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2018 DIGILAW 2336 (ALL)

TEJ SINGH v. STATE OF U. P.

2018-11-16

ANIL KUMAR

body2018
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—By means of present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. applicant/petitioner has prayed for quashing of Charge-sheet No. 2 of 2006 dated 9.2.2006 filed in Case Crime No. 333 of 2003 under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, police station Kaiserganj District Bahraich as contained in Annexure 3 to the petition and the entire proceedings arising out of the chargsheet. 2. Facts, in brief as submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that an FIR was lodged against the applicant and one Abdul Wahab on 16.5.2003 at case crime No. 333 of 2003 under Sections 406,409, 420 and 471 IPC, Police Station Kaisarganj District Bahraich. From the perusal of the FIR (Annexure 1) lodged against the petitioner and one Sri Abdul Wahab, it reveals that the petitioner alongwith Abdul Wahab played fraud cheated some of the members of the society which act is against the interest of the society and the members. 3. Thereafter the petitioner filed a writ petition No. 73 (MB) of 2006 challenging the FIR, after exchange of pleadings this Court by order dated 31.1.2006 stayed the arrest of the petitioner until further order or till submission of the police report whichever is earlier. In the meantime case was transferred to Special Investigation Branch, Co-operative District Faizabad who submitted the charge-sheet under Section 409, 420, 467,468, 471 and 120-B IPC against the applicant and one Abdul Wahab. 4. On 25.9.2007, learned counsel for the State made a statement that since the charge-sheet has been filed as such the writ petition has become infractuous. Accordingly, the same was dismissed on 25.9.2007. 5. Moreover petitioner was working as Secretary Sadhan Sahkari Samiti Limited, Kasehari Bujurg, District Bahraich and one Sri Abdul Wahab was also working as Accountant. 6. As the FIR has been lodged, so the then Assistant Registrar Co-operative Society constituted three members committee to look into the allegation regarding fraud played by petitioner and one Sri Abdul Wahab. 7. On the basis of report submitted by the Committee, the competent authority, as per rules known as U.P. Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies Centralized Services Rules, 1976 (herein after referred as ‘’ Rules,1976') has placed the petitioner under suspension vide order dated 28.12.2002 and a charge-sheet alongwith suspension order containing two charges were also served on him. In the meantime, petitioner has been retired from service after attaining the age of superannuation. In the meantime, petitioner has been retired from service after attaining the age of superannuation. 8. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that two charges which were levelled against the petitioner are identical in nature to the fact on which F.I.R. dated 16.5.2003 has been lodged against the petitioner. 9. After placing petitioner under suspension as per Rules,1976 one Sri Munijar Prasad Shukla, Additional District Co-operative Officer, Bahraich was appointed as inquiry officer in the matter to conduct the disciplinary proceedings. Taking into consideration the reply submitted by the petitioner to the charges which were levelled against him by the charge-sheet dated 31.7.2004 which was served on the petitioner and other evidence on record, inquiry officer has submitted a report dated 26.8.2004 inter alia stating therein that two charges which were levelled against the petioner were not proved. Thereafter by order dated 23.6.2005 the competent authority of the Society has passed an order thereby reinstating the petitioner in service on the ground that in the domestic inquiry petitioner was not found guilty in respect to the charges which were levelled against him by the charge-sheet served on 31.7.2004 in the domestic inquiry and on the same facts of FIR was lodged as a result of which Charge-sheet No. 2 of 2006 dated 9.2.2006 filed in Case Crime No. 333 of 2003 under Section 409,420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, police station Kaiserganj District Bahraich and the entire proceedings arising out of the chargsheet may be quashed. 10. Learned A.G.A. while rebutting the contention as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is settled proposition of law that criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously and if the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal proceedings, disciplinary proceedings can go on. 11. Learned A.G.A. further submits that from the perusal of the FIR as well as the charge-sheet the position which emerge out is that prima facie offense has been made out against the petitioner, so the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner liable to be dismissed. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 13. Inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 13. Inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 14. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. Hon’ble Apex Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under Section 482: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the 9 evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.” 15. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and others, (1976) 3 SCC 736 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside : “(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like”. 16. Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, (1977) 2 SCC 699 , observed that the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of 10 the Court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the Court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this Court and other Courts. 17. In Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, (1992) 4 SCC 305 , Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under: “131. Section 482 which corresponds to Section 561-A of the old Code and to Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code proceeds on the same principle and deals with the inherent power of the High Court. 17. In Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, (1992) 4 SCC 305 , Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under: “131. Section 482 which corresponds to Section 561-A of the old Code and to Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code proceeds on the same principle and deals with the inherent power of the High Court. The rule of inherent powers has its source in the maxim “Quadolex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa, ess uon potest” which means that when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist. 132. The criminal Courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the 11 administration of which alone the Courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles.” 18. In Dr. Raghubir Sharan v. State of Bihar, (1964) 2 SCR 336 , Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under “... Every High Court as the highest Court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of justice .... Being an extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate Court of its powers ....” 19. In the said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court also observed that the inherent powers can be exercised under this section by the High Court (1) to give effect to any order passed under the Code; (2) to prevent abuse of the process of the Court; (3) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 20. In the said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court also observed that the inherent powers can be exercised under this section by the High Court (1) to give effect to any order passed under the Code; (2) to prevent abuse of the process of the Court; (3) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 20. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1964 AC 1254, Lord Ried at page 1296 expressed his view “there must always be a residual discretion to prevent anything which savours of abuse of process” with which view all the members 12 of the House of Lords agreed but differed as to whether this entitled a Court to stay a lawful prosecution. 21. In State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, (1992) Suppl.1 SCC 335, Hon’ble the Apex Court had an occasion to examine the scope of the inherent power of the High Court in interfering with the investigation of an offence by the police and laid down the following rule: [SCC pp. 364-65, para 60: SCC (Cri) p. 456, para 60]. “The sum and substance of the above deliberation results in a conclusion that the investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code and the Courts are not justified in obliterating the track of investigation when the investigating agencies are well within their legal bounds as aforementioned. Indeed, a noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. Indeed, a noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. But if a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the Court on being approached by the person aggrieved for the redress of any grievance, has to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as 13 may be called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of our Constitution.” 22. In Bhajan Lal (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 23. Hon’ble Apex Court held that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: “(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, 14 justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, 14 justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, on investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceedings is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 24. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Rajiv Thappar and others v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , has held as under : “29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the Court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.: 30.1. Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the Court, and would not serve the ends of justice? (Emphasised by us) 30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious Court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 25. Hon’ble the Apex Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and others v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and another, (2005) 1 SCC 122 , observed as under : “It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 26. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 26. The three-Judge Bench of this Court in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 , has examined scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court in the said case observed that inherent powers under Section 482 should be exercised for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court would be fully justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers of the Court. 27. In Devendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2009) 7 SCC 495 , Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under : “There is no dispute with regard to the aforementioned propositions of law. However, it is now well-settled that the High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the allegations made in the First Information Report, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any offence. When the allegations made in the First Information Report or the evidence collected during investigation do not satisfy the ingredients of an offence, the superior Courts would not encourage harassment of a person in a criminal Court for nothing.” 28. In State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh and others, (2010) 11 SCC 226 , Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide but has to be exercised with great care and caution. The interference must be on sound principle and the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution. The Court further observed that if the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is up to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code 29. The Court further observed that if the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is up to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code 29. In M. Mohan v. The State, 2011 (3) SCALE 78 , Hon’ble Apex Court again had an occasion to consider the case of similar nature and this Court held that if all the facts mentioned in the complaint are accepted as correct in its entirety and even then the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence, in such a case the High Court should ensure that such frivolous prosecutions are quashed under its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 30. Now reverting to the facts of the present case the position which emerge out is to the effect that agaisnt the petitioenr an FIR was lodged on 16.5.2003 and thereafter on the basis of the same Charge-sheet No. 2 of 2006 dated 9.2.2006 filed in Case Crime No. 333 of 2003 under Section 409,420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, police station Kaiserganj District Bahraich 31. In the same instance rather on the basis of charges on which FIR was lodged against the petitioner he was placed under suspension by the competent authority as per Rules 1976 which governs the field and a charge-sheet was also served on him on 31.7.2004. Thereafter domestic inquiry was conducted, the inquiry officer after conducing the disciplinary proceedings on the basis of record, it came to the conclusion that charges were levelled against the petitioner by the charge-sheet served on him on 31.7.2004 were not established and proved and submitted his report dated 26.8.2004. Taking into consideration the said fact, the punishing authority has passed final order on 23.6.2005 exonerating the petitioner from the charges which were levelled against him by the charge-sheet served on 31.7.2005. 32. Taking into consideration the said fact, the punishing authority has passed final order on 23.6.2005 exonerating the petitioner from the charges which were levelled against him by the charge-sheet served on 31.7.2005. 32. The core question which to be considered that if on same and identical charges petitioner has been exonerated in the departmental proceedings then in that circumstances in Charge-sheet No. 2 of 2006 dated 9.2.2006 filed in Case Crime No. 333 of 2003 under Section 409,420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, police station Kaiserganj District Bahraich which is instituted agaisnt the petitoner on the same charges can alllow to continue or not? 33. Answer to the said question find place in the judgment given by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, 1996 SCC (Cri) 897, although the Hon’ble the Apex Court in para 17 has held as under : “At the outset we may point out that the learned counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the present case, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute the findings rendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it. On these premises, if we proceed further then there is no difficulty in accepting the case of the appellant. For if the charge which is identical could not be established in a departmental proceedings and in view of the admitted discrepancies in the reports submitted by the valuers one wonders what is there further to proceed against the appellant in criminal proceedings.” 34. Further in the case of P.S. Rajya (supra) Hon’ble the Apex Court in paras 20 and 21 has as under : “20. At the risk of repetition, we may state that the charge had not been proved and on that basis the appellant was cleared of departmental enquiry. In this connection, we may also usefully cite a decision of this Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others (1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335). At the risk of repetition, we may state that the charge had not been proved and on that basis the appellant was cleared of departmental enquiry. In this connection, we may also usefully cite a decision of this Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others (1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335). This Court after considering almost all earlier decisions has given guidelines relating to the exercise of the extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure for quashing an F.I.R. or a complaint. This Court observed as follows ; “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prime facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegation in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR donot disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the ode except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-ongnzable offence, no investigation is permitted by a magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private an personal grudge. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an-arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 21.The present case can be brought under more than one head given above without any difficulty. 35. In the instant matter, from the perusal of the record the position which emerge out is that so far as the matter in regard to shortage of fertilizers is concerned, the said charges has not been established and proved against the petitioner. 36. Further, from the Distribution Register (Vitran Register), none of the members of the Simiti has stated that signature of the petitioner was forged and there is neither any cutting nor overwriting in the said register. 36. Further, from the Distribution Register (Vitran Register), none of the members of the Simiti has stated that signature of the petitioner was forged and there is neither any cutting nor overwriting in the said register. Moreover, it is also evident from the material on record that no fraud or any act has been done by the petitioner while while holding post of Secretary of the Simiti in regard to which FIR was lodged. 37. From the perusal of the documents of the Simiti as well as bank, it is clearly established that no financial irregularities have been committed by the petitioner while discharging his duties on the post of Secretary of the Simiti. 38. Thus keeping in view of the above facts as well as position of law as stated herein above, the charge-sheet No. 2 of 2006 dated 9.2.2006 filed in Case Crime No. 333 of 2003 under Section 409,420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, police station Kaiserganj District Bahraich as contained in Annexure 3 to the petition and the entire proceedings arising out of the charge-sheet are hereby quashed. 39. Accordingly, the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. No order as to costs.