JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with consent of learned counsel for both the parties. 2. By this Writ Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner is challenging the judgment and order dated 1st April, 2017, passed by the District Judge-3, Satara, thereby allowing Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.43 of 2016 preferred by the Respondents, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed below Exhibit-5 by 2nd Jt. Civil Judge Junior Division, Satara, on 10th February, 2016 in Regular Civil Suit No.471 of 2015. 3. Brief facts of the Writ Petition are to the effect that the Petitioner herein is the Original Plaintiff, who has filed the suit before the trial Court contending inter-alia that she is the owner of the agricultural land bearing Gat No.231, ad-measuring 1-Hectare 20-R situated within the limits of village Nagthane, Tal. & District Satara and it is her ancestral joint family property. The suit property is having approach road which is situated on North-West side of old Nagthane-Mazgaon Road, running in North-South direction on the Eastern side. The said road is described in the plaint in paragraph No.1 by the letters “A, B, C, D, E & F”. 4. As per the Petitioner, she is using the said road as a access to her land, since the time of her forefathers for carrying-out agricultural activities. The said road is also used for passing of bullock carts, tractors and other agriculture machineries. The road falls along side of the agricultural lands of Respondent No.1 bearing Gat No.221 and Respondent Nos.2 to 4 bearing Gat Nos.224 and other lands bearing Gat Nos. 226, 227, 228, 229 and 230. 5. According to the Petitioner, in the consolidation scheme, which was implemented in the village in the year 1961, the suit property as well as agricultural property including, those of the Respondents were re-numbered. At that time, in an enquiry conducted before the Asst. Consolidation Officer, Satara, a statement of the predecessor of the Respondents came to be recorded on 8th June, 1961. In the said statement, he has accepted the existence of the said road. Despite all these facts, the Respondents started causing obstruction to the Petitioner's access from the said road. 6. Therefore, the Petitioner approached the Tahsildar, Satara and filed road Dispute Case bearing S.R.No.7 of 2015. In the said statement, he has accepted the existence of the said road. Despite all these facts, the Respondents started causing obstruction to the Petitioner's access from the said road. 6. Therefore, the Petitioner approached the Tahsildar, Satara and filed road Dispute Case bearing S.R.No.7 of 2015. The Tahsildar visited the suit property and the disputed road on 12th April, 2015, but neither prepared a panchanama nor had taken any further action. In view thereof, the Petitioner was constrained to file the suit before the trial Court for declaration of her right to use the said road and for permanent injunction against the Respondents. 7. Along with the suit, the Petitioner had filed an application for interim injunction at Exhibit-05, restraining the Respondents from causing obstruction to her use of this road during pendency of the suit. 8. The said application came to be resisted by the Respondents vide their say at Exhibit-55, denying the existence of such road and also the use of the said road as an access to her land by the Petitioner. It was submitted that the Petitioner is trying to create a new road from the agricultural lands of the Respondents, which are presently under cultivation. According to the Respondents, there is another available road which is passing from the Southern side of the land. The said path has been used and is being used by the Petitioner as well as the land owners of Gat Nos.226 to 230 and 232. It was further submitted that, the Petitioner has not claimed any right over the lands alongside of the disputed road nor any easementary right over the disputed road. The Petitioner has also not joined the owners of the other lands alongside of which the disputed road is passing. It is denied that any such statement was made by the Predecessor of Respondents in consolidation scheme about existence of the road or of the Petitioner using the said road since forefathers. It was specifically contended that, the Petitioner was and is having the road which is passing from Gat Nos.230, 239 and then 240. The Petitioner has claimed her right of way from the said road and not from the disputed road, before the Tahsildar in Road Dispute Case No.7 of 2015. It was specifically contended that, the Petitioner was and is having the road which is passing from Gat Nos.230, 239 and then 240. The Petitioner has claimed her right of way from the said road and not from the disputed road, before the Tahsildar in Road Dispute Case No.7 of 2015. The Tahsildar, however, has rejected the said application, thereby clearly indicating that the Petitioner has no prima-facie case, the balance of convenience also does not lie in her favour and hence, her application for interim-injunction needs to be dismissed. 9. The trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for both the parties and after relying on the report of Court Commissioner, who was appointed to bring on record the existing situation, was pleased to allow the application for interim injunction. 10. Being aggrieved thereby, the Respondents approached Appellate Court and the Appellate Court, relying on the same Court Commissioner Report and the material produced on record, was pleased to reverse the finding of the trial Court and allowed the appeal. 11. While challenging the impugned judgment and order of the Appellate Court, the submission of learned counsel for the Petitioner is two fold. In the first place, it is submitted that, the Appellate Court should not have interfered in the well reasoned order of the trial Court, which was also passed on the material on record. It is submitted that, the order passed by the trial Court is discretionary one and the view taken by the trial Court was also a plausible view of the matter. Therefore, the Appellate Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in reassessing the material and reaching a conclusion different from the one reached by the trial Court and thereby substituting its own discretion. According to learned counsel for the Petitioner, it was not permissible, as the discretion exercised by the trial Court in the present case is reasonable. Hence, merely because, a different view was possible, the Appellate Court was not justified in interfering with the trial Court's exercise of discretion. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance placed on the judgment of the Apex Court, in the case of Wander Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 (supp.) SCC 727. 12. Secondly, it is submitted that, the Appellate Court has not disputed the existence of the disputed road. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance placed on the judgment of the Apex Court, in the case of Wander Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 (supp.) SCC 727. 12. Secondly, it is submitted that, the Appellate Court has not disputed the existence of the disputed road. The only ground on which the Appellate Court has rejected the claim of the Petitioner is that, there is also another road from which the suit property can be accessed and that road is comparatively shorter than the disputed road; therefore, it was not possible to hold that the Petitioner was using the longer road. According to learned counsel for the Petitioner, the Appellate Court has also, in this respect, not properly read the Court Commissioner's Report and hence, according to learned counsel for the Petitioner, the impugned order passed by the Appellate Court needs to be quashed and set-aside. 13. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondents has supported the impugned order by submitting that, if the discretion exercised by the trial Court was not based on the material on record and not on its proper appreciation, hence in that sense, it was perverse, the Appellate Court was justified in interfering with the said discretion. Here, in the case, it is submitted that, the Petitioner has neither asked for the relief of declaration of ownership over the disputed road nor has claimed any relief of easementary right, nor has joined the owners of the other lands alongside of the disputed road as party defendants. The Petitioner has also failed to establish the use of the said road and hence, the Appellate Court was justified in rejecting the application for interim injunction, which was allowed by the trial Court. According to learned counsel for the Respondents, this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, therefore, should be slow to again interfere in the correction of factual findings done by the Appellate Court. 14. In view of these rival submissions, on appreciation of thereof, in the facts of the present case, this Court finds much substance in the submission of learned counsel for the Respondents. It needs no reiteration that the burden lies on the Petitioner, she being the Plaintiff, to prove prima-facie the case, the balance of convenience and irreparable loss, in order to get the relief of interim injunction. It needs no reiteration that the burden lies on the Petitioner, she being the Plaintiff, to prove prima-facie the case, the balance of convenience and irreparable loss, in order to get the relief of interim injunction. Here in the case, the Petitioner has approached the Court with a case that she is the owner of the agricultural property bearing Gat No.231 and the suit property is having the approach road on North-West side of old Nagthane-Mazgaon Road, running in North-South direction on the Eastern side. According to the Petitioner, the said road is being used from the time of her forefathers for carrying out agricultural activities. She had also admitted that said road falls alongside agricultural properties of Respondent No.1 bearing Gat No.221, Respondent Nos.2 to 4 bearing Gat Nos.224 and other lands bearing Gat Nos. 226, 227, 228, 229 and 230, which are owned by other persons. Hence, the initial burden was lying upon the Petitioner, first to prove the existence of such road alongside the lands belonging to other persons and secondly to prove its user and her right to use the same unobstructed. 15. However, as rightly observed by the Appellate Court, the Petitioner has prima-facie failed to prove all these facts. Though in her suit she has claimed the relief of declaration that she is having the right to use this road, she has not explained on which basis she is claiming the said right. It is pertinent to note that, she has not even joined the owners of the other lands bearing Gat Nos.226, 227, 228, 229 and 230, when admittedly the disputed road is passing alongside their lands. She has only joined Respondent No.1, the owner of Gat No.221 and Respondent Nos.2 to 4, the owners of Gat No.224. If she is claiming the right of way against the owners of the lands bearing Gat Nos.226 to 230 and as the disputed road is passing alongside the lands of these persons, then it was utmost essential for her to join them also. She has not done so. Hence, one does not know whether they are accepting the right of the Petitioner to use that road and the user of that road by the Petitioner, since the time of her forefathers till the date. They are also not joined as co-plaintiff or co-defendants in the suit. She has not done so. Hence, one does not know whether they are accepting the right of the Petitioner to use that road and the user of that road by the Petitioner, since the time of her forefathers till the date. They are also not joined as co-plaintiff or co-defendants in the suit. As per the Respondents, the owner of one of these lands, had already filed an affidavit in favour of the Respondents, denying the Petitioner's right to use the said road. 16. The Petitioner has also not claimed any ownership over this disputed road or over the land below it. She has also not explained how that road came into existence and whether it was with the consent of the owners of those lands and whether at any time they have accepted the user of the said road as of right by the Petitioner. Thus, without any title or any prima-facie proof of user or enjoyment over the said road, the Petitioner is claiming her right of way and without joining all the necessary parties, she is also claiming the relief of injunction. 17. It is also pertinent to note that, the Petitioner has not even claimed any easementary right of way, either on account of the necessity or on account of prescription over the said road. The reason may be because there is another road in existence, which is not only pointed out by the Respondents but the existence of such road is also brought on record from the report of the Court Commissioner and photographs which he has taken at the time of the inspection in the presence of the parties. The Appellate Court has discussed in detail, how this road proceeds from Mazgaon-Nagthane i.e. South-West Direction to the suit property. The Court Commissioner's Report shows that initially the said road is having 9 feet in width, then there is the crop of ladies finger which has been cut off, thereafter there is a water canal, there is a bandh and there is a toilet. The ginger crop is there. The pipe-line is also laid down. This road directly goes to the land of the Petitioner bearing Gat No.231. The Court Commissioner has shown this road upto the toilet and from toilet, the water canal is shown and the ladies finger crop is shown. The ginger crop is there. The pipe-line is also laid down. This road directly goes to the land of the Petitioner bearing Gat No.231. The Court Commissioner has shown this road upto the toilet and from toilet, the water canal is shown and the ladies finger crop is shown. This road appears to be directly leading to the land of the Petitioner and appears to be a shorter road and having sufficient width. 18. As against it, the approach road on which the Petitioner is claiming the right, is a longer road and as stated above on the way, one has to travel through the many lands in order to reach the land of the Petitioner by this road and the owners of these lands are not joined in the suit. As observed by the Court Commissioner, at some places, the said road is having the width of only 4 to 6 feet and hence the tractor cannot pass on this road. 19. It is the contention of the Petitioner that the second road shown by the Court Commissioner is not a continuous one, the tractor cannot pass from the said road. However, the Court Commissioner's Report and the photographs' clicked at that time also show that, at the time of the inspection of the Court Commissioner, the tractor could easily pass from the said road. Even the width of the said road is more than the width of the disputed road. Only on a very small piece of land, there appears to be the crop of ladies finger, but otherwise the said road gives clear access to the land of the Petitioner and therefore, there is every possibility of the Petitioner using this very road, it being shorter and closer to her road and hence easily accessible and even the tractor can pass from the said road, as against the disputed road, which is not only a longer route but is not having sufficient width also. 20. The Appellate Court has considered all these factual aspects of the case. The Appellate Court has also considered the statement of the Respondent's predecessor, recorded in the Consolidation Scheme and found that the said statement does not refer at all to any particular road. It merely states that, whatever road is in existence, it will remain as it is. 20. The Appellate Court has considered all these factual aspects of the case. The Appellate Court has also considered the statement of the Respondent's predecessor, recorded in the Consolidation Scheme and found that the said statement does not refer at all to any particular road. It merely states that, whatever road is in existence, it will remain as it is. Hence, the said statement is also not sufficient to establish the Petitioner's right over the disputed road or to prove that the Petitioner is using this very specific disputed road., since the time of her forefathers. As disputed road is not the only way or the road at the site, in the absence of specific reference to this disputed road, the statement of the Respondent's predecessor recorded in Consolidation Scheme cannot be of much help to the Petitioner. It is pertinent to note that the existence of this disputed road is also not appearing in the 7/12 extract of any of the lands, which are alongside to this road. 21. It is further significant to note that, the Petitioner has filed the Dispute Road case before the Tahsildar, who is the Appropriate Authority to decide the same. Accordingly, the Tahsildar has after inspection of the site rejected the claim of the Petitioner over the disputed road. The Petitioner has not challenged the said order before the Superior Authority viz. Sub-Division Officer (S.D.O.). 22. In my considered opinion, the Appellate Court has considered all these factual aspects of the case in their proper perspective, the most important fact being the Petitioner's failure to prima-facie establish her right over the disputed road juxtaposed to the existence of the another road, which is shorter and much closer to her land, these aspects being not properly considered by the trial Court. Therefore, no fault can be found, if the Appellate Court has interfered in the discretion exercised by the trial Court, to correct the said discretion. As the order of the Appellate Court is found to be correct, legal and proper; in writ jurisdiction this Court cannot interfere in the said order. 23. Writ Petition, therefore, being without merit, stands dismissed. 24. Rule is discharged. 25. As the order of the Appellate Court is found to be correct, legal and proper; in writ jurisdiction this Court cannot interfere in the said order. 23. Writ Petition, therefore, being without merit, stands dismissed. 24. Rule is discharged. 25. At this stage, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that, the interim order passed in this proceeding is in existence till today and therefore, the same order may be continued, in order to enable the Petitioner to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 26. Learned counsel for the Respondents takes an objection thereof. 27. However, in the interest of justice, the interim order passed by this Court on 16th June 2017 and thereafter, modified on 2nd August 2017 is extended for a period of six weeks from today.