the defendant No. 1 has not produced the Will in question, but had moved an application for leading secondary evidence before the learned Court below. However, despite this, the defendant No. 1 failed to lead any evidence to prove that the Will was lost and further could not satisfactorily prove the circumstances in which the photocopy of the same was in her possession. She further failed to prove that the photocopy was compared with the original. 12. That being the position, then this Court has no hesitation to conclude that the mutation attested on the basis of so called Will is only mischief played by the defendant No. 1 in connivance with the revenue officials. After all, the entries in revenue records are the paradise of the Patwari. 13. As observed earlier, the main plea raised by the appellant/defendant No. 1 that the findings recorded by learned Courts below are perverse. Therefore, in order to appreciate this submission, this Court is required to decide as to actually what is the meaning of the word ''perverse''. This expression was considered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu and another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and another , 2009 10 SCC 206 wherein it was held as under:- "26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another , 1977 AIR(Kar) 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another , 1977 AIR(Kar) 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough,1878 1 LR 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined ''perverse'' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner''s Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE:- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster''s Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U. P , 2003 1 SCC 761 , the Court observed thus: (SCC p. 766, para 8 "8 We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity. " 29. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity. " 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Others , 1999 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p. 14, paras 9-10) "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. " 30. The meaning of ''perverse'' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others , 1992 Supp2 SCC 312, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 316-17, para 7) "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. " 14. What is ''perverse'' has further been considered by this Court in RSA No. 436 of 2000, titled ''Rubi Sood and another vs. Major (Retd. ) Vijay Kumar Sud and others, decided on 28. 05. 2015 in the following manner:- "25 . . A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. 26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated. " 15. 28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated. " 15. What is ''perversity'' recently came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal vs. Sohan Devi and others , 2016 3 SCC 78 wherein it was held as under:- "8. "Perversity" has been the subject matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam , 2007 12 SCC 190 , it has been held at paragraph-11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect. " 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram , 2010 15 SCC 530 , at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) "10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent. " 11. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent. " 11. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondent-defendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally non-acceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. Material alteration of a property is not a fact confined to the exclusive/and personal knowledge of the owner. It is a matter of evidence, be it from the owner himself or any other witness speaking on behalf of the plaintiff who is conversant with the facts and the situation. PW-1 is the vendor of the plaintiff, who is also his power of attorney. He has stated in unmistakable terms that there was structural alteration in violation of the rent agreement. PW-2 has also supported the case of the plaintiff. Even the witnesses on behalf of the defendant, partially admitted that the defendants had effected some structural changes. 12. Be that as it may, the question whether there is a structural alteration in a tenanted premises is not a fact limited to the personal knowledge of the owner. It can be proved by any admissible and reliable evidence. That burden has been successfully discharged by the plaintiff by examining PWs-1 and 2. The defendants could not shake that evidence. In fact, that fact is proved partially from the evidence of the defendants themselves, as an admitted fact. Hence, only the trial court came to the definite finding on structural alteration. That finding has been endorsed by the first appellate court on re-appreciation of the evidence, and therefore, the High Court in second appeal was not justified in upsetting the finding which is a pure question of fact. We have no hesitation to note that both the questions of law framed by the High Court are not substantial questions of law. Even if the finding of fact is wrong, that by itself will not constitute a question of law. We have no hesitation to note that both the questions of law framed by the High Court are not substantial questions of law. Even if the finding of fact is wrong, that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man''s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. 13. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann , 2001 4 SCC 262 , this Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal. To quote para 34: (SCC pp. 278-79) "34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis--vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ''103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ''103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact. - In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal, (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100. " The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with. " 14. In S. R. Tiwari v. Union of India , 2013 6 SCC 602 , after referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration , 1984 4 SCC 635 , it was held at para 30: (S. R. Tewari case6, SCC p. 615) "30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn , 1984 4 SCC 635 , Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police , 1999 2 SCC 10 , Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A. P , 2009 10 SCC 636 and Babu v. State of Kerala , 2010 9 SCC 189 " This Court has also dealt with other aspects of perversity. 15. We do not propose to discuss other judgments, though there is plethora of settled case law on this issue. Suffice to say that the approach made by the High Court has been wholly wrong, if not, perverse. It should not have interfered with concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court on a pure question of fact. Their inference on facts is certainly reasonable. The strained effort made by the High Court in second appeal to arrive at a different finding is wholly unwarranted apart from being impermissible under law. Therefore, we have no hesitation to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court as confirmed by the appellate court. " 16. Now, adverting to the first plea raised by the appellant/defendant No. 1 regarding the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the plaintiff is out of possession, suffice it to say that it is more than settled that in case of common property ''joint tenant'' or ''tenant-in-common'' all of them are entitled to the said property and are entitled to the said property and enjoy the same. If one of them alone holds the entire property or part thereof, the same would be deemed to be on behalf of all the co-sharers, unless ouster is pleaded. 17. If one of them alone holds the entire property or part thereof, the same would be deemed to be on behalf of all the co-sharers, unless ouster is pleaded. 17. Admittedly, in this case, the parties are co-owners and the plaintiff was sought to be excluded from such co-ownership only on the strength of the Will which the appellant/defendant No. 1 has failed to prove and, therefore, even if it is assumed that defendant No. 1, who alone is in possession, even then, the possession of defendant No. 1 is deemed to be on behalf of all the co-sharers including not only the plaintiff but also the defendants No. 3 to 7. 18. As regards the second contention of the appellant/defendant No. 1 regarding the suit being time barred, it is more than settled that the plea of limitation is normally a mixed plea of facts and law and has to be examined in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. The mutation in this case has already been discarded by this Court as being illegal and, therefore, cannot confer any right upon defendant No. 1. 19. That apart, even if the mutation is taken into consideration, then also it would be noticed that defendant No. 1 while appearing as DW2 in the witness box has categorically admitted that at the time of mutation, the plaintiff was never summoned nor was present. Once that be so, obviously the plaintiff had no knowledge regarding the attestation of the mutation, being the daughter of Chhota Ram, had no reason whatsoever to come to the Court till the time she came to know about the attestation of the mutation. 20. It has specifically come on the record that the plaintiff had learnt about the mutation only in the year 2009 at the time when she came to her parental house and made inquiries about the status of the suit land. Admittedly, the suit was filed in the year 2009 itself and, therefore, the same was within three years from the denial of her right in the suit land by defendant No. 1. Thus, the suit cannot be said to be time barred as has otherwise been concurrently observed by the learned Courts below. 21. Admittedly, the suit was filed in the year 2009 itself and, therefore, the same was within three years from the denial of her right in the suit land by defendant No. 1. Thus, the suit cannot be said to be time barred as has otherwise been concurrently observed by the learned Courts below. 21. It is otherwise more than settled that the appellate Court continues to be a final court of fact and law and second appeal to the High Court lies only where there is a substantial question of law. Meaning thereby the pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before this Court in second appeal. It shall be apt to refer to three Judges Bench decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs , 2001 3 SCC 179 wherein it was observed as follows: " 15 The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate Court is also a final Court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one. " 22. What would be the substantial question of law was thereafter considered in para 12 of the judgment, which reads thus: " 12. The phrase ''substantial question of law'', as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta & Anr. Vs. T. Ram Ditta , 1928 AIR(PC) 172, the phrase "''substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 of the C. P. C. (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacuring Co. , Ltd. , 1962 Supp3 SCR 549, the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao Vs. Noony Veeraju , 1952 ILR(Mad) 264:- "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law. " and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial:- "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law. " 23. Finally, in paragraph 14, the Hon''ble Supreme Court laid down the guidelines on the test of as to what is the substantial question of law, which reads thus: "14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. " 24. The findings recorded by the learned Courts below are concurrent findings of fact which are binding on this Court while hearing the second appeal. It is more so, when these findings are neither found to be perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such findings nor these findings have been found against the evidence nor against the pleadings and lastly, nor against any provision of law (Refer: Parminder Singh vs. Gurpreet Singh , 2017 AIR(SC) 3601). 25. No question of law much less substantial question of law arises for consideration in the instant appeal and accordingly the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any.