ORDER : The civil revision petitioner, the defendant in the suit, is a tenant of the Waqf, the plaintiff/respondent in CRP. 2. A suit was filed by the Waqf in W.O.P.No.4 of 2001 on the file of the Waqf Tribunal-cum-Principal Sub-Court, Thanjavur. The prayer in the suit was for a decree in favour of the plaintiff / respondent waqf directing the defendant / revision petitioner to vacate and handover possession of the suit premises within a time frame or directing delivery through process of Court. The suit was contested by the petitioner herein and a judgment and decree dated 20.07.2006 passed by the Waqf Tribunal in favour of the Waqf, as against which the present CRP has been filed. 3. Though various grounds have been raised by the petitioner challenging the order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 20.07.2006, the sole ground canvassed before me is that the Tribunal did not have requisite jurisdiction to have entertained the matter as it was not maintainable before it. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Gobindram (Dead), through Lrs. v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Waqf [ 2010 (8) SCC 726 ]. 4. Heard Mr. P. Thiagarajan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Anand Chandrasekar, for M/s. Sarvabhuman Associates, for the respondent. 5. At the outset, Mr. Anand Chandrasekar objects to the argument of maintainability arguing that such ground was never raised at the first instance and hence should not be permitted to be raised now. Mr. Thiagarajan for his part, submits that the question of maintainability or otherwise of a matter before an authority and the vesting of jurisdiction in that authority to entertain the case is one that goes to the root of the matter. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner cites the judgment of the Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain (dead) by Lrs., and another [ 1996 (4) SCC 178 ] and a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Jayalakshmi Ammal v. Kaliaperumal [2014 (3) CTC 473] in support of his submission. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner cites the judgment of the Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain (dead) by Lrs., and another [ 1996 (4) SCC 178 ] and a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Jayalakshmi Ammal v. Kaliaperumal [2014 (3) CTC 473] in support of his submission. 7. In the case of Urban Improvement Trust (supra), a Division Bench of the Supreme Court was concerned with the question of whether an objection on the maintainability of a matter could be raised at the stage of execution and in paragraph 15 and 16 the Bench holds thus : '...15. The question then is : whether the objections can be raised in execution ? This controversy is no longer res integra. In Sushil Kumar Mehta V. Gobind Ram Bohra a three - Judge Bench of this Court was to consider whether the nullity of a decree can be raised in execution. Under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 o f 1973) the building was governed by the provisions of the said Act. The civil court granted decree of eviction. When objection was raised in execution the executing court rejected the same. On appeal, this court had held that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or on any other ground which goes to the root of its exercise of jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction, is a nullity. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. it s invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. If the court has jurisdiction but there is any defect in its exercise of jurisdiction it does not go to the root of its authority. Such a defect like territorial jurisdiction could be waived by the party. If the court has jurisdiction but there is any defect in its exercise of jurisdiction it does not go to the root of its authority. Such a defect like territorial jurisdiction could be waived by the party. If the court has jurisdiction but there is any defect in its exercise of jurisdiction it does not go to the root of its authority. Such a defect like territorial jurisdiction could be waived by the party which could be corrected only by way of an appeal or revision. In that case it was held that since the decree was a nullity the validity was upheld in execution. 16. In Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shaym this Court had upheld the same objection raised under Section 47 CPC when the decree awarding allotment of land in addition to compensation was held to be a nullity. That objection was allowed to be raised in execution and was upheld. Hiralal Moolchand Doshi V. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas relied on by the respondents is of no avail. In that case though nullity of a decree on the basis of a compromise for eviction of a tenant governed by the provisions of the Rent Act was pressed for acceptance, this Court had held that the party cannot be permitted to lead fresh evidence as to the existence of that ground for eviction. On the facts in that case, it was held that the tenant impliedly admitted existence of statutory ground for eviction. Therefore, the decree was held to be not a nullity. As regards the nullity or lack of inherent jurisdiction, this Court observed that the decree can be said to be a nullity if it is passed by a court having no inherent jurisdiction. Erroneous decree can not be said to be a nullity; nor can a decree based on an error be a nullity. Nullity has to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the power of the court passing the decree and not merely avaidable decree. As stated earlier, if the decree strikes at the jurisdiction of the court or the court lacks jurisdiction it strikes at the very root of the authority to pass the order or the decree. As seen, the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 has not application to the lands acquired under the Act. It was amended only w.e.f., 01.08.1987 and it was made applicable only to the pending proceedings. It would, therefore, be clear that the order awarding additional benefits is clearly without jurisdiction and thereby it is a nullity. As seen, the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 has not application to the lands acquired under the Act. It was amended only w.e.f., 01.08.1987 and it was made applicable only to the pending proceedings. It would, therefore, be clear that the order awarding additional benefits is clearly without jurisdiction and thereby it is a nullity. Its nullity can be assailed at any stage including at the execution or in a collateral proceedings since it strikes at the very jurisdiction and authority of the Court....” 8. In Jayalakshmi Ammal's case (supra), this Court reiterated the proposition that there need be no pleading for a pure question of law. Reliance was placed at paragraph 9.4 therein, upon decisions of this Court in the case of V. Bapu Kalingarayar v. Rajan [ AIR 1978 Mad. 192 ] and Chellammal and another v. Valliammal [AIR 1978 Mad, 21]. 9. Since this matter calls for an interpretation of the provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995 (in short 'Act'), I set out below the provisions as are relevant to this case. Section 6 relates to disputes regarding a Waqf and reads thus : 6. Disputes regarding Waqfs.—(1) If any question arises whether a particular property specified as Waqf property in the list of Waqf is Waqf property or not or whether a Waqf specified in such list is a Shia Waqf or Sunni wak,, the Board or the mutawalli of the Waqf or any person aggrieved may institute a suit in a Tribunal for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal in respect of such matter shall be final : Provided that no such suit shall be entertained by the Tribunal after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the list of Waqfs. : Explanation – For the purposes of this section and section 7, the expression 'any person interested therein' shall, in relation to any property specified as Waqf property in the list of Waqfs published after the commencement of this Act, shall include also every person who, thought not interests in the Waqf concerned, is interested in such property and to whom a reasonable opportunity had been afforded to represent his case by notice served on him in that behalf during the course of the relevant inquiry under Section 4. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no proceeding under this Act in respect of any Waqf shall be stayed by reason only of the pendency of any such suit or of any appeal or other proceeding arising out of such suit. (3) The Survey Commissioner shall not be made a party to any suit under sub-section (1) and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against him in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rules made thereunder. (4) The list of Waqf shall, unless it is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), be final and conclusive. (5) On and from the commencement of this Act in a State, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted or commenced in a court in that State in relation to any question referred to in sub-section (1). 10. Section 7 of the Act deals with the power of the Tribunal to determine disputes regarding Waqfs and is couched as follows : '....7. 10. Section 7 of the Act deals with the power of the Tribunal to determine disputes regarding Waqfs and is couched as follows : '....7. Power of Tribunal to determine disputes regarding Waqf.—(1) If, after the commencement of this Act, any question arises, whether a particular property specified as Waqf property in a list of Waqf is Waqf property or not, or whether a Waqf specified in such list is a Shia Waqf or a Sunni Waqf, the Board or the mutawalli of the Waqf, or any person interested therein, may apply to the Tribunal having jurisdiction in relation to such property, for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal thereon shall be final : Provided that— (a) in the case of the list of Waqf relating to any part of the State and published after the commencement of this Act no such application shall be entertained after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the list of Waqf; and (b) in the case of the list of Waqf relating to any part of the State and published at any time within a period of one year immediately preceding the commencement of this Act, such an application may be entertained by Tribunal within the period of one year from such commencement : Provided further that where any such question has been heard and finally decided by a civil court in a suit instituted before such commencement, the Tribunal shall not re-open such question. (2) Except where the Tribunal has no jurisdiction by reason of the provisions of sub-section (5), no proceeding under this section in respect of any Waqf shall be stayed by any court, tribunal or other authority by reason only of the pendency of any suit, application or appeal or other proceeding arising out of any such suit, application, appeal or other proceeding. (3) The Chief Executive Officer shall not be made a party to any application under sub-section (1). (4) The list of Waqf and where any such list is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), the list as so modified, shall be final. (3) The Chief Executive Officer shall not be made a party to any application under sub-section (1). (4) The list of Waqf and where any such list is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), the list as so modified, shall be final. The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter which is the subject-matter of any suit or proceeding instituted or commenced in a civil court under sub-section (1) of section 6, before the commencement of the Act or which is the subject-matter of any appeal from the decree passed before such commencement in any such suit or proceeding or of any application for revision or review arising out of such suit, proceeding or appeal, as the case maybe..” 11. Section 83 provides for the constitution of the Waqf Tribunal and, as it stood at the relevant point in time, reads thus : “....The state Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute as many Tribunals as it may think fit, for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a wakf or wakf property under this Act and define the local limits and jurisdiction under this Act of each of such Tribunals...” 12. Section 85 deals with the bar of the civil courts and reads as follows : '85. Bar of jurisdiction of [Civil Court, revenue Court and any other authority].-No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie in any [Civil Court, revenue Court and any other authority] in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any wakf property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal.' 13. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions make it apparent that there only two issues in respect of which jurisdiction vestes in the Waqf Tribunal. They are, determination of whether a property is Waqf property and whether the Waqf is a Shia or Sunni Waqf. In respect of the aforesaid two issues the Institution of a suit before the civil Court is barred. 14. They are, determination of whether a property is Waqf property and whether the Waqf is a Shia or Sunni Waqf. In respect of the aforesaid two issues the Institution of a suit before the civil Court is barred. 14. It is an admitted position that the dispute in question does not relate to either one of the two issues coming within the ambit of Section 6 of the Act and as I can see from the prayer in the plaint, what the Waqf Board sought successfully in the suit was a decree directing the petitioner/defendant to vacate and handover possession of the suit premises. 15. Though Section 83 is couched in wide terms and states that a Tribunal constituted thereunder can determine 'any kind of dispute, a question of other matter relating to a Waqf or Waqf property under this Act', the Supreme Court has, in the case of Ramesh Gobindram (supra) as well as Bhanwar Lal and another v. Rajasthan Board of Muslim Waqf and others [ (2014) 16 SCC 51 ], upon a conjoint reading of Sections 6, 7 and 83 of the Act, held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court shall extend to all matters except the two specific issues enumerated under Section 6 of the Act. 16. At paragraph 29, the Bench in the case of Ramesh Gobinddram states thus : 29....The language employed in Section 83 of the Act has been understood to be so wide as to include any dispute, question or other matter relating to a wakf or wakf property. Section 83 of the Act, however, does not deal with the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to entertain civil suits generally or suit of any particular class or category. The exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction is dealt with by Section 6(5) and Section 85 of the Act. To interpret Section 83 as a provision that excludes the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not therefore, legally correct, for that provision deals with constitution of Tribunals, the procedure which the Tribunals would follow and matters relating thereto.” 17. At paragraph 26 of the latter case, the Supreme Court extracts the conclusion of the Bench in the case of Ramesh Gobindram (supra) as follows : 26. At paragraph 26 of the latter case, the Supreme Court extracts the conclusion of the Bench in the case of Ramesh Gobindram (supra) as follows : 26. It would also be profitable to refer to that part of the judgment where the Court gave guidance and the need for a particular approach which is required to deal with such cases. In this behalf the Court specified the modalities as under : (Ramesh Gobindram case, SCC PP.730-31, paras 11-13). “11. Before we take up the core issue whether the jurisdiction of a civil Court to entertain and adjudicate upon disputes regarding eviction of (sic from) wakf property stands excluded under the Wakf Act, we may briefly outline the approach that the courts have to adopt while dealing with such questions. 12. The well-settled rule in this regard is that the civil courts have the jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those entertainment whereof is expressly or impliedly barred. The jurisdiction of the civil courts to try suits of civil nature is very expansive. Any statue which excluded such jurisdiction is, therefore, an exception to the general rule that all disputes shall be triable by a civil court. Any such exception cannot be readily inferred by the courts. The court would learn in favour of a construction that would uphold the retention of jurisdiction of the civil courts and shift the onus of proof to the party that asserts that the civil court's jurisdiction is ousted. 13. Even in cases where the statute accords finality to the orders passed by the Tribunals, the Court will have to see whether the Tribunal has the power to grant the reliefs which the civil courts would normally grant in suits filed before them. If the answer is in the negative, exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction would not be ordinarily inferred. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2), a three–Judge Bench of this Court observed : (SCC pp.302 h-303 a) 'There is a presumption that a civil court has jurisdiction. Ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. A person taking a plea contra must establish the same. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2), a three–Judge Bench of this Court observed : (SCC pp.302 h-303 a) 'There is a presumption that a civil court has jurisdiction. Ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. A person taking a plea contra must establish the same. Even in a case where the jurisdiction of a civil court is sought to be barred under a statute, the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction in respect of some matters particularly when the statutory authority or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction.” 18. The question of maintainability has thus been decided by the Supreme Court and the rationale of the aforesaid judgements are fully applicable to the present case. 19. Section 83 was substituted by Act 27 of 2013, with effect from 01.11.2013, in the following terms : '83. Constitution of Tribunal, etc.-(1) The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute as many Tribunals as it may think fit, for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a Waqf or Waqf property under this Act and define the local limits and jurisdiction under this Act of each of such Tribunals....' The substituted provision is applicable only with effect from 01.11.2013 and would have no application to the present case. 20. In the light of the above discussion, there remains no doubt in my mind that it is the Civil Court that would have the requisite jurisdiction to try the issue arising in the present matter and the impugned order of the Tribunal is vitiated in law, being bereft of jurisdiction. 21. As to the objection regarding non-raising of a specific ground in this regard, I reject the same as the question of jurisdiction is, as been reiterated consistently by the Courts, one that goes to the root of the matter. 22. In fact, the language of Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, make it clear that the question of jurisdiction / maintainability of the matter is one that could be raised and decided by the Tribunal itself that does not require the same to be raised at the instance of a party. 23. 22. In fact, the language of Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, make it clear that the question of jurisdiction / maintainability of the matter is one that could be raised and decided by the Tribunal itself that does not require the same to be raised at the instance of a party. 23. Incidentally, I may mention here that the petitioner, for whatever it may be worth, has raised a omnibus ground reading 'the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is erroneous, immaterial, irregular and contrary to law and has to be set aside'. 24. In fine, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. I hasten to clarify that this will not stand in the way of the Waqf Board from instituting, if is so advised, appropriate action before the competent civil Courts for redressal, in accordance with law. No Costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.