JUDGMENT Sandeep Sharma, J. - Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.PC, is directed against the judgment dated 30.8.2017, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kullu, H.P., in Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 2016, affirming the judgment of conviction/sentence dated 11.11.2016, recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Manali, District Kullu, H.P. in complaint No. 000214 of 2014, whereby the learned trial Court below while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the "Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay compensation to the tune of Rs.2,50,000/- . 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerge from the record are that respondent-complainant preferred a complaint under Section 138 of the Act, before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, H.P., against the present petitioner-accused, alleging therein that the petitioner-accused, had borrowed a sum of Rs. 2 lac from him for business and promised him to re-pay the same in a shot span of time. With a view to discharge his liability, accused issued a cheque bearing No. 044551 dated 27.11.2013, for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/-drawn at Bank of India, branch Manali, District Kullu, H.P., however, fact remains that the aforesaid cheque was dishonoured on its presentation on account of insufficient funds. Since petitioner-accused failed to make the payment good within the stipulated period despite issuance of legal notice dated 18.2.2014, respondent/complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings before the competent Court of law under Section 138 of the Act. 3. Learned trial Court on being satisfied that prima-facie case exists against the accused, put him notice of accusation under Section 138 of the Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, however fact remains that, on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, learned trial Court held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the court below, accused preferred an appeal in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Kullu H.P., which also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 30.8.2017, as a consequence of which, judgment of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court came to be upheld. 4. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the court below, accused preferred an appeal in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Kullu H.P., which also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 30.8.2017, as a consequence of which, judgment of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, present petitioner-accused has approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein his acquittal after setting aside the judgments of conviction recorded by the courts below. 5. Before adverting to the factual matrix of the case, it may be noticed that repeatedly, case at hand came to be adjourned on the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner, who on the instructions of the accused, repeatedly informed this Court that accused is in process of settling the dispute amicably with the complainant, but despite repeated opportunities, petitioner failed to make the payment to the complainant and as such, this Court has no option but to decide the present case on merits. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record vis--vis reasoning assigned by the learned court below while passing the impugned judgment, this Court is not persuaded to agree with Mr. Amar Deep Singh, learned counsel representing the accused that judgments passed by the courts below are not based upon proper appreciation of evidence, rather this Court finds that both the courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously and there is no room left for this Court to interfere. This Court with a view to ascertain the correctness of arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that evidence led on record by the parties have not been read in its right perspective, carefully examined evidence vis--vis reasoning assigned by the court below, perusal whereof, certainly not compels this Court to agree with the aforesaid contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, but this Court finds that complainant by way of cogent and convincing evidence led on record successfully proved that he had lent a sum of Rs. 2 lac to the accused, who with a view to discharge his liability, issued cheque in question Ext.CW1/B amounting to Rs. 2 lac, drawn at Bank of India, branch Manali. 2 lac to the accused, who with a view to discharge his liability, issued cheque in question Ext.CW1/B amounting to Rs. 2 lac, drawn at Bank of India, branch Manali. Complainant examined himself as CW1 and tendered in evidence his affidavit Ext.CW1/A, cheque Ext.CW1/B, memo Ext.CW1/C, legal notice Ext.CW1/D and postal receipt Ext.CW1/E and closed his evidence. 7. If statement of complainant (CW1) is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that he successfully proved his case, as is required to be proved, under Section 138 of the Act. Cross-examination conducted upon this witness by the defence, nowhere suggests that defense was able to shatter his testimony. Interestingly, accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC., nowhere denied the case of the prosecution, rather, he stated that he had borrowed a sum of Rs. 75,000/-from the complainant, which he had returned to him and had issued blank cheque as security, which was subsequently, mis-used by the complainant. Neither issuance of cheque in question (Ext.CW1/B), ever came to be disputed by the accused nor he disputed his signatures on the cheque, rather he took a very strange stand that he had issued a blank cheque as security, but, unfortunately, there is no evidence led on record by the accused to the effect that he had returned sum of Rs. 75,000/-, which he had borrowed from the complainant. 8. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that careful perusal of statement having been made by complainant (CW1) clearly suggests that he successfully proved that cheque issued by the accused was deposited by him in the bank, which was dishonoured vide memo Ext.CW1/C, whereafter he by way of legal notice Ext.CW1/D called upon the accused to make the payment well within the stipulated period. Factum with regard to service of legal notice also came to be proved in accordance with law by CW1 (complainant), who tendered in evidence postal receipt Ext.CW1/E. 9. As has been noticed herein above, accused was not able to shatter the testimony of the accused. In cross-examination, it was suggested to the complainant that cheque in question was taken by the complainant from some person and it was filled by him, but interestingly, no such plea was ever taken by the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC. In cross-examination, it was suggested to the complainant that cheque in question was taken by the complainant from some person and it was filled by him, but interestingly, no such plea was ever taken by the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC. No doubt, plea/admission, if any, made by the accused under Section 313, cannot be read in evidence, but certainly it can be taken into consideration, while considering the other evidence adduced on record by the respective parties for the purpose of corroboration. If aforesaid suggestion put forth by the defence is read in context of statement of accused made under Section 313 Cr.PC, it totally belies the case of the accused, wherein he has stated that he himself issued the cheque but as security. 10. Leaving everything aside, since there is no dispute with regard to the issuance of cheque and signatures thereupon of the accused, statutory presumption as contemplated under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act is available in favour of the complainant, who otherwise by leading cogent and convincing evidence successfully proved on record factum with regard to the issuance of cheque by the accused towards discharge of his lawful liability. Section 118 of the Act clearly provides that it shall be presumed that, until the contrary is proved the cheque was drawn for consideration, whereas Section 139 of the Act stipulates that unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that holder of the cheque receives the cheque for the discharge of whole or part of any debt or liability. 11. Complainant has successfully proved that he having received cheque Ext.CW1/B presented the same in the bank, but on its presentation, same was returned vide memo Ext.CW1/C. It also stands proved on record that the complainant after having received memo served the accused with legal notice CW1/D, which fact has been otherwise not disputed by the accused. Ext.CW1/E i.e. postal receipt proves the factum with regard to the receipt of legal notice Ext.CW1/D, by the accused. No doubt, presumption as available to the complainant being holder of cheque as envisaged under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, is rebuttable, but in the case at hand, accused has not been able to put up probable defence that he had not issued cheque towards discharge of any lawful liability, rather cheque in question was issued as security. No doubt, presumption as available to the complainant being holder of cheque as envisaged under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, is rebuttable, but in the case at hand, accused has not been able to put up probable defence that he had not issued cheque towards discharge of any lawful liability, rather cheque in question was issued as security. There is nothing led on record by the accused that cheque issued by him was not towards the discharge of legal liability, rather same was blank cheque issued as security. To the contrary, defence set-up by the accused while cross-examining the complainant is totally contrary to the stand taken by him in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC, wherein he stated that his blank cheque has been mis-used by the accused. 12. The Hon''ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat , (2013) 1 RCR(Cri) 260, has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No. 23 to 25 of the judgment herein:- "23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof". The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy." 13. Having carefully gone through the evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, this Court sees no reason to interference with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below, which otherwise are based upon the correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon''ble Apex Court in case " State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri , (1999) 2 SCC 452 " , wherein it has been held as under:- "In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice." 14. True it is that the Hon''ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another , (1997) 4 SCC 241 ; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but Mr. Sharma learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 15. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned findings recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appears to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. Present petition fails and dismissed accordingly. Order dated 22.9.2017, passed by this Court, whereby sentence imposed by the court below was suspended, is hereby vacated and the petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial court.