ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 24.06.2017 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) passed by the Collector-cum-Divisional Forest Officer, West Forest Division, Hazaribagh, in BPLE Case No. 01 of 2013, G(F) Case No. 173 of 2013, whereby in purported exercise of the power under Section 6 of the Bihar (now Jharkhand) Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act, 1956) the petitioner has been directed to remove the encroachment (boundary wall and house) constructed over Plot No. 2455, Mouza Dhengura, measuring an area of about 20 acres within 20 days of the receipt of order or before 08.07.2017 (appears to be wrongly typed as 2016) failing which the said encroachment would be removed by the administration and the cost towards such removal would be recovered from the petitioner as per law. Further prayer has been made for quashing the order dated 22.08.2017 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh in BPLE Appeal No. 07 of 2017, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed. 2. The factual background of the case, as stated in the writ petition, is that the petitioner purchased the land situated at village Dhengura, P.S. Hazaribagh P.S. No. 115, District Hazaribagh under Khata No. 264/293, plot no. 2455, measuring an area of 19.55 acres and plot No. 2447, measuring an area of 1.75 acres (hereinafter called the said land) by way of registered sale deed dated 28.04.2010. Thereafter his name was mutated in the revenue records and he started paying rent for the same. The petitioner received a notice vide memo no. 2649 dated 31.07.2013 issued by the Collector-cum-Divisional Forest Officer, West Forest Division, Hazaribagh under Section 3 of Act, 1956. The petitioner preferred a writ petition before this Court being W.P. (C) No. 7245 of 2013 challenging the impugned notice as well as the order of cancellation of Jamabandi of the said land. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 12.01.2016, directing the petitioner to appear before the concerned authority and to submit his reply to the said notice. Thereafter, the petitioner appeared before the Collector-cum-Divisional Forest Officer and filed reply to the show cause notice. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 12.01.2016, directing the petitioner to appear before the concerned authority and to submit his reply to the said notice. Thereafter, the petitioner appeared before the Collector-cum-Divisional Forest Officer and filed reply to the show cause notice. However, the Divisional Forest Officer, West Forest Division, Hazaribagh, vide order dated 24.06.2017 has held that by virtue of notification dated 02.01.1953, the State Government through the Department of Forest has got all the proprietary right over the said land and as such the same is a public land. Further, the petitioner was directed to remove the alleged encroachment from the said land failing which the same would be removed by the district administration. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh being BPLE Appeal No. 07 of 2017, however, the same was also dismissed vide order dated 22.08.2017. Hence the present writ petition. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that originally the said land was recorded as Gairmazarua Malik under Khewat Nos. 3/1 and 14 and Samilat Khewat No. 27. The recorded Khewatdars Baijnath Pandey for himself and on behalf of his brother Kedar Nath Pandey along with Roshan Mian made permanent raiyati settlement of various lands including the said land with Smt. Atashi Kusum Sarkar by virtue of a registered settlement deed dated 17.09.1946 and also put the settlee in possession of the said lands. It is further submitted that on the eve of the vesting of Zamindari, the landlord filed return under Section 3K of the Bihar Land Reform Act, 1950 showing possession of said Atashi Kusum Sarkar upon the settled lands including the said land. The said land was subsequently transferred to various persons and the Jamabandi was also created in their names. The said land was notified as private protected forest under the Bihar Private Forest Act, 1947 but the same was subsequently released by the Forest Settlement Officer vide order dated 22.08.1949. It is also submitted that a proceeding for cancellation of Jamabandi of the said land was initiated by the Circle Officer, Katkamdag vide Misc. Case No. 10 of 2012-13 and a recommendation was made to the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Sadar, Hazaribagh for cancellation of jamabandi, however, all these actions were taken behind the back of the petitioner. It is also submitted that a proceeding for cancellation of Jamabandi of the said land was initiated by the Circle Officer, Katkamdag vide Misc. Case No. 10 of 2012-13 and a recommendation was made to the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Sadar, Hazaribagh for cancellation of jamabandi, however, all these actions were taken behind the back of the petitioner. It is further submitted that the Divisional Forest Officer and the appellate authority failed to appreciate that the instant case involved serious question of title which could not have been adjudicated in BPLE proceeding which is summary in nature. Moreover, by reasons of notification dated 02.01.1953, neither a title of the government was created upon the said land nor the title of the petitioner got extinguished. The Divisional Forest Officer and the appellate authority also failed to appreciate that in the demarcation register of Hazaribagh Range, the lands pertaining to Plot No. 2455 measuring an area of 48.50 acres and Plot No. 2447 measuring an area of 34.30 acres, Thana No. 115, Mouza Dhengura, P.S. Katkamsandi, District Hazaribagh have been shown as released area. It is thus submitted that the land in dispute is not a public land under section 2(3) of the Act, 1956 and as such the encroachment proceeding initiated in relation to the said land was itself without jurisdiction. 4. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the said land is a public land within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act, 1956 and as such the authorities have rightly passed the impugned orders and, thus, the same need no interference. It is further submitted that by virtue of a government notification dated 02.01.1953 issued under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, the said land has been declared as protected forest. It is also submitted that all the registered sale deeds alleged to have been executed for the said land are after the year 1963 and till that time the land had already been declared as protected forest and as such the vendors did not get any title upon it. It is further submitted that the petitioner has violated the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 as also the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkapad vs. Union of India and Others, (1997) 2 SCC 267 . It is further submitted that the petitioner has violated the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 as also the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkapad vs. Union of India and Others, (1997) 2 SCC 267 . It is also submitted that any notification issued under the Bihar Private Forest Act, 1947 is entirely different from the notification issued under Section 29 of the Indian Forests Act, 1927. Demarcation register cannot be a proof of ownership over the land. After promulgation of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the government got all the proprietary rights over the said land which has been recorded in the Khatian as Jungle. Hence in the light of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.N. Godavarman (supra), it has to be considered as forest land. It is further submitted that earlier a Bench of this Court vide order dated 12.1.2016 passed in W.P. (C) No. 7245 of 2013 has clearly observed that notice under Section 3 of the Act, 1956 issued in this regard vide memo no. 2649 dated 31.07.2013 by the court of Collector-cum-Divisional Forest Officer, Hazaribagh Western Forest Division cannot be termed as illegal because it has been issued under proper jurisdiction. It is lastly submitted that the present writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has not exhausted the remedy of filing appeal before the Commissioner under Section 11 of the Act, 1956. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The respondents have raised question regarding maintainability of the present writ petition, contending that the petitioner has approached this Court in writ jurisdiction without taking recourse as provided under Section 11 of the Act, 1956. On perusal of Section 11 of the Act, 1956, it would appear that if an order is passed under Sections 6, 7 and 8 by an officer other than the Collector of the district, the appeal will lie before the Collector of the said district or to any officer specifically empowered by the State Government by notification in the official gazette. However, if such order is passed by the Collector of the district, the appeal will lie before the Commissioner. However, if such order is passed by the Collector of the district, the appeal will lie before the Commissioner. In the present case, the impugned order dated 24th June, 2017 has been passed by the Divisional Forest Officer, West Forest Division, Hazaribagh and not by the Collector of the said district. Aggrieved by the said order dated 24th June, 2017, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh (Collector of the district), which was also dismissed vide order dated 22nd August, 2017. Thus, in my considered view, the petitioner has availed the remedy of appeal as provided under Section 11 of the Act, 1956 and, therefore, the present writ petition is maintainable. 6. The petitioner has challenged the original order as well as the appellate order passed under Act, 1956 primarily on the ground that a bona-fide dispute of title is involved with respect to the said land which could not have been adjudicated in a land encroachment proceeding. In support of the said contention, the petitioner has brought on record a copy of the sale deed of the said land which has not been disputed by the respondents. The petitioner has averred in the writ petition that the said land was settled by the Khewatdar to one Smt. Atashi Kusum Sarkar by virtue of a registered settlement deed dated 17.09.1946 and since then the settlee as well as the subsequent vendors/purchasers had been in possession of the said land and had also paid the rent to the Government. On contrary, it has been contended by the respondent-State that since the land was recorded as ‘Gairmazurwa Malik Jungle’ after vesting of Zamindari, the proprietary right of the same vested to the government. Moreover, in view of notification dated 02.01.1953 issued under Section 29 of the Act, 1927, the said land has been declared as protected forest. Thus any construction raised over the same is an encroachment which has rightly been directed to be removed. 7. It will thus be relevant to go through the provisions of Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 which reads as follows:- “29. Thus any construction raised over the same is an encroachment which has rightly been directed to be removed. 7. It will thus be relevant to go through the provisions of Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 which reads as follows:- “29. Protected Forests:- (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the provisions of this Chapter applicable to any forest-land or waste-land which is not included in a reserved forest, but which is the property of Government, or over which the Government has proprietary rights, or to the whole or any part of the forest-produce of which the Government is entitled. (2) The forest-land and waste-land comprised in any such notification, shall be called a protected forest. (3) No such notification shall be made unless the nature and extent of the rights of Government and of private persons in or over the forest-land or waste-land comprised therein have been inquired into and recorded at a survey or settlement, or in such other manner as the State Government, thinks sufficient. Every such record shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved: Provided that, if, in the case of any forest-land or waste-land, the State Government thinks that such inquiry and record are necessary, but that they will occupy such length of time as in the meantime to endanger the rights of Government, the State Government may, pending such inquiry and record, declare such land to be a protected forest, but so as not to abridge or affect any existing rights of individuals or communities.” 8. Section 29(1) of the Act, 1927 explicitly provides that the state government may notify officially declaring the provisions of the protected forests applicable to any forest land or waste land which is not included in a reserved forest, but over which the government has the proprietary rights, or to the whole or any part of the forest-produce of which the government is entitled. However, the condition precedent for issuing any notification under section 29 (1) is an inquiry under section 29 (3) about the nature and extent of the right of the government vis-a-vis the private persons upon the forest land or waste land. The respondents have, however, not brought on record that any fact to suggest that an enquiry was conducted before notifying the land as protected forest. The respondents have, however, not brought on record that any fact to suggest that an enquiry was conducted before notifying the land as protected forest. The respondents are claiming proprietary right of the government upon the said land on the ground that the same was “Gairmazurwa Malik Jungle” and as such by virtue of promulgation of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the same vested to the Government. 9. However it is a settled law that before vesting, the Zamindars were entitled to settle the Gairmazurwa Malik land to any person. Admittedly the land was notified under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 in the year 1953. However, the case of the petitioner is that before issuance of the said notification, the Khewatdar had made the raiyati settlement of the said land and the return to that effect was also filed. The petitioner is the purchaser of the said land and, thus, there appears to be bona-fide dispute of title between the parties. 10. In the case of Govt. of A.P. vs. Thummala Krishna Rao and Another, AIR 1982 SC 1081 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “8. The view of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided for by S. 6 cannot be resorted to unless the alleged encroachment is of "a very recent origin" cannot be stretched too far. That was also the view taken by the learned single Judge himself in another case which is reported in Mehrunnissa Begum vs. State of A.P. (1970) 1 Andh LT 88 : (1971) 1 Andh LT 292 which was affirmed by a Division Bench. It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person. What is relevant for the decision of that question is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bona fide. Facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. Facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can he taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law.” 11. It has been well settled by now that a summary proceeding for eviction under the Act, 1956 can be resorted to by the government only against such persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of government. If there is a bona-fide dispute regarding the title of the government vis-a-vis private persons over any property, the government cannot take unilateral decision in its own favour claiming that the property belongs to it and on the basis of such decision, take recourse to a summary proceeding provided for evicting a person who is in possession of the property under a bona fide claim of title. In the instant case, there appears to be a dispute of title between the petitioner and the State over the said land and, thus, the petitioner cannot be evicted by the respondent authorities except by following the due process of law. The summary proceeding prescribed under the Act, 1956 is not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. The said procedure is therefore not the due process for evicting the petitioner. Duration of occupation is also a relevant factor in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property for a considerable length of time may lay claim over the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law. 12. The next contention of the respondents is that the petitioner has violated the provisions of Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 as also the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.N. Godavarman (supra). 12. The next contention of the respondents is that the petitioner has violated the provisions of Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 as also the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.N. Godavarman (supra). Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 reads as under:- “S.2 : Restriction on the de-reservation of forests or use of forest land for non-forest purpose: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force in a State, no State Government or other authority shall make, except with the prior approval of the Central Government, any order directing: (i) that any reserved forest (within the meaning of the expression ‘reserved forest’ in any law for the time being in force in that State) or any portion thereof, shall cease to be reserved. (ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose. (iii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be assigned by way of lease or otherwise to any private person or to any authority, corporation, agency or any other organisation not owned, managed or controlled by Government. (iv) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be cleared of trees which have grown naturally in that land or portion, for the purpose of using it for re afforestation. Explanation - For the purposes of this section ‘‘non-forest purpose” means the breaking up or clearing of any forest land or portion thereof for:- (a) the cultivation of tea, coffee, spices, rubber, palms, oil-bearing plants, horticulture crops or medicinal plants. (b) any purpose other than re-afforestation, but does not include any work relating or ancillary to conservation, development and management of forests and wild-life, namely, the establishment of check-posts, fire lines, wireless communications and construction of fencing, bridges and culverts, dams, waterholes, trench marks, boundary marks, pipelines or other like purposes.” 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.N. Godavarman (supra) in para-4, has held as under:- “4. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 was enacted with a view to check further deforestation which ultimately results in ecological imbalance and therefore, the provisions made therein for the conservation of forests and for matters connected therewith, must apply to all forests irrespective of the nature of ownership or classification thereof. The word “forest’’ must be understood according to its dictionary meaning. The word “forest’’ must be understood according to its dictionary meaning. This description covers all statutorily recognised forests, whether designated as reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of Section 2(i) of the Forest Conservation Act. The term “forest land” occurring in Section 2, will not only include “forest” as understood in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the Government record irrespective of the ownership. This is how it has to be understood for the purpose of Section 2 of the Act. The provisions enacted in the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 for the conservation of forests and the matters connected therewith must apply clearly to all forests so understood irrespective of the ownership or classification thereof. This aspect has been made abundantly clear in the decisions of this court in Ambica Quarrry Works and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Others and Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra vs. State of U.P. and recently in the order in Supreme Court Monitoring Committee vs. Mussorie Dehradun Development Authority. The earlier decision of this court in State of Bihar vs. Banshi Ram Modi and Others, has, therefore, to be understood in the light of these subsequent decision. We consider it necessary to reiterate this settled position emerging from the decisions of this court to dispel the doubt, if any, in the perception of any State Government or authority. This has become necessary also because of the stand taken on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, even at this late stage, relating to permissions granted for mining in such area which is clearly contrary to the decisions of this court. It is reasonable to assume that any State Government which has failed to appreciate the correct position in law so far, will forthwith correct its stance and take the necessary remedial measures without any further delay.” 14. In view of the provisions contained in Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of T. Godavarman (supra), it is abundantly clear that Section 2 of the Act, 1980 is applicable to the government as well as the private forest land so as to check/restrict deforestation which ultimately results in ecological imbalance. The term ‘Forest’ will not only mean forest as understood in the dictionary sense but will also include the land recorded as forest in the government record irrespective of its ownership. Thus, the purpose of Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 is to check deforestation irrespective of the fact that the land is owned by the government or by a private person. Nevertheless, a land encroachment proceeding cannot be initiated against any land owner alleging violation of the provisions of Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 or the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court rendered in the case of T. Godavarman (supra), since the land encroachment proceeding is only meant for removal of encroachment from any public land. 15. In view of the discussions made herein above, the impugned order dated 24.06.2017 passed by the Collector-cum-Divisional forest Officer, Hazaribagh in BPLE Case No. 01 of 2013, G(F) Case No. 173 of 2013 (Annexure-7) as also the appellate order dated 22.08.2017 (Annexure-9) passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh in BPLE Appeal No. 07 of 2017 are quashed and set aside having been passed without jurisdiction. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. 16. However, the respondents are at liberty to take appropriate recourse before the civil court of competent jurisdiction, if they claim the title of the government over the said land. 17. It is further observed that if the petitioner makes any deforestation on the said land, the respondents are at liberty to take appropriate action against him as provided under the law.