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2018 DIGILAW 2232 (JHR)

Hindustan Produce Company, a Partnership Firm Kolkata, through one of its partners Mr. Puneet Keyal, son of Mr. Surendra Kumar Keyal v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. , through its Managing Director, Bokaro Steel City, Jharkhand

2018-10-09

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, B.B.MANGALMURTI

body2018
ORDER : 1. The controversy involved in this appeal is over withholding refund of security deposit for a sum of Rs.22,67,181/- to the appellant/writpetitioner by the respondent-Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL). The appellant had responded to a global tender floated by SAIL dated 31st August, 2015 for supply of 900 tonnes of 96% natural Flaky Graphite. The appellant was successful in the tender and purchase order was placed on them on 19th March, 2016. They have also executed the tender work. The tender terms required making of security deposit of the aforesaid sum. Apart from security deposit, the sum otherwise receivable by the appellant has been paid. The security deposit has been withheld by SAIL in relation to an earlier transaction between the same parties. That transaction took place in the year 2007 in connection with supply of Ferro Chrome. The case, which is sought to be made out by the respondent is that they were entitled to a sum of Rs.1,90,35,675/- on account of risk purchase differential action in respect of that transaction. Such action, in substance implies that in the event the supplier fails to deliver the entire quantity of goods ordered at the quoted price and the buyer of the goods has to purchase the differential quantum from the open market at a higher price, then the difference between the quoted price and the price at which the goods are procured from open market would have to be paid by the supplier. Though, that transaction is not directly in issue in this appeal, it overshadows the controversy involved in this appeal as withholding of the said sum of security deposit has been attributed to such risk purchase differential in relation to the transaction of 2007. 2. The appellant had invoked the Constitutional Writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning legality of action of SAIL withholding the security deposit, which the appellant contends was illegal appropriation of their own legitimate dues. The learned First Court, however, dismissed the writ petition mainly on the ground of there being adequate alternative remedy. It has been observed and held by the learned First Court citing several authorities including the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. Versus Union of India & Others reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728 in the Judgment under appeal :- “10. It has been observed and held by the learned First Court citing several authorities including the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. Versus Union of India & Others reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728 in the Judgment under appeal :- “10. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if a particular mode of settlement is provided in the contract itself, the High Court may refuse to exercise its discretion and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement. When the relief sought in the writ petition is primarily a monetary claim arising out of contractual obligations, the writ petition is to be entertained only in exceptional circumstances. 11. Now coming back to the factual context of the present case. The dispute between the parties is with regard to supply of materials in pursuance of Purchase Order No. P38.0/P126/91042 dated 19.02.2007. The contention of the petitioner is that 125 MT material was not inspected by the respondents in spite of its request and suddenly letter dated 08.02.2008 was issued under the Risk Purchase Order dated 19.02.2007 alleging that the respondents would purchase the balance materials from the alternative sources. The respondents have however alleged that 125 MT material was neither supplied nor an inspection was offered by the petitioner in spite of repeated requests of the respondents, as a result of which letter dated 08.02.2008 was issued to the petitioner. The said allegations and counter allegations made by the parties cannot be adjudicated in the writ jurisdiction as the same requires adducing of evidences by both the sides. The respondents have also contended that purchase of the materials from M/s. Kothari brothers caused monetary loss to them which is sought to be recovered from the petitioner. However, ascertainment of the actual damage caused to the respondents also requires leading of evidences by the parties. Moreover, the monetary claim/ counter claim made by both the parties relating to the subsequent purchase order also arises out of the contractual obligation between the parties. As such, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Joshi Technologies International (supra), the present writ petition is not maintainable. Moreover, the petitioner had earlier moved before the City Civil Court, Calcutta by filing a Misc. As such, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Joshi Technologies International (supra), the present writ petition is not maintainable. Moreover, the petitioner had earlier moved before the City Civil Court, Calcutta by filing a Misc. Case No. 1732 of 2008 which has already been dismissed vide order dated 17.03.2012 for want of jurisdiction.” 3. Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel has assailed the judgment under appeal mainly on two grounds. His first submission is the writ petition was maintainable on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice even though the appellant-writ petitioner had alternative remedy. On this point, he has relied on two authorities of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Harbanslal Sahnia & Anr. Versus Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 107 and Union of India and Others versus Tantia Construction Private Limited reported in (2011) 5 SCC 697 . Both these decisions are authorities on the point that alternative remedy does not exclude the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts in absolute terms and in the event there is breach of principles of natural justice, the high prerogative writs can always be issued by the High Court. Mr. Mittal’s further submission is that such appropriation of security deposit without any notice or formal demand constituted action prejudicial to the writ petitioner without giving prior opportunity of hearing. The other authority relied upon by him is also the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gangotri Enterprises Limited versus Union of India and Others reported in (2016) 11 SCC 720 . In this decision, it has been held that forfeiture/recovery clause cannot be invoked straightaway to realise unascertained demands and to invoke such forfeiture or recovery clause, the amount due must first be ascertained through a valid adjudicatory process. 4. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned senior counsel appearing for SAIL on the other hand has mainly argued on availability of alternative remedy in the form of arbitration clause. This arbitration clause is incorporated in General Conditions of Contract and stipulates a conciliation cum arbitration mechanism for resolution of any dispute arising out of a contract between SAIL and its suppliers/contractors. 5. We find from the materials available before us that there was an earlier proceeding on the aspect of risk purchase pertaining to the 2007 contract. This arbitration clause is incorporated in General Conditions of Contract and stipulates a conciliation cum arbitration mechanism for resolution of any dispute arising out of a contract between SAIL and its suppliers/contractors. 5. We find from the materials available before us that there was an earlier proceeding on the aspect of risk purchase pertaining to the 2007 contract. An application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was taken out by the appellant before the learned City Civil Court at Kolkata, which was registered as Misc. Case No.1732 of 2008. Initially the appellant had obtained an order in the form of restraint direction on SAIL from procuring materials from open market through the risk purchase process but ultimately that application was dismissed on 17th March, 2012. The learned City Civil Court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain or try the said application on territorial grounds. 6. It is in this perspective question arises as to whether the learned First Court was right in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. What in substance the appellant seeks to achieve by instituting the proceeding out of which this appeal arises is recovery of security deposit in a contractual matter by invoking the jurisdiction of the Writ Court. 7. The dispute in this matter directly arises out of and relates to a contract entered into by and between the parties. The prayer of the appellant has the characteristic of money claim for which the Writ Court can grant relief in very rare cases. We do not find any exceptional circumstances as to why the writ jurisdiction of the High Court ought to be invoked in the given case. The relief mechanism provided in the contract itself cannot be termed to be inefficacious. We have already referred to the clauses relating to conciliation and arbitration earlier in this judgment. So far as the decision of Gangotri Enterprises Limited (supra) is concerned that decision was delivered in a civil action and not by the Constitutional Court at the first instance. To apply the ratio of that decision in the facts of the present case, we need to construe the terms of the 2007 contract as well as examine the power or authority of SAIL to utilize the security deposit in relation to 2016 Purchase Order towards dues of the contract of 2007. To apply the ratio of that decision in the facts of the present case, we need to construe the terms of the 2007 contract as well as examine the power or authority of SAIL to utilize the security deposit in relation to 2016 Purchase Order towards dues of the contract of 2007. That would require addressing several factual issues. The Writ Court is inappropriate forum for determination of these questions. Mr. Mittal has argued that the contract of 2007 could not be subjected to the conciliation cum arbitration clause contained in General Conditions of Contract as this instrument came into existence in the year 2016. But the very fact that the appellant had filed an application under Section 9 of the 1996 Act in connection with the earlier contract itself establishes that disputes in connection with the said transaction was also subject to an arbitration clause. 8. The nature of relief asked for in the subject writ petition has the features and characteristics of money claim and the dispute having arisen out of a contract, we do not think the decisions of Harbanslal Sahnia (supra) or Tantia Construction Private Limited (supra) can be of any aid to the appellant in this proceeding. In Harbanslal Sahnia (supra), the Court had come to a finding that the writ petitioner’s dealership was terminated on nonexistent or irrelevant cause. The case of Tantia Construction Private Limited (supra), involved certain breaches of contractual terms, on which there was interference by the Writ Court. But in the proceeding, out of which this appeal arises, the factual issues that require adjudication go much deeper. We have briefly narrated the scope of factual enquiry necessary for adjudicating the subject- dispute earlier in this judgment. Moreover, the two authorities relied upon by Mr. Mittal lay down the proposition of law that even in situations where there are alternative remedies available, the jurisdiction of the Writ Court is not ousted. But these authorities cannot be read to have had transformed the Writ Court into a Court of primary jurisdiction. The writ remedy is discretionary remedy and the learned First Court has, in our opinion, rightly exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in not entertaining the writ petition of the appellant. 9. For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal. There shall be no order as to costs.