R. Muthukumar v. Chairman And Managing Director Tangedco
2018-08-02
HULUVADI G.RAMESH, M.DHANDAPANI
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : M. Dhandapani, J. This writ appeals and the writ petitions are directed against the common issue and therefore, all the matters were clubbed together and disposed by way of common order. 2. The appellants in W.A.Nos.574 of 2017, 990 of 2016 and 1696 to 1702 of 2018 are the writ petitioners whose prayer for a mandamus directing the Chief Engineer (Personnel) of the Corporation and the Commissioner of Employment and Training, Guindy, Chennai, to consider their claim for appointment as Helper (Trainee) in the Corporation, was rejected by the learned single Judge. The appellants in W.A.Nos.1450 to 1462 of 2017 is the Corporation which has been directed to appoint the first respondent as ITI Helper (Trainee) by another learned single Judge. 3. The facts which led to the filing of the present writ appeals are as under: The appellants in W.A.Nos.574 of 2017, 990 of 2016 and 1696 to 1702 of 2018 and the first respondent in W.A.Nos.1450 to 1462 of 2017 are ITI holders in the Trade of Wireman and Electrician. They have got themselves registered in the Employment Exchange. The Corporation issued proceedings in B.P.No.14 dated 12.7.2012 calling for applications to fill up 4000 vacancies of Helper/Trainee through direct recruitment from the Employment Exchange. Consequent to the order passed by the High Court in a batch of writ petitions, relaxing the upper age limit in respect of ITI Trade Certificate Holders, the impediment for the appellants and the contesting respondents for considering them for direct recruitment got cleared. Thus, they applied to the post of ITI Helper/Trainee, as they undergone Apprenticeship Training under the Apprentices Act, 1961 and secured industrial training. Subsequently, interview was conducted and marks were given in favour of candidates and thus, according to them, interview was not conducted in a proper manner. Though on an earlier occasion, they were called for an interview in the year 2008-09 and also in 2013, they were not selected on the ground that they were over aged. 4. It appears that 84 similarly placed persons who were not selected on earlier occasion, challenged the selection process in writ petitions. Though the said writ petitions were dismissed, on appeal, a compromise was entered into between the Corporation and the appellants therein, consequent to which those 84 persons were appointed as ITI Helper (Trainee) by the Corporation. 5.
4. It appears that 84 similarly placed persons who were not selected on earlier occasion, challenged the selection process in writ petitions. Though the said writ petitions were dismissed, on appeal, a compromise was entered into between the Corporation and the appellants therein, consequent to which those 84 persons were appointed as ITI Helper (Trainee) by the Corporation. 5. The appellants in W.A.Nos.574 of 2017, 990 of 2016 and 1696 to 1702 of 2018 filed writ petitions seeking to extend the benefit of the compromise memo entered between the Corporation and 84 similarly placed persons in the writ appeal supra. The learned single Judge after hearing both the parties dismissed holding that the petitioners were not parties to the said compromise memo and therefore, the benefit of the compromise memo cannot be extended to them. Challenging the said order, the individuals have come up with appeals. However, the writ petitions filed by the first respondent in W.A.Nos.1450 to 1462 of 2017 seeking to extend the benefit of the compromise memo relief were allowed by another learned single Judge. Challenging the said order, the Corporation has come up with appeals. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants, contesting respondents and the petitioners submitted that the Corporation has entered into compromise with the 84 unsuccessful candidates and given appointment to them and since these appellants, contesting respondents and petitioners are similarly placed persons like that of the 84 similarly placed persons in the compromise memo, they are also entitled to the said benefit. 7. To buttress his contention, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivasatava, (2015) 1 SCC 347 . 8. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Corporation submitted that Clause (4) of the compromise memo clearly states that the benefit extended therein will not apply to those persons who have not approached the Court on time challenging the selection process and also that the said compromise could not be treated as a precedent. 9. On a careful consideration to the submissions of both sides, the issue that has to be decided by us is whether the benefit of the compromise entered into between the Corporation and the 84 similarly placed persons can be extended to the appellants herein, contesting respondents and the writ petitioners or not. 10.
9. On a careful consideration to the submissions of both sides, the issue that has to be decided by us is whether the benefit of the compromise entered into between the Corporation and the 84 similarly placed persons can be extended to the appellants herein, contesting respondents and the writ petitioners or not. 10. In order to answer the issue in the instant case, it is necessary for us to see the prayer of the 84 similarly placed persons who entered into compromise with the Corporation. Those 84 persons challenged the selection process and on becoming unsuccessful, they filed writ appeals. At that time, the Corporation entered into compromise with them and thereafter appointed them as ITI Helper/Trainee. 11. The prayer of the appellants as well as the first respondent herein in the writ petitions filed by them is for a direction to the Corporation to consider their claim for appointment as Helper (Trainee) with ITI qualification possessed by them and that of the selection held during October 2013 with reference to the direct recruitment to the said post in the existing or next arising vacancy on the basis of the representation and as per the directions dated 14.10.2015 made in W.A.No.81 of 2015 etc. batch. 12. It is thus clear that in the instant case, the claim for appointment as ITI Helper (Trainee) is based on the compromise memo entered into between the Corporation and 84 similarly placed persons. In other words, the claim is to extend the benefit of the compromise memo. 13. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer to the decision of the Apex in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivasatava, (2015) 1 SCC 347 , wherein it is held as follows: “22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under. 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treat differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C.Sharma v. Union of India). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.” 14.
A perusal of the above would make it clear that the Hon'ble Apex Court has clarified that the benefit granted to a particular set of employees should be extended to the identically situated persons, as otherwise, it would amount to discrimination and violation of Article 14 and that this principle should be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. 15. The Apex Court has also made it clear that the persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay, as their counterparts who approached the Court earlier had succeeded in their efforts, cannot claim the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons to be extended to them. 16. In the light of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court supra, if we come to the case on hand, it is clear that the prayer made by the appellants, contesting respondents and petitioners is entirely different from the prayer made by the 84 similarly placed persons who secured job, as, in the instant case, the prayer is to extend the benefit of the compromise memo entered into between the Corporation and the 84 similarly placed persons, but in the writ petitions filed by the 84 similarly placed persons, a challenge is made to the selection process. 17. In this regard, it is necessary to have a look into the compromise memo entered into between the Corporation and the petitioners in the earlier cases, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: “As per the respondent Corporation's request, this order will not apply to the persons, who did not approach this Hon'ble Court in time challenging the selection process and that this compromise cannot be treated as a precedent as this order is binding as between the parties on the basis of the consensus reached”. 18. A reading of the above is very specific that the benefit of the compromise memo cannot be extended to other persons except the petitioners therein. In other words, it cannot be equated to judgment in rem, but it is only a judgment in personam. 19.
18. A reading of the above is very specific that the benefit of the compromise memo cannot be extended to other persons except the petitioners therein. In other words, it cannot be equated to judgment in rem, but it is only a judgment in personam. 19. In the light of the fact that the judgment based on compromise is not a judgment in rem, we have no hesitation to hold that the appellants, first respondent and the writ petitioners who claim the benefit of compromise memo to be extended to them, are not entitled to such benefits. Accordingly, the W.A.Nos.574 of 2017, 990 of 2016 and 1696 to 1702 of 2018 and the writ petitions are dismissed. W.A.Nos.1450 to 1462 of 2017 are allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.