JUDGMENT Sandeep Sharma, J. - Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with order dated 17.06.2017, passed by learned Civil Judge, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., whereby two applications having been filed by the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the ''plaintiff'') under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC, came to be dismissed, plaintiff has approached this Court in the instant proceedings filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying therein to quash and set aside the aforesaid order and to allow the application for setting aside the order of "dismissed in default" after condoning the delay and decide the suit on merits. 2. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused the material available on record vis-a- vis reasoning assigned by the learned Court below while passing the impugned order, this Court finds that suit for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction having been filed by the plaintiff was fixed for hearing on 2.12.2015. Since on 2.12.2015, none appeared on behalf of the plaintiff in the learned Court below, her suit was dismissed in default for non prosecution and non-appearance. 3. Plaintiff with a view to get the order of "dismissed in default" passed against her quashed and set- aside, preferred an application under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC (available at Page 23 of the paper book) after delay of more than two months i.e. somewhere in March, 2016. Since prescribed period for moving application for getting the ex- parte order set-aside had expired, plaintiff also preferred an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act ( available at Page 28 of the paper book), praying therein for condonation of delay in moving the application under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC. Learned Court below vide common order dated 17.6.2017, dismissed both the applications. In the aforesaid background, plaintiff has approached this Court in the instant proceedings. 4. Careful perusal of both the applications filed by the plaintiff, persuade this Court to agree with the contention of learned counsel representing the respondents that since no plausible explanation is/was rendered on behalf of the plaintiff qua the delay in moving the appropriate application, praying therein for condonation of delay in moving application under order 9 Rule 4 CPC, learned Court below rightly dismissed both the applications. Otherwise also, careful perusal of the applications referred hereinabove, clearly suggest that though plaintiff claimed before the learned Court below that on the given date i.e. 2.12.2015, she was bed ridden and was ill, but no documentary evidence is/ was adduced on record to substantiate her aforesaid claim. Similarly, there is/was no specific averment with regard to instructions, if any, given by her to counsel to remain present on her behalf on the given date. Though, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the impugned order, which otherwise appears to be based upon the proper appreciation of facts as well as law, but having taken note of the fact that plaintiff had engaged lawyer on her behalf and it was his duty to remain present on her behalf in the court on the given date, this Court is of the view that Court below should have not taken hyper technical view. Otherwise also, litigant cannot be allowed to suffer for the lapse, if any, committed by the lawyer. 5. No doubt, averments contained in the applications are vague, but same have been drafted by the counsel, not by the litigant. It is/ was the duty of the lawyer to properly advise her client to place on record necessary documents, if any required to substantiate his/her claim, but in the case at hand it is quite apparent that plaintiff was not properly advised and as such, she could not be allowed to suffer for the fault, if any, committed by her lawyer. 6. Repeatedly, it has been held by the Hon''ble Apex Court as well as this Court that litigant cannot be allowed to suffer for the fault, if any, on the part of his/her counsel. In the case at hand, bare perusal of application filed under Order 9 Rule 4 clearly suggests that counsel representing the petitioner was negligent while drafting the application because there is no plausible explanation rendered on record qua the delay, otherwise application as per plaintiff came to be filed immediately when she received certified copy of the order dated 2.12.2015. 7. Though this Court having gone through the record is in agreement with Mr. Khajuria,learned counsel for the respondents that delay being inordinate cannot be condoned in the instant case but delay, if any, in the instant case is of 2 months, which by no stretch of imagination can be termed to be inordinate. 7. Though this Court having gone through the record is in agreement with Mr. Khajuria,learned counsel for the respondents that delay being inordinate cannot be condoned in the instant case but delay, if any, in the instant case is of 2 months, which by no stretch of imagination can be termed to be inordinate. Mr. Khajura, placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon''ble Apex Court in H. Dohil Constructions Company Pvt Ltd. v. Nahar Exports Limited and Anr. , (2015) 1 SCC 680 , to contend that inordinate delay in filing the application cannot be allowed mechanically without there being plausible explanation rendered on record by the petitioner. There cannot be any quarrel with the aforesaid exposition of law because definitely, delay cannot be condoned without there being any proper explanation in that regard. It is also not in dispute that delay cannot be condoned as a matter of course, rather courts while considering the application for condonation of delay are required to scrutinize the material adduced on record by the parties seeking condonation of delay with utmost caution so that no prejudice is caused to the opposite party in whose favour some right may or may not have accrued on account of delay, if any, in filing the proceedings, which were required to be filed in the competent court of law within the stipulated period. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon''ble Apex Court has taken note of its recent judgment rendered in case titled Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy , (2013) 12 SCC 649 wherein certain principles were culled out to be kept in mind while dealing with application for condonation of delay. Para-23 of the judgment is reproduced herein below: 23. We may also usefully refer to the recent decision of this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee where several principles were culled out to be kept in mind while dealing with such applications for condonation of delay. Principles (iv), (v), (viii), (ix) and (x) of para 21 can be usefully referred to, which read as under: (SCC pp 659-59) 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bana fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.8. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bana fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation." 8. In the judgment referred herein above, Hon''ble Apex Court has observed that there is distinction between inordinate delay and delay of short duration or few days, first category warrants strict approach, whereas second warrants for liberal delineation. Hon''ble Apex Court has also observed that the conduct, behavior and attitude of the party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration and courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both the parties. Most importantly, in the principles, which have been reproduced herein above, the Hon''ble Apex Court has culled out principle that no presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay, but gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 9. Hon''ble Apex Court in case titled N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy , (1998) 2 SLJ 1800, has categorically held that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court and Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. 9. Hon''ble Apex Court in case titled N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy , (1998) 2 SLJ 1800, has categorically held that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court and Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Hon''ble Apex Court has further held that sometimes delay of shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation, whereas in certain other cases, delay of very long range, can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced herein below:- "9. Appellant''s conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. But during these days when everybody is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences. 10. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first cut refuses to condone the dela. But it is a different matter when the first cut refuses to condone the dela. In such cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. 11. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 12. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 13. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari , (1969) AIR SC 575 and State of West Bengal Vs. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari , (1969) AIR SC 575 and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality , (1972) AIR SC 749. 14. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 10. Hon''ble Apex Court has further held that primary function of the Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Most importantly, in the aforesaid judgment, the Hon''ble Apex Court, has held that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned, which cannot be enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. 11. Consequently in view of the above, the present petition is allowed subject to payment of cost amounting to Rs.11000/- payable to the respondents. The order dated 17.6.2017 passed by learned trial Court is quashed and set- aside and suit filed by the plaintiff is ordered to be restored to its original number. 12. Learned counsel representing the parties undertake to cause presence of the parties on 27.12.2018 before the learned Court to enable it to proceed with the matter. The order dated 17.6.2017 passed by learned trial Court is quashed and set- aside and suit filed by the plaintiff is ordered to be restored to its original number. 12. Learned counsel representing the parties undertake to cause presence of the parties on 27.12.2018 before the learned Court to enable it to proceed with the matter. Registry is directed to apprise the learned Court below with regard to passing of the instant order to enable it to do the needful in terms of the instant order. Petitions stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.