JUDGMENT : ABDUL QUDDHOSE, J. 1. The instant petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenging the Arbitral Award dated 31.07.2007 passed against the petitioner by the second respondent/Arbitrator. 2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the instant petition are as follows: The petitioner is a civil contractor and he was awarded a contract for the construction of CPWD family quarters by the first respondent under an agreement No.8/CCD-11/96-97. Under the contract, the work was stipulated to be commenced on 14.06.1996 and to be completed on 13.12.1997. According to the first respondent, the work under the said agreement is a time bound work and it has to be completed within a period of 18 months. According to the first respondent, the petitioner did not proceed with the work with due diligence but also delayed the execution of the work. Even after nine months time, the progress of work achieved by the petitioner was merely 18.98 %. After issuing show cause notice to the petitioner, the contract was terminated by the first respondent under clauses 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) of the agreement and the balance work left undone by the petitioner was got executed by the first respondent through another agency at the cost and risk of the petitioner. The petitioner did not agree with the termination of the contract on the ground of the site being faraway, difficulty in obtaining water and also labour. Since there arose disputes between the petitioner and the first respondent, the dispute was referred to the arbitration and at the request of the petitioner, the first respondent as per the terms of the contract appointed a sole arbitrator to decide the dispute on merits. 3. At the inception Mr.K.K.Mutreja was appointed as the sole arbitrator. After his resignation, the first respondent appointed Mr.A.K.Singhwal as the sole arbitrator. Mr.A.K.Singhwal also resigned and in his place Mr.J.B.Fadia was appointed as the sole arbitrator by the first respondent. Mr.J.B.Fadia, sole arbitrator also resigned and ultimately, Mr.R.Gopalakrishnan was appointed as the sole arbitrator by the first respondent who acted upon the reference and after issuing notice to the parties to the dispute and after considering the materials available on record and after hearing the submissions of the respective parties, passed the following Arbitral Award dated 31.07.2007. Mr.J.B.Fadia, sole arbitrator also resigned and ultimately, Mr.R.Gopalakrishnan was appointed as the sole arbitrator by the first respondent who acted upon the reference and after issuing notice to the parties to the dispute and after considering the materials available on record and after hearing the submissions of the respective parties, passed the following Arbitral Award dated 31.07.2007. S.No. Claim No. Amount of claim Award in Fig Award in words 1 1 33,17,860 33,17,860 Thirty three lakhs seventeen thousand Eight hundred and sixty only 2 2 14,33,985 2,55,394 Two Lakhs, fifty five thousand three hundred and Ninety four only 3 3 2,23,757 NIL NIL 4 4 13,50,214 NIL NIL 5 5 63,25,816 NIL NIL 6 6 Interest at 12% on the claims NIL NIL 7 7 10,000 NIL NIL Counter claims S.No. Claim No. Amount of claim Award in Fig Award in words 1 1 3,00,000 3,03,626 Three lakhs, three thousand six hundred and twenty six only 2 2 2,63,317 3,38,480 Three lakhs, thirty eight thousand four hundred and eighty only 3 3 27,828 27,828 Twenty seven thousand eight hundred twenty eight only 4 4 15,87,881 NIL NIL 5 5 6,23,225 3,40,000 Three lakh forty thousand only 6 6 1,73,010 1,73,010 One lakh seventy three thousand ten only 7 7 3,30,000 NIL NIL 8 8 Interest at 18% p.a pendentelite Simple interest as under at 10% p. annum from the dates mentioned below: Claim no 1: From 1.4.2000 to the date of award Claim no 2: From 23.10.2000 to the date of award Claim no 3: From 1.02.97 to date of award 9 9 1,50,000 1,50,000 One lakh and fifty thousand only As seen from the arbitral award, the first respondent had submitted seven claims, out of which, the Arbitrator had allowed only two claims i.e., claim nos. 1 and 2 and rejected the rest of the claims. The petitioner on its part has submitted nine counter claims, out of which, the Arbitrator has allowed seven counter claims i.e., counter claim nos.1,2,3,5,6,8 & 9 and disallowed the rest of the two counter claims i.e., claim nos.4 & 7. 4. Aggrieved by the arbitral award dated 31.07.2007, the instant petition has been filed by the petitioner who was the respondent in the arbitration. 5. Heard Mr.T.S.Baskaran, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.C.V.Ramachandra Murthy, learned counsel for the first respondent. 6. 4. Aggrieved by the arbitral award dated 31.07.2007, the instant petition has been filed by the petitioner who was the respondent in the arbitration. 5. Heard Mr.T.S.Baskaran, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.C.V.Ramachandra Murthy, learned counsel for the first respondent. 6. The first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Arbitrator has been repeatedly changed and further, the Arbitrator who passed the award was the person who terminated the contract of the petitioner on behalf of the first respondent. He drew the attention of this Court to the proceedings of the Arbitrator, Mr.A.K.Singhal dated 19.12.2003 which reveals that originally K.K.Mutreja was appointed as the sole arbitrator by the first respondent and resigned his appointment as the arbitrator and in his place, by letter dated 18.11.2003 to the first respondent, Mr.A.K.Singhal was appointed as the sole arbitrator. The learned counsel for the petitioner then drew the attention of this Court to the proceedings of the J.B.Fadia, the arbitrator dated 08.06.2004 which reveals that in the place of Mr.A.K.Singhal who resigned his appointment as Arbitrator, Mr.J.B.Fadia was appointed as the Arbitrator by a letter to the first respondent dated 17.05.2004. Thereafter, as seen from the proceedings dated 10.12.2006 of Mr.R.Gopalakrishnan, the sole arbitrator, Mr.J.B.Fadia, the sole arbitrator resigned his appointment as the arbitrator and in his place, by letter dated 03.11.2006, Mr.R.Gopalakrishnan was appointed as the sole arbitrator. 7. The learned counsel would also pointed out that Mr.R.Gopalakrishnan was the person who passed the Award and terminated the contract of the petitioner on behalf of the first respondent. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, since Mr.R.Gopalakrishnan/sole arbitrator did not disclose in writing any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality as contemplated under Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Arbitral Award passed by Mr.R.Gopalakrishnan is in conflict with the public policy of India and also is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. 8. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that after termination of the petitioner's contract, a copy of the notice inviting tenders for the balance work was not sent to the petitioner nor a copy of the acceptance letter for the balance work was sent to the petitioner to enable the petitioner to know the extent of its liability. According to the learned counsel, it is evident that the first respondent had planned in such a way to keep the petitioner in dark in the matter of execution of the balance work, after terminating the contract. According to the petitioner, it can be seen that for completing the balance work by engaging another agency, the first respondent had granted more time than the time originally allowed under the contract to the petitioner for completing the work. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the work site where the quarters had to be constructed was outside Coimbatore town and the movement of materials, water and labour to the work site posed a difficult problem for the petitioner. The learned counsel requested this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that during the years 1990s, the Coimbatore town was a sensitive area due to series of bomb blasts. All these factors, according to the petitioner posed immense difficulties and problems for the petitioner to keep up with the schedule of progress in the execution of the contract. 10. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, no opportunity was given to the petitioner to verify the cost of execution of the balance work which got completed through another agency by the first respondent. He drew the attention of this Court to the findings in the arbitral award on the various claims awarded by the arbitrator in favour of the first respondent. 11. With regard to the Award of Rs. 33,17,860/- towards the recovery of excess expenditure incurred by the first respondent for completing the balance work, due to termination of the petitioner's contract, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the said conclusion of the arbitrator is against his own findings, since according to him, there had been a flaw in the final termination of the contract because there was only eight days time given for joint measurement i.e., from 04.06.1997 to 12.06.1997. Therefore according to the learned counsel, the Arbitrator ought not to have awarded a sum of Rs. 33,17,860/- to the first respondent without any sufficient proof submitted by the first respondent in support of that claim. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner while referring to award of Rs. Therefore according to the learned counsel, the Arbitrator ought not to have awarded a sum of Rs. 33,17,860/- to the first respondent without any sufficient proof submitted by the first respondent in support of that claim. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner while referring to award of Rs. 2,55,394/- on account of loss of revenue to the first respondent would submit that the said sum ought not to have been awarded by the Arbitrator which clearly contradicts his own findings which reads as follow: "The rent has been calculated purely on carpet basis or based on hypothetical rent without considering the undeveloped area in a remote place in Coimbatore. Besides whether actually the staff paid the rent or not, was not produced. Neither rent receipt nor any document or pay was presented to show payment of house rent to the staff." After referring to the above referred findings of the Arbitrator, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Arbitrator ought not to have awarded Rs. 2,55,394/- without any basis, towards the loss of revenue to the first respondent. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner also drew the attention of this Court to the reply filed by the petitioner to the claim made by the first respondent, before the Arbitrator, wherein the petitioner has submitted that under the contract awarded to the petitioner, only 15 months time was given for completion of the entire contract, whereas 19 months was allowed to the new agency for completion of the balance work alone. According to the learned counsel, this shows that it is the intention of the first respondent to terminate the petitioner's contract and to give the work to the first respondent's favoured agency at abnormal high cost causing losses to the exchequer. 14. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the findings of the Arbitrator allowing Claim Nos.1 and 2 made by the first respondent are perverse, irrational and illegal and therefore, the Arbitral Award allowing claim Nos.1 and 2 made by the first respondent is also patently illegal and is in conflict with the public policy of India and also is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. 15. Per contra, Mr.C.V.Ramachandra Murthy, learned counsel for the first respondent would submit that the Arbitral Award is a detailed and well considered Award. 16. 15. Per contra, Mr.C.V.Ramachandra Murthy, learned counsel for the first respondent would submit that the Arbitral Award is a detailed and well considered Award. 16. As a preliminary objection, the learned counsel for the first respondent would submit that the petitioner has filed the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 beyond the maximum period stipulated under section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. He drew the attention of this Court to the petition filed by the petitioner wherein the petitioner has admitted that he has calculated 90 days from the date of receipt of the Arbitral Award by the petitioner's counsel on 28.01.2008. The learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that the period of 90 days stipulated under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 will have to be calculated from the date of receipt of the Arbitral Award by the petitioner and not from the date, when the petitioner's counsel received the same. Further, the learned counsel after referring to the Arbitral Award submitted that no counsel appeared on behalf of the petitioner in the Arbitral proceedings and the petitioner on their own had defended the claim made by the first respondent. 17. The learned counsel for the first respondent also drew the attention of this Court to the letter dated 06.03.2010 sent by the Arbitrator to the first respondent clarifying that the impugned award was sent to the petitioner as well as the first respondent on 12.09.2007 by speed post and a copy of the postal receipt for having sent the Arbitral Award on 12.09.2007 was also attached by the Arbitrator along with his letter dated 06.03.2010. 18. The arbitrator has also confirmed that no counsel for the petitioner was present at the time of hearing of the case at Coimbatore. The learned counsel, by relying on Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 submits that the time limit for calculating three months period for filing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is from the date, on which, the petitioner has received the Arbitral Award and therefore, the date of receipt of Arbitral Award by the counsel will not be the date, from which, the period of three months is to be calculated under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the first respondent, the petition filed by the petitioner has to be dismissed in limine, since it has been filed beyond the period of three months from the date of receipt of the Arbitral Award by the petitioner. 19. The learned counsel for the first respondent after referring to the Arbitral Award dated 31.07.2007 submitted that the Arbitrator has passed a detailed and reasoned Arbitral Award. According to him, the findings of the Arbitrator are a plausible view, which are supported by the materials placed before him and there is no illegality in the Award. Discussions: 20. Insofar as the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the first respondent has repeatedly changed the Arbitrator and that the Arbitrator who passed the impugned Award is the same person who terminated the petitioner's contract, this Court finds that no such objection was raised by the petitioner, while defending the claim made by the first respondent. This Court perused the reply statement filed by the petitioner to the claim made by the first respondent and finds that no such objection regarding the repeated change of Arbitrator and objection regarding the appointment of R.Gopalakrishnan as sole arbitrator who terminated the petitioner's contract was ever raised in the Arbitral proceedings. 21. Even after entering appearance in the arbitration, the petitioner has not challenged the appointment of the Arbitrator as contemplated under Section 13 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 13 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 reads as follows: "13. Challenge procedure._ (1) Subject to sub-section (4), the parties are free to agree on a procedure for challenging an arbitrator. (2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (1), a party who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall, within fifteen days after becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or after becoming aware of any circumstances referred to in sub-section (3) referred to in sub-section (3) of section 12, send a written statement of the reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal. (3) Unless the arbitrator challenged under sub-section (2) withdraws from his office or the other party agrees to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on the challenge. (3) Unless the arbitrator challenged under sub-section (2) withdraws from his office or the other party agrees to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on the challenge. (4) If a challenge under any procedure agreed upon by the parties or under the procedure under sub-section (2) is not successful, the arbitral tribunal shall continue the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award. (5) Where an arbitral award is made under sub-section (4), the party challenging the arbitration may make an application for setting aside such an arbitral award in accordance with section 34. (6) Where an arbitral award is set aside on an application made under sub-section (5), the Court may decide as to whether the arbitrator who is challenged is entitled to any fees." 22. Neither the petitioner has raised any objection with regard to the appointment of R.Gopalakrishnan as the sole arbitrator nor have they filed any application under Section 13 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to challenge the appointment of R.Gopalakrishnan as the sole arbitrator. The petitioner has questioned the appointment of R.Gopalakrishnan who has passed the impugned Award, for the first time in the instant petition filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of MSP Infrastructure Limited vs. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Limited, (2015) 13 SCC 713 , while deciding the competence of arbitral tribunals, jurisdiction under section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has held that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction, after the statement of defence has been filed by the petitioner. Paragraph 13 of the said Judgment to be reads as follows: "13. Section 16(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 reads as follows: "16. (2) A plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence; however, a party shall not be precluded from raising such a plea merely because that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator." On a plain reading, this provision mandates that a plea that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall not be raised later than the submission of the statement of defence. There is no doubt about either the meaning of the words used in the section nor the intention. There is no doubt about either the meaning of the words used in the section nor the intention. Simply put, there is a prohibition on the party from raising a plea that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction after the party has submitted its statement of defence. The intention is very clear. So is the mischief that it seeks to prevent. This provision disables a party from petitioning a tribunal to challenge its jurisdiction belatedly, having submitted to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, filed the statement of defence, led evidence, made arguments and ultimately challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This is exactly what has been done by the respondent Corporation. They did not raise the question of jurisdiction at any stage. They did not raise it in their statement of defence; they did not raise it at any time before the tribunal; they suffered the award; they preferred a petition under Section 34 and after two years raised the question of jurisdiction of the tribunal. In our view, the mandate of Section 34 clearly prohibits such a cause. A party is bound, by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 16, to raise any objection it may have to the jurisdiction of the tribunal before or at the time of submission of its statement of defence, and at any time thereafter it is expressly prohibited. Suddenly, it cannot raise the question after it has submitted to the jurisdiction of the tribunal and invited an unfavourable award. It would be quite undesirable to allow arbitrations to proceed in the same manner as civil suits with all the well-known drawbacks of delay and endless objections even after the passing of a decree." 24. Applying the same analogy to Section 13 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which is the challenge procedure contemplated for challenging the appointment of a named arbitrator, a party who intends to challenge the Arbitrator shall, within fifteen days after becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or after becoming aware of any circumstances to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality send a written statement of the reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, within fifteen days after becoming aware of the appointment of the named Arbitrator, a party who is aggrieved by the said appointment shall have to challenge the appointment under Section 13 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In the instant case, no such challenge was made by the petitioner as contemplated under Section 13 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 25. Applying the same analogy of the judgment cited which deals with section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 regarding the competence of Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction, the maximum period of fifteen days from the date of knowledge of the appointment of the named Arbitrator cannot be extended and the appointment of the named Arbitrator who passed the impugned Award cannot be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 26. Therefore this Court is of the considered view that there is no merit in the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding passing of the Award by R.Gopalakrishnan, the sole Arbitrator. 27. Insofar as the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the details of the fresh tender for the balance work and the cost to be incurred for completing the balance work were never informed by the first respondent is concerned, this Court after examining the Arbitral Award is satisfied with the findings of the Arbitrator. 28. Insofar as claim No.1 allowed by the Arbitrator in favour of the first respondent is concerned, the Arbitrator has given the following findings: (a) Adequate notices were sent by the first respondent to the petitioner vide telegrams dated 11.07.1996, 26.11.1996, 10.12.1996 and 22.01.1997 and notices dated 26.11.1996, 19.12.1996, 02.04.1997 and 13.05.1997 and letters dated 21.03.1997, 21.05.1997 and 18.06.1997 regarding the slow progress of work done by the petitioner. (b) The petitioner themselves in their letter dated 28.12.1996 have accepted the delay in progress of work. Even after the assurance on 28.12.1996 to speed up work, the progress has been very slow. (c) The petitioner has not disputed the joint measurement even though the said measurement was made only eight days from the date of termination to the date of measurement i.e., from 04.06.1997 to 12.06.1997. (d) The details of the work awarded to the balance work contractor M/s. Inter Continental Constructions (P) Limited vide agreement No.36/CCD/97-98. (c) The petitioner has not disputed the joint measurement even though the said measurement was made only eight days from the date of termination to the date of measurement i.e., from 04.06.1997 to 12.06.1997. (d) The details of the work awarded to the balance work contractor M/s. Inter Continental Constructions (P) Limited vide agreement No.36/CCD/97-98. There are many items which are either abnormally high or low. Similarly is the case with the petitioner's agreement No.8/CCD/96-97 in item rate tenders, these are very common. That is why restrictions are placed in quantity variations by tender accepting authority. The first respondent has submitted the justified rate for each of the items and total justified amount at the time of acceptance of tender for both the agreements. The accepted amount of tender in both the agreements are very reasonable when compared with the justified rates. (e) The rescission of the work of the petitioner under Clause 3(a),(c) is in order and the recovery claim at Rs. 33,17,860/- is in order. 29. Insofar as the claim no.2 made by the first respondent, the Arbitrator has awarded a sum of Rs. 2,55,394/- towards the loss of revenue to the first respondent, the findings of the arbitrator are as follows: (a) The rent has been calculated purely on carpet area basis and hypothetical rent without considering the undeveloped area in a remote place in Coimbatore. Besides whether actually the staff paid the rent or not, was not produced. Neither rent receipt nor any document or pay was presented to show payment of house rent to the staff. The petitioner stated that actually the staff was staying in temporary accommodation built within the CTC campus itself and no rent was charged or paid. The first respondent thereafter vide letter No.55(1)2006/CCD/AB/ARB/KCO/6 dated 20.04.2007 have submitted the details of 53 eligible persons for type II quarters who stayed outside and paid rent. The HRA paid by the department to them was Rs,2,55,394/-. Even though the first respondent had made a claim of Rs. 14,33,985/- towards the loss of revenue to the Government, the Arbitral Tribunal based on HRA paid by the Department to the staff has awarded only Rs. 2,55,394/- in favour of the first respondent. 30. The HRA paid by the department to them was Rs,2,55,394/-. Even though the first respondent had made a claim of Rs. 14,33,985/- towards the loss of revenue to the Government, the Arbitral Tribunal based on HRA paid by the Department to the staff has awarded only Rs. 2,55,394/- in favour of the first respondent. 30. Therefore, as seen from the findings of the Arbitrator for allowing Claim no.1 and for partially allowing Claim no.2, it is evident that the findings of the Arbitrator are supported by documentary evidence and the findings are not perverse, Arbitrary or illegal. The Arbitrator has rightly allowed claim no.1 in entirety and claim no.2 partially and has rightly rejected the rest of the claims made by the first respondent. Insofar as the counter claims made by the petitioner, the Arbitrator has rightly allowed seven counter claims namely claim nos.1,2,3,5,6,8 & 9 and disallowed the rest of the two counter claims namely claim nos.4 & 7. 31. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be countenanced. Insofar as submissions made by the learned counsel for the first respondent that the petition filed by the petitioner is barred by limitation, since the petitioner has filed the petition beyond the period of three months stipulated under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is concerned, this Court after considering Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as well a the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the instant petition is of the considered view that the learned counsel for the first respondent is right in submitting that the petition has been filed beyond the period of three months stipulated under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for the following reasons: (a) The petition was presented on 28.04.2008. The petitioner has calculated three months period from 28.01.2008 being the date of receipt of the Arbitral Award by the petitioner's counsel. (b) Under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the period of three months shall be calculated only from the date when the party receives the Arbitral Award and not from the date when the counsel for the party receives the Arbitral Award. (b) Under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the period of three months shall be calculated only from the date when the party receives the Arbitral Award and not from the date when the counsel for the party receives the Arbitral Award. (c) As seen from the Arbitral Award, there is no reference to any counsel representing the petitioner in the arbitral proceedings. The Arbitrator has himself by his letter dated 06.03.2010, has clarified that no counsel for the petitioner was present at the time of hearing of the case at Coimbatore. 32. In view of the above cited reasons, it is evident that the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, has been filed by the petitioner beyond the period of 90 days stipulated under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The period can be extended only by another one month, that too, with a condone delay application. It is settled law that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is not applicable for an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 33. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that there is no merit in the instant petition. The findings of the Arbitrator are perfectly valid and no perversity is found in the findings of the Arbitrator. There is no illegality in the Arbitral Award. 34. The scope for interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is very limited. Unless and until, the Award is in conflict with the public policy of India or the findings of the Arbitrator are perverse or the Arbitral Award is patently illegal, this Court cannot interfere under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 35. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a Catena of decisions starting from Renusagar Power Company Ltd vs. General Electric Company, (1994) Supp1 SCC 644 to the recent Associated Builders Vs DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 has held only under the following grounds the Arbitral Award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act: (a) Procedure contemplated under Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not followed by the Arbitrator. (b) The Arbitral Award is a non speaking Award. (c) The Arbitrator has transgressed his jurisdiction. (d) The Arbitral Award is in conflict with the public policy of India. (b) The Arbitral Award is a non speaking Award. (c) The Arbitrator has transgressed his jurisdiction. (d) The Arbitral Award is in conflict with the public policy of India. (iii) An award would be regarded as conflicting with the public policy of India if:- (a) it is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, or (b) it is contrary to the interests of India, (c) it is contrary to justice or morality, (d) it is patently illegal, or (e) it is so perverse, irrational, unfair or unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. (iv) An award would be liable to be regarded as contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, for example, if (a) it disregards orders passed by superior courts, or the binding effect thereof, or (b) it is patently violative of statutory provisions, or (c) it is not in public interest, or (d) the arbitrator has not adopted a "judicial approach", i.e. has not acted in a fair, reasonable and objective approach, or has acted arbitrarily, capriciously or whimsically, or (e) the arbitrator has failed to draw an inference which, on the face of the facts, ought to have been drawn, or (f) the arbitrator has drawn an inference, from the facts, which, on the face of it, is unreasonable, or (g) the principles of natural justice have been violated. (v) Insofar the "patent illegality" has to go to the root of the matter. Trivial illegalities are inconsequential. (vi) Additionally, an award could be set aside if (a) either party was under some incapacity, or (b) the arbitration agreement is invalid under the law, Or (c) the applicant was not given proper notice of appointment of the arbitrator, or of the arbitral proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present his case, or (d) the award deals with a dispute not submitted to arbitration, or decides issues outside the scope of the dispute submitted to arbitration, or (e) the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or in accordance with Part I of the Act, or (f) the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or in accordance with Part I of the Act, or (g) the award contravenes the Act, or (h) the award is contrary to the contract between the parties. (vii) "Perversity", as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award, has to be examined on the touchstone of the Wednesbury principle of reasonableness. It would include a case in which (a) the findings, in the award, are based on no evidence, or (b) the Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to the decision arrived at, or (c) the Arbitral Tribunal ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision. (viii) At the same time, (a) a decision which is founded on some evidence, which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious, cannot be treated as "perverse", (b) if the view adopted by the arbitrator is a plausible view, it has to pass muster, (c) neither quantity, nor quality, of evidence is open to re-assessment in judicial review over the award. (ix) "Morality" would imply enforceability, of the agreement, given the prevailing mores of the day. "Immorality", however, can constitute a ground for interfering with an arbitral award only if it shocks the judicial conscience. 36. The petitioner has not satisfied any of the grounds mentioned above to interfere with the Award dated 31.07.2007. Hence, the Original Petition shall stand dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.