JUDGMENT : The petitioner is aggrieved of order dated 04.01.2017 by which his application for amendment in the written statement has been rejected. 2. Briefly stated, Eviction Suit No. 10 of 2013 was instituted for a decree for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of default in payment of rent and personal necessity of the plaintiff's daughter. The defendant has denied the tenant-landlord relationship and taken a plea that suit land is vested in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. In the pending suit, the defendant filed an application for the following amendment in the written statement; (a) That after para 32 of the written statement a fresh paragraph as para 33 may be added with the following figures :- “Para 33 That besides above the Circle Officer, Jamshedpur, in its demand as contained in letter 1474 dated 27.05.2008 and letter no. 1288 dated 20.07.2013 also claimed that the Dhalbhum Raja Market is situated over the government land and rent is liable to be paid to the State. That the Collector cum Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Dhalbhum, Jamshedpur, also issued a notice under Section 4(g) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, mentioning a list of shop holders of Dhalbhum Raja Market and name of the answering defendant also fined mentioned in the said list. Further, the court of the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Dhalbhum, Jamshedpur, passed a final order in Section 4(g) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act dated 20.11.2015/22.12.2015 passed in Misc. Case No. 1/2013-14 against Bikram Singh & others including the plaintiff in which the learned court has directed to take physical possession of the entire land of Dhalbhum Raja Market together with the super astructure standing there on by application of force under Section 3, 3A, 4A and 7A of Bihar Land Reforms Act” 3. Referring to the judgment in “State of Bihar and Others vs. Modern Tent House and Another” reported in (2017) 8 SCC 567 , Mr. Birendra Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the proposed amendment is by way of elaboration of the stand taken by the defendant and it is not that through amendment the defendant intends to fill-up lacuna in his case. 4. Birendra Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the proposed amendment is by way of elaboration of the stand taken by the defendant and it is not that through amendment the defendant intends to fill-up lacuna in his case. 4. Order VI Rule 17 CPC provides that the court may permit either party to amend his pleadings at any stage of the proceedings, however, Rule 17 CPC itself puts a limitation on powers of the court to permit amendment in the pleadings. It provides that if amendment in the pleadings is necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties, all amendments in the pleadings can be permitted on such terms as the court may deem just and proper. After Order VI Rule 17 CPC was amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 and a proviso was inserted therein, further limitation has been put on powers of the court to permit amendment in the pleadings. It provides that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced and by now it is well-settled that proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC is mandatory. In “Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. Vs. Union of India” reported in (2005) 6 SCC 344 , scope of proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC has been discussed by the Supreme Court in the following words : 26. ........“The proviso, to some extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. Now, if application is filed after commencement of trial, it has to be shown that in spite of due diligence, such amendment could not have been sought earlier. The object is to prevent frivolous applications which are filed to delay the trial. There is no illegality in the provision”. 5. Thus, the fundamental test when amendment in the pleadings shall be permitted is whether the proposed amendment is necessary for adjudicating real dispute between the parties. It is not that in all cases where the other party can be suitably compensated or before trial in the suit has commenced, the parties can be permitted to amend their pleadings. It is only such amendment which is necessary for adjudicating the real question in controversy that can be permitted. 6. In “Ragu Thilak D. John Vs. It is not that in all cases where the other party can be suitably compensated or before trial in the suit has commenced, the parties can be permitted to amend their pleadings. It is only such amendment which is necessary for adjudicating the real question in controversy that can be permitted. 6. In “Ragu Thilak D. John Vs. S. Rayappan” reported in (2001) 2 SCC 472 it has been observed that amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. 7. The plaintiff has pleaded that previously a similar issue was raised in Eviction Suit No. 47 of 2010 and the issue stands concluded by an order of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3638 of 2014. The plaintiff has also pleaded that against the notice under Section 4(g) of Bihar Land Reforms Act, he has come to this Court in W.P.(C) No. 5018 of 2013 and by an order dated 04.01.2016 an order of “status-quo” has been granted by this Court. In the context of an eviction suit this has to be kept in mind that the suit can be instituted even by a person who, infact, is not the owner of the suit premises. Section 2 (f) of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2000 defines landlord to include the person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of the building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf of for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, guardian or who would so receive the rent, to be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant. 8. Whether the defendant was a tenant at the time of institution of the suit, or whether the defendant has committed default in payment of rent and whether the plaintiff needs the suit schedule property for personal necessity or not, are the issues which shall be decided in the suit. The notice issued by the Circle Officer and the notice under Section 4(g) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act are not such facts which would assist the Court in arriving at a just conclusion on the aforesaid issues involved in the eviction suit. Evidently, the proposed amendments are not necessary for adjudicating the real dispute involved in the suit. The notice issued by the Circle Officer and the notice under Section 4(g) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act are not such facts which would assist the Court in arriving at a just conclusion on the aforesaid issues involved in the eviction suit. Evidently, the proposed amendments are not necessary for adjudicating the real dispute involved in the suit. Even if the suit is posted for the plaintiff's evidence, that is to say, trial is at the initial stage, an amendment which is not necessary for adjudicating the real dispute involved in the suit cannot be permitted. 9. Viewed thus, I find no merit in the writ petition and accordingly it is dismissed.