JUDGMENT Hon’ble Yashwant Varma, J.—Heard Sri Aishwarya Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 2. This writ petition challenges the order dated 28 March 2017 passed by the District Magistrate, Mathura terminating the services of the petitioner and reiterating an order of punishment dated 3 March 2000. The order further records that the same is being passed in contemplation of sanction from the Governor. It would be appropriate, however, to take a step back and notice certain relavant facts which preceded the passing of the order impugned. 3. The petitioner is stated to have been appointed as a Collection Amin on 12 April 1987. On various allegations of misdemeanour he came to be suspended on 22 April 1999. The suspension order was followed by a charge-sheet dated 11 June 1989. On receipt of the charge-sheet the petitioner is stated to have submitted a reply on 8 July 1999 calling upon the respondents to provide all relevant documents on the basis of which the charges were sought to be proved. Since it was also alleged that subsistence allowance was not being paid nor the prayer for supply of material evidence being attended to, the petitioner was constrained to file the first of the writ petitions assailing the action of the respondents being Writ Petition No. 44174 of 1999. This petition was disposed of with a direction to the respondents to pay subsistence allowance and also endeavour to conclude the disciplinary proceedings which had been initiated. 4. On 3 March 2000, the respondents without holding any oral enquiry or even putting the petitioner to notice to represent his case proceeded to pass an order of termination. This order was assailed by the petitioner by way of Writ-A No. 17345 of 2000. 5. The Court accepting the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner while allowing the writ petition observed thus: “In view of the materials which exists on record, this Court is satisfied that no inquiry, as was required in the eyes of law, has been conducted against the petitioner and as such, no finding of guilt can be returned against the petitioner. It is further apparent on record that even the inquiry report has not been served upon the petitioner and, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Mohd. It is further apparent on record that even the inquiry report has not been served upon the petitioner and, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, 1991 AIR 471 order of dismissal, otherwise, cannot be sustained. Reliance has already been placed upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Kaptan Singh v. State of U.P., 2014(8) ADJ 16 .” 6. The writ petition itself was ultimately allowed with the following operative directions: “Writ petition consequently succeeds and is allowed. Order dated 3.3.2000 is set aside. In view of the law as laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others; (1993) 4 SCC 727 , it shall be open for the respondents to conduct an inquiry afresh from the stage it has gone bad i.e. after the submission of reply to the charge-sheet. The required inquiry shall be conducted with all expedition, in accordance with law, within a period of 4 months from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order. The petitioner shall be reinstated for the purposes of holding of inquiry and the question of payment of back wages as well as the relief to be granted to the petition shall abide by the out come of fresh proceedings to be under taken, in accordance with law.” 7. The State assailed the decision rendered by the learned Judge by way of Special Appeal Defective No. 434 of 2016 (State of U.P. and another v. Shree Niwas). This appeal appears to have come up for final disposal before the Division Bench of the Court on 12 July 2016. However, significantly the petitioner had, in the meanwhile, attained the age of superannuation and exited service on 31 July 2015. Undisputedly, no permission was sought or obtained to either continue the petitioner in service for the purposes of conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings [if there existed any such rule] nor was any permission obtained to continue proceedings post the superannuation of the petitioner. Reverting to the appeal preferred by the State, the Division Bench disposed of the same observing thus: “There is hardly any denial with regard to non service of the enquiry report upon the delinquent employee before inflicting the punishment. Reverting to the appeal preferred by the State, the Division Bench disposed of the same observing thus: “There is hardly any denial with regard to non service of the enquiry report upon the delinquent employee before inflicting the punishment. For this ground alone, we see no reason to interfere with the final directions issued by the Hon’ble Single Judge. The issue remains as to what should be the procedure now for completing the departmental enquiry against the petitioner-respondent inasmuch as it is admitted to the parties that the employee has since retired. It is held that in view of the provision of Fundamental Rule 56-A as the departmental enquiry initiated against the Government servant, may continue, even if, he has retired subject to the conditions but no punishment shall be inflicted upon the retired employee without prior consent of the Governor of the State of U.P. We, therefore, modify the interim order passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge and provide that if the department proceeds with the departmental enquiry, it shall continue and be completed in accordance with law. However, it will be necessary for the employer to obtain prior consent from the Governor of the State of U.P. before passing the punishment order. The writ petition is disposed of.” 8. Admittedly, despite the directions of the Division Bench no disciplinary proceedings were drawn nor was the prior consent of the Governor obtained. The petitioner thereafter approached this Court yet again by means of Writ -A No. -57334 of 2016 (Sri Shree Niwas v. State of U.P. and 2 others) and contended that despite the orders of the Division Bench no departmental proceedings had been initiated and that the petitioner was being subjected to unwarranted harassment even after he had retired from service. Faced with these submissions, a learned Judge of the Court disposed of the aforementioned writ petition with the observation that the departmental enquiry against the petitioner be concluded with expedition and in any case by 31 March 2017. 9. The petitioner aggrieved by the said direction as framed by the learned Judge filed Special Appeal Defective No. 144 of 2017 (Sri Shree Niwas v. State of U.P. and 2 others). 9. The petitioner aggrieved by the said direction as framed by the learned Judge filed Special Appeal Defective No. 144 of 2017 (Sri Shree Niwas v. State of U.P. and 2 others). This appeal was disposed of on consent in the following terms: “In view thereof, we dispose of this appeal with the following observations: “The concerned respondent shall conclude the departmental enquiry, initiated against the appellant, on or before 31.3.2017 and in any case, within fifteen days therefrom. If the departmental enquiry is not concluded within the aforesaid time, the respondents shall release the retiral and pensionary benefits in favour of the appellant, within fifteen days therefrom. It is needless to mention that the appellant shall cooperate in the departmental enquiry and shall not take unnecessary adjournments before the Enquiry Officer. If for any reason, the departmental enquiry is not concluded within time frame, the Enquiry Officer shall record his reasons, if the appellant is responsible for delay and in which case, it is open to the respondents to move this Court for extension of time.” 10. Pursuant to the liberty granted by the Division Bench to conclude the enquiry by 31 March 2017, the respondents in haste and without following the due process proceeded to pass the order impugned. It is also not disputed before this Court that even this order dated 28 March 2017 was not preceded by any oral enquiry as is statutorily mandated to be undertaken in cases where a major penalty is liable to be imposed. The impugned order, more fundamentally, was not preceded by any sanction or permission of the Governor to continue enquiry proceedings in respect of an employee who had superannuated. That this requirement was an imperative necessity and a statutory prerequisite in order to clothe the District Magistrate with jurisdiction and authority to proceed against the petitioner is not disputed by the learned Standing Counsel. Curiously, the District Magistrate while passing the impugned order has chosen to reiterate the order dated 3 March 2000 by describing it as having been validly passed. This aspect is noticed by the Court since the order of 3 March 2000 has already been quashed by the learned Judge on 27 January 2017. 11. Curiously, the District Magistrate while passing the impugned order has chosen to reiterate the order dated 3 March 2000 by describing it as having been validly passed. This aspect is noticed by the Court since the order of 3 March 2000 has already been quashed by the learned Judge on 27 January 2017. 11. Be that as it may, the action of the respondents is liable to be tested on a more fundamental plain and that is whether any orders of punishment could have been imposed upon the petitioner after he had exited service on 31 July 2015. 12. The law in this connection, is clearly well-settled. Once an employee retires from service there is an immediate severence of the relationship of master and servant. In case disciplinary proceedings which had been initiated prior to his retirement remain unconcluded, even then power does stand vested in the Governor to sanction the continuance of such proceedings against a Government servant. However, such continuance is and must necessarily be preceded by a prior sanction which is accorded by following the due process. Admittedly, no prior sanction was obtained by the District Magistrate before the passing of the order impugned. The Court deems it apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dev Prakash Tewari v. U.P. Coop. Institutional Service Board, (2014) 7 SCC 260 , where the settled legal position in this respect was reiterated in the following terms : “5. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. The facts are not in dispute. The High Court while quashing the earlier disciplinary proceedings on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice in its order dated 10-1-2006 [D.P. Tewari v. U.P. Coop. Institutional Service Board, Writ Petition (S/B) No. 4328 of 1988, order dated 10-1-2006 (All)] granted liberty to initiate the fresh inquiry in accordance with the Regulations. The appellant who was reinstated in service on 26-4-2006 and fresh disciplinary proceeding was initiated on 7-7-2006 and while that was pending, the appellant attained the age of superannuation and retired on 31.3.2009. There is no provision in the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Employees’ Service Regulations, 1975, for initiation or continuation of disciplinary proceeding after retirement of the appellant nor is there any provision stating that in case misconduct is established a deduction could be made from his retiral benefits. 6. There is no provision in the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Employees’ Service Regulations, 1975, for initiation or continuation of disciplinary proceeding after retirement of the appellant nor is there any provision stating that in case misconduct is established a deduction could be made from his retiral benefits. 6. An occasion came before this Court to consider the continuance of disciplinary inquiry in similar circumstance in Bhagirathi Jena case [Bhagirathi Jena v. Orissa State Financial Corpn., (1999) 3 SCC 666 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 804] and it was laid down as follows: (SCC pp. 668-69, paras 5-7) “5. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents also relied upon clause (3)(c) of Regulation 44 of the Orissa State Financial Corporation Staff Regulations, 1975. It reads thus : ‘’44. (3)(c) When the employee who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the Board shall consider and make a specific order: (i) Regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the employee for the period of his absence from duty, and (ii) Whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period on duty.’ 6. It will be noticed from the abovesaid Regulations that no specific provision was made for deducting any amount from the provident fund consequent to any misconduct determined in the departmental enquiry nor was any provision made for continuance of the departmental enquiry after superannuation. 7. In view of the absence of such a provision in the abovesaid Regulations, it must be held that the Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in the retiral benefits of the appellant. There is also no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any provision stating that in case misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retiral benefits. Once the appellant had retired from service on 30-6-1995, there was no authority vested in the Corporation for continuing the departmental enquiry even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such an authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on retirement.” 8. In the absence of such an authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on retirement.” 8. Once the appellant had retired from service on 31.3.2009, there was no authority vested with the respondents for continuing the disciplinary proceeding even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such an authority it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to get full retiral benefits.” 13. This Court dealing with an identical issue in V.K. Jaiswal v. U.P.S.R.T.C. and others, 2017(2) ADJ 699 , held: “7. ... ... ... ... ... ... . If the petitioner was permitted to retire with effect from 31 January 1998, this Court fails to comprehend what authority inhered in the Corporation to proceed with or continue the disciplinary proceedings or to inflict any punishment upon the petitioner. As noted above, no statutory provision, rule or regulation prevalent in the Corporation was referred to or relied upon to sustain the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings after the retirement of the petitioner on 31 January 1998. Once the petitioner had retired from service no authority vested in the Corporation to continue with the disciplinary proceedings which had been initiated against the petitioner. Retirement of an employee cuts the cord which connects the two entities and severs all relationship of master and servant or employer and employee. The retirement of an employee brings the curtain down upon the relationship of employer and employee. Once this event occurs, no further jurisdiction or authority vests in the employer to inflict any punishment upon the employee thereafter. The only exception to this position is where a statutory rule enables the employer to continue the employee in service for the purposes of concluding an enquiry already initiated and inflicting punishment even after retirement or a special provision to make good the loss suffered by the employer even after the superannuation of the employee. The position in law on this aspect is no longer res integra and stands authoritatively answered in favour of the petitioner by the Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Jena. The principles elucidated in the said judgment have been reiterated in Dev Prakash Tewari. The position in law on this aspect is no longer res integra and stands authoritatively answered in favour of the petitioner by the Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Jena. The principles elucidated in the said judgment have been reiterated in Dev Prakash Tewari. This Court, therefore, must record that the Corporation had no authority to continue with the disciplinary proceedings post the superannuation of the petitioner on 31 January 1998.” 14. In the present case, while it is not disputed that the State respondents could have resorted to drawing authority from the statute conferring a right to continue proceedings even after the retirement of the petitioner, it is admitted that this procedure was neither followed nor any sanction obtained. This Court also notes that the Division Bench while disposing of the Special Appeal of the State had itself sounded a note of caution by observing that “prior consent” of the Governor would have to be obtained. Despite this caveat, the respondents paid no heed to the command of the statute and failed to obtain the requisite sanction of the Governor to continue proceedings against the petitioner. That sanction was never obtained, as noted above, is candidly admitted on behalf of the respondents. In fact the impugned order itself records that it is being issued in anticipation of sanction. This is clearly not the procedure prescribed by law. Consequently bearing in mind the principles enunciated in Dev Prakash Tewari and V.K. Jaiswal, this Court arrives at the inescapable conclusion that the impugned order cannot sustain. 15. The Court also notes that although certain orders were passed by this Court while entertaining a writ petition preferred by the petitioner himself and thereafter on appeal by the State to conclude the enquiry, this cannot possibly come to the aid of the respondents nor can these orders be possibly read or viewed as vesting in them jurisdiction or authority to proceed against the petitioner departmentally after retirement. It is well-settled that jurisdiction must be established to exist in law and cannot be conferred by an order of Court or by consent of parties. Learned Standing Counsel has abjectly failed to sustain the exercise of power with reference to any statutory provision which may have even remotely clothed the District Magistrate with authority to proceed against the petitioner or to impose the punishment after he had retired from service. 16. Learned Standing Counsel has abjectly failed to sustain the exercise of power with reference to any statutory provision which may have even remotely clothed the District Magistrate with authority to proceed against the petitioner or to impose the punishment after he had retired from service. 16. Accordingly and on an overall conspectus of the aforesaid facts, this writ petition shall stand allowed. The order dated 28 March 2017 are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits and reliefs.