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Allahabad High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 2323 (ALL)

Beni Madho Inter College Beni Madho Nagar Pratapgarh v. State Of U. P. Throu. Its Secy. Secondary Education Lko.

2018-11-14

VIVEK CHAUDHARY

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsels for parties. 2. By the present writ petition, petitioner has challenge the order dated 11.06.2012 passed by the Additional Director of Education (Secondary) U.P. Lucknow. This is a long pending dispute which earlier also reached this court and was decided by order dated 30.01.2012 passed in Special Appeal No. 455 of 1999 and other connected 6 writ petitions. Relevant portion of the order dated 30.01.2012 reads:- "Learned counsel for the parties agree that membership dispute be referred to the Director of Secondary Education, who would decide the dispute of membership of the Society in question as well as that of the Committee of Management. We order accordingly. The Director of Secondary Education would be at liberty to nominate any other officer but not below the rank of Joint Director of Education for the purpose. All the orders passed by the educational authorities and the Prescribed Authority with regard to the membership dispute and the validity of the elections as well as the order passed by the learned Single Judge shall stand superseded by this order. The parties shall approach the Director of Secondary Education with certified copy of this order, who would act accordingly and shall determine the membership after giving opportunity of participation and hearing to all the parties concerned, who may be represented before this Court or may not be represented but seek their claim of being the member of the Society. The Director of Secondary Education or the officer nominated by him, as the case may be, shall decide the dispute expeditiously, say within a maximum period of four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The parties shall cooperate in the matter. On determination of membership, election shall be held and the control of the institution shall be handed over to the elected Committee of Management. If any person is aggrieved by the election so held, he shall be at liberty to challenge the same in the appropriate forum, after the elections are over. The Sub Divisional Magistrate/Authorised Controller shall immediately hand over the charge of the Committee of Management to the elected Committee of Management. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the special appeal is disposed of finally. Consequently, the writ petitions also stand disposed of. The Sub Divisional Magistrate/Authorised Controller shall immediately hand over the charge of the Committee of Management to the elected Committee of Management. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the special appeal is disposed of finally. Consequently, the writ petitions also stand disposed of. This order has been passed with the consent of counsel for all the parties, namely, Sri S.K. Kalia, learned Senior Advocate, Sri O.P. Srivastava, Sri G.C. Verma, Sri Santosh Kumar Tripathi and the State Counsel Sri Mukund Tiwari." (emphasis added) 2. In furtherance of the said order, petitioner as well as others persons approached the Director of Education (Secondary) who referred the matter to the Additional Director of Education (Secondary). The specific challenge made by the petitioner is that one Sri Amar Nath Verma, Upar Shiksha Nideshak Madhyamik was appointed by the Director of Education (Secondary) to hear the matter. Later, charge of the Upar Shiksha Nideshak Secondary Education Lucknow was given to Dr. Prem Lata Singh on 28.03.2012. The date already fixed was 30.03.2012 and parties appeared before Dr. Prem Lata Singh. A request was made and the matter was adjourned to 09.04.2012. On 09.04.2012 parties filed their documents before Dr. Prem Lata Singh. The matter was also heard on 09.04.2012 by Dr. Prem Lata Singh. However, Dr. Prem Lata Singh proceeded for leave on 07.05.2012. Thereafter on 9.05.2012 the additional charge of the post of Upar Shiksha Nideshak Secondary Education, Lucknow was given to Dr. I.P. Sharma (respondent no.4). Respondent no.4 neither ever heard the parties nor fixed any date for hearing of the matter. Dr. Prem Lata Singh also never joined back. Respondent No.4 without giving any opportunity of hearing to the parties passed the impugned order dated 11.06.2012. Therefore, the submission of counsel for petitioner is that though the Division Bench of this court specifically directed that the matter shall be decided "after giving opportunity of participation and hearing to all concerned", without giving such an opportunity of participation and hearing, Dr. I.P. Sharma passed the impugned order. The same violates principle of natural justice. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of Supreme Court in case of AIR 1959 SC 308 ; 'Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Others Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another. Paragraph 31 of the said judgment reads:- "31. I.P. Sharma passed the impugned order. The same violates principle of natural justice. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of Supreme Court in case of AIR 1959 SC 308 ; 'Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Others Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another. Paragraph 31 of the said judgment reads:- "31. The second objection is that while the Act and the' Rules framed thereunder impose a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure prescribed by the Rules impose a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Chief Minister to decide. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear-up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party-appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. We therefore hold that the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure." 3. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has strongly raised certain preliminary objections to the writ petition. His first submission is that petitioner no. 2 is no more a manager of the institution since the year 1999 and has wrongly filed the present writ petition on behalf of the Committee of Management. His second submission is that there is no resolution of Committee of Management authorizing the manager for filing the present petition. His third submission is that there is concealment of fact made by the petitioner no. 2, inasmuch as, he has wrongly described himself as manager of the institution. Number of decisions are also referred to by counsel for the respondents to support the said contention. 4. The order of the Division Bench dated 30.01.2012 specifically provides that the matter shall be decided "after giving opportunity of participation and hearing to all parties concerned who may be represented before this court or may not be represented but seek their claim of being member of the society". Petitioner no. 1 is Committee of Management, through its manager Sri Ram Prakash Shukla and petitioner no.2 is Sri Ram Prakash Shukla in his personal capacity. Petitioner no. 1 is Committee of Management, through its manager Sri Ram Prakash Shukla and petitioner no.2 is Sri Ram Prakash Shukla in his personal capacity. In view thereof, without going into the merits, even presuming that the preliminary objections raised by the respondents with regard to the petitioner no. 2 not being manager since 1999 or there being no resolution of the Committee of Management are accepted, the petition would remain maintainable on behalf of petitioner no. 2. There is no dispute that, earlier, before the dispute arose in the Committee of Management, petitioner no.2 was the manager of the institution. Even number of petitions were filed by the petitioner no.2, as manager, which were heard and decided by order dated 30.01.2012. Therefore, preliminary objections raised by the respondents have no force. 5. So far as the submission of denial of opportunity of hearing, in compliance of order dated 30.01.2012, raised by the petitioner is concerned, the sole submission of counsel for the respondent is that written statements were made and, therefore, it was sufficient compliance of the order for giving opportunity of hearing. 6. A perusal of the order dated 30.01.2012 and the language used therein indicates that the said order dated 30.01.2012 which is a consent order, provides opportunity of participation and hearing to all concerned. It cannot be said that merely because, before another officer written statements were given, an order could have been passed by a new person without giving any opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. The intent of the order of this court was for giving opportunity of "hearing" and not just an opportunity to make a written representation. 7. Thus, the impugned order is directly in teeth of order dated 30.01.2012. Persons who were members for long, more so, a person who has earlier been a manager of the institution cannot be held not to be a member in such an ex-parte manner when there is a specific direction of the Court. 8. In view thereof, the order dated 11.06.2012 cannot stand and is set aside. 9. The matter is remanded back to the Director of Secondary Education for deciding the same again as per directions contained in order dated 30.01.2012 passed in Special Appeal No.455 of 1999. 10. 8. In view thereof, the order dated 11.06.2012 cannot stand and is set aside. 9. The matter is remanded back to the Director of Secondary Education for deciding the same again as per directions contained in order dated 30.01.2012 passed in Special Appeal No.455 of 1999. 10. Since the matter is very old, the Director of Education Basic, U.P., Lucknow-respondent no.2 shall ensure that the exercise in compliance of order dated 30.01.2012 is completed, as expeditiously as possible and within not more than two months from the date a certified copy of this order is placed before him. 11. With the aforesaid observations and directions, present writ petition is allowed.