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2018 DIGILAW 23 (CAL)

Banamali Mondal v. Tarak Nath Pan

2018-01-05

SHIVAKANT PRASAD

body2018
JUDGMENT : SHIVAKANT PRASAD, J. 1. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 12th May, 2011 passed by the learned 15th Court of Additional District Judge at Alipore in Title Appeal No. 254 of 2010 confirming the judgment and decree dated 24th June, 2009 passed by the learned 9th Court, Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Alipore in Title Suit No. 50 of 2008 inter alia on the grounds the learned Appellate Court below was not justified in rejecting the application under order 41 rule 27 CPC merely on the ground that the documents were not produced earlier and thereby erred in law in not considering the fact that the defendants did not adduce any evidence as the defendant no. 2 was hospitalised due to operation and the advocate was also absent due to his operation. It is submitted that the learned Court below ought to have considered the fact that the defendants had refused to pay rent to the respondent because no document was shown by him in support of the ownership in respect of the suit property. 2. Accordingly, the appellant has prayed for setting aside the impugned judgment and the decree as bad in law and in fact. 3. This Court is called upon to decide this appeal on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether in passing the impugned order the learned appellate court below appreciated the true scope, purport and ambit of order 41 rule 27(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure? 2. Whether the lower appellate court could have refused the prayer for production of additional document/evidence in the form of rent receipts in proceedings in which the question raised was whether the defendants licensee or tenant? 4. Now the point for decision is as to whether the judgment impugned is tenable in law. 5. Learned Advocate for the defendants hereinafter referred to as appellants has contended that the appellant was inducted as tenant by Baidyanath Pan, owner of the suit property as per the agreement dated the 10th January, 1991 executed by him at a monthly rental of Rs. 150 in respect of two rooms on the ground floor, kitchen and Thakur ghar on the roof and bath and privy on the ground floor. 6. 150 in respect of two rooms on the ground floor, kitchen and Thakur ghar on the roof and bath and privy on the ground floor. 6. On the other hand plaintiffs hereinafter referred to as respondents specific case is that the suit property originally belonged to Joy Krishna Pan since deceased, the father of the plaintiff who during his lifetime executed a registered will which was probated in Probate Case No. 189 of 1967 by the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta. Amongst the sons of Joy Krishna Pan, the eldest son Baidyanath Pan died a bachelor. The appellant no. 1 during the life time of said Baidyanath Pan, approached in the year 1993 for a temporary accommodation representing himself to be a poor man who earns his livelihood as a water carrier, locally known as Bhari. The defendant no. 1was allowed to stay in the ground floor with attached kitchen common bath and privy as a licensee without any license fees at the said suit premises for looking after him as domestic help. Subsequently, he married the defendant no. 2 and started staying together in the suit premises along with their children. Plaintiff was an officer of West Bengal Power development Corporation Ltd. and retired from his service on 30th June, 2006 for his last place of work at Pulwama Midnapore. During the period of service the respondent used to stay in the officers quarter with his family and used to stay for a short visit at 64 Pratapaditya place. As the plaintiff son grew up the plaintiff's wife and the son came and stayed permanently at the said premises for the education of his son. After the demise of his brother the defendants approached the plaintiff for extension of the licence on assurance by the defendant to the plaintiff that he would arrange a suitable accommodation at the earliest and the plaintiff extended the permission of licence upon the defendant to stay at the suit premises for a limited period on the basis of such undertaking that he would arrange his accommodation at the earliest. As soon as the wife of plaintiff and son started staying continuously the defendants became apprehensive of their continuous occupation as licensees but the plaintiff requested them to vacate the rooms under their occupation. The defendants also gave out threat to the plaintiff's wife and son. As soon as the wife of plaintiff and son started staying continuously the defendants became apprehensive of their continuous occupation as licensees but the plaintiff requested them to vacate the rooms under their occupation. The defendants also gave out threat to the plaintiff's wife and son. The plaintiff revoked the license granted in favour of the defendants by a notice in writing dated 29.6.2006 asking them to vacate and delivery of peaceful possession within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice but the notice returned with postal revenue 'Not claimed'. Hence the plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of possession by evicting the defendants therefrom and for damages for wrongful occupation of the suit premises. The appellants as defendants entered appearance before the trial court and contested the suit by filing written statement denying all material particulars made in the plaint and contended inter alia that they were inducted as a tenant at a rental of Rs. 150/- per month at the suit premises comprising two living rooms on the ground floor one kitchen on the roof, a Thakur ghar and common bath and privy both in the first and ground floor. The defendant looked after well being of said Baidyanath Pan and they had cordial relationship with him. The whole trouble began when the plaintiff suddenly appeared and claimed himself to be the owner of the suit premises. The defendant no. 1 all along paid rent to his landlord since deceased under rent receipts and paid rent up to August 1995.The defendants refused to pay the rent to the plaintiff as he failed to produce any document of his right as the owner. The plaintiff, his wife and son, with the active support of political party attempted to oust the defendants from the tenanted premises. The defendant came to know after the death of Baidyanath Pan that the premises No. 64 Pratapaditya place and other properties of the original owner had vested in the trust estate and the defendants have been depositing rent month by month to the Rent Controller. It is also contended that there is no relationship of licensor and licensee between these the plaintiff and defendants. Accordingly, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit with cost. 7. It is also contended that there is no relationship of licensor and licensee between these the plaintiff and defendants. Accordingly, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit with cost. 7. On the pleadings above, the learned trial court framed as many as five issues and after going to trial by taking evidence from both the parties and upon hearing learned Advocates for the parties the trial Court was of the considered view that the plaintiff has sufficiently proved that the defendant was a licensee in the suit premises and the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of recovery of khas possession and decreed the suit on contest by granting him a decree for recovery of khas possession against the defendants by the judgment and decree dated 7th August, 2010. 8. The said judgment and decree was appealed against in the court of 15th Additional District Judge, Alipore 24 Parganas (South) and was dismissed on contest on the finding that appellants/defendants neither produced any evidence nor established their case of tenancy. 9. It appears that in the lower appellate court the appellants filed an application under order 41, rule 27 of Code of Civil Procedure on the contention that the appellants are the tenants at a rental of Rs. 150/- per month payable according to English calendar month and are possessed of rent receipts granted by the landlord but unfortunately those could not be filed in the court below. The rent receipts for the months of April 1995, May 1995, June 1995, July 1995 and August 1995 filed for effective adjudication to show the status of the appellants as a lawful tenants and not as the licence in respect of the suit premises. The photocopy of agreement dated 10.01.1991 was also submitted in support of their case that they are tenants and not the licensee. The appellants wanted the appeal Court below to accept them as additional evidence for effective adjudication of the real point in issue as to whether the appellants are the tenants or the licensee in respect of the suit premises. On perusal of judgment of the trial court and evidence on record, the appeal Court below was of the view that though the defendants appellants in their written statement have made out a case of tenancy at the suit premises at a monthly rental of Rs. On perusal of judgment of the trial court and evidence on record, the appeal Court below was of the view that though the defendants appellants in their written statement have made out a case of tenancy at the suit premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 150/- payable according to English calendar month by payment of rent up to August, 1995 while the landlord died in the month of September, 1995 but they refused to make payment to the respondent plaintiff on the ground that they have not shown their right and title in the suit premises. But despite the fact of several opportunities given to the appellants, they failed and neglected to produce any evidence in support of their case of tenancy on the other hand in cross-examination the respondent plaintiff deposing as PW1 has clearly stated that the defendants were allowed to occupy the suit premises as a licensee when he was present. This piece of evidence of PW 1 has not been controverted by the defendants/appellants during cross-examination. By taking the rule of preponderance of probability, the learned court below held the appellants defendants as licensee to the suit premises. The learned appeal court below did not interfere into the findings of the learned trial court and accordingly the appeal was dismissed on contest by the judgement and decree dated 12.05.2011 against which the present appellants/defendants have preferred the instant appeal on the grounds inter alia that the appeal court below ought to have allowed the application under order 41, rule 27 (1)(b) of CPC and in not doing so has committed a serious error in confirming the judgment of the learned trial Court. 10. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that for the interest of justice the liberty be given to adduce additional evidence and relied on a decision in case of K. Venkata Maya v. A. Sitaram Reddy and others reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1526 wherein it has been held thus- "The object of rule 27(2) clearly is to keep a clear record of what weighed with the appellant court in allowing the additional evidence to be produced that whether this was done on the ground i) that the court appealed from had refused to admit evidence which ought to have admitted, or ii) it allowed it because it required it to enable it to pronounce judgement in the appeal or iii) it allowed this for any other substantial cause. Whether if further appeal lies from the decision of the appellate court such recording of the regions is necessary and useful also to the court of further appeal for deciding whether the discretion under the rule has been judicially exercised by the court below. The mission to the court the region must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. Even so, the provision is not mandatory and the omission of the High Court to record reasons for allowing additional evidence does not vitiate such admission. It is true that the word 'shall' is used in rule 27(2); but that by itself does not make it mandatory. ILR 12 Cal 37 relied on. Relying on the observation made in paragraph 16 of the cited decision, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is well to remember that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, but also for any other substantial cost. There may well be is cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it is still considers that in interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence for any other substantial cause under rule 27(1)(b) of the court." 11. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence for any other substantial cause under rule 27(1)(b) of the court." 11. In paragraph 17 it has been observed thus: "it is easy to see that such requirement of the court to enable it to pronounce to or for any other substantial cause is not likely to arise ordinarily unless some inherent lacuna defect becomes apparent on an examination of the evidence. That is why in Parsotim Thakur v. Lal Mohar Thakur, 53 IND App 254 ; the AIR 1931 PC 143 the privy Council while discussing whether additional evidence can be admitted observed; it may be required to enable the court to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, but in either case it must be the court that requires it. This the plaint grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but when on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent." 12. As the Privy Council proceeded to point out it may well be that the defect may be pointed out by a party, or that a party may move the court to supply the defect, but the requirement must be the requirement of the court upon its appreciation of the evidence as it stands. 13. In Shalimar Chemicals Works Ltd v. Surendra Oil and Dal Mills (refineries) and others reported in 2010(3) CHN(SC) 241 the appellant filed suit against the respondents defendant alleging that defendants were marketing their product in infringement of its registered trademark and prayed for decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from marketing the said product. The appellants produced several documents along with photocopies of registration certificates under Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 which was exhibited subject to objection of proof and admissibility. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the appellant had not established its case. The plaintiff appellant preferred appeal before the High Court and filed application under order 41 rule 27 of CPC for accepting the original of trademark registration certificates and allied documents of which Xerox copies were filed before the trial court as additional evidence. High Court allowed the said application and set aside the judgement and decree passed by the trial court. High Court allowed the said application and set aside the judgement and decree passed by the trial court. The respondents filed an intra-appeal before the division bench of the said High Court which reversed the judgement and the decree of the single bench holding that there was no occasion or justification for admitting the original trademark registration certificates at the appellate stage as additional evidence. Against the judgment of division bench the appellant moved the Hon'ble Apex Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed in paragraph 12 thus- "On careful consideration of the whole matter, we feel that serious mistakes where committed in the case at all stages. The trial court should not have marked as exhibits the Xerox copies of the certificates of registration of trademark in face of the objection raised by the defendants. It should have declined to take them on record as evidence and left to the plaintiff to support its case by whatever means it proposed rather than leaving the issue of admissibility of those copies open and hanging by marking them as exhibits subject to objection of proof and admissibility. The appellant, therefore, had illegitimate grievance in appeal about the way the trial proceeded. The learned single judge rightly allowed the appellants plea for production of the original certificates of registration of trademark as additional evidence because that was simply in the interest of justice and there was sufficient stacked three basis for that under clause be of order 41, rule 27. But then the single judge seriously erred in proceeding simultaneously to allow the appeal and not giving the defendants respondents an opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal of the documents taken in an additional evidence. The division bench was again wrong in taking the view that in the facts of the case, the production of the additional evidence was not permissible under order 41, rule 27. As shown above the additional documents produced by the appellant where liable to be taken on record as provided under order 41, rule 27 in interest of justice. But it was certainly right in holding that the way the learned single judge disposed of the appeal caused serious prejudice to the defendants respondents. As shown above the additional documents produced by the appellant where liable to be taken on record as provided under order 41, rule 27 in interest of justice. But it was certainly right in holding that the way the learned single judge disposed of the appeal caused serious prejudice to the defendants respondents. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the proper course for the division bench was to set aside the order of the learned single bench without disturbing it insofar as it took the originals of the certificates of the registration produced by the appellant on record and two room and the matter to give opportunity to the defendants/respondents to produce evidence in rebuttal if they solely desired." 14. Accordingly judgment of the division bench was set aside and matter was remitted to the learned single judge to proceed in the appeal from the stage of the original of the registration certificates were taken on record as additional evidence. 15. Yet learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a decision of North-Eastern Railway Administration Gorakhpur v. Bhagavan Das D. by LRS reported in 2008(3) ICC 612 wherein in paragraph 12 and 13 it has been observed thus: "12. Though the general rule is that ordinarily the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and additional evidence, whether oral or documentary is not admitted but Section 107 C.P.C., which carves out an exception to the general rule, enables an appellate court to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed. These conditions are prescribed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. Nevertheless, the additional evidence can be admitted only when the circumstances as stipulated in the said rule are found to exist. These conditions are prescribed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. Nevertheless, the additional evidence can be admitted only when the circumstances as stipulated in the said rule are found to exist. The circumstances under which additional evidence can be adduced are : (i) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, (clause (a) of sub rule (1)) or (ii) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within the knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, (clause aa, inserted by Act 104 of 1976) or (iii) the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause. (clause (b) of sub rule (1)). 13. It is plain that under clause (b) of sub rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 C.P.C., with which we are concerned in the instant case, evidence may be admitted by an appellate authority if it 'requires' to enable it to pronounce judgment 'or for any other substantial cause'. The scope of the rule, in particular of clause (b) was examined way back in 1931 by the Privy Council in Parsotim Thakur & Ors. v. Lal Mohar Thakur & Ors., 1931 AIR (PC) 143 While observing that the provisions of Section 107 as elucidated by Order 41 Rule 27 are clearly not intended to allow litigant, who has been unsuccessful in the lower court, to patch up the weak parts of his case and fill up omissions in the court of appeal, it was observed as follows: "Under Cl. (1) (b) it is only where the appellate Court 'requires' it, (i.e., finds it needful) that additional evidence can be admitted. It may be required to enable the Court to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, but in either case it must be the Court that requires it. This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but 'when on examining the evidence as it stands some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent." 16. This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but 'when on examining the evidence as it stands some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent." 16. Now, by taking cue from the principle as laid down in the foregoing decisions it would be wise to proceed to scrutinise the conduct of the appellant and the quality of evidence adduced in the trial court by and between the parties to the suit. 17. In 1993 admittedly a co-owner of suit property Baidyanath Pan a bachelor and elderly person desiring to have a domestic help permitted Banamali Mondal a married couple to stay with him as licensee without licence fee. In June 30, 2006 the plaintiff/respondent, brother of said Baidyanath and a co-owner of ancestral property retired and decided to stay in the suit premises. On 23rd July, 2008 suit for recovery of possession of the suit premises being Title Suit No. 50 of 2008 was filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), 9th Court, Alipore which suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff/respondent herein by the judgment dated 7th August, 2010. The defendants as appellants preferred Title Appeal being No. 254 of 2010 before learned Additional District Judge, 15th court at Alipore against the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The said Title Appeal was dismissed by judgement and decree dated 12th May, 2011 by declining to interfere into the findings of the learned trial Court. Appellant filed an application under order 41, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for additional evidence by producing rent receipts allegedly issued by Baidyanath Pan, which were not produced inspite of the learned Court granting several opportunities to them. It would appear from the order-sheets of the lower court record that the learned trial Court fixed the suit for peremptory hearing on 10.6.2009. It was adjourned time to time on 24.6.2009, 07.7.2009, 19.8.2009 when the defendants/appellants herein did not take any steps. The defendant was directed to showcause by 3rd September, 2009 as to why the suit shall not be heard ex parte against the defendants. It was adjourned time to time on 24.6.2009, 07.7.2009, 19.8.2009 when the defendants/appellants herein did not take any steps. The defendant was directed to showcause by 3rd September, 2009 as to why the suit shall not be heard ex parte against the defendants. The show-cause was filed and accepted but again several times were granted as prayed for and the suit was fixed on 15.9.2009 and the plaintiff was cross-examined on 09.02.2010 but thereafter the defendants absented without taking any steps and also failed to produce any evidence on their behalf. So the suit was fixed on 13.4.2010 for argument. An application was filed by the defendant on 13.4. 2010 for recall of the order and the defendants were given opportunity to cross-examine the PW1 who was cross-examined in full on behalf of the defendants. Thereafter, the learned Judge fixed the suit on 25th of May, 2010 for defendants' evidence but again time was prayed for on the ground of medical certificate which was turned down as the ground for further adjournment was not substantiated bearing in mind the conduct of the defendant. Then on 29.8.2010 evidence of the defendant was closed. On 05.8.2010 defendant prayed for time to adduce evidence but the same was turned down as the defendants lawyer submitted that he had nothing to adduce in evidence and to make any argument except for taking time. Latter the prayer of the defendant for time to adduce evidence was rejected and the learned Judge was compelled to proceed to hear out the argument and finally delivered Judgment on 07.8.2010. Thus, conduct before the trial Court reveals a dismal conduct on the part of the defendants/appellants. PW 1 in clear crystal term deposed during cross-examination that the defendants were inducted as licensee at the suit premises by the brother of the plaintiff to take care of him and this is evident from the averments made in the written statement by the defendants themselves which clearly corroborates the evidence of PW1. If the defendants were inducted as a tenant by the elder brother of the plaintiff what prevented them in not producing even a photocopy of the same in the record at the earliest point of time. 18. If the defendants were inducted as a tenant by the elder brother of the plaintiff what prevented them in not producing even a photocopy of the same in the record at the earliest point of time. 18. In appeal before the Court below, an application under order 41, rule 27 of CP Code was taken out for permitting the appellants/defendants to adduce the tenancy agreement and rent receipts which they were possessed of right at the institution of the suit itself. 19. Bearing in mind the dismal conduct of the defendants whose object is to continue in possession and to remain in occupation of the suit premises without payment of any charge to the original owner, the defendants appeared to have gone up to the level to dispute even the title of the plaintiff respondent in respect of the suit property and for that they refused to tender any rent to the plaintiff/respondent. The application for additional evidence was refused and the Civil Revisional application was taken out by the appellants in C.O. No. 1904 of 2011 which was also dismissed as infructuous vide order dated 06.7.2011 in view of the fact that the first appeal was dismissed on contest by Judgement dated 12th May, 2011. 20. On behalf of the respondent the case of Yunus Ali v. Khursheed Akram reported in (2008) 7 Supreme Court cases 293 has been relied on wherein it has been held that the High Court cannot really appreciate evidence and set aside concurrent findings of courts below by taking a different view of the evidence. High Court is empowered only to interfere with the findings of the fact if they are perverse or there is none appreciation or none consideration of material evidence on record. Simply because another view of evidence is possible, is no ground for High Court to interfere. 21. In case of Lekh Raj Bansal v. state of Rajasthan and another reported in (2015) 1 W.B.LR (SC) 811 wherein at paragraph 7 it has been observed in the following lines- "the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence in the appellate court unless the conditions stipulated under order 41 rule 27 CPC are satisfied. It is not the case of the appellant that the trial court had refused to admit the said evidence which ought to have been admitted. It is not the case of the appellant that the trial court had refused to admit the said evidence which ought to have been admitted. It is also not the case of the appellant that the said evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him during pendency of the suit before the trial court. On the other hand it is vehemently contended that the said evidence namely the document was filed but was committed to be tendered in evidence and got exhibited in the suit. The lower appellate court laboratory considered the factual aspects and held that the appellant has not satisfied any of the conditions stipulated under order 41, rule 27 and hence is only entitled to produce additional evidence." 22. Learned counsel for the respondent has further relied in a decision of Sardar Estates v. Atmaram Properties Private Limited reported in (2009)6 Supreme Court Cases 609 wherein the conduct of the defendant/appellant was taken into serious consideration on the finding, that evidently frivolous objections have been filed in the execution case which is an abuse of the process of the court and a flagrant violation of the eviction decree against the appellant against which appeals had been rejected and even SLP before the Hon'ble Apex Court was dismissed. It was held thus- "it is evident that after the first round of litigation was over the tenant started a second round of litigation on frivolous grounds which was a fragment abuse of the process the Court. This is a practice which has become widespread, and which the court cannot approve of, otherwise no judgment will ever attained finality." 23. On the above findings of conduct by the appellant the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to dismiss the appeal with the imposition of cost of Rs. 10,000/- on the appellant payable to the respondent within two months from the date of order. 24. Having bestowed upon the conduct of the defendants/appellants this Court comes to the conclusion that such an application has been taken out by the appellant for production of additional evidence with a view to take a dilatory method to somehow occupy the suit premises without payment of any occupational charges. 24. Having bestowed upon the conduct of the defendants/appellants this Court comes to the conclusion that such an application has been taken out by the appellant for production of additional evidence with a view to take a dilatory method to somehow occupy the suit premises without payment of any occupational charges. In fact rent receipts allegedly were available with the defendants/appellants right at the time when they had filed written statement making averment that they were tenant at a rental of Rs. 150/- per month payable according to English calendar month, but at no stage of the suit they filed a single scrap of paper to show their tenancy right. On the contrary, they have cross-examined PW1 corroborating the plaint case of licence given to them for occupation of suit premises for taking care of the elder brother of the plaintiff. It would reflect from the conduct of the defendants/appellants herein that they want to use the suit premises as their own by disputing the title of the plaintiff as they even refused to tender any rent to the plaintiff/respondent. 25. Thus, this Court finds that the defendants/appellants have failed to substantiate their claim of tenancy right of the suit premises by production of any rent receipts or document before the trial Court. Since the plaintiff/respondent has proved his right title interest in the suit property the conclusion arrived at is that the defendants are in occupation as a licensee at the beginning of their induction at the premises by the brother of the plaintiff for taking care of him. Exercising the judicious discretion in the matter, I am not inclined to allow the appellants to adduce any further evidence as I find no ground to interfere into the concurrent findings of the trial Court and that of the appeal court below and I affirm the judgment impugned. 26. Therefore, the appellants/defendants are directed to deliver up peaceful vacant possession of the suit premises unto the decree holder the present respondent/plaintiff within two months from the date hereof in delicto the respondent/plaintiff shall be entitled to put the decree into execution before the learned trial Court below and shall be entitled to occupational charge of Rs. 10,000/- per month until delivery of possession of the suit premises. 27. Hence, SA No. 311 of 2011is hereby dismissed with costs. 28. 10,000/- per month until delivery of possession of the suit premises. 27. Hence, SA No. 311 of 2011is hereby dismissed with costs. 28. CAN 7917 of 2016 with CAN 8230 of 2011 arising out of SA 311 of 2011 are accordingly disposed of. 29. Certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be urgently made available to the parties, subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.