JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants. 2. Mr. Rajiv Anand, waives notice on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 to 5. 3. As per the stamp reporting, there is a delay of 67 days in preferring the present appeal. For condonation of delay an application being I.A. No.7020/2015 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with section 173 (1) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 has been filed by the appellants. 4. Office has made objection that the provision of law mentioned in the instant interlocutory application may be verified and corrected. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants has made objection to such office report and has contended that the Motor Vehicle Act is an independent code and contains the provision of period of limitation and the power of condonation. 6. Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 is quoted hereunder : 173. Appeals.— (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court : Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent. of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court : Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees. 7. From perusal of above section, it is evident that period of limitation is 90 days from the date of Award. Further the High Court has jurisdiction even after the period of limitation, if the appellant could satisfy that there is sufficient cause, which has prevented the appellant in preferring the appeal within time. 8. Thus, when the period of limitation as well as power of condonation of delay has been provided under the specific act, and specifically, Section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable. 9. 8. Thus, when the period of limitation as well as power of condonation of delay has been provided under the specific act, and specifically, Section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable. 9. In the proceeding, under the Motor Vehicle Act, the limitation act has not been made applicable. 10. For this purpose, learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vrs. Ravi Kumar & Ors. reported in 1992 ACJ 274 . Para-5 and 6 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder : 5. Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act which governs the filing of appeals in the High Court against the awards of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals lays down the period of 90 days for filing an appeal against such an award. It, however, permits a prospective appellant to file the appeal beyond the period of 90 days if it is in a position to satisfy the court that it was prevented by a sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the period of 90 days. While the Full Bench was discussing the issue, it referred to Section 12 of the Limitation Act to indicate that even though the section in terms did not apply to appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act yet its principle and the underlying idea, as emanating from the section, could be invoked as a sufficient cause for filing the appeal and as a ground by the appellant of satisfying the court that because of such a sufficient cause it was prevented from filing the appeal within the limitation period. It was in the light of this principle that the Full Bench made the following observation: Even though the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act are not specifically applicable to the appeal filed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act yet the principle underlying that section can be taken into consideration for determining the existence or otherwise of 'sufficient cause' for computing the period of limitation within the meaning of proviso to Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. 6. 6. Based on the aforesaid principle of law, therefore, I hold that the principles underlying Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act and those emanating therefrom do not perse apply to the appeals under Motor Vehicles Act and it is not that in every case a prospective appellant is entitled to exclude the period spent by him in obtaining a copy of the judgment from the limitation period in filing the appeal. If that were the position, the Full Bench should have said so in so many words. It qualified the application of principles of Section 12 by prefacing that application with the words 'sufficient cause' and 'prevented'. It is only in those cases where a party approaching the High Court for condoning the delay shows by way of a sufficient cause that it was prevented from coming to the High Court because of the delay in obtaining the copy of the judgment. Not otherwise. It was not that in every case a party applies for, obtains the certified copy of the judgment and then sits over for the limitation period to expire and asks for condonation of delay by excluding the period spent in obtaining the copy. 11. Judgment in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vrs. Kaka Ram & Ors. reported in 1993 (2) TAC 107. Para-4 and 5 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder : 4. Mr. Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the appeal is within time, as according to him the period spent for obtaining the certified copy of the award has to be excluded while computing the period of limitation and because the period spent for obtaining the copy of the award was more than seven days, and if this is excluded, the appeal has been filed before the expiry of 90 days and is, therefore, well in time. Because the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is a special law and a complete code and because section 110-D of the Act itself prescribed the period for filing the appeal, section 29 of the Limitation Act to which a reference was made by Mr. Because the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is a special law and a complete code and because section 110-D of the Act itself prescribed the period for filing the appeal, section 29 of the Limitation Act to which a reference was made by Mr. Thakur during the course of his argument is not attracted in this case and because of non-applicability of section 29 of the Limitation Act, section 12 is also inapplicable and, therefore, the period spent for obtaining the copy of the award is not per se to be excluded while computing the period of limitation. This point has specifically arisen for consideration in this Court in the case titled Union of India v. Manzoor Ahmad, 1982 ACJ 241 (J & K) and a Division Bench of this Court while dismissing the appeal as time barred had clearly held that section 29 of the Limitation Act and correspondingly, therefore, section 12 were inapplicable to the appeals preferred under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. The following observations of the Division Bench are extracted with advantage for ready reference : (8) That the Motor Vehicle Act is a special Act within the meaning of section 29 of the Limitation Act is not a matter which is in dispute, as indeed it cannot be. The basic condition for the applicability of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, however, is that there has to be ‘difference’ law and the one prescribed therefore by the First Schedule of the Limitation Act. ‘ By a legal fiction created under Section 29 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation provided under the special law shall then be deemed to be the period provided under the First Schedule for the purpose of reckoning limitation under section 3 of the Act.’ [see State of J & K. v. G.S. Baroca, AIR 1978 J & K 64]. Since there is no specific period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal against an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, and further since there is no difference between the period of limitation prescribed under section 110-D of the Act and Article 156 of the Limitation Act, sub-section ( ) of section 29, on its plain reading, would not be attracted and sub-clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 29 would not come into play.” 5. The aforesaid Division Bench judgment of this Court came to be reconsidered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Managing Director v. Fatima Begum, 1989 KLJ 51 . The Full Bench upheld the principles of law enunciated by the Division Bench and reconfirmed that neither section 29 nor, therefore, section 12 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the appeals preferred under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. In Para-8 of the judgment, the Full Bench observed as under : “(8) After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that there is no conflict in between the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1982 KLJ 78 and the other authorities cited at the Bar. In all the aforesaid cases It was conceded that the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal after expiry of 90 days if satisfied that the appellant was prevented by ‘sufficient cause’ for preferring the appeal in time. The provisions of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act even though not specifically made applicable to the appeals filed under the provisions of the Act are in fact bases upon the principles of justice, equity and good conscience which have been codified as judicially recognized grounds of sufficient cause. It follows, therefore, that even though, strictly speaking, provisions of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act are not applicable yet the principle underlying the section has to be taken into consideration while determining the ‘sufficient cause’ within the meaning of section 110-D of the Act. The appellant, therefore, as already held in 1982 KLJ 78, would be entitled to commutation of the period for which he was prevented by ‘sufficient cause’ for preferring an appeal in time. As no appeal could be filed without the copy of the judgment of the Tribunal, the appellant, if he satisfied the Court that he was not supplied the copy of the judgment despite his efforts, would be entitled to the commutation of such period as is permissible for obtaining a copy, for the purposes of limitation in filing the appeal after the expiry of 90 days provided under section 110-D of the Act.” 12. Judgment in the case of The Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vrs. Subrata Mitra & Ors., reported in AIR 2011 Sikkim 16. Judgment in the case of The Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vrs. Subrata Mitra & Ors., reported in AIR 2011 Sikkim 16. Para-15 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder : 15. In the first instance, it is made clear that the application though filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be rejected as being not entertainable on het assumption that the Limitation Act would not be applicable in matters concerning belated appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, when second proviso thereof specifically makes provisions in that respect. In the interest of furthering substantial justice, it is discretionary upon this Court to consider it as an application having been filed under that proviso, as the principle for condoning the delay under the said proviso would be pari material to the one under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. There can be no doubt that while searching for the guiding principles as regards the interpretation of the “sufficient cause” appearing in the second proviso to Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, it would be permissible to rely upon the one enunciated in respect of under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. I, therefore, hold that the application is maintainable. The decision in the Fairgrowth Investments case (supra) cited by Mr. Joshi is clearly distinguishable from the facts, law and the circumstance involved in the present case. In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether the Special Court constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to Transaction in Securities) Act, 1992, has the power to condone the delay in filing a petition under Section 4(2) of the Act. The Court held that in view of the express provisions contained in the Act excluding the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it could not be invoked. This is quite clear from paragraph 19 of the judgment which is reproduced below:-- “19. But in this case apart from the mandatory and compulsive provision of sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act, there are in addition two provisions of the Act which show that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked. These are : an express provision for condonation of delay under Section 10(3) of the Act which states that the provision of the Act : “13. These are : an express provision for condonation of delay under Section 10(3) of the Act which states that the provision of the Act : “13. …….shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law, other than this Act, or in any decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority.” On going through Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, we find no such provision that excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the contention stands rejected. 13. Judgment in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vrs. Ravi Kumar & Ors. reported in 2008 7 SCC 169 . Para-53 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder : 53. Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the AC Act prescribes the period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside an award as three months from the date on which the applicant has received the arbitral award. The proviso thereto vests in the court discretion to extend the period of limitation by a further period not exceeding thirty days if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause for not making the application within three months. The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso makes it clear that even if a sufficient cause is made out for a longer extension, the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. The purpose of proviso to Section 34(3) of the AC Act is similar to that of Section 5 of the Limitation Act which also relates to extension of the period of limitation prescribed for any application or appeal. It vests a discretion in a court to extend the prescribed period of limitation if the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not place any outer limit in regard to the period of extension, whereas the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the AC Act places a limit on the period of extension of the period of limitation. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not place any outer limit in regard to the period of extension, whereas the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the AC Act places a limit on the period of extension of the period of limitation. Thus the proviso to Section 34(3) of the AC Act is also a provision relating to extension of period of limitation, but differs from Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in regard to period of extension, and has the effect of excluding Section 5 alone of the Limitation Act. 14. Relying the above judgments and section, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted, since Motor Vehicle Act is complete code in itself, which provides procedure as well as period of limitation and further power of condonation, section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied in the proceeding under motor vehicle Act 15. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 16. From perusal of section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, it is evident, so far as limitation is concerned, that it is complete code in itself. The period of limitation is 90 days and there is a provision for condoning the delay, if sufficient cause is there. 17. Since, there is a special provision for condoning the delay, section 5 of the limitation act will not apply. 18. So far as proceeding in Motor Vehicle Act is concerned, the principle of limitation Act will apply in all proceeding before tribunal or before arbitrator or before any competent court until and unless specifically excluded. 19. Under the motor vehicle act, the application of limitation act has not been excluded and as such it will apply but the power of condoning the delay has to be exercised under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act and not under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. 20. In view of the above discussion, it is declared that the application for condonation of delay has to be filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act and not under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. 21. Accordingly, the office objection is hereby overruled and learned counsel for the appellant is directed to make necessary correction. 22. Issue notice upon the respondents except respondent Nos.1 to 5 in the limitation matter (I.A. No.7020/2015) as well as in the main appeal under ordinary process for which requisites etc. 21. Accordingly, the office objection is hereby overruled and learned counsel for the appellant is directed to make necessary correction. 22. Issue notice upon the respondents except respondent Nos.1 to 5 in the limitation matter (I.A. No.7020/2015) as well as in the main appeal under ordinary process for which requisites etc. must be filed within two weeks. I.A. No.9164 of 2018 23. The instant interlocutory application has been filed for staying of further proceeding in Certificate Case No. 12 of 2016-17 pending before the Certificate officer, Bokaro. 24. Present appeal has mainly been filed for shifting liability upon the owner of the offending vehicle. 25. Entitlement and quantum of compensation has not been questioned. Rate of interest is under challenge. 26. In view of the above factual position, the appellant is directed to deposit 50% of the Awarded amount i.e. Rs.6,50,000/- as the similar order has been passed in connecting cases. 27. Be that as it may, further proceeding in Certificate Case No. 12 of 2016-17 pending before the Certificate officer, Bokaro shall remain stayed till further orders, subject to the condition that the appellant shall deposit Rs. 6,50,000/-(Rupees Six Lacs Fifty Thousand) by cheque/draft in the Executing Court within a period of six weeks. 28. The Executing Court is directed to release Rs.6,50,000/-(Rupees Six Lacs Fifty Thousand) to the claimants on proper identification on their furnishing undertaking on the terms and conditions, which the court below deems fit and proper to impose. 29. With the aforesaid direction, I.A. No.9164 of 2018 stands disposed of.