JUDGMENT : 1. The arrest of a vessel has been questioned in this appeal. 2. The first respondent herein is the plaintiff in the admiralty action. 3. According to the first respondent and the case run in the plaint, the first respondent effected supplies to vessel M. V. ARYBBAS and remains unpaid therefor. M. V. ARYBBAS is said to be owned by Maximus Marine Ltd. Company Probulk Shipping and Trading S.A is said to be the holding company of Maximus Marine Ltd.. Probulk is also said to be the holding company of Keletros Maritime Company Ltd. The vessel arrested is vessel M. V. NEPENTHE. M. V. NEPHENTHE is owned by Keletros. A report from a British agency by the name of InfoSpectrum Ltd. has been relied upon by the plaintiff to demonstrate that Probulk is ultimately controlled by a person by the name of Alexandros Tsakos, whether individually or along with another individual, and that Probulk is the ultimate owner of both M. V. ARYBBAS and M. V. NEPENTHE though through individual single–ship–owning companies. The claim of the plaintiff on account of the supplies amounts to slightly over Rs.1 crore (Indian). The plaintiff claims that the invoices were duly raised on the relevant vessel and its owners and the plaintiff has remained unpaid. 4. The principal ground urged by the appellants, the persons interested in M. V. NEPHENTHE, is that the claim of the plaintiff and whatever may have been said in the plaint and the affidavit of arrest could not have resulted in M. V. NEPHENTHE being detained by this Court. In such context, Article 3(2) of the International Convention of Arrest of Ships of 1999 has been placed. Since such provision is the key issue in this matter, the same is quoted: “Article 3: Exercise of right of arrest 1… 2. Arrest is also permissible of any other ship or ships, which when the arrest is effected, is or are owned by the person who is liable for the maritime claim and who was, when the claims arose: (a) owner of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose; or (b) demise charterer, time charterer or voyage charterer of that ship.” 3. The appellants assert that if an order of arrest is to be passed under the 1999 Convention, the arrest of a ship for the claim against another may only be made if, as is relevant for the present purpose, the arrested ship is also owned by the person who is liable for the maritime claim. The appellants say that since it is the admitted position that Probulk is not the owner of either M. V. ARYBBAS or M. V. NEPHENTHE, it cannot be said that any ship directly or indirectly owned by Probulk can be arrested on account of a maritime claim that a person may have against M. V. ARYBBAS. The argument is that since the owners of M. V. NEPHENTHE cannot be regarded as persons “liable for the maritime claim”, where the maritime claim is the subject-matter of the action, M. V. NEPHENTHE could not have been arrested for the best possible claim that the plaintiff may have had against M. V. ARYBBAS. 4. The order impugned dated January 24, 2018 dwelt at length on the quality of the claim and the link that has been sought to be established by the plaintiff between M. V. ARYBBAS and M. V. NEPHENTHE. It appears that some credence has been given to the report of InfoSpectrum. It is, thus, necessary, to look at such report and the stand that has been taken by the appellants herein in course of the affidavits filed in the court of the first instance. 5. According to the report of InfoSpectrum, Probulk is a Liberian registered company operating out of Greece. The promoters or persons in control of Probulk, including the said Tsakos, are shown in the report to have acquired several vessels including M.V. ARYBBAS and M. V. NEPHENTHE. The report says that Probulk has apparently been providing management services to the vessels in its group since May, 2015 and it entered the market by taking on the management of four vessels which were acquired by its principals second-hand. 6. Individuals claiming to be directors of Keletros and Probulk filed affidavits dealing with some aspect of the affidavit of arrest, but the plaintiff says that it is doubtful whether the persons who claimed as directors are, at all, directors of such companies. 6. Individuals claiming to be directors of Keletros and Probulk filed affidavits dealing with some aspect of the affidavit of arrest, but the plaintiff says that it is doubtful whether the persons who claimed as directors are, at all, directors of such companies. The plaintiff submits that as to ownership and control, such matters are within the special knowledge of the appellants and the other defendants and, in the absence of such defendants demonstrating that the two vessels could not be linked, an adverse inference was liable to be dreawn against them. To an extent, the plaintiff may be justified; but for the vessel to be arrested it was for the plaintiff to demosntrate that the plaintiff was entitled to arrest M. V. NEPENTHE for a maritime claim against M.V. ARRYBBAS. 7. Whatever adverse inference may be drawn against the appellants herein or the defendants in the admiralty action, the plaintiff would be entitled to an order of arrest provided that such arrest is permissible under the 1999 Arrest Convention. So much has been accepted by the plaintiff, though the plaintiff says that if there are other laws applicable in this country and such laws permit the arrest of the vessel otherwise, the vessel may also be arrested. 8. The plaintiff has referred copiously to the judgment in M. V. Elisabeth reported at AIR 1993 SCC 1014. By such judgment, it was held that notwithstanding the limited interpretation given to the powers in exercising admiralty jurisdiction by High Courts in this country under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, all High Courts would be entitled to exercise the admiralty jurisdiction as long as the vessel is within the jurisdiction of such High Court and the action is in pursuance of a maritime claim or the like. The plaintiff refers particularly to paragraph 59 of the judgment which refers to the concept of beneficial ownership. The plaintiff seeks to suggest that the word ‘owned’ in Article 3(2) of the 1999 Arrest Convention should be read to include the concept of beneficial owner within its fold. The plaintiff refers particularly to paragraph 59 of the judgment which refers to the concept of beneficial ownership. The plaintiff seeks to suggest that the word ‘owned’ in Article 3(2) of the 1999 Arrest Convention should be read to include the concept of beneficial owner within its fold. The aspect of beneficial ownership is referred to at paragraph 59 of M. V. Elisabeth in the context of admiralty actions in England and the Court observed that such actions in England “are confined to well defined maritime liens or claims and directed against the res (ship, cargo and freight) which is the subject-matter of the dispute or any other ship in the same beneficial ownership as the res in question.” It must also be kept in mind that at the time Elisabeth was decided, it was the 1952 Arrest Convention that was in place and not the present convention of 1999. 9. The plaintiff has also placed strong reliance on a post-1999 Arrest Convention judgment of the Supreme Court reported at (2004)9 SCC 512 (Liverpool and London S. P. and I Asson. Ltd. vs. M. V. Sea Success I). Such judgment was rendered in the context of a demurrer under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code and the Court observed that for the purpose of rejecting a plaint it is not necessary to consider whether the averments made in the plaint prove the factum that is asserted therein. Though, in passing, at paragraph 154 of the report, the Court referred to such issues being taken into account at the time of an order of arrest, the ratio decidendi of such judgment is confined to the consideration of an application to reject the plaint. 10. As to Probulk and the human agencies in control of Probulk being the real persons liable for the maritime claim asserted by the plaintiff, the plaintiff relies on an unreported judgment of this Court on the concept of lifting of the corporate veil rendered in GA No.533 of 2008, TS No.88 of 1993 (In the goods of: Kamal Kumar Mitra, Deceased) on March 19, 2008. The plaintiff has also carried a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported at AIR 1999 Cal 64 as to what should be regarded as the best arguable case of a plaintiff in an admiralty action. The plaintiff has also carried a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported at AIR 1999 Cal 64 as to what should be regarded as the best arguable case of a plaintiff in an admiralty action. There is an observation in the judgment to the effect that the asset of an Indian national may not be arrested merely because a money claim is brought against him, unless other circumstances as recognised in Order XXXVIII of the Code are established; but when the asset of a foreign national is arrested in India merely because the claimant may not be able to pursue the foreign national to execute the possible decree, the foreign national has to furnish security to undo the order of arrest so that the security can be proceeded against in the execution of the decree in the event the decree is obtained. Such principle has nothing to do with the interpretation of Article 3(2) of the 1999 Arrest Convention which is at the heart of this appeal. 11. It must also be recorded that the plaintiff has referred to the concept of beneficial ownership as indicated in Lloyd’s List Intelligence where the beneficial owner is deemed to be the ultimate owning entity or a representative of a vessel as distinguished from the commercial operator of the vessel and the registered owner thereof. The plaintiff has also referred to the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 and specifically Section 15 thereof which deals with the rights of judgment-creditors against judgment-debtors. Section 2(2) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 has also been placed along with Sections 443 and 71 thereof; all of which have little or no connection with the present lis or the principal issue which has arisen therein. There is no doubt that a foreign ship having entered Indian territorial waters is subject to the laws prevailing in India and Section 2(2) of the 1958 Act recognises the same. Section 443 of the said Act has nothing to do with a sister ship and is confined to the offending vessel itself. Section 71 pertains to the concept of beneficial ownership upon pecuniary penalties being imposed by such Act or any other law in India. Section 443 of the said Act has nothing to do with a sister ship and is confined to the offending vessel itself. Section 71 pertains to the concept of beneficial ownership upon pecuniary penalties being imposed by such Act or any other law in India. In other words, under Section 71 of the Act of 1958, for the realisation of any penalty imposed on a ship, its beneficial owners may also be traced and proceeded against in addition to its de jure owners. 12. According to the plaintiff, there is a distinct departure from the position as to a sister vessel as it stood in the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Sea-Going Ships, 1952 (the 1952 Arrest Convention) and its successor convention of 1999. Under the 1952 Arrest Convention, a ship would be deemed to be in the same ownership when all the shares therein were owned by the same person or persons. The plaintiff suggests that upon such concept of shareholding being removed, the strict tests of ownership no longer apply under Article 3(2) of 1999 Arrest Convention. 13. The expression used in Article 3(2) of the 1999 Arrest Convention is “arrest is also permissible of any other ship…owned by the person who is liable for the maritime claim…” The condition in sub-clause (a) is relevant for the present purpose. The word ‘person’ is qualified in the provision by the words “who is liable for the maritime claim”. Such qualification precludes the beneficial owner of the offending vessel being regarded as the owner within the meaning of the relevant provision. In this case, even if it is assumed that Probulk, through a wholly-owned subsidiary, is the ultimate owner of M. V. ARYBBAS and Probulk, through another wholly-owned subsidiary, is the absolute owner of M. V. NEPHENTHE, the provision would not permit Probulk to be regarded as the owner within the meaning of cognate expression used in Article 3(2) of the 1999 Arrest Convention as Probulk as the holding company of Maximus cannot be liable for the maritime claim against a vessel owned by Maximus. It would be possible for Probulk to be shown as the person who is liable for the maritime claim if the laws of Liberia were placed and it were to be demonstrated from such laws that a holding company would be completely liable for the debts of its subsidiary. It would be possible for Probulk to be shown as the person who is liable for the maritime claim if the laws of Liberia were placed and it were to be demonstrated from such laws that a holding company would be completely liable for the debts of its subsidiary. Equally, if Probulk had issued an omnibus guarantee taking responsibility for all of Maximus’s liability, as a matter of fact, Probulk would have fitted appropriately into the expression of owner or the cognate variant thereof as used in the provision. It is quite possible that either case may ultimately be established by the plaintiff at the trial of the suit; but the order of arrest could not have been obtained on the basis of the report of InfoSpectrum even if all of such report is accepted as gospel truth. 14. Ordinarily, as in Indian Law, a holding company cannot be held to be liable for the debts of its subsidiary. The liability of the shareholders of a company is limited and the shareholders of a company stand last in line to recover their investment in the company upon a company going into liquidation. Thus, the extent of the liability of shareholder in a company – irrespective of whether such shareholder is effectively the 100 per cent owner of the shares in the company – is limited to the extent of the value of the shareholding in the relevant company. The plaintiff does not city any special law in Liberia, where company Maximus is registered, or any other law in the country that permits the assets of a holding company to be attached in pursuance of a claim against its subsidiary. In certain cases of fraud, the distinction between the holding company and the subsidiary may be obliterated upon lifting the corporate veil; but an unpaid seller or an unpaid provider of services to a company can scarcely city fraud to be entitled to proceed against the assets of the holding company in furtherance of a claim against its subsidiary. 15. That does not imply that the quality of the plaintiff’s claim is doubted. There is no material as of now to doubt such claim. One may even sympathise with the plaintiff. 15. That does not imply that the quality of the plaintiff’s claim is doubted. There is no material as of now to doubt such claim. One may even sympathise with the plaintiff. But merely because the plaintiff has a claim against a vessel or against the owners of such vessel would not permit the general law to be cast aside or the 1999 Arrest Convention to be brushed aside and an order of arrest made against a vessel that has some nebulous link with the owners of the vessel against which the claim arises. Indeed, no other law in this country has been shown by the plaintiff to sustain the order of arrest de hors the 1999 Arrest Convention. 16. The consideration here is not of the propriety of the plaintiff’s claim on account of supplies effected to M.V. ARYBBAS, it is the plaintiff’s right to have M.V. NEPHENTHE arrested for a claim against M.V. ARYBBAS. 17. Nothing that the plaintiff has been able to show permits M.V. NEPENTHE to be arrested for the plaintiff’s claim against M.V. ARYBBAS as the person or entity which owns M.V. NEPENTHE cannot be regarded under Article 3(2) of the 1999 Arrest Convention to be the person who owns M.V. ARYBBAS and is liable for the maritime claim against M.V. ARYBBAS. 18. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal succeeds. The order impugned dated January 24, 2018 is set aside. The order arresting M.V. NEPENTHE is discharged. The plaintiff will pay costs assessed at Rs.10 lakh to the appellants herein. 19. In addition, the plaintiff will furnish security of value of Rs.1 crore to be entitled to pursue the suit and the claim therein any further. Such security should be furnished within four weeks from date by way of a demand draft or banker’s cheque or like instrument, not being a personal cheque, in favour of the Registrar, Original Side. Upon receipt of such money, the Registrar will invest it by way of a fixed deposit with any nationalised bank and hold it to the credit of any counter-claim for damages that may be filed by the appellant herein for the wrongful arrest of M.V. NEPENTHE at the behest of the plaintiff. If such counterclaim is not filed within four weeks of the security being furnished, the plaintiff will be entitled to seek the immediate discharge of the security. 20. If such counterclaim is not filed within four weeks of the security being furnished, the plaintiff will be entitled to seek the immediate discharge of the security. 20. APO No.31 of 2018 and GA No.278 of 2018 are allowed as above. 21. The plaintiff seeks a stay of the operation of this order, which is declined. 22. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.