JUDGMENT : Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. This Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 05.05.2010 passed by learned Additional District Judge [F.T.C.-II] Seraikella-Kharsawan in Title Appeal No.48 of 1998 whereby and where under the learned first appellate court has allowed the appeal on contest and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 3. The case of the plaintiff in brief is that the suit land was under Seraikella Raj which merged in the State of Bihar in 1948. In the cadastral survey of the year 1925-27 which is known as Abdul Settlement, C.S. Plot No.445 stood recorded under Khata No.137 of Mouza- Dindli, which stood recorded in the name of Jagannath Mahto. Jagannath Mahto planted a number of fruit bearing trees like mango, blackberry etc. C.S. Plot No.445 was recorded as Anabad Malik Khata but in the remark column of the C.S. Khatiyan the usufructuary right of Jagananath Mahto has been noted. It is also the case of the plaintiff that Khata No.211 of ward No.5 of Adityapur N.A.C. has been recorded in his name without any objection from any quarter. It is further the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff applied to the Circle Officer, Gamharia for fixation of fair rent of the suit land but the Circle Officer, Gamharia, with ulterior motive did not fix fair rent and instead filed an application for institution of a case under Section 90 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act in the court of Charge Officer, Jamshedpur, who vide his order dated 22.08.1995 passed an order for correction of the finally published record of right in respect of the suit land by deleting his name from the raiyati column and in his place to record the name of State of Bihar. According to the plaintiff, the said order of Charge Officer is arbitrary because the Charge Officer has no right to decide the rights of the parties under Section 90 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. It is further the case of the plaintiff that after passing of the order by the Circle Officer, Jamshedpur, the local revenue staff of Gamharia Anchal in November, 1995, held out threat to eject the plaintiff from the suit land. It is further the case of the plaintiff that after passing of the order by the Circle Officer, Jamshedpur, the local revenue staff of Gamharia Anchal in November, 1995, held out threat to eject the plaintiff from the suit land. So, he served a notice under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure and after expiry of period of two months after service of the notice, he filed the suit to declare his right, title and interest over the suit land as well as for confirmation of possession over the suit land and also to declare that order dated 22.08.1995 passed by the Charge Officer, Singhbhum in Settlement Case No.162/1986-87 under Section 90 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act is illegal, without jurisdiction and inoperative and also to declare that the entire suit related to Notified Area Committee Survey Record of Rights is correct in respect to the suit land. 4. The defendants on the other hand, besides usual defence have pleaded that the description of the suit land is vague. The suit land was never in possession of Jagannath Mahto nor did Jagannath Mahto planted any tree on or any portion of the suit land because it was in Anabad Khas land of the Saraikealla Raj. It was vested in the State of Bihar in the year 1950. It is further pleaded by the defendants that assuming for the sake of arguments that Jagannath Mahto was having possessory right over the suit land for which he was entitled till the trees were in existence or till his death. The defendants denied that there was any tree ever existed over the suit land nor Jagannath Mahto or his descendants ever exercised their right, title and interest over the suit land. It is further pleaded by the defendants that R.S. Khatiyan has rightly been prepared but Abhimanyu Mahato in collusion with others got his name recorded in the remarks column of R.S. Plot No.1159, which is incorrect. The defendants also pleaded that Abhimanyu Mahto was not the grandson of Jagannath Mahto and the claim of possessory right over C.S. Plot No.445 since 1950 has got no basis and is wrong. The defendants also pleaded that Abhimanyu Mahto was not the grandson of Jagannath Mahto and the claim of possessory right over C.S. Plot No.445 since 1950 has got no basis and is wrong. The Defendant State further pleaded that Abhimanyu Mahto had no right to execute any sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in 1973 in respect of the suit land as he did not have any transferable title with him in respect of the suit land. It is the specific case of the defendant that the plaintiff recently trespassed to the suit land and started some construction. It is the further case of the defendants that in the Notified Area Committee Survey was finally published in 1983. The plaintiff in collusion with the settlement staff and officer, got his name recorded with respect to the suit land and when it came to light, a case under Section 90 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act was filed, by the State of Bihar and after considering the claims of the parties, the Charge Officer made correction in the N.A.C. Khatiyan of Khata No.211. The plaintiff did not file any appeal against the order of the Charge Officer dated 20.08.1995. The defendants also denied service of notice under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure. 5. On the basis of rival pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed altogether twelve issues. The principal issue being the issue No.8 which is as under:- (8) Whether the plaintiff has got subsisting title, interest and possession over the suit land by virtue of his purchase from Abhimanyu Mahato? 6. The learned trial court held that though the proceeding under Section 90 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act was filed within prescribed period of limitation, but the Charge Officer was not having any jurisdiction to decide the right, title and interest of the parties and also held that the plaintiff had already perfected his right, title and interest by virtue of adverse possession against the State of Bihar by continuously remaining in possession along with his vendor for a period of more than 30 years and thus, they have got subsisting title in respect of the suit land by adverse possession and decreed the suit on contest. 7. 7. The respondents of this appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court being the Subordinate Judge-II, Seraikella in Title Suit No.04/1996/16-1997 preferred an appeal in the court of District Judge, Seraikella and the same was numbered as Title Appeal No.48 of 1998. The said appeal was heard and disposed of by the Additional District Judge (F.T.C-II), Seraikella by the impugned judgment and decree. 8. The learned first appellate court considered that the plaintiffs having not pleaded the essential ingredients of the plea of adverse possession, the learned court below erred by passing the decree of title by adverse possession. The learned court below also considered that the order of Charge Officer has not been challenged before the learned appellate court and the Charge Officer has not decided the right, title and interest of the parties. The first appellate court also considered that there is no genealogy mentioned in the plaint to establish that Abhimanyu Mahto is the grandson of Jagannath Mahto. The plaintiff has not filed the khatiyan of Abdul Settlement in which the name of Jagannath Mahto was claimed to have been recorded. The first appellate court also took note of the contradictions in the pleadings and evidence of the plaintiff. The learned first appellate court further considered that assuming for the sake of arguments Abhimanyu Mahto was in possession of the land since 1950 he did not perfect his title against the government by way of adverse possession by the date of execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in the year 1973. The learned appellate court on an appreciation of evidence disbelieved the documents of the plaintiff and also considered that no permission in terms of under Section 46 (1) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act was taken for execution of the sale deed. Hence, in the absence of such mandatory permission, the sale deed could not convey any title and after thus considering, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree and dismissed the suit. 9. Mr. A. K. Sahani, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned court below failed to appreciate the evidence in the record in its proper perspective and further submitted that the learned court below failed to meet out the reasoning recorded by the learned trial court in its judgment. Mr. 9. Mr. A. K. Sahani, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned court below failed to appreciate the evidence in the record in its proper perspective and further submitted that the learned court below failed to meet out the reasoning recorded by the learned trial court in its judgment. Mr. Sahani fairly submits that though it has not been specifically pleaded but the learned first appellate court ought to have held that the Charge Officer could not have changed the entry after long lapse of time. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and after going through the record, I find that the learned trial court has considered that the final N.A.C. record of right was finally published on 23.09.1993 and the said order has remained unchallenged. The learned first appellate court after threadbare discussion of the evidence in the record disbelieved the documents proved by the plaintiff and also considered that in the absence of any pleading of the essential ingredients of the plea of adverse possession, the trial court ought not have passed a decree of title based on adverse possession. It is a settled principle of law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse, as has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme of India, in paragraph -10 of the case of Gurvachan Kaur and Others vs. Salikram (dead) through LRS., reported in (2010) 15 SCC 530 as under:- "10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." (Emphasis Supplied). 11. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." (Emphasis Supplied). 11. So far as the contention of the appellants regarding the reasoning given by the trial court being not met by the first appellate court is concerned, the same do not have any force as it is a settled principle of law that it is open to the first appellate court to consider the evidences adduced by the parties and give its own reasons for accepting the evidences on one side or rejecting the evidences on the other side. It is not permissible for the second appellate court to interfere with such finding of the first appellate court only on the ground that the first appellate court had not come to grips with the reasoning given by the trial court as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Arumugham v. Sundarambal, (1999) 4 SCC 350 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under in paragraph 14: “14. From the aforesaid judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Ramachandra Ayyar it is clear that this Court held that the second appellate court cannot interfere with the judgment of the first appellate court on the ground that the first appellate court had not come to close grips with the reasoning of the trial court. It is open to the first appellate court to consider the evidence adduced by the parties and give its own reasons for accepting the evidence on one side or rejecting the evidence on the other side. It is not permissible for the second appellate court to interfere with such findings of the first appellate court only on the ground that the first appellate court had not come to grips with the reasoning given by the appellate trial court. … …”(Emphasis Supplied) 12. After going through the record, this Court finds that there is no substantial question of law involved in this appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any specific instance of any particular evidence being not considered. … …”(Emphasis Supplied) 12. After going through the record, this Court finds that there is no substantial question of law involved in this appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any specific instance of any particular evidence being not considered. The learned Counsel for the appellant also could not point out any illegality or error in the impugned judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court giving rise to any substantial question of law to be framed and decided by this Court in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction. 13. Accordingly, this appeal, being without any merit, is dismissed but in the circumstances without any cost. 14. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned court below forthwith. Appeal dismissed.