Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 2242 (HP)

Sanjeev Kapila v. Braham Raj Sharma

2018-12-17

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2018
JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - The petitioner is the tenant, who aggrieved by the eviction order passed by the learned Rent Controller as affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority, has filed revision petition under Section 24(5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (for short, the Act). 2. The parties shall be referred to as the "landlord" and "tenant". 3. Briefly stated the facts leading to filing of the present petition are that the landlord sought eviction of the tenant from the shop measuring 24 x 8 x 8 feet, situated in a building known as Braham NiwasII, Red Cross Road, Ward No.12, Solan, Tehsil and District Solan on the ground that the same had been rented out to the tenant about 15 years back on a monthly rental of Rs.3000/ and now, the landlord, who is a practicing Advocate, requires the same for his office. In addition thereto, the eviction was sought on the ground of arrears of rent w.e.f. March 2013. 4. The tenant contested and resisted the petition by filing reply, wherein it was stated that the eviction petition was not maintainable as he was not the tenant in the shop and it was his brother, Sanjeev Kapila, who was the tenant. The monthly rental of the shop was Rs. 2500/ and not Rs. 3000/, which had been paid till August 2013. The eviction petition was termed to be mala fide on the ground that the landlord had sufficient space for his office and had otherwise been practicing for the last more than 25 years. 5. The landlord filed rejoinder to the reply, wherein averments made in the reply were denied and the averments made in the eviction petition were reaffirmed and reasserted. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller on 13.8.2014 framed the following issues: 1. Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the petitioner requires the premises for his own occupation as claimed in the petition? OPP 3. Whether the premises are required for urgent repair and the repair cannot be done unless the premises are vacated? OPP 4. Whether the respondent has materially impaired the utility of the shop, as alleged, if so, whether the respondent is liable to be ejected? OPP 5. Whether the petitioner is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 6. Relief. 7. Whether the premises are required for urgent repair and the repair cannot be done unless the premises are vacated? OPP 4. Whether the respondent has materially impaired the utility of the shop, as alleged, if so, whether the respondent is liable to be ejected? OPP 5. Whether the petitioner is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 6. Relief. 7. After recording the evidence and evaluating the same, the learned Rent Controller vide order dated 29.3.2018 allowed the eviction petition and directed the eviction of the tenant from the demised premises on the ground of nonpayment of arrears of rent w.e.f March 2013 to March 2018, which comes to Rs.1,80,900/, however, it was made clear that in case the tenant pays the amount of rent and interest within 30 days from the date of order, then he shall not be evicted on this ground. However,the tenant was also ordered to be evicted on the ground of bona fide requirement and impairment of value and utility of premises. 8. Aggrieved by the eviction order passed by the learned Rent Controller, the tenant filed an appeal before the learned Appellate Authority, but the same was dismissed vide judgment 28.5.2018, constraining him to file the instant petition. 9. It is vehemently argued by Mr. Naresh Kumar Gupta, Advocate, that the findings recorded by both the learned authorities below are perverse being based on surmises and conjectures and are not sustainable in the eyes of law. On the other hand, Mr. Anirudh Sharma, Advocate, would argue that the findings recorded by both the learned authorities below, being based on correct appreciation of the pleadings, evidence and law on the subject, warrant for no interference and therefore, the instant petition should be dismissed with heavy costs. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material placed on record carefully. 11. What is ''perverse'' was considered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu and another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and another , (2009) 10 SCC 206 wherein it was held as under: "26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another , (1977) AIR Karnataka 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another , (1977) AIR Karnataka 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough,1878 1 LR 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined ''perverse'' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner''s Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster''s Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P , (2003) 1 SCC 761 , the Court observed thus: (SCC p.766, para 8 "8 We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others , (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p.14, paras 910) "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of ''perverse'' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officercum Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others , (1992) Supp2 SCC 312, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 31617, para 7) "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court reappreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the factfinding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness as distinguished from the legal permissibility of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 12. What is ''perverse'' has further been considered by this Court in RSA No.436 of 2000, titled ''Rubi Sood and another vs. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and others, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner: "25... A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. 26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated." 13. What is ''perversity'' recently came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal vs.Sohan Devi and others , (2016) 3 SCC 78 wherein it was held as under: "8. What is ''perversity'' recently came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal vs.Sohan Devi and others , (2016) 3 SCC 78 wherein it was held as under: "8. "Perversity" has been the subject matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam , (2007) 12 SCC 190 , it has been held at paragraph11 that: (SCC pp. 19293) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect." 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram , (2010) 15 SCC 530 , at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) "10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlordtenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." 11. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondentdefendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally nonacceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondentdefendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally nonacceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. Material alteration of a property is not a fact confined to the exclusive/and personal knowledge of the owner. It is a matter of evidence, be it from the owner himself or any other witness speaking on behalf of the plaintiff who is conversant with the facts and the situation. PW1 is the vendor of the plaintiff, who is also his power of attorney. He has stated in unmistakable terms that there was structural alteration in violation of the rent agreement. PW2 has also supported the case of the plaintiff. Even the witnesses on behalf of the defendant, partially admitted that the defendants had effected some structural changes. 12. Be that as it may, the question whether there is a structural alteration in a tenanted premises is not a fact limited to the personal knowledge of the owner. It can be proved by any admissible and reliable evidence. That burden has been successfully discharged by the plaintiff by examining PWs1 and 2. The defendants could not shake that evidence. In fact, that fact is proved partially from the evidence of the defendants themselves, as an admitted fact. Hence, only the trial court came to the definite finding on structural alteration. That finding has been endorsed by the first appellate court on reappreciation of the evidence, and therefore, the High Court in second appeal was not justified in upsetting the finding which is a pure question of fact. We have no hesitation to note that both the questions of law framed by the High Court are not substantial questions of law. Even if the finding of fact is wrong, that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man''s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man''s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. 13. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann , (2001) 4 SCC 262 , this Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal. To quote para 34: (SCC pp.27879) "34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity visvis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication - what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ''103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication - what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ''103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact. In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,- (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100." The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with." 14. In S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India , (2013) 6 SCC 602 , after referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration , (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was held at para 30: (S.R.Tewari case6, SCC p. 615) "30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn , (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 ] , Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police , (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429 : AIR 1999 SC 677 ] , Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P , (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372 : AIR 2010 SC 589 ] and Babu v. State of Kerala , (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] .)" This Court has also dealt with other aspects of perversity. 15. We do not propose to discuss other judgments, though there is plethora of settled case law on this issue. Suffice to say that the approach made by the High Court has been wholly wrong, if not, perverse. It should not have interfered with concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court on a pure question of fact. Their inference on facts is certainly reasonable. The strained effort made by the High Court in second appeal to arrive at a different finding is wholly unwarranted apart from being impermissible under law. Therefore, we have no hesitation to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court as confirmed by the appellate court." 14. Thus, it can be taken to be settled that a judgment can be said to be perverse if the conclusions arrived at by the learned Courts below are contrary in evidence on record, or if the Court''s entire approach with respect to dealing with the evidence or the pleadings is found to be patently illegal, leading to the miscarriage of justice, or if its judgment is unreasonable and is based on erroneous understanding of law and of the facts of the case. A perverse finding is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would have arrived at. A perverse finding is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would have arrived at. Therefore, unless it is found that some relevant evidence has not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration, the findings cannot be said to be perverse. 15. Having considered, in detail, the concept of term and expression "perversity", it also needs to be noticed that this Court in its revisional jurisdiction can interfere with finding of facts arrived at by the appellate authority only, if it finds that the findings of the appellate authority are perverse or arbitrary. 16. Section 24(5) of the Act deals with the revisionary power of jurisdiction, which reads thus: "(5) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit." 17. Identical provisions came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Constitutional Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh , (2014) 9 SCC 78 , wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court after taking into consideration the entire law on the subject held that none of the Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. It shall be apposite to refer the relevant observations, which reads thus: "43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity." 18. Now, in order to adjudge whether such findings are perverse, it would be necessary to refer to oral as well as documentary evidence brought on record. 19. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity." 18. Now, in order to adjudge whether such findings are perverse, it would be necessary to refer to oral as well as documentary evidence brought on record. 19. The landlord himself appeared as PW1 and tendered in evidence his affidavit, Ext.PW1/A, in examinationinchief, wherein he reiterated the entire contents of his eviction petition and categorically stated that he and his brother were having one house known as Braham NiwasII. In the second floor, there were four shops, out of which two belonged to him and the remaining two belonged to his brother, Om Raj. He had rented out a shop in question to the tenant on monthly rental of Rs.3000/ per month, but the tenant had not paid the rent since March 2013. He further deposed that he was having his office measuring 8x8 feet, but wanted to shift to a bigger office. Even otherwise, his office was in the house of Om Raj, whereas the tenant was using the tenanted premises as godown. In crossexamination, he admitted receipt Ext.RA, however, denied the suggestion that the dimension of his office was 14x10 feet. He self stated that the dimension of his office was 8x10 feet. 20. Pw2, Om Raj, tendered in evidence his affidavit, Ext.PW2/A, and stated that he and his brother i.e. the land lord herein, were having a building known as Braham Niwas. In the second floor, there were four shops, out of which two belonged to the landlord and remaining two to him. The landlord had rented out a shop measuring 24 x 14 x 8 feet to the tenant and the tenant had increased the rent from Rs.2500/ to Rs.3000/ per month from January 2013. The tenant had paid the rent for the months of January and February, but he failed to pay rent since March 2013. He further deposed that the office of the landlord was in his building and the same was measuring 8 x 8 feet. He had given this room to the landlord for office purpose with a clear understanding that as and when he requires the same, he would hand over peaceful possession thereof. In crossexamination, this witness admitted that he was running a Karyana shop in the building. He had given this room to the landlord for office purpose with a clear understanding that as and when he requires the same, he would hand over peaceful possession thereof. In crossexamination, this witness admitted that he was running a Karyana shop in the building. He further stated that the dimension of the office of the landlord was 10x6 feet. He also admitted that he too had filed an eviction petition against his tenant. He admitted that he knew the tenant, who is an A class Contractor and was using the shop as his office and was residing at place Jawahar Park. 21. Pw3, Amar Jiaswal, proved that he had seen the office of the landlord, which was in the house of Om Raj, who was pressurizing him to vacate the same. He further deposed that dimension of office of the landlord was 8 x 8 feet and not more than two persons could sit there at a given time. 22. As against the evidence led by the landlord, the tenant himself appeared as RW1 and tendered in evidence his affidavit, Ext. RW1/A, in which he reiterated and reasserted the stand taken by him in his reply. He also tendered in evidence electricity bills, Ext.PW1/B. In crossexamination, he admitted that location of demised premises had been correctly shown in site plan, Ext.P1, wherein shop No.1 was rented out to him, however, he denied that the premises remained vacant. He admitted that he had not kept any typewriter and computer system in his office, but denied that the office of the landlord was measuring 8x8 feet, self stated that the same must be 10x 8 feet. He denied that he keeps other articles in the shop, but volunteered that during Mela, he keeps articles of Bhandara there. He also admitted that the landlord had requested him personally to vacate the demised premises as he wanted to open his office. 23. The tenant also examined one Vishnu Kumar, as PW2, who tendered in evidence his affidavit, Ext.RW2/A, wherein he stated that he was a contractor of car parking near D.C. Office, Solan and knew the parties very well. He claimed that the building of the landlord was situated below the car parking, wherein Sanjeev Kapila was tenant. He stated that the tenant would open the shop regularly and had been using it for keeping articles. 24. He claimed that the building of the landlord was situated below the car parking, wherein Sanjeev Kapila was tenant. He stated that the tenant would open the shop regularly and had been using it for keeping articles. 24. This in entirety is the evidence of the parties. 25. It would be noticed that the landlord has categorically proved that he has a very small office that too in the portion of building belonging to his brother, Om Raj and wants to shift to a bigger office. Obviously, in such circumstances, the tenant could have no say in this matter as it is for the landlord to see size and suitability of the premises he requires for his office. 26. The tenant has not brought about any evidence, which may create doubt about the bonafides or genuinity of the landlord seeking his eviction. Here, not only the learned Rent Controller, but even the learned Appellate Authority has ordered the eviction of the tenant on the basis of the material that has come on record. Therefore, it cannot be held that such findings are perverse or have been arrived at without consideration of material evidence. Consequently, such findings cannot also be said to be no evidence or misreading of the evidence so as to be termed grossly erroneous. Therefore, such findings of fact in the given case cannot be interfered by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 27. In view of aforesaid discussions, there is no merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.