JUDGMENT : D.N. PATEL, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner, whose W.P. (S) No. 453 of 2006 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 30th September, 2016 whereby, the prayer of this appellant for quashing and setting aside the order of punishment inflicted upon him by the disciplinary authority dated 30th October, 2001 was not granted by the learned Single Judge and hence, the original petitioner has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that this appellant is an original petitioner, who was working as a Constable in Jharkhand Police Force. The date of misconduct is dated 06.10.1998. There is gross misbehaviour on the part of this appellant for his superior officers and that too in presence of others. Because of the misconduct committed on 06.10.1998 he was suspended during pendency of the enquiry. 3. Chargesheet was issued on 13.11.2018 (Annexure-1 to the memo of the writ petition). Several witnesses were examined during the departmental proceedings. Few of them have already been cross-examined by this appellant. 4. Enquiry Officer has given his report on 14th September, 2000 (Annexure-7 to the memo of the writ petition). As per the report given by the Enquiry Officer, the charges levelled against this appellant have been held as proved. The charges levelled against this appellant are as under: “(i) While on deputation at Patna Police Picket under Gawan Police Station, on 06.10.1998 at 17.15 in the evening, the delinquent came to Gawan Police Station for taking leave Parwana and in that course, in presence of other police officer, literate police personnels, Digwar and Chowkidar, abused the Office-in- Charge in an in-disciplined manner and behaving in an uncivilised manner. (ii) Further, repeating the inelegant words, he threatened the Officer-in-Charge to assault him after putting off the sleeper. (iii) Further, he picked up a brick in order to assault the Officer-in-Charge.” 5. Looking to the procedure followed by the respondents in holding enquiry, it cannot be said that there is violation of principles of natural justice. Adequate opportunity of being heard was given to this appellant. Even departmental appeal was also preferred by this appellant before the departmental appellate authority. Looking to the procedure followed by the respondents in holding enquiry, it cannot be said that there is violation of principles of natural justice. Adequate opportunity of being heard was given to this appellant. Even departmental appeal was also preferred by this appellant before the departmental appellate authority. The departmental appeal was also dismissed vide order dated 04.08.2004 (Annexure-15 to the memo of the writ petition) against the order of disciplinary authority dated 30th October, 2001 whereby he was put at the initial pay scale. Thus, there is no procedural lacuna in holding the enquiry. 6. Once the procedure is followed in holding the departmental proceeding then there is no illegality committed in holding the departmental proceedings. 7. Now the only question is left out to be decided by this Court is the quantum of punishment. Looking to the fact that this appellant was working as a Constable in a Police Force and looking to the nature of misconducts which are narrated in the chargesheet and which are held as proved on the basis of the evidences on record, the quantum of punishment inflicted upon this delinquent appellant cannot be labelled as shockingly disproportionate punishment nor can it be labelled as unreasonably excessive punishment. This appellant is working with the disciplinary force. The behaviour of this appellant as on date of misconduct for his superior was, infact not befitting for holding the post. Nonetheless much lenient view has been taken by the respondents and he has been awarded punishment of putting this appellant at an initial pay scale. 8. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Police and Others vs. Syed Hussain, (2006) 3 SCC 173 especially in paragraph nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15 as under: “12. Thus, even assuming that a time has come where this Court can develop “administrative law” by following the recent decisions of the House of Lords, we are of the opinion that it is not one of such cases where the doctrine of proportionality should be invoked. In ex p Daly it was held that the depth of judicial review and the deference due to the administrative discretion vary with the subject-matter. In ex p Daly it was held that the depth of judicial review and the deference due to the administrative discretion vary with the subject-matter. It was further stated: “It may well be, however, that the law can never be satisfied in any administrative field merely by a finding that the decision under review is not capricious or absurd.” As for example in Huang vs. Secy. of State for the Home Department referring to R. vs. Secy. of State of the Home Department, ex p Daly, it was held that in certain cases, the adjudicator may require to conduct a judicial exercise which is not merely more intrusive than Wednesbury, but involves a full-blown merits judgment, which is yet more than [what] ex p Daly requires on a judicial review where the court has to decide a proportionality issue. 13. It is, therefore, beyond any doubt or dispute that the doctrine of proportionality has to be applied in appropriate case as the depth of judicial review will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 14. The respondent herein was a Constable. He was to uphold the rule of law. It was his duty to aid the prosecution in getting the guilty punished. It was not his duty to aid or abet the accused in fleeing from justice. The accused in question Ahmed Qureshi, in view of the finding of fact arrived at by the disciplinary authority, was a hardened criminal. He had been involved in a series of snatching cases. Not only that, the respondent was also helping other accused persons in obtaining bail from the courts. It has been pointed out that in the case in which the respondent stood surety for the said Ahmed Qureshi, he had jumped bail. Presumably because the respondent a Constable had stood as his surety, he was enlarged on bail by the court. 15. In a situation of this nature, keeping in view the nature of duties that a protector of law is required to perform, we are firmly of the opinion that the disciplinary authority cannot be said to have committed an error in imposing the punishment of removal from service upon the respondent, particularly when on earlier two occasions also he had been found guilty of commission of misconduct and punished therefor. The High Court thus committed a manifest error in arriving at a finding that the respondent had unblemished record for 28 years. We are not sure whether the High Court’s attention was drawn to the statements made in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants herein before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal which showed the contra but on the basis of the materials on record which was before the High Court such finding could not have been arrived at. 16. Furthermore, the punishment of removal from service is not imposed only in the case of fraud or defalcation of government funds but even where a misconduct is committed by a person who holds a position of trust and on whom society looks forward as a protector of law and in such cases punishment of removal from service cannot be said to be wholly disproportionate, and thus the same was not even violative of the doctrine of proportionality.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Samar Bahadur Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2011) 9 SCC 94 especially in paragraph no. 8 as under: “8. Now, the issue is whether punishment awarded to the appellant is disproportionate to the offence alleged. The appellant belongs to a disciplinary force and the members of such a force are required to maintain discipline and to act in a befitting manner in public. Instead of that, he was found under the influence of liquor and then indulged himself in an offence. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to interfere with the satisfaction arrived at by the disciplinary authority that in the present case punishment of dismissal from service is called for. The punishment awarded, in our considered opinion, cannot be said to be shocking to our conscience and, therefore, the aforesaid punishment awarded does not call for any interference.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 especially in paragraph no. 19 as under: “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: “19.1. When charges of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. 19 as under: “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: “19.1. When charges of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition preferred by this appellant being W.P. (S) No. 453 of 2006 vide judgment and order dated 30th September, 2016 and we see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge. There is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and hence, the same is hereby, dismissed.