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2018 DIGILAW 222 (JHR)

Manoj Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand

2018-01-29

RATNAKER BHENGRA

body2018
JUDGMENT : Ratnaker Bhengra, J: Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner, through the instant application, seeks setting aside of judgment dated 12.04.2016, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-VI, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum in Criminal Appeal No. 277/2012, whereby and whereunder, the learned court-below has been pleased to dismiss the appeal filed by the petitioner and uphold the judgment of conviction dated 14.09.2012, passed in C/1 Case No. 2458/2010, corresponding to T.R. No. 2072/2012 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum, whereby, learned Magistrate convicted the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, and sentenced him to one year simple imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs.7,00,000/-. In default of payment of fine, the accused petitioner was to undergo three months simple imprisonment. Petitioner further prayed to set aside the judgment of conviction dated 14.09.2012, passed in C/1 Case No. 2458/2010, corresponding to T.R. No.2072/2012 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum. 3. The case of the complainant is that the complainant deals in the manufacturing of angles, channels, bars, flat, strips etc. and the petitioner-accused is the proprietor of M/s. MAPS Enterprises having its works and office at C/44, 1st Phase, Adityapur Industrial Area, Adityapur, District Saraikela-Kharsawan, Jharkhand. It is alleged that the accused had placed an order for MS strips/ bar/ flat vide purchase order No. M/E/ASW/02/10-11 dated 24.05.2010. The complainant supplied the said articles against purchase order of the accused vide Despatch Advice cum Invoices No. B0276 dated 10.06.2010 amounting Rs.5,15,745.15/-( Rupees Five Lakh Fifteen Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Five and Fifteen Paisa only) and Despatch Advice cum Invoice No. B0282 dated 11.06.2010 amounting Rs.1,53,438.77/-(Rupees One Lakh Fifty Three Thousand Four Hundred Thirty Eight and Seventy Seven Paisa only). In discharge of aforesaid liabilities, the accused issued two cheques bearing no. 534484 dated 11.07.2010 amounting Rs.5,15,745.15/-( Rupees Five Lakh Fifteen Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Five and Fifteen Paisa only) and another cheque no.534486 dated 12.07.2010 amounting Rs.1,53,438.77/-(Rupees One Lakh Fifty Three Thousand Four Hundred Thirty Eight and Seventy Seven Paisa only), both were drawn on State Bank of India, Adityapur Branch, Jamshedpur. Both the aforesaid cheques were deposited by the complainant in Union Bank, S.S.I. Branch, Bistupur, Jamshedpur on 15.07.2010. Both the aforesaid cheques were deposited by the complainant in Union Bank, S.S.I. Branch, Bistupur, Jamshedpur on 15.07.2010. The complainant received bank return memo dated 15.07.2010 issued by Union Bank, S.S.I, Branch, Bistupur, Jamshedpur that both the aforesaid cheques have not been honoured and returned the same with a note “Exceeds Arrangement”. Therefore, legal notice dated 29.07.2010 was sent through Advocate by registered post with acknowledge due on 29.07.2010 and demanded the amount indicated in the aforesaid cheques within 15 days from the receipt of notice. The accused received with acknowledgement the said notice on 30.07.2010, but, he neither paid amount to the complainant nor issued any reply. The complainant being aggrieved filed case before the learned C.J.M., Jamshedpur being C1 2458/2010. The learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, after hearing the parties, convicted the accused-petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 and sentenced him for one year SI and to pay a fine of Rs.7,00,000/-(Rupees Seven Lacs), and in default of fine, further three months SI. On appeal by the accused-petitioner in Criminal Appeal No. 277/2012, the learned Additional Sessions Judge-VI, Jamshedpur, dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the court-below in C1 Case No. 2458/2010. Hence, this revision application. Argument advanced by counsel for the petitioner: 4. Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, the complainant-Mr. Pramod Singh must be fully acquainted with the transaction, and in this case regarding the allegation made in the transaction, counsel has cited the case of “Pooja Ravinder Devidasani versus State of Maharashtra and another”, reported in (2014) 16 Supreme Court Cases 1 para 17, and said that opposite party No.2, or Pramod Singh was not the chief person in his company and not in charge of the business of the company, hence, opposite party No.2 was in no position to send him the notice or file the initial complaint against him. Counsel for the petitioner argues that the complainant does not even have knowledge of how much the transaction consisted of. The knowledge of the transaction was obtained only from the accountant. Hence, Opposite Party No.2/ complainant is an incompetent witness. 5. Counsel for the petitioner argues that the complainant does not even have knowledge of how much the transaction consisted of. The knowledge of the transaction was obtained only from the accountant. Hence, Opposite Party No.2/ complainant is an incompetent witness. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that Manoj Kumar Singh, the petitioner, had given blank cheques as security and accountant of opposite party No.2, M/s. Akshay Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. filled the amounts in the cheque. The complainant himself did not have any personal, direct knowledge of the cheque amounts. He only came to know subsequently. 6. Counsel for the petitioner reiterated that the cheques were given in blank as security, and this has been misused and it is not executed by the signatory or cannot be said to be executed by the signatory. 7. Counsel for the petitioner has also put forth the arguments, that, the signatures on the cheques by the signing person or the executant and the content and substance of the cheques that is the filled in amount was filled by another person and they are two different things. Hence, the petitioner cannot be held liable, particularly since the cheques were given in blank only for security. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the signatures on the cheques is for M/s. MAPS Enterprises, hence, the drawer is the Company-M/s. MAPS Enterprises or accused No.1, as per complaint case, hence, the liability if at all existed was of the Company. 9. Regarding notice, learned counsel submitted that the notice was issued to Manoj Kumar Singh, in his personal capacity, and not on M/s. MAPS Enterprises, who has the responsibility for any liability in the case of the cheques. Counsel has also cited the cases of “S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. versus Neeta Bhalla and another, reported in (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 89 as well as “Pooja Ravinder Devidasani (supra) to argue that it is the company that is responsible, and not him. His argument is that the signature on the cheques is for M/s. MAPS Enterprises and therefore, the company or M/s. MAPS Enterprises is liable or responsible and not him. His argument is that the signature on the cheques is for M/s. MAPS Enterprises and therefore, the company or M/s. MAPS Enterprises is liable or responsible and not him. Counsel for the petitioner has also cited the judgment, in the case of “Charanjit Pal Jindal versus L.N. Metalics”, reported in (2015) 15 Supreme Court Cases 768, and said that the notice to the accused-petitioner Manoj Kumar Singh was in his personal capacity. Counsel has said that notice was only issued to petitioner Manoj Kumar Singh and not to the company. The company is a necessary party. 10. Petitioner's counsel also argued that the amount in the cheques are tallying or are in synchronization with the invoice amount, paise to paise. If the accused would have issued the cheques, it would have been issued in higher amount, not paise to paise equivalent, this, thus, raises doubts. 11. Counsel for the petitioner has then raised the issue of validity or legality of the legal notice sent to the accused. Counsel has claimed that the legal notice is nonest because it was issued prior to the authorization letter. This means that the complainant was initially not authorized and he sent the legal notice. Counsel has referred to the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra), para-5 and said that as because legal notice was issued prior to authorization, and therefore non-est, cognizance should not have been taken by the Magistrate in the first place. 12. Counsel for the petitioner's next line of argument is that the complainant or Pramod Singh was not authorized by the Managing Director, Rajender Sachdev, and nor was his power to authorize legal and valid, where does he get the power to authorize from. If the power to authorize in the bye-laws of the Company is not there, then the authorization is invalid. Also, the Managing Director does not have the power to sub-delegate, unless, there is a provision made in the bye-laws for sub-delegation. He has referred to paragraph-15 of the cross-examination of the complainant where he has indicated that his signature is not there in the authorization letter. Hence, if his signature is not there, that means he has not accepted the authorization letter, hence, there is no valid authorization. Counsel has also claimed that he has not received the letter of authorization personally from the Managing Director. 13. Hence, if his signature is not there, that means he has not accepted the authorization letter, hence, there is no valid authorization. Counsel has also claimed that he has not received the letter of authorization personally from the Managing Director. 13. Counsel for the petitioner further claimed that the accused or Manoj Kumar Singh has not put his signature on the invoice, hence, he did not accept the legal debt, therefore, he is free from any liability towards the complainant. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the cheques exhibited as Ext.3 and Ext.3/1 had the contents or substance written in different inks. Counsel said that the amounts indicated in the body of the cheque and the signatures were in different inks. He claimed that the Apex Court has ruled that when inks are separate, then the cheques cannot be relied upon. Counsel has cited the case of “C. Antony versus K.G. Raghavan Nair”, reported in (2003) 1 Supreme Court Cases 1 and said that when the ink used in the body of the cheque is different from the ink used in the signature on the cheque, then the respondents' case cannot be sustained. 15. Counsel further submitted that the return memo from the bank indicating “Exceed Arrangement” does not bear the seal of the concerned bank, therefore, the return memo is doubtful and cannot be relied upon. That the dishonour imputed by the bank, in the absence of the bank seal is not proved. 16. Counsel for the petitioner has referred to the examination dated 2.3.2012 under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and the questions put to the petitioner/ accused and his answers thereof. Counsel says that from the substance of the statements therein, it is clear that (1) there is no admission made regarding the cheques (2) that there is no admission made regarding dishonour of cheques and (3) there is no admission of notice sent or received by the petitioner. 17. Counsel further submitted that in the examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the amount alleged to have been involved was Rs.9,22,835.10/-, which is different from the total of the alleged cheque amounts, which is even less than this, therefore, when amounts, in question, are varied or different, no question of dishonour of any cheques arises. 17. Counsel further submitted that in the examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the amount alleged to have been involved was Rs.9,22,835.10/-, which is different from the total of the alleged cheque amounts, which is even less than this, therefore, when amounts, in question, are varied or different, no question of dishonour of any cheques arises. Counsel for the appellant has then referred to the judgments, in the cases of “Sujit Biswas versus State of Assam”, reported in (2013) 12 Supreme Court Cases 406; “Prakash versus State of Karnataka”, reported in (2014) 12 Supreme Court Cases 133 and “Nagaraj versus State represented by Inspector of Police, Salem Town, Tamil Nadu”, reported in (2015) 4 Supreme Court Cases 739 and argued that since the relevant or precise questions were not put to him under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, this is not proper and lawful, and hence his defence was prejudiced. 18. Counsel for the petitioner has also argued that a petition for compromise had also been filed. Further, petitioner was also willing to pay a certain preliminary amount and for which, this Hon'ble Court had allowed some time to see the result. Though, the petitioner is not admitting his guilt, but, all this demonstrates his good bona fide. 19. Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that, though not admitting, even if cheques amounts are in issue, the complainant is not entitled to receive any interest amount on the principal amount. On the point of interest, counsel has cited the judgment in the case of “Suman Sethi versus Ajay K. Churiwal and another”, reported in (2000) 2 Supreme Court Cases 380 and submitted that though he is not admitting the allegations made against the appellant, no interest would accrue to the respondents on the principal amount. 20. Finally, counsel has argued that in such matter, the preponderance of probability has to be seen, and from the facts and circumstances, the petitioner/ accused cannot be held liable and guilty. On conclusion of his arguments, counsel for the petitioner has stressed a lot on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. He has argued that the principle of proving beyond reasonable doubt rests upon the complainant and, the accused can oppose or counter that on the principle of preponderance of probabilities, that so long as the accused can make his case reasonably probable, he must be given the benefit. He has argued that the principle of proving beyond reasonable doubt rests upon the complainant and, the accused can oppose or counter that on the principle of preponderance of probabilities, that so long as the accused can make his case reasonably probable, he must be given the benefit. He cites, in this context, the Hon'ble Apex Court's judgment, in the case of “Vijay versus Laxman and another”, reported in (2013) 3 Supreme Court Cases 86. Counsel has also stressed that even in a case of two consecutive lower courts deciding against the petitioner for setting aside errors or gross injustice, the Hon'ble High Court under its revisionary jurisdiction can decide in favour of the accused/ petitioner. Counsel has cited the ruling in “Daungarshi Madanlal Zunzunwala versus M/s. Deviprasad Omprakash Bajoria and another”, reported in 1985 CRI. L.J. 1943, and said that in the aforesaid case the Hon'ble High Court set aside, the concurrent findings of the two courts-below for the sake of rectifying injustice. Argument advanced by counsel for Opposite Party No.2: 21. Mr. Dilip Kr. Prasad, counsel for opposite party No.2, has argued that the lengthy arguments of the petitioner are not supported by any cross-examination. In absence of cross-examination on vital issues, arguments of the petitioner are not tenable. At this stage, this Hon'ble Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence, particularly, when two earlier courts-below on the basis of evidence have ruled against the petitioner. Counsel has then cited the ruling in “Amit Kapoor versus Ramesh Chander & another”, reported in (2012) 9 Supreme Court Cases 460 and submitted that revisional jurisdiction can only be invoked when there is a gross error, no compliance of the laws, finding is recorded on the basis of no evidence or material evidence is ignored, and judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or pervasively or finding is of a perverse nature. Counsel says that none of the aforesaid applies to the present case. Another, aspect that counsel has addressed is on the issue of preponderance of probabilities. He has also relied on the case also cited by the petitioner i.e. “Vijay versus Laxman and another”, reported in (2013) 3 Supreme Court Cases 86. Counsel has submitted that the facts and circumstances in each case needs to be taken into account, and that a judgment is for what it decides. He has also relied on the case also cited by the petitioner i.e. “Vijay versus Laxman and another”, reported in (2013) 3 Supreme Court Cases 86. Counsel has submitted that the facts and circumstances in each case needs to be taken into account, and that a judgment is for what it decides. Counsel has then said that the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act has not been rebutted. 22. Counsel submits that earlier letter of authorization and the legal notice was not questioned initially. Counsel has further claimed that none of the exhibits were questioned. They were accepted without objection, and there is nothing on record to show that they were objected. Petitioner has not denied any of the exhibits, rather allowed them, he cannot now revert or rescind from the same. The necessary inference under Section 114 of the Evidence Act will be that these exhibits are of good and proper evidentiary value. 23. Regarding Ext.1 or the letter of authorization, counsel submits that it was marked without objection. There was no cross-examination as to it being bad. Hence, Ext.1 cannot be questioned now at this stage. Regarding cheques in question, i.e., Ext.3 and 3/1, counsel has argued that these exhibits were also not challenged or objected to on being exhibited and marked. As per the ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, the presumption is that they are good cheques. The arguments now being made is that amounts of 6 lac and 3.5 lac were then made by RTGS and also that the cheques were given as security. Counsel says it is an admitted fact that the cheques were issued for the relevant and precise amounts and given to the complainant, and they have been accepted as exhibits. 24. Counsel further says that it is indicated that the cheques were blank, but, it is for the petitioner to prove the same. However, it is also said that there is no evidence of payment. 25. Regarding Exts. 6 and 6/1 that is postal receipts and acknowledgement, counsel has claimed that the objection being raised were not raised during the cross-examination, and exts. 6 and 6/1 were accepted and marked without objection. 26. Counsel for the opposite party, on the point of two inks on cheques, says that, that was never tested by the experts or by forensic examination. 6 and 6/1 were accepted and marked without objection. 26. Counsel for the opposite party, on the point of two inks on cheques, says that, that was never tested by the experts or by forensic examination. Moreover, the petitioner admitting the cheques is on record and now, since issues have arisen, he raises the ground of two kinds of inks. He cannot now wriggle out of the admission on technicalities post facto. 27. Regarding, the exhibits, which have been admitted and that too without objection, counsel for the opposite party has then submitted with reference to the judgment in the case of “Narbada Devi Gupta versus Birendra Kumar Jaiswal and another, reported in (2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 745. Paragraphs-16 and 17 of the said judgment read as under: “16. Reliance is heavily placed on behalf of the appellant on the case of Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the “evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue”. The situation is, however, different where the documents are produced, they are admitted by the opposite party, signatures on them are also admitted and they are marked thereafter as exhibits by the court. We find no force in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that as the mark of exhibits has been put on the back portions of the rent receipts near the place where the admitted signatures of the plaintiff appear, the rent receipts as a whole cannot be treated to have been exhibited as admitted documents. 17. We have already reproduced above the contents of Order No. 53 dated 3-9-1982 of the trial court. The appellant cannot be allowed to question the correctness of the said order. The documents were admitted and then exhibited. The plaintiff did not dispute his signatures on the back of them. 17. We have already reproduced above the contents of Order No. 53 dated 3-9-1982 of the trial court. The appellant cannot be allowed to question the correctness of the said order. The documents were admitted and then exhibited. The plaintiff did not dispute his signatures on the back of them. There was, therefore, no further burden of proof on the defendant to lead additional evidence in proof of the writing on the rent receipts and its due execution by the deceased landlady.” Counsel has then said in the current case on hand also, the exhibits 1 to 6/1 were admitted, and they cannot now be denied to open a Pandora box. 28. Regarding letter of authorization and validity of the same, counsel says Pramod Singh is the Manager of M/s. Akshay Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and he has filed the complaint case in that capacity. The owners of the Company have not denied the authorization, and he, in his examination-in-chief, has stated that he is knowledgeable and aware about the allegation made in the transaction relevant for the case. 29. Regarding the incorrect or misstatements made in the examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C, counsel says those are the questions and answers, recorded by the Court and not of the opposite party, therefore, opposite party should not be made liable for them. FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS 30. Having heard both counsels, having gone through the records available and in the facts and circumstances, the followings are observed: At the outset, two important aspects that have been raised need to be borne in mind. One is to what extent can this Court enter into the dispute when two consecutive lower courts have already held against the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that in case of gross injustice or setting aside errors it is possible for the Court to go into the matter and cited the case of “Daungarshi Madanlal Zunzunwala” (supra) to support his case. Counsel for the opposite party has, on the other hand, cited the case of “Amit Kapoor” (supra) and argued that only in case of gross error, no compliance of laws, finding is recorded on the basis of no evidence, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely or finding is of perverse nature, then only can there be interference by this Court. The other important aspect that needs to be addressed is the matter of preponderance of probabilities. The other important aspect that needs to be addressed is the matter of preponderance of probabilities. Petitioner has argued that so long as he can make his case reasonably probable, then he must be given the benefit of doubt. 31. While deciding the revision, I have heard both the counsels at length and at least to address two of the aforesaid aspects, as well as the other aspects of the matter, I have felt that fulfillment of the conditions or ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 is necessary. Prima facie, if the conditions are met, then will it be proper to address any other issues raised. The following conditions need to be met to fasten any liability on the accused petitioner. These have been enumerated so in the judgment of the impugned criminal appeal as under: (i) The cheque must have been issued towards the discharge of any legally enforceable debt or liability. (ii) The cheque in question must be presented before the Bank within the validity period. (iii) The cheque should get dishonoured due to insufficiency of fund standing to the credit or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by agreement. (iv) The payee/holder in due course should have issued a legal notice of demand upon the drawer within 30 days of getting information regarding said dishonour. (v) The drawer should have failed to make the payment of disnonoured cheque amount within 15 days of receipt of notice. (vi) The payee of cheque should file complaint case before competent magistrate having jurisdiction within one month from the date of cause of action arose. As per the findings of both the lower courts:- (i) The cheques issued by the accused petitioner was issued towards the discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability, and in this case, for the payment of the articles that were already delivered against the invoices. (ii) The invoices are dated 10.06.2010 and 11.06.2010 respectively, and the cheques issued for them are soon thereafter, dated 11.07.2010 and 12.07.2010. Both cheques were presented at the concerned Union Bank on 15.07.2010, and they were returned by bank return memo on the same day dated 15.07.2010. Hence, the cheques were presented at the concerned bank within the validity period. (iii) The bank return memos, marked as Ext.-4 and Ext.4/1, both dated 15.07.2010 were returned for reasons indicated as “Exceeds Arrangement”. Both cheques were presented at the concerned Union Bank on 15.07.2010, and they were returned by bank return memo on the same day dated 15.07.2010. Hence, the cheques were presented at the concerned bank within the validity period. (iii) The bank return memos, marked as Ext.-4 and Ext.4/1, both dated 15.07.2010 were returned for reasons indicated as “Exceeds Arrangement”. (iv) The legal notice sent by the Advocate of M/s. Akshay Steel Works Pvt. Ltd., represented by its Manager, Pramod Singh, dated 29.07.2010 marked as Ext.5, was sent on the same day i.e. 29.07.2010, as proved by the postal receipt, marked as Ext.-6, the acknowledgement of which has been marked as Ext.6/1. Hence, legal notice to be sent within required 30 days of getting information of dishonour is also proved by the aforesaid exhibits. (v) The appellant failed to pay the dishonoured cheque amounts within 15 days of notice. (vi) The legal notice dated 29.07.2010 was sent by the Advocate of M/s. Akshay Steel Works Pvt. Ltd., marked as Ext.-5 and the letter of authorization was issued by Rajender Sachdev, Managing Director dated 10.08.2010, marked as Ext.1. Both refer to the Manager Pramod Singh of M/s. Akshay Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and is representing M/s. Akshay Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and is authorized to file the case, hence, even the sixth ingredient is met by filing the case within time as required. From the aforesaid facts and reasonings, it is clear that at least the conditions as required by Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 are prevalent and therefore, prima facie, there is a case for proceeding in the matter. 32. Another, important reason that needs to be flagged at this instance is that the petitioner has admitted that the cheques are under his signature. Considering the sequence and dates of the invoices, the fact of delivery of the articles and thereafter the dates of the cheques soon after. It can be concluded that the petitioner had accepted and taken responsibility for payments. 33. In para-8 of this revision application, the petitioner claims to have paid Rs.6,00,000/-and Rs.3,50,000/-by RTGS. Then in para-11 of this revision application, the petitioner says dispute between the parties irrespective of the individual merit was settled amicably in four compliant cases bearing Nos.2459/2010, 2458/2010, 2868/2010 and 2867/2010, and attached a photocopy of the compromise petition as Annexure-3 that corresponds to paragraph-11 of this revision application. Then in para-11 of this revision application, the petitioner says dispute between the parties irrespective of the individual merit was settled amicably in four compliant cases bearing Nos.2459/2010, 2458/2010, 2868/2010 and 2867/2010, and attached a photocopy of the compromise petition as Annexure-3 that corresponds to paragraph-11 of this revision application. However, in the prayer portion of the compromise petition it reads as “It is therefore prayed that Your Honour may be pleased to grant time to the accused to settle their dispute out of the Court amicably and allow this compromise between the parties in the interests of justice.” So it is apparent that a compromise settlement had not been reached. 34. Petitioner had also during the hearing of the revision also filed a reply to I.A. No. 4392 of 2016, which included an Annexure-1 series, which was a photocopies of statement of account of the petitioner and the money receipts indicating payments of substantial amount to the opposite party before and after the institution of complaint cases. In this Annexure-1 series, there are 13 money receipts, for various amounts, but all indicated as pertaining to C. Case No. 2459/2010. There are three photocopies of bank cheque for various amounts, and these are also indicated for C. Case No. 2459/2010. In the statement of account also many amounts or payments are indicated. The point to be noted is that while payments pertaining to C. Case No. 2459/2010 are apparent, it is not so for payments that pertain to C. Case No. 2458/2010 for which petitioner has prayed for setting aside the impugned order in this revision application. Hence, by dragging sums involved in other cases, accused-petitioner it seems tries to say that he has paid so also in the current case, or at least tries to mitigate his position. However, it is to be noted that payments or amounts specified are for C. Case No. 2459/2010, and not for the other two cases, and neither for the C. Case No. 2458/2010. 35. One more important argument raised by the opposite party is that exhibits were all admitted and marked as exhibits without any objection to them. Counsel for the opposite party says accused-petitioner cannot raise objections and deny them now. 36. Petitioner has raised many other grounds to defend his case. One of these is that the complainant did not have authorization or proper authorization to file the case. Counsel for the opposite party says accused-petitioner cannot raise objections and deny them now. 36. Petitioner has raised many other grounds to defend his case. One of these is that the complainant did not have authorization or proper authorization to file the case. He has gone to the extent of saying that the Managing Director's power to authorize is not legal or valid, since it must be specified in the bye-laws of the organization, and that the complainant must have accepted the authorization by countersigning the letter of authorization and so on. Counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, has argued that at the initial stage, the authorization was not questioned. That this questioning of authorizing is a later development, moreover, the authorizing letter was admitted as exhibit without objection and it cannot be objected to now. A look at the letter of authorization shows the complainant, Pramod Singh was the Manager of the organization. Even in the legal notice sent by the Advocate of the organization, holds him out to be the Manager, and representing the organization. Hence, it will be a weak argument that a Manager, further authorized to file a case or to take legal steps is not qualified to do so. In “A.C. Narayanan versus State of Maharashtra”, reported in 2014(1) East Cr C 389 (SC), it has been held amongst others that: “(i) Filing of complaint petition under Section 138 of N.I. Act through power of attorney is perfectly legal and competent. (ii) The Power of Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the Court in order to prove the contents of the complaint. However, the power of attorney holder must have witnessed the transaction as an agent of the payee/holder in due course or possess due knowledge regarding the said transactions.” It is apparent from the letter of authorization that Manager Pramod Singh or complainant was authorized and from his evidence in his examination-in-chief and cross-examination, it is obvious that he is conversant of the matter. This Court thinks petitioner's counsel got things wrong here, the authorization was for the filing of the complaint case, while the legal notice was filed prior to the authorization because he did it in his capacity as a trusted and directed employee of the opposite party company precisely to give notice. This Court thinks petitioner's counsel got things wrong here, the authorization was for the filing of the complaint case, while the legal notice was filed prior to the authorization because he did it in his capacity as a trusted and directed employee of the opposite party company precisely to give notice. Petitioner's argument that Manager Pramod Singh or complainant, representing M/s. Akshay Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. does not have knowledge of the transaction to be authorized is also answered, from the evidence of the complainant in his examination-in-chief and cross-examination, which shows he had knowledge of the matter and was aware of the transaction. In the current case on hand, the petitioner is also the proprietor of the M/s. MAPS Enterprises, and he had not resigned. While in Pooja Ravinder Devidasani (supra) the Owner-Director concerned, had resigned much before the alleged transaction. 37. Petitioner's counsel has also raised objection about the legal notice. In fact, petitioner argues that the legal notice was sent prior to the authorization, and the authorization being invalid, the legal notice is hence defective and invalid. It is also argued that the notice was issued to the petitioner or Manoj Singh in his personal capacity and not on M/s. MAPS Enterprises, and also cited two cases, S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd.(supra) and Pooja Ravinder Devidasani (supra) to hold that it is the company that is responsible and not him. (i) First regarding the legal notice, it would be proper to look at the letter of authorization and the legal notice as two different items or articles, but, bearing on the same case, the argument of whether chicken came first or the egg is irrelevant in the instance. Both documents claim and state that complainant is the Manager of the organization. This claim has not been denied or questioned by the petitioner. As Manager of the organization, complainant is a competent person to issue the legal notice, and the letter of authorization will only enhance his legitimacy. (ii) Secondly, regarding the issue that the legal notice was issued to the petitioner and not to M/s. MAPS Enterprises, and that the company is liable and not him. In this case, petitioner has also argued that the signature on the cheques, though by the petitioner, is indicated in the cheques to be that of M/s. MAPS Enterprises or for M/s. MAPS Enterprises. 38. In this case, petitioner has also argued that the signature on the cheques, though by the petitioner, is indicated in the cheques to be that of M/s. MAPS Enterprises or for M/s. MAPS Enterprises. 38. So now to consider the aspect of the personality of the individual Manoj Kumar Singh, who is also the petitioner in this revision application, and the personality of the M/s. MAPS Enterprises, it will be good to look at the transaction or relevant documents. In the initial Despatch Advice cum Invoices, the person addressed to in both the invoices as the consignee are M/s. MAPS Enterprises, Adityapur, Jamshedpur. Next, for discharging the liability of the purchases, the petitioner issues two cheques, in which, above the signed signature, it is indicated “For M/s. MAPS Enterprises”. However, petitioner has failed to point out that below the signatures is written “Proprietor”. So, from these two documents itself, it is proved that there is a firm or enterprise and that there is also a proprietor. In the current case on hand, in the notice to the petitioner, through letter addressed to him, he was also referred to as the owner-proprietor of M/s MAPS Enterprises. In the body of the notice, it is made clear that the petitioner is the owner or the proprietor of the company. So petitioner is liable. 39. Next, there is a legal notice, Ext.5, which is addressed from the Advocate of M/s. Akshay Steel Works Pvt. Ltd., represented by its Manager Pramod Singh to Manoj Kumar Singh, in his personal address. However, in paragraph-2 of the legal notice, it reads as: “2. That you are Proprietor of M/s MAPS Enterprises, C/ 44, 1st Phase, Industrial Area, Adityapur, Saraikela-Kharsawan, Jharkhand.” And then goes on to detail the facts and issues of the case. So, in the notice, it is addressed to Manoj Kumar Singh, but, makes it clear that it is addressed to him because he is the Proprietor of the said Enterprises, and that they have defaulted in honouring the two cheques, and that both of them are being put on notice for them. 40. Regarding issue of liability or joint liability, in the letter of authorization also, it is seen that Pramod Singh, or the complainant or opposite party herein is being authorized “to file case against M/s MAPS Enterprises, C/ 44, 1st Phase, Industrial Area, Adityapur, Saraikela-Kharsawan, Jharkhand and its Proprietor, Mr. 40. Regarding issue of liability or joint liability, in the letter of authorization also, it is seen that Pramod Singh, or the complainant or opposite party herein is being authorized “to file case against M/s MAPS Enterprises, C/ 44, 1st Phase, Industrial Area, Adityapur, Saraikela-Kharsawan, Jharkhand and its Proprietor, Mr. Manoj Kumar Singh, son of late Ranvir Singh, resident of E-313, East Lay out, Khutadih, PO and PS-Sonari, Town Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum.” So, from the letter of authorization, it is clear that both the individual and the enterprise are being held liable. As a corollary to the just aforesaid, when the case was instituted by the M/s. Akshay Steel Works Pvt. Ltd., as complainant it made both as parties i.e. M/s MAPS Enterprises as accused No.1 and Manoj Kumar Singh as accused No.2. Hence, it is clear that both have been made liable. Further in the current case, Manoj Kumar Singh is the Proprietor of the enterprise, and both have initially been impleaded, and being the Proprietor, and as seen from the records available, also an active Proprietor, he is definitely liable along with the enterprise. The cases relied on by the petitioner S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) and Pooja Ravinder Devidasani (supra) at paras 4 and 17 respectively, the Hon'ble Apex Court has said that every person who at the time of offence was committed, was in charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company is liable for the offence. Hence, these two cases cited by the accused petitioner are of no help to him in the facts and circumstances of this case. 41. The other line of argument that has been raised by the accused-petitioner is that he had only given blank cheques as security and claimed that, therefore, the filled in amount and the signatures are different. Accused-petitioner's counsel has argued that the blank cheques were only given as security and it has been misused by the opposite party. Petitioner has also with regard to usage of two separate inks cited the case of C. Antony (supra) to support his case. Accused-petitioner's counsel has argued that the blank cheques were only given as security and it has been misused by the opposite party. Petitioner has also with regard to usage of two separate inks cited the case of C. Antony (supra) to support his case. On going through the judgment of the Court below, in the first instance, that is the impugned judgment of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur, it is noticed that the accused-petitioner has argued that he had given the cheques as security and it has been misused, but, nowhere it is reflected that the cheques were given in blank, or that only his signatures were initially signed in and the amount later on filled in, or that two different inks have been used. Therefore, the two inks argument, it seems from the judgment was not raised at the first instance. Therefore, accordingly, the opposite party has argued that the cheques were admitted as exhibits without objection, and he cannot now raise this new or later argument. Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out the paras-19, 20, 22 and 31 of the cross-examination of complainant and pointed out the usage of two inks. Counsel for the opposite party has argued, then why were they at all admitted as exhibits with no objection in the first place. Opposite party's counsel argues that, in fact, the petitioner has admitted in his evidence that the signature was his, which means at the first stage, he admitted to the signature as well as the amount, since it was not contested as so in the first stage. The two inks argument, it seems is an afterthought. Moreover, given the sequence of the transaction and the dates, and the evidence in the money receipts and the bank cheques the payments have been specified for the amounts of a particular though differing case, I am not inclined to accept that the fulfillment of the ingredients or conclusions of Section 138 of the Negotiable of Instrument Act, 1881, stands demolished. 42. 42. Another argument that has been raised by the petitioner is that in the examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. or that the questions that were put to him under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were regarding an amount, which was different and much higher than the amount for which the cheques were signed, and hence, the defence of the petitioner was prejudiced right at the initial stage, and therefore, he should not become a victim of prejudiced proceedings. Opposite party, on the other hand, has argued that those questions were put to the petitioner by the Hon'ble Court, and he should not suffer for such questioning. In the impugned judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 14.09.2012, it is stated that the substance of accusation was explained to the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 and read over to the accused in Hindi and he pleaded not guilty, and he sought to be tried. In this regard, this Court comes to the conclusion that under the deposition or evidence of the complainant, Pramod Singh the relevant amounts were exhibited in the invoices Ext.2 and 2/1 and the relevant cheques were also exhibited as Ext.3 and 3/1, so it cannot be said that in the trial at the first stage itself, the accused-petitioner was not aware of what the correct substance of the accusations were. From the records of the case, it appears that at the magisterial stage itself, all the exhibits that were put on record, themselves tell that, at trial, the petitioner was tried for the correct accusations. And even the evidence of both the complainant and respondent were in relation to the exhibits. Hence, this Court does not see how petitioner was prejudiced. Regarding the kind of omission as the petitioner has raised the Apex Court has held in this regard in the case of “Nar Singh versus State of Haryana”, reported in (2015) 1 Supreme Court Cases 496 para 18, that “....omission to put any material circumstance to the accused does not ipso facto vitiate the trial and the accused must show prejudice and that miscarriage of justice had been sustained by him....”. So counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that because of the alleged omission, petitioner was prejudiced and in what way he was prejudiced. 43. So counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that because of the alleged omission, petitioner was prejudiced and in what way he was prejudiced. 43. Petitioner has also made certain arguments, which seem contrived or a desperate attempt to present as many points as possible hoping something would stick, or that the cumulative effect of all would mitigate the issue and make the allegation totally crushed and falsified. Petitioner has argued that cheques amounts are totally in tally with the invoice amounts, and if the cheque had been issued by the petitioner, it would not have been to the paisa. On going through his statement of accounts in the reply to I.A. No. 4392 of 2016, though not many, but, there are several credited amounts that are indicated to the paise. Petitioner's counsel has also argued that since Manoj Kumar Singh, or the petitioner did not put his signature on either of the invoices, he did not accept any legal debt or liability. The question then to be asked, why then did the petitioner issued the cheques, and at this point for argument's sake, even if in blank. Petitioner has also argued that the bank return memos did not bear the seal of the bank and therefore, unreliable. It appears from the impugned judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum, that this argument was not raised in the first instance. Moreover, opposite party has argued that the bank return memos, marked as Ext. 4 and 4/1 were admitted without objections. The last three aforesaid points raised by the petitioner seem contrived and even trivial and not having much substance also. 44. Before my conclusion or finally deciding this case, I will like to get back to the two issues that had been raised and that was borne in mind, that is to what extent this Court can enter into the dispute, when two consecutive lower courts have already held against the petitioner and the other is the question of preponderance of probability. In the case that is now being decided here, now that the entire gamut of arguments and counter arguments have been gone through, the basis of deciding both these issue is now based on a more considered approach. In the case that is now being decided here, now that the entire gamut of arguments and counter arguments have been gone through, the basis of deciding both these issue is now based on a more considered approach. First and foremost, both the consecutive lower court had examined the case and concluded that the conditions or ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 were met. Based on this alone, it may have been advisable not to enter into deciding the issue again in a revision application. It may also have been possible to say that when two consecutive lower courts have concluded against the accused petitioner then on the basis of the argument of preponderance of probabilities, the decisions of the lower courts below should be upheld. In this revision application, in retrospect and while bearing in mind that the conditions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, are fulfilled, arguments raised earlier against the accused petitioner have further deepened. Moreover, with the added benefit of some new arguments, I feel that this Court may not have been justified in entering into the issue, but after doing so, I do not feel inclined to set aside the impugned order. For the same reasons herein also, I do not feel that on the basis of preponderance of probabilities, I can dislodge the grounds raised against the petitioner. Rather, the balance of arguments do not lie in the petitioner's favour. 45. Therefore, having heard both counsels, having gone through the records of the case available, and the aforesaid reasoning, the judgment of conviction of the petitioner passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-VI, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum in Criminal Appeal No. 277/2012 and judgment of conviction passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum in C/1 Case No. 2458/2010, corresponding to T.R. No. 2072/2012 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 are upheld. 46. Finally, petitioner has submitted that without admitting his guilt, that no interest would accrue to the opposite party on the principal amount in any case. On this point, while, there may be agreement with petitioner on the point of interest, as per Suman Sethi (supra). 46. Finally, petitioner has submitted that without admitting his guilt, that no interest would accrue to the opposite party on the principal amount in any case. On this point, while, there may be agreement with petitioner on the point of interest, as per Suman Sethi (supra). However, so far as sentence regarding fine or compensation, this Court will be directed by the judgment of “Pankajbhai Nagjibhai Patel versus State of Gujarat and another”, reported in (2001) 2 Supreme Court Cases 595, where the magisterial fine of Rs.83,000/-was converted to a compensation of Rs.83,000/-. In the case of “Pankajbhai Nagjibhai Patel (supra), the sentence imposed by the Judicial Magistrate of the 1st Class of Rs.83,000/-as fine in a matter pertaining to the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, was questioned because he had exceeded Rs.5000/-limitation in view of the restriction imposed by Section 29(2), Cr.P.C. The learned Apex Court had observed that if the Magistrate of the 1st Class wants to impose more severe sentence of fine then he can follow the procedure prescribed under Section 325(1) Cr.P.C. or if he considers it fit that the complainant should be compensated with his loss, he should follow the provisions of Section 357, Cr.P.C. under which no limit is prescribed. The Apex Court in this case converted the fine of Rs.83,000/-to a compensation of Rs.83,000/-, hence, likewise this Court converts the fine of Rs.7,00,000/-to a compensation of Rs.7,00,000/-, which is to be paid to the complainant or opposite party herein, within a period of six months from the date of this order. The sentence of imprisonment, however, is to be applied only in the case the compensation is defaulted to be paid within six months. 46. With the aforesaid observation and direction, this criminal revision stands dismissed, with above modification in sentence. 47. In view of this judgment rendered by me, the order of this Court dated 30.05.2016 passed in I.A. No.3419/2016 is vacated. 48. Accordingly, I.A. No. 4392 of 2016, in view of this final judgment stands disposed of.