JUDGMENT : M.S. SONAK, J. 1. Heard Mr. N.C. Walimbe, the learned AGP for the appellants. 2. The challenge in this appeal is to the judgment and order dated 15th December 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing Writ Petition No. 7580 of 2002 instituted by the appellants. In Writ Petition No. 7580 of 2002, the challenge was to the common order dated 26th February 1999 passed by the Industrial Court, Pune in Complaint (ULP) Nos. 96 to 101 of 1997. The Industrial Court, Pune, in its common order dated 26th February 1999 had held that the appellants had indulged in unfair labour practices under Items 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU and PULP Act) and further directed the appellants to regularise the services of the respondent – workman. 3. Mr. Walimbe, at the outset, submitted that the impugned judgment and order dated 15th December 2010 contains no independent reasons and therefore, the same warrants interference. In the alternate and without prejudice, Mr. Walimbe submits that if the reasons set out in the judgment and order dated 8th September 2010, by which, the learned Single Judge had dismissed Writ Petition No. 3274 of 2002 and connected matters, are to be taken as reasons in the impugned judgment and order dated 15th December 2010, even then, the same warrants interference on the grounds which follow. 4. Mr. Walimbe submits that the Forest Department discharges sovereign functions and therefore, the Industrial Court as well as the learned Single Judge committed jurisdictional error in proceeding on the basis that the Forest Department constitutes 'industry' under section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He submits that the two Courts erred in relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Chief Conservator of Forests and anr. vs. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare – 1996 (I) CLR 680, which decision, had already been distinguished and explained by the Apex Court itself in case of State of Gujarat vs. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar – 2001 (1) CLR 968. 5. Mr. Walimbe also submitted that the view taken by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge may not be consistent with the ruling of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and ors v/s. Umadevi and ors. 5. Mr. Walimbe also submitted that the view taken by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge may not be consistent with the ruling of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and ors v/s. Umadevi and ors. - (2006) 4 SCC 1 . Mr. Walimbe submits that on this ground as well the impugned judgment and order warrants interference. 6. We have carefully considered the grounds raised by Mr.Walimbe in support of this appeal. We have also perused the material on record and the orders made by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge in the matter. For reasons indicated hereafter, we see no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment and order. 7. From the perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 15th December 2010, it is quite clear that the learned advocates for the parties, i.e., the appellants and the respondent – workmen specifically agreed that the facts involved in the batch of the writ petitions which were disposed of by the impugned judgment and order dated 15th December 2010 were the same as in Writ Petition No. 3274 of 2002 and connected matters. The learned Single Judge, after recording this agreement between the learned counsel for the parties proceeded to dispose of Writ Petition No. 7580 of 2002 in terms of the judgment and order dated 8th September 2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 3274 of 2002 and connected matters. Accordingly, there is absolutely no merit in the ground that the impugned judgment and order contains no 'independent' reasons. It is very obvious that Writ Petition No. 7580 of 2002 and connected matters came to be dismissed on the basis of the reasoning in the judgment and order dated 8th September 2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 3274 of 2002 and connected matters. 8. Further, it is necessary to note that the appellants had in fact challenged the judgment and order dated 8th September 2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 3274 of 2002 and connected matters by instituting various appeals, including Letters Patent Appeal (St) No. 536 of 2012 and connected matters. All these Letters Patent Appeals came to be dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court by order dated 24th July 2018 by holding that there was no error or perversity in the view taken by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge. All these Letters Patent Appeals came to be dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court by order dated 24th July 2018 by holding that there was no error or perversity in the view taken by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge. In the light of the order dated 24th July 2018 therefore, even the present Letters Patent Appeal deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. 9. However, Mr. Walimbe submits that the order dated 24th July 2018 made by the Coordinate Bench does not address the two grounds now urged by him in support of the present appeal. Mr. Walimbe submits that such grounds are therefore, required to be considered in the present appeal. 10. At the outset, we may note that there is no material placed on record by the appellants to even suggest that the two grounds which are now sought to be raised, were in fact raised or argued in the several Letters Patent Appeals which came to be disposed of by order dated 24th July 2018 by our Coordinate Bench. Therefore, it is really not open to Mr. Walimbe to contend that such grounds were not addressed whilst making the order dated 24th July 2018. 11. In any case, we are satisfied that the two grounds now raised by the appellants in the present appeal are by no means sufficient to warrant interference with the impugned judgment and order dated 15th December 2010. 12. The appellants had filed a detailed reply to the complaint made by the respondent under MRTU and PULP Act before the Industrial Court. In such reply no plea whatsoever was taken that the appellant - Forest Department does not constitute 'industry' under section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or under section 3(7) of the MRTUP & PULP Act. There was no defence taken that the appellant -Forest Department discharges only sovereign functions and therefore, stands excluded from the definition of 'industry'. Since no such defence was taken in the pleadings obviously, no issue was struck in this regard. In the absence of the appellants raising any specific defence that the appellant – Forest Department was not 'industry', it is not possible to fault the view taken by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge in this matter. 13. Mr. Since no such defence was taken in the pleadings obviously, no issue was struck in this regard. In the absence of the appellants raising any specific defence that the appellant – Forest Department was not 'industry', it is not possible to fault the view taken by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge in this matter. 13. Mr. Walimbe did attempt to urge that the issue as to whether the appellant – Forest Department is an industry or not is a purely legal issue and therefore, he must be permitted to urge such issue for the first time in this appeal. 14. In the first place, the issue as to whether the appellant – Forest Department is an 'industry' or not cannot be said to be a purely legal issue. At the highest, this is an issue which involves mixed questions of law and fact. In the absence of any pleadings and evidence, the appellants cannot urge such an issue virtually for the first time in the present appeal. 15. Secondly, from the perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 15th December 2010 and the judgment and order dated 8th September 2010 in Writ Petition No. 3274 of 2002 and connected petitions, it appears that the issue of the appellant - Forest Department not being an industry was not even raised before the learned Single Judge. If the grounds in support of the present appeal are perused, there is no ground to the effect that the appellant – Forest Department does not constitute 'industry' for the purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or MRTU & PULP Act. 16. This means that the ground that the appellant – Forest Department does not constitute an 'industry' was neither raised in the pleadings before the Industrial Court nor raised before the learned Single Judge who has made the impugned judgment and order. Such a ground finds no mention even in the memo appeal. In such circumstances, there is no justification for raising such ground for the first time at the appellate stage. 17. Such a ground finds no mention even in the memo appeal. In such circumstances, there is no justification for raising such ground for the first time at the appellate stage. 17. Even otherwise, we see no error on the part of the learned Single Judge in relying upon the ruling of Apex Court in Kondhare (supra) which was delivered by a Bench of Three Judges and in which, it has been held that the Forest Department of the State of Maharashtra is an industry within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which definition has been adopted by the MRTU and PULP Act. 18. In Parmar (supra) as is clear from paragraph 5 of the ruling, the State in its counter affidavit had taken a positive stand that the Forest Department by virtue of the activities undertaken by it was not an 'industry' under section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore, the provisions of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were inapplicable. The Industrial Tribunal, in the said case, without addressing such a factual issue, which had been specifically raised, had proceeded on the basis that Kondhare (supra) constitutes an omnibus declaration that the Forest Department of all State Governments, constitute industry for purposes of section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 19. In the absence of the appellants raising any defence that the Forest Department does not constitute “industry” under section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, there was no error on the part of the learned Single Judge in preferring to rely upon Kondhare (supra) and not Parmar (supra). Further, it appears that Parmar (supra) was not even cited before the learned Single Judge since the issue of the appellants not being “industry” was not even raised either before the Industrial Court or the learned Single Judge. 20. The ruling of the Three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Kondhare (supra) is entirely in tune with the ruling of the Seven Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A.Rajappa - (1978) 2 SCC 213 . 20. The ruling of the Three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Kondhare (supra) is entirely in tune with the ruling of the Seven Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A.Rajappa - (1978) 2 SCC 213 . In fact, in State of U.P. vs. Jai Bir Singh– (2005) 5 SCC 1 , the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court taking cognizance of the apparent conflict between Kondhare (supra) and Parmar (supra) has referred the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constituting a suitable larger Bench for reconsideration of the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply (supra). 21. In State of Maharashtra and anr. vs. Sarva Shramik Sangh, Sangli and ors. - (2013) 16 SCC 16 , an issue arose as to whether an Irrigation Department of the State of Maharashtra could be considered to be an 'industry' within definition of the concept under section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The State urged that since the issue of reconsideration of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) was pending before the larger Bench, the issue as to whether the Irrigation Department was an industry or not be kept pending until the larger Bench answers the reference. On the other hand, the workman before the Apex Court submitted that the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) will have to be followed until it is overruled, since the proposition therein continues to hold good. Reliance was placed on State of Orissa vs. Dandasi Sahu – (1988) 4 SCC 12 , in which, the Apex Court had held that pendency of a point before the larger Bench is not a good ground to postpone the adjudication and disposal of the appeal on the basis of law as it then stood. 22. The Apex Court in Sarva Shramik Sangh (supra), upheld the workmen's contention and rejected the State's contention by observing thus: “27. It is, however, contended on behalf of he appellant that the said undertaking was being run by the Irrigation Department of the first appellant, and the activities of the Irrigation Department could not be considered to be an “industry” within the definition of the concept under Section 2(j) of the ID Act. As noted earlier, the reconsideration of the wide interpretation of the concept of “industry” in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board is pending before a larger Bench of this Court. As noted earlier, the reconsideration of the wide interpretation of the concept of “industry” in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board is pending before a larger Bench of this Court. However, as of now we will have to follow the interpretation of law presently holding the field as per the approach taken by this Court in State of Orissa v. Dandasi Sahu, referred to above. The determination of the present pending industrial dispute cannot be kept undecided until the judgment of the larger Bench is received.” (emphasis supplied) 23. Thus, even on the basis of the law as it stands today by virtue of the ruling of Seven Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply (supra), we are unable to accept Mr.Walimbe's contention. We clarify that this is only an additional reason, since, as we have noted earlier, in the present case the appellant did not even choose to raise the defence that the appellant – Forest Department is not an 'industry' under section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, much less produced any material in support of any such defence. 24. The second ground in the context of the ruling of the Constitution Bench in Uma Devi (supra) has in fact been answered by the Apex Court in case of MSRTC and anr vs. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari sanghatana – (2009) 8 SCC 566, in which, the issue as to whether the provisions of MRTU and PULP Act have been denuded of their status on account of the ruling in Uma Devi (supra) directly fell for consideration. 25. The Apex Court in MSRTC (supra) has clearly observed that the issue relating to unfair labour practices was neither referred nor considered or decided in Uma Devi's case and therefore, the ruling in Uma Devi (supra) does not denude the Industrial and Labour Courts of their statutory power under section 30 read with section 32 of the MRTUP and PULP Act to order permanency of the workers who have been victim of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV. The Apex Court in fact, held that Uma Devi (supra) cannot be held to have overridden the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order under section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act, once a case of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV is established. 26. In the present case, there are concurrent findings that the appellant had in fact indulged in unfair labour practices, inter alia, under Item 6 and Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. There was not even any challenge to such concurrent findings in the present appeal. In any case, from the perusal of the order made by the Industrial Court as well as the learned Single Judge, it is apparent that such findings of unfair labour practices are well supported by the evidence on record. Accordingly, there is no merit even in the second ground urged by Mr. Walimbe on behalf of the appellants. 27. For all the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss this appeal. There shall however, be no order as to costs. 28. In view of disposal of the main appeal, the Civil Application does not survive and the same is disposed of accordingly.