ORDER : Attau Rahman Masoodi, J. 1. Heard Sri Adnan Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Akash Dixit, alongwith Sri Bajhul Qamar Siddiqui, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 and 3. The opposite party no. 4 gave up his case before the appellate court below, therefore, issuance of notice to opposite party no. 4 is dispensed with. Maintainability 2. At the very outset, learned counsel for the opposite parties no. 2 and 3 vehemently opposed the maintainability of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India on the ground that a judgment rendered on 18.8.2018 by the Additional District Judge (III), Unnao in First Appeal No. 5/2011 filed under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) can only be assailed by way of a second appeal before this Court, hence a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would not lie. 3. To repel the preliminary objection raised by opposite parties, Sri Adnan Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that Regular First Appeal No. 5/2011 had arisen out of the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Unnao on an application filed under Section 151 read with Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC to set aside a compromise decree rendered in First Appeal No. 13/1976 on 23.12.1976. This application was decided by learned Civil Judge, Senior Division in exercise of delegated powers on behalf of the District Judge, which not being a decree, was an order passed by the District Judge himself, hence the First Appeal against such an order was not maintainable. The objection raised by the petitioner having remained unconsidered, would thus impinge upon the very jurisdiction of the learned District Judge who has passed the impugned judgment dated 18.8.2018, therefore, this petition is maintainable within the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. At the outset it may be clarified that the judgment/order dated 21.12.2010 assailed in Regular First Appeal No. 5/2011 for certain typographical mistakes, was corrected by an order dated 14.1.2011, as such, mention of both the dates in this judgment is unavoidable. 5. 4. At the outset it may be clarified that the judgment/order dated 21.12.2010 assailed in Regular First Appeal No. 5/2011 for certain typographical mistakes, was corrected by an order dated 14.1.2011, as such, mention of both the dates in this judgment is unavoidable. 5. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, a regular first appeal would not lie as against the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 deciding an application filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC whereby the compromise decree dated 23.12.1976 rendered at the appellate stage was simply set aside as void to reopen the First Appeal No. 13/1974 for adjudication on merit. Thus, the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 was essentially not a decree against which First Appeal No. 5/2011 could be filed under Section 96 CPC. Once the very maintainability of First Appeal under Section 96 CPC assailing the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 was questioned and the objection was not dealt with, hence the preliminary objection raised by the opposite parties against this petition deserves to be rejected. Moreover, the judgment dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 was rendered by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Unnao on an application filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC in exercise of the delegated appellate powers of the District Judge, hence First Appeal No. 5/2011 filed under Section 96 CPC against the above order reopening the proceeding of First Appeal No. 13/1976 was not maintainable before the District Judge against his own order. 6. The arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner confining his case only on the question of preliminary objection raised against the maintainability of First Appeal No. 5/2011 directed against the judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 has force for more than one reason, as such, the objection raised by the opposite parties against the maintainability of this petition is overruled. Firstly, the Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, while deciding the application filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC by judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 acted in exercise of the delegated appellate powers of the District Judge, hence the same Court could not entertain a First Appeal against his own order. Firstly, the Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, while deciding the application filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC by judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 acted in exercise of the delegated appellate powers of the District Judge, hence the same Court could not entertain a First Appeal against his own order. The aspect of jurisdiction becomes more significant when it is argued that the judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 simply re-opening the proceedings of First Appeal No. 13/1974, was not essentially a decree, hence First Appeal No. 5/2011 was not maintainable at all under Section 96 CPC before the District Judge against his own order. 7. The further submission though hypothetical is to the effect that even if the judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 is assumed to be a decree, yet a second appeal before the High Court under Section 100 CPC would have been maintainable but filing of the First Appeal No. 5/2011 against the same was clearly misconceived and beyond the jurisdiction of the learned District Judge. Facts 8. The factual position of the case in brief may be culled out as under: Plots no. 1843 and 1847 are admittedly the waqf property whereupon a Mela and cattle fair is organised. It appears that two civil suits for permanent injunction came to be filed in relation to the above plots way back in the year 1968 before the Court of Munsif who at the relevant point of time had competent jurisdiction. Regular Suit No. 67/1968 for permanent injunction was filed by the father of opposite parties no. 2 to 4 against Sunni Central Waqf Board and late Bashir Ahmad being the Mutawalli. Regular Suit No. 47 of 1968 for the like prayer was filed by the Waqf through Mutawalli late Bashir Ahmad, the father of the petitioner, against the father of opposite parties no. 2 to 4. The later suit filed by the Waqf through Mutawalli was to protect the land i.e. plots no. 1843 and 1847 contrary to the claim laid by the predecessor in interest of opposite parties no. 2 to 4 who had instituted Regular Suit No. 67/1968 claiming the relief of permanent injunction in respect of the property in dispute inclusive of the plots mentioned above. 9. The two suits filed before the court of Munsif, South, Unnao were decided on the same day but through separate judgments dated 30.3.1974. 2 to 4 who had instituted Regular Suit No. 67/1968 claiming the relief of permanent injunction in respect of the property in dispute inclusive of the plots mentioned above. 9. The two suits filed before the court of Munsif, South, Unnao were decided on the same day but through separate judgments dated 30.3.1974. The suit for permanent injunction filed by the predecessor in interest of opposite parties no. 2 to 4, namely, late Badruddin Khan was dismissed whereas Regular Suit No. 47/1968 instituted on behalf of the Waqf Board through Mutawalli late Sri Bashir Ahmad was decreed in favour of Waqf Board by judgment/decree dated 30.3.1974. The predecessor in interest of opposite parties no. 2 to 4 feeling aggrieved against both the judgments rendered on 30.3.1974, filed two separate appeals under Section 96 CPC before the court of District Judge, Unnao. The two first appeals registered as 12/1974 and 13/1974 relating to the same subject matter and between the same parties were proceeded with simultaneously. 10. The record reveals that the District Judge transferred both the appeals for hearing before the court of Civil Judge, now Civil Judge, Senior Division, Unnao, where both the appeals proceeded for final adjudication. 11. The power to transfer regular first appeals for adjudication to any subordinate judge under the administrative control is vested in the District Judge by virtue of Section 22 of The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 and the same for ready reference is reproduced as under: "22. Power to transfer to Subordinate Judges appeals from Munsifs. (1) A District Judge may transfer to any Subordinate Judge under his administrative control any appeals pending before him from the decrees or orders of Munsifs. (2) The District Judge may withdraw any appeal so transferred, and either hear and dispose of it himself or transfer it to a Court under his administrative control competent to dispose of it. (3) Appeals transferred under this section shall be disposed of subject to the rules applicable to like appeals when disposed of by the District Judge." 12. During the pendency of appeals, a compromise was filed by the parties on 16.12.1976 on the basis of which First Appeal No. 13/1974 directed against the decree rendered in favour of the Waqf Board, came to be decided by a compromise decree on 23.12.1976. During the pendency of appeals, a compromise was filed by the parties on 16.12.1976 on the basis of which First Appeal No. 13/1974 directed against the decree rendered in favour of the Waqf Board, came to be decided by a compromise decree on 23.12.1976. Although there is no mention of any compromise on First Appeal No. 12/1974 in the compromise decree dated 23.12.1976 placed on record, but learned counsel for opposite parties no. 2 and 3 have stated that both the appeals were decreed on the basis of same agreement but there is no proof on record insofar as First Appeal No. 12/1974 is concerned. 13. This Court is conscious of the fact that even if both the appeals on the relief of permanent injunction were decided by a like compromise decree rendered on 23.12.1976, yet the property i.e. plot nos. 1843 and 1847 does not cease to be the waqf property and this position is undisputed between the parties. 14. It is worthy to note that the petitioner for the first time filed Regular Suit No. 41/1995 for setting aside the compromise decree dated 23.12.1976. Prior to the filing of this suit, many other proceedings appear to have culminated to which the petitioner claims not to be a party, hence, the Court would consciously desist from taking note of all other proceedings prior to filing of Regular Suit No. 41/1995 for they rest on the questionable compromise decree which according to the petitioner being unlawful was void. During pendency of Regular Suit No. 41/1995, opposite parties no. 2 to 4 filed yet another suit for permanent injunction in respect of disputed Waqf plots mentioned above, which was registered as Regular Suit No. 58/2006. Both the suits were instituted before the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Unnao, according to the pecuniary jurisdiction and incidentally the same very court exercising the delegated appellate powers on behalf of the District Judge had earlier rendered the compromise decree on 23.12.1976 in the Civil Appeal No. 13/1974 on the basis of an agreement dated 16.12.1976. The said agreement according to learned counsel for the petitioner, was incompetently arrived at by the Mutawalli in respect of a Waqf property, hence the compromise decree alleged to be unlawful, according to the petitioner, was void. 15. The said agreement according to learned counsel for the petitioner, was incompetently arrived at by the Mutawalli in respect of a Waqf property, hence the compromise decree alleged to be unlawful, according to the petitioner, was void. 15. During the pendency of Regular Suit No. 41/1995 and 58/2006, which were being tried together, the petitioner seems to have been well advised to seek the remedy under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Section 151 C.P.C. by praying for setting aside the compromise decree rendered on 23.12.1976. On the basis of legal advice, as it appears, an application was filed by the petitioner under Section 151 CPC read with Order XXIII Rule 3 in reference to Regular Civil Appeal No. 13/1974. The said application was entertained and registered before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Unnao as Misc. Case No. 13/2007. The misc. case after due notice to the parties proceeded alongwith the pending suits mentioned above. The parties seem to have been heard at length on the application filed under Section 151 CPC as well as on the respective suits filed by them before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Unnao, who had passed the compromise decree dated 23.12.1976. The maintainability of application under Section 151 CPC filed by the petitioner for setting aside the compromise decree dated 23.12.1976 was not questioned by the opposite parties no. 2 to 4 at any point of time till a final common judgment came to be rendered on 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 in all the three proceedings. No attempt was either made by opposite parties no. 2 to 4 under Section 22 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 read with Section 24 CPC to seek transfer of the misc. case no. 13/2007 to any other court of competent jurisdiction or to the District Judge himself. 16. The common judgment dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 reveals that Regular Suit No. 41/1995 filed by the petitioner being barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC was dismissed whereas Regular Suit No. 58/2006 filed by opposite parties no. 2 to 4 was dismissed on merit. However, the application filed by the petitioner under Section 151 CPC was allowed and the compromise decree dated 23.12.1976 based on the agreement dated 16.12.1976 was set aside and the proceedings of Civil Appeal No. 13/1974 stood reopened. 2 to 4 was dismissed on merit. However, the application filed by the petitioner under Section 151 CPC was allowed and the compromise decree dated 23.12.1976 based on the agreement dated 16.12.1976 was set aside and the proceedings of Civil Appeal No. 13/1974 stood reopened. It is under these circumstances that the judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 rendered inclusively in exercise of delegated appellate power of the District Judge in Misc. Case No. 13/2007 under Section 151 CPC, gave rise to an objection against the maintainability of Regular First Appeal No. 5/2011 before the same very court under Section 96 CPC. 17. The opposite parties no. 2 and 3 also filed a separate Regular First Appeal No. 4/2011 against the judgment dated 21.10.2012 insofar as the dismissal of Civil Suit No. 58/2006 is concerned but the same is said to have been dismissed. No further remedy appears to have been availed by opposite parties no. 2 to 4 against the same. Questions of law 18. The questions that immediately crop up are (i) as to whether the Civil Judge, Senior Division, who exercised the appellate jurisdiction on behalf of the District Judge to render the compromise decree dated 23.12.1976 in First Appeal No. 13/1974 filed under Section 96 CPC was at all competent to entertain the application under Section 151 CPC for setting aside the same; (ii) whether setting aside the compromise decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC simply having the effect of reopening the proceedings of Regular Civil Appeal No. 13/1974 would amount to a decree and if not; (iii) whether an appeal under Section 96 CPC before the District Judge would lie against his own judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 which was rendered in exercise of the delegated appellate powers of the District Judge by the Civil Judge, Senior Division under Section 151 read with Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. Discussion 19. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India on the questions framed above by itself would decide the jurisdiction of learned Additional District Judge (III), Unnao, hence it is a fit case for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India so as to set right the judicial propriety of the subordinate court. 20. 20. Now coming to the first question as to whether Civil Judge, Senior Division could entertain an application under Section 151 CPC for setting aside the compromise decree dated 23.12.1976, it has already been noticed above that First Appeal No. 13/1974 filed under Section 96 CPC was transferred by the District Judge to the Civil Judge in exercise of the powers vested in him by virtue of Section 22 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. This Court may note that the inherent power conferred on the civil courts under Section 151 CPC is with a purpose of promoting the cause of justice. The power is mutually inclusive when it is read with the remedial provisions. 21. It may be noted that a suit for setting aside a compromise decree is specifically barred by virtue of Order XXIII Rule 3-A CPC which reads as under: "3A. Bar to suit No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful." 22. The remedy for setting aside a compromise decree is provided for within the scope of Order XXIII Rule 3 read along with Section 151 CPC and it is immaterial whether reference to Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC is made in the application filed or not. Therefore, Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC being relevant is reproduced hereunder: "3. Compromise of suit Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree is accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit: Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but not adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation--An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." 23. In the present case, undisputedly the property i.e. plots no. 1843 and 1847 is the waqf property, therefore, the competence of the Mutawalli to enter into a compromise had come to be questioned in Misc. Case No. 13/2007 which was allowed. The question, however, is as to whether the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Unnao, which had rendered the original compromise decree, was competent to entertain such an application. 24. It is no more Respondent integra that an application for setting aside a compromise decree can be entertained by the same court which has rendered the decree. This position is clear from the proviso appended to Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC extracted hereinabove wherein the phrase used i.e. 'the court' would imply the same court. Such a view stands fortified when reference to the judgments reported in (2014) 15 SCC 471 -Para 11 and 12, (2012) 5 SCC 525 -Para 9 and 10 and (2006) 5 SCC 566 -Para 6, 11 and 12 is made. The Court may also note that once the statutory power vested by virtue of Section 22 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Act, 1887 was exercised by the District Judge to transfer the First Appeals no. 12/1974 and 13/1974 instituted under Section 96 CPC to the court of civil judge, for adjudication, the jurisdiction for setting aside a compromise decree rendered in the said appeals, unless altered under Section 22 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 or Section 24 CPC, would vest in the same court. The statutory appellate power once delegated in a case would not revive in the District Judge unless an order as permissible under law was passed. Thus, the first question in view of what crystallizes above is answered in affirmative and the order passed by the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Unnao on 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 for all purposes would be understood to have been rendered by the District Judge against which no appeal under Section 96 CPC would lie before the District Judge himself. 25. Thus, the first question in view of what crystallizes above is answered in affirmative and the order passed by the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Unnao on 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 for all purposes would be understood to have been rendered by the District Judge against which no appeal under Section 96 CPC would lie before the District Judge himself. 25. The second question as to whether the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 is a decree or not is concerned, it is to be kept in mind that a judgment is understood to be a decree only when there is final adjudication of rights. A decree is defined under Section 2(2) CPC as under: "2. Definitions. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- (1) ..............; (2) “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not include- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default." 26. It may be noted that the First Appeal No. 5/2011 filed before the District Judge, Unnao assailing the judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 was firstly not titled to be directed against a decree, therefore, it could not be entertained within the scope of Section 96 CPC. The First Appeal No. 5/2011 titled against judgment/order dated 21.10.2010/14.1.2010 seems to have wrongly been registered and assigned to Additional District Judge (III) Unnao. As a matter of civil procedure, a regular first appeal would only lie against a decree passed by a subordinate court in a suit and in the present case, the judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 was neither a decree nor the same was passed by a subordinate court in a suit. 27. This Court having regard to the definition of decree extracted above, has no hesitation to observe that the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 reopening the proceedings of First Appeal No. 13/1974 would not be a decree, inasmuch as the rights of the parties for the purposes of relief sought had yet to be determined. The opposite parties no. 27. This Court having regard to the definition of decree extracted above, has no hesitation to observe that the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 reopening the proceedings of First Appeal No. 13/1974 would not be a decree, inasmuch as the rights of the parties for the purposes of relief sought had yet to be determined. The opposite parties no. 2 to 4 clearly had a remedy to challenge the judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2010 once the First Appeal No. 13/1974 was decided on merit and this remedy would be available when we look at the plain language of Section 105 read with Order XLIII Rule 1-A CPC. The opposite parties no. 2 and 3 as against the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2010 could also avail the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India subject to limitation as aforesaid. The judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2010, therefore, is not a decree for two reasons; firstly, it does not culminate the rights of parties; secondly the aggrieved parties as against the judgment/order dated 21.12.2010 had a remedy as aforesaid. 28. The apex court in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, 2003 (6) SCC 675 , has observed that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is ordinarily akin to appellate or revisional power. Thus, the requirement as postulated under the definition of decree that an order would not be covered under the definition of decree if an appeal lies against the same is also met with looking to the position of law as aforesaid. 29. This Court may also note that the power exercised by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Unnao in Misc. Case No. 13/2007 under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC was not exercised along with Section 144 CPC, therefore, the question of the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 being a decree on that premise would also not arise. Since the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 was passed in the exercise of delegated appellate power of the District Judge, therefore, in view of the Full Bench judgment rendered in the case of Jupiter Chit Fund (P) Ltd. Vs. Dwarka Diesh, AIR 1979 All 218 , a revision under Section 115 CPC would also not lie. 30. Since the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 was passed in the exercise of delegated appellate power of the District Judge, therefore, in view of the Full Bench judgment rendered in the case of Jupiter Chit Fund (P) Ltd. Vs. Dwarka Diesh, AIR 1979 All 218 , a revision under Section 115 CPC would also not lie. 30. This Court is also conscious of the fact that two other proceedings i.e. Regular Suit No. 41 of 1995 and Regular Suit No. 58/2006 were decided along with Misc. Case No.13 of 2007. The opposite parties filed a separate First Appeal No. 4/2011 under Section 96 CPC insofar as the dismissal of Regular Suit No. 58 of 2006 is concerned. The said appeal as noted above, was dismissed. The opposite parties no. 2 and 3 while assailing the composite judgment dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 before the District Judge against the decree rendered in Regular Suit No. 58 of 2006, would, however, not be right to take advantage of Order XLIII Rule 1-A CPC against the order rendered in Misc. Case No. 13/2007 before the District Judge. It is for the reason that the composite judgment/order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 deciding Misc. Case No. 13/2007 along with other two Regular Suits was partly rendered in exercise of delegated appellate power of the District Judge. Once an order that could not be assailed under Section 105 read with Order XLIII Rule 1-A CPC in First Appeal No. 4/2011, the same was thus not open to be challenged in a regular first appeal as well. 31. Having given my anxious consideration to the second issue as aforesaid, I am of the considered opinion that the District Judge was not well within his power to entertain the First Appeal No. 5 of 2011 under Section 96 CPC inasmuch as the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 passed in Misc. Case No. 13/2007 setting aside the compromise decree dated 23.12.1976 under Order XXIII Rule-3 read with Section 151 CPC was not a decree passed by a subordinate court. 32. The discussion aforesaid necessarily answers the third question in negative, once it is held that the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2010 was not a decree of a subordinate court and the same for all purposes would be an order passed by the District Judge himself. 33. Before parting, it may also be put on record that this Court has confined this decision only to plot no. 33. Before parting, it may also be put on record that this Court has confined this decision only to plot no. 1843 and 1847 which admittedly are Waqf property, therefore, the application under Section 151 CPC for all purposes was filed on behalf of the Waqf Board for which the locus was unquestionable. The court below on such an aspect of the matter clearly misdirected the proceedings and the observations made are erroneous. An aggrieved person even if not a part to the decree impugned, would nevertheless, in the event of being aggrieved, shall have a right to challenge the same. In the present proceedings, however, the Waqf Board has been a party throughout. 34. Having regard to the observations recorded on the questions framed above, this Court has no hesitation to put on record that the impugned judgment dated 18.8.2018 passed by learned Additional District Judge (III), Unnao is without authority of law and is seriously erroneous on the fundamental principles which the court below ought to have conceived and dealt with. The very approach of the learned Additional Judge (III), Unnao being faulty, ought not to have allowed the issues to arise once a preliminary objection was raised by the petitioner. Surprisingly, the objection was not considered at all and this Court would expect the civil court to be cautious in this regard. The preliminary objection raised by the petitioner against maintainability of First appeal No. 5/2011 is sustained. 35. For the reasons recorded above, the petition deserves to be allowed and accordingly the impugned judgment/order dated 18.8.2018 is hereby set aside with a direction to the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Unnao to proceed with First Appeal No. 13/1974 and decide the same expeditiously and preferably within a period of six months from the date a certified copy of this judgment is filed. The petition is allowed. Cost is made easy.