JUDGMENT : By this appeal, Judgment and Order dt. 26.04.2001 is challenged, whereby the accused (appellants herein) stood convicted and sentenced under Sections 5(1)(e) r/w 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”). While the original accused No. 1 was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/-, the other accused were sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/-, each. The original accused No. 1 i.e. appellant No. 1 in this appeal died during the pendency of this appeal and consequently his legal representatives were brought on record for pursuing the appeal on his behalf before this Court. But, for the sake of convenience, the original accused No. 1, although deceased, is being referred to as appellant No. 1 in this judgment. 2. Appellant No. 1 joined service in the Police Department as Constable in 1962. He was then promoted to the post of Head Constable in 1971 and thereafter, he was sent for training as Police Sub-Inspector. Upon completion of training, the appellant No. 1 was posted as Police Sub-Inspector in district Yavatmal and thereafter, he served in the said capacity at different places. While he was working as Police Sub-Inspector at Pusad, an enquiry was initiated against him on the suspicion of having acquired assets beyond the known sources of his income. 3. In November-1986, an enquiry report was submitted to the Director of Anti-Corruption, who granted permission on 26.11.1986 to lodge a complaint (Exh. 508) against the appellant No. 1, leading to registration of FIR against the appellant No. 1 and other appellants under the provisions of the said Act. The other appellants are the wife, uncle and relatives of the appellant No. 1. On the basis of the said complaint registered against the appellants, house searches were conducted and material was recovered including gold & silver articles and documents. The report of searches was placed before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buldhana on 20.12.1986. On the basis of the said material, an application was moved for obtaining sanction for prosecution of appellant No. 1. 4. On 20.03.1991, the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Aurangabad Range, passed the sanction order for prosecution of the appellant No. 1 under the provisions of the said Act. It was recorded in the said sanction order [Exh. On the basis of the said material, an application was moved for obtaining sanction for prosecution of appellant No. 1. 4. On 20.03.1991, the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Aurangabad Range, passed the sanction order for prosecution of the appellant No. 1 under the provisions of the said Act. It was recorded in the said sanction order [Exh. 460] that, the total income of the appellant No. 1 from all his known sources was Rs. 4,71,866.84 and total expenditure was Rs. 2,63,386.27. It was estimated that the probable saving of the appellant No. 1 was Rs. 2,08,480.57, but, during investigation, he was found to be in possession of assets worth Rs. 12,44,158.72/-. Consequently, it was concluded by the said sanctioning authority that, the appellant No. 1 was found to be in possession of assets worth Rs. 10,35,678.15, being disproportionate to his known sources of income. On this basis, the said sanctioning authority was satisfied that, the appellant No. 1 deserved to be prosecuted and accordingly, the said sanction order dt. 20.03.1991 [Exh. 460] was passed. 5. The prosecution examined a large number of witnesses totaling 38 and it relied upon more than 600 documents to prove its case against the appellant No. 1 and other accused persons. It was the endeavour of the prosecution to demonstrate that the appellant No. 1 had purchased properties in the name of his uncle and other relatives and that gold and silver articles were also purchased, the total value of which was well beyond the known sources of income of the appellant No. 1. It was the case of the prosecution that the other accused had connived with and associated themselves with the appellant No. 1, in order to assist him in gathering such assets well beyond the known sources of his income. 6. The prosecution relied upon oral and documentary evidence to claim that, when the appellant No. 1 entered service in the year 1962, he did not have any agricultural land in his family, but, as his service career progressed, he purchased huge tracts of agricultural land in his own name as well as in the name of his relatives. 6. The prosecution relied upon oral and documentary evidence to claim that, when the appellant No. 1 entered service in the year 1962, he did not have any agricultural land in his family, but, as his service career progressed, he purchased huge tracts of agricultural land in his own name as well as in the name of his relatives. It was further claimed, that house property was constructed at Chikhli which was well beyond his means and that the extent of gold and silver articles as also clothes and other items found in house searches demonstrated that the appellant No. 1 was guilty of having committed the offences with which he was charged. The said material was relied upon by the prosecution to support its allegations against the other appellants also. 7. Although a large number of witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution, the most significant of these witnesses were PW-35the sanctioning authority, PW-37the then Police Constable and PW-38the Investigating Officer. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the trial Court found that the charges levelled against the appellants stood proved beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court took into account the income of the appellant No. 1 during the relevant period and upon making calculations pertaining to the expenses that the appellant no. 1 was required to incur, the trial court came to a conclusion that the assets which the appellant No. 1 and the other appellants were found to be in possession of, were well beyond the known sources of income of the appellant No. 1. It is significant, that the trial Court proceeded on the basis that the only source of income of the appellant No. 1 was his salary during the relevant period and the amount that he had received towards cash awards during the said period. The trial Court rendered a finding that the prosecution had proved that the only source of income of the appellant no. 1 was his salary. On the basis of such finding, the trial Court passed the impugned judgment and order convicting and sentencing the appellants in the aforesaid manner. 8. Mr Adwait Manohar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted, that the findings of the trial Court were wholly erroneous and unsustainable because the basic premise on which the trial Court proceeded was faulty. 8. Mr Adwait Manohar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted, that the findings of the trial Court were wholly erroneous and unsustainable because the basic premise on which the trial Court proceeded was faulty. It was submitted that, the trial Court findings and the prosecution case were based on the assertion that the only source of income of the appellant no. 1 during the relevant period was his salary amounting to Rs. 1,41,904.10 and cash awards of Rs. 4,033/received by him during that period. According to the learned counsel, a perusal of the sanction order dt. 20.03.1991 [Exh. 460] demonstrated that, the sanctioning authority proceeded on the basis that the total income of the appellant No. 1 from all his known sources was Rs. 4,71,866.84. It was submitted that, this figure was markedly different from the total income claimed by the prosecution and rendered as a finding by the trial Court. Apart from this, it was submitted that the sanctioning authority recorded the said bigger figure of income of appellant No. 1 as being “from all his known sources”. On this basis, it was submitted that the sources of income of appellant No. 1 other than his salary and the cash awards were not enumerated anywhere either in the sanction order dt. 20.03.1991 or any other material on which the prosecution placed reliance. It was further submitted that, a perusal of the material on record clearly demonstrated that the appellant No. 1 had agricultural lands in his name thereby showing that he had agricultural income, he also had livestock showing that he had income from that source also and there were other legitimate sources of income of the appellant No. 1. All these aspects were neither placed on record by the prosecution nor dealt with by the trial Court while passing the impugned judgment and order. 9. In this context, the learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Vasant Rao Guhe v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 2017 SC 3713 , wherein it has been held that, if the court is required to enter into the realm of calculation and approximation of the amount of income attributable to the accused, the prosecution case must necessarily fail. It was submitted that, in the present case the prosecution had completely failed to place on record the basis on which the different figures of income were reflected and whether all sources of income of the appellant No. 1 were taken into consideration and if so, what were the figures of income to be derived from such various sources. On this basis, it was submitted that, the very foundation of the case of the prosecution stood demolished. 10. It was further submitted that, the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court was not sustainable, because all incriminating circumstances were not put to the appellants when their statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) were recorded before the trial Court. This was absolutely fatal to the prosecution case, which the trial Court failed to appreciate. It was further submitted that, the law pertaining to Benami transactions was ignored by the trial Court while answering the findings against appellant No. 1. It was also submitted that, valuation report was relied upon by the court when the author of such valuation report was not examined by the prosecution, thereby demonstrating further error committed by the trial Court. It was also submitted that, the appellant No. 1 had indeed intimated to the competent authority about his purchasing agricultural land by obtaining loan from his uncle, which was ignored by the trial Court while convicting the appellants. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon judgments in the cases, [i] Ajay Singh Versus State of Maharashtra 2007 (2) Bom. C.R. (Cri.) 6 [ii] State of Punjab Versus Hari Singh and others (2009) 4 SCC 200 [iii] Krishnanand versus The State of Madhya Pradesh (1977) 1 SCC 816 [iv] P. Satyanarayan Murty Versus State of Andhra Pradesh (1992) 4 SCC 39 [v] Vasant Rao Guhe v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2017 SC 3713 [vi] Hindustan Copper Ltd. vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 2010(5) Mh.L.J. 551 . 11. Per contra, Mrs Swati Kolhe, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent/State, submitted that voluminous documentary and oral evidence was placed on record on behalf of the prosecution and that the charges levelled against the appellants had been proved by conclusive evidence. It was submitted that, the trial Court was justified in convicting and sentencing the appellants by the impugned judgment and order. It was submitted that, the trial Court was justified in convicting and sentencing the appellants by the impugned judgment and order. It was submitted that the appellant No. 1 could not claim that the prosecution had not specifically proved the extent of disproportionate assets, as details of income and expenditure were placed on record by the prosecution, which were taken into account by the trial Court while passing the impugned judgment and order. It was submitted that, sufficient material was placed on record to show that the appellant No. 1, who had joined police service as Constable in 1962 with a monthly salary of only Rs. 89/could not have legitimately gathered assets to the extent of which he was found in possession through his service career till the year 1986. The only known source of income of the appellant No. 1 was his salary and the few cash awards that he had earned and that he could not push the burden on the prosecution to demonstrate various sources of his income, when it was for him to show such sources and the amounts earned by him from such sources, particularly when the prosecution had successfully demonstrated the large extent of assets found in his possession uptil the period ending in the year 1986. On this basis, the learned APP submitted that the appeal deserved to be dismissed. 12. Heard Counsel for the parties. In a case involving charge pertaining to offence of possessing assets disproportionate to the known sources of income, the most crucial aspect is presentation of facts by the prosecution to clearly demonstrate the calculation of figures pertaining to income of the accused, with details of income from various sources, expenditure incurred by the accused, savings projected from such figures of income and expenditure and finally the extent of disproportionate nature of assets to the known sources of income identified by the prosecution. Usually these facts are presented in the form of a chart wherein various heads are stated and figures pertaining to the same are also stated so as to clearly demonstrate the thrust of the prosecution case. In the present case, despite voluminous material in the form of documentary and oral evidence brought on record by the prosecution, such a presentation of facts is conspicuously absent. In the present case, despite voluminous material in the form of documentary and oral evidence brought on record by the prosecution, such a presentation of facts is conspicuously absent. In such a situation, the court is required to look into the voluminous documents to ascertain the basis of figures pertaining to income, expenditure, savings and consequently the assets in the hands of the accused. Despite absence of cogent material on record, the trial Court has come to a specific finding that the only source of income of the appellant No. 1 was his salary and certain amounts received towards awards during the relevant period. The figures pertaining to salary paid to the appellant No. 1 during the relevant period has been accepted by the trial Court as the only source of income and to the said figure, the figure pertaining to cash awards received by the appellant No. 1, has been added to reach a conclusion about the income of the appellant No. 1 during the relevant period. 13. But, a perusal of the sanction order dt. 23.03.1991 [Exh.460] shows, that sanctioning authorityPW-35 has taken into account larger figure of income and it has been noted that the said larger figure was arrived at after taking into account all known sources of income of the appellant No. 1. The said figure has not been taken into account by the trial Court at all. It appears, that the prosecution has also emphasized before the trial Court only on salary being the sole source of income of the appellant No. 1. Thus, there is material on record to show that the extent and sources of income of appellant No. 1 have not been identified by the prosecution. If the figure mentioned in the sanction order is taken into consideration, the extent of disproportionate assets would be different from the figures on which the trial Court has placed reliance. Apart from this, if the sanctioning authority itself proceeded on the basis that there were various sources of income and the extent of income was found to be far higher than the total income of the appellant No. 1 from his salary, it was necessary for the prosecution to come out with the details of the various sources of income of appellant No. 1, taken into consideration by the sanctioning authority in the present case. There are no such details available on record. There are no such details available on record. If such details were placed on record, the appellant No. 1 would have been afforded an opportunity to point out whether such sources did exist and whether the component of income attributable to such various sources was correctly calculated by the prosecution and the sanctioning authority. This aspect was not appreciated by the trial Court in the correct perspective at all. As a result, the finding of the trial Court pertaining to the income of the appellant No. 1 during the relevant period is rendered erroneous and unsustainable. 14. Even if the total expenditure calculated by the prosecution and accepted by the trial Court is assumed to be correct, valuation of assets in the present case also leaves doubt about findings rendered by the trial Court. One of the major assets taken into consideration by the trial court was the house property at Chikhli, the valuation of which has been accepted by the trial Court as Rs. 3,44,000.00. The basis of arriving at the said figure is the evidence of the Investigating Officer (PW38) and a certificate of valuation placed on record by the Investigating Officer. The said certificate indeed states the value of the said house property at Chikhli, which has been accepted by the trial Court. But, it is an admitted position on record that the author of the valuation reports at Exh. 129 and 130 has not been examined by the prosecution. In the absence of the examination of the author of the valuation reports, the trial Court could not have accepted the valuation to be Rs. 3,44,000.00. The evidence of the Investigating Officer could never have substituted the evidence of the author of the valuation reports and, therefore, the said reports could not have been relied upon. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant was justified in relying judgment of this court rendered in the case of Hindustan Copper Ltd (supra). After relying upon various judgments on this issue, it has been held in the aforesaid judgment that the author of such a valuation report was required to be examined to give direct evidence. In absence of examination of author of such a document, it could not be relied upon because there was no evidence on record to vouchsafe the truth of the facts stated in such a document. In absence of examination of author of such a document, it could not be relied upon because there was no evidence on record to vouchsafe the truth of the facts stated in such a document. Thus, reliance placed on the said figure of valuation of the said property at Chikhli by the trial Court was clearly unsustainable. 15. Apart from this, said house property at Chikhli was admittedly a house wherein the purchaser was uncle of the appellant No. 1 i.e. the appellant No. 3. It was the case of the prosecution that the said Bungalow was purchased in the name of accused No.3, while the amount towards consideration for purchase of the said house came from appellant No. 1. In other words, it was the case of the prosecution that the said house was purchased by a transaction which was nothing but a benami transaction and therefore it could not be said that the said house property was indeed purchased by appellant No. 1. The trial court accepted the case of the prosecution thereby including the said house property in the list of assets in the name of the appellant No. 1. 16. It is trite that the burden of proving an allegation lies on the person who makes such an allegation. In the present case, the prosecution has claimed that the aforesaid house property at Chikhli bought in the name of appellant No. 3 (uncle of appellant No. 1) was nothing but a benami transaction in his name and that the resources for purchase of the said house had actually come from the appellant No. 1. But, there is hardly any evidence placed on record by the prosecution in the present case to show that the aforesaid transaction concerning house property was indeed a benami transaction. It has come on record that the appellant No. 3 himself was a teacher and that he was not a person without any source of income or resources. In order to prove that the aforesaid was a benami transaction, the prosecution ought to have placed on record oral and documentary evidence to support its case. But, there was nothing brought on record to show that the appellant No. 3 was not the real owner and that it was appellant No. 1, who had actually purchased the said house. In order to prove that the aforesaid was a benami transaction, the prosecution ought to have placed on record oral and documentary evidence to support its case. But, there was nothing brought on record to show that the appellant No. 3 was not the real owner and that it was appellant No. 1, who had actually purchased the said house. In the case of Krishnanand (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that though intention of a benami transaction is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced but, such difficulties would not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of the burden that rests upon him to prove such a fact. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, it would not be enough merely to show circumstances which might create suspicion because the court cannot decide on the basis of suspicion. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads thus: “26. Then we must consider whether the sum of Rs. 11,180/-lying in safe deposit with Allahabad Bank, Varanasi in the name of Shanti Devi belonged to the appellant or to Shanti Devi. The case of the appellant in regard to this amount was as follows. The mother of the first husband of Shanti Devi died in 1945 after a brief illness. She loved Shanti Devi very much, particularly since Shanti Devi's life was ruined by reason of being married to her son who was suffering from tuberculosis. She, therefore, gave away to Shanti Devi during her illness cash amounting to Rs. 2,500/-, ornaments and some gold. Subsequently, Shanti Devi sold these ornaments and gold along with some of her own ornaments and got an aggregate sum of Rupees 5,500/-which she invested in the hosiery factory of the father of her first husband, namely, Ramadhar Avasthi on interest at the rate of 12 per cent, per annum. This amount together with interest was gradually returned by Ramadhar Avasthi to Shanti Devi and as and when the monies were returned, they were deposited by Shanti Devi in a Savings Bank account opened with Allahabad Bank, Varanasi. Since the interest in the Savings Bank account was small, Shanti Devi, under the advice of Ramadhin Avasthi D. W. 90, the uncle of her first husband, deposited the monies in fixed deposit with the Allahabad Bank, Varanasi and these accumulated to Rs. 11,180/-as on 1st January, 1962. Since the interest in the Savings Bank account was small, Shanti Devi, under the advice of Ramadhin Avasthi D. W. 90, the uncle of her first husband, deposited the monies in fixed deposit with the Allahabad Bank, Varanasi and these accumulated to Rs. 11,180/-as on 1st January, 1962. This case of the appellant was supported by the evidence of Ramadhar Avasthi D. W. 22 and Ramadhin Avasthi D. W. 90. Vishwanath Avathi D. W. 16 also corroborated the testimony of these two witnesses on the point. It is difficult to see how in the face of this overwhelming evidence it could be concluded that the sum of Rupees 11,180/lying in fixed deposit in Shanti Devi's name was an asset belonging to the appellant. It must be remembered that the fixed deposit stood in the name of Shanti Devi and the burden, therefore, lay on the prosecution to show that Shanti Devi was a benamidar of the appellant. It is well settled that the burden of showing that a particular transaction is benami and the appellant owner is not the real owner always rests on the person asserting it to be so and this burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly prove the fact of benami or establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of benami is the intention of the parties and not unoften, such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of the serious onus that rests on him, nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises as a substitute for proof. (Vide Jayadayal Poddar v. Mst. Sibi Hazra. It is not enough merely to show circumstances which might create suspicion, because the court cannot decide on the basis of suspicion. It has to act on legal grounds established by evidence. Here, in the present case, no evidence at all was led on the side of the prosecution to show that the monies lying in fixed deposit in Shanti Devi's name were provided by the appellant and howsoever strong may be the suspicion of the court in this connection, it cannot take the place of proof. Here, in the present case, no evidence at all was led on the side of the prosecution to show that the monies lying in fixed deposit in Shanti Devi's name were provided by the appellant and howsoever strong may be the suspicion of the court in this connection, it cannot take the place of proof. It must, therefore, be held that the prosecution has failed to show that the sum of Rs. 11,180/-lying in fixed deposit in Shanti Devi's name belonged to the appellant.” 17. In the present case, the trial court has proceeded to accept the claim of the prosecution that the purchase of the aforesaid house property was nothing but a benami transaction and accordingly it has added the worth of the said asset to the name of the appellant no. 1, in order to prove its case of disproportionate assets against the said appellant. Thus, apart from the fact that the valuation of Rs. 3,44,000.00 of the said house property is not supported by cogent evidence on record, there is absence of convincing evidence to show that the house property was an asset to be credited to the appellant No. 1. 18. A perusal of the statements of appellant No. 1 recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. shows that, questions pertaining to his income as calculated by the prosecution were not put to him. Specific questions regarding the extent of disproportionate assets as claimed by the prosecution were also not put to him. The extent of expenditure and the figures pertaining to the same were also not put to him and no questions were put to him regarding alleged benami transactions undertaken by him in the purchase of house property and agricultural lands allegedly in the name of appellants No. 3 to 5. The extent of expenditure and the figures pertaining to the same were also not put to him and no questions were put to him regarding alleged benami transactions undertaken by him in the purchase of house property and agricultural lands allegedly in the name of appellants No. 3 to 5. These were incriminating circumstances that ought to have been put specifically to appellant No. 1 for his response under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. In the case of State of Punjab v. Hari Singh and others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the law pertaining to significance of putting questions to the accused u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. and it has been categorically held that the aforesaid requirement of putting all incriminating circumstances to the accused under the said provision is not a mere formality and that it has a crucial bearing on the process of affording sufficient opportunity to the accused to explain such incriminating circumstances. It has been categorically held that, if crucial incriminating circumstances are not put to the accused, the entire prosecution case stands vitiated and the accused cannot be convicted because such a default would be fatal to the order of conviction rendered by the trial Court. In the present case, questions were not put to the appellant no.1 on crucial incriminating circumstances, causing prejudice to him, thereby violating the said requirement of law under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The trial Court failed to appreciate this aspect while passing the impugned judgment and order. 19. In this backdrop, it would be appropriate to refer to the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vasantrao Guhe (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, that if the findings of the court in such a case concerning allegations of disproportionate assets against the accused are based on speculative assumptions in favour of the prosecution and against the accused, such findings are clearly vitiated and conviction cannot be granted on such findings. In the said case, the trial Court had indulged in assumptions and approximations for arriving at figures of income, expenditure, savings and consequential assets against the accused. On such presumptive and assumptive calculations and inferences the trial Court had convicted the accused. In the said case, the trial Court had indulged in assumptions and approximations for arriving at figures of income, expenditure, savings and consequential assets against the accused. On such presumptive and assumptive calculations and inferences the trial Court had convicted the accused. The High Court had upheld the conviction by itself indulging in such assumptions and presumptions and entering into the realm of calculation of figures under the said heads, while upholding the conviction rendered against the accused. While allowing the appeal of the accused, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case held that, the High Court had fallen in the same error as had the trial Court in rendering findings pertaining to the figures under the aforesaid heads based on assumptions and presumptions. It was held that, if the court was required to undertake such an exercise, the conviction could not be sustained. On that basis, the appeal of the accused was allowed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the concurrent orders of conviction rendered by the trial Court and High Court were set aside. 20. Applying the said position of law to the facts of the present case, it becomes evident that the conviction rendered by the trial Court cannot be sustained. As noted above, there is no material placed on record by the prosecution to ascertain the exact figure of total income of appellant No. 1. While the prosecution on the one hand has claimed that his total income was Rs. 1,41,904.00 from salary, which was his only source of income and which was accepted by the trial Court, on the other hand, the prosecution placed on record material before the sanctioning authority and the said authority recorded the total income of the appellant No. 1 as Rs. 4,71,866.84. The prosecution on the one hand claimed before the trial Court that the only source of income of the appellant no. 1 was his salary and the amounts of cash awards received by him, while, on the other hand, the sanctioning authority recorded that the extent of income taken into consideration by it was from all his known sources of income. Thus, if this court is required to reconcile the two figures, an exercise in assumptions and presumptions will necessarily have to be undertaken, which cannot be done. Thus, if this court is required to reconcile the two figures, an exercise in assumptions and presumptions will necessarily have to be undertaken, which cannot be done. The trial court has completely ignored the basis of the sanctioning authority arriving at the figure of income of appellant no. 1, while simply holding that the only source of income of appellant no. 1 was his salary, which amounted to only Rs. 1,41,904.00/. Thus, the allegations pertaining to income made by the prosecution were not supported by cogent material on record and the findings rendered by the trial court stood clearly vitiated. 21. Similarly, there is hardly any basis demonstrated by the prosecution in claiming the figure towards expenditure. The trial Court has also not looked into the evidence and material on record to see whether there was any basis for arriving at the said figure. As a consequence, neither were all sources of income taken into consideration or placed on record, nor was any cogent evidence placed on record to arrive at the specific figure of expenditure. 22. As noted above, the finding on extent of disproportionate assets was also clearly vitiated because properties not owned by the appellant No. 1 were treated as his assets on the ground that they were nothing but benami transactions. There was lack of cogent material to prove benami transactions and consequently when the said assets are removed from those attributable to the appellant No. 1 the extent of assets also get drastically reduced. Even on this aspect, the trial court has not appreciated the evidence and material on record in the proper perspective and the position of law has also not been taken into consideration while rendering the findings against the appellants. Thus, the entire set of findings of the trial court are based on conjecture and acceptance of claims made by the prosecution without examining as to whether the material on record supported such claims. 23. The failure of putting all the incriminating circumstances to the accused in the present case has also fatally affected the prosecution case, which was not appreciated by the trial court at all. 23. The failure of putting all the incriminating circumstances to the accused in the present case has also fatally affected the prosecution case, which was not appreciated by the trial court at all. Although, as many as 38 witnesses were examined by the prosecution, the only material witnesses referred to and relied upon by the trial court were PW35sanctioning authority, PW37the police constable, who claimed to have placed on record accounts pertaining to expenditure incurred in construction of the house property at Chikhli and PW38the Investigating Office himself. The evidence of PW-37 on which the trial Court has placed reliance regarding alleged amounts spent by the appellant No. 1 for construction of the said house property, also shows that the basis for claiming the amounts spent by the appellant no. 1 is not supported by cogent evidence on record. It is claimed that the details of the expenditure were recorded in a diary, which has no logical basis. Some of the entries made towards expenditure of construction, were admittedly done by the mason who was never examined by the prosecution. Thus, the evidence of the said PW37 could certainly not have been made a basis for arriving at the finding pertaining to alleged amounts spent by the appellant no. 1 for construction of the said house property. 24. The evidence of the Investigating OfficerPW38 shows, that there was material collected by him regarding approximate income of appellant No. 1 from agricultural lands. Despite the fact that such material was on record, it was not taken into consideration by the trial court to examine as to what were the sources of income of the appellant No. 1 and what could be the actual figure of income over the period from 1962-1986. 25. Thus, there was lack of oral and documentary evidence on record in the present case to arrive at any logical conclusion regarding figures pertaining to income, expenditure, savings and consequently the extent of assets attributable to the appellant no. 1. In these circumstances, there was no way in which it could be examined as to whether the assets of appellant no. 1 could be said to be disproportionate to his known sources of income. Yet, the trial court went ahead to convict and sentence the appellants by erroneously accepting the claims of the prosecution. 1. In these circumstances, there was no way in which it could be examined as to whether the assets of appellant no. 1 could be said to be disproportionate to his known sources of income. Yet, the trial court went ahead to convict and sentence the appellants by erroneously accepting the claims of the prosecution. There was sufficient material on record to show that the prosecution case itself was not clear on arriving at specific figures under all the aforesaid heads. Consequently, the very basis of the prosecution case crumbled, which the trial Court completely failed to appreciate while passing the impugned judgment and order. 26. As a result, the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial court is found to be unsustainable. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order dt. 26.04.2001 passed by the trial Court is quashed and set aside. Since the appellant No. 1 expired during the pendency of the present appeal, no consequential orders would be necessary insofar as he is concerned, but, if fine amounts were deposited by the appellants, the same shall be refunded to them, forthwith.