JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This is an application under Section 439 Cr.P.C for enlarging the accused-petitioner, namely, Shri Ranjit Debbarma, who has been detained in custody since 11-11-2017 in connection with Teliamura Police Station Case No.83 of 2017 U/s 124-A/153-A/153-B/120-B IPC and Sections 10/13/18 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 2. Both Mr. P.K. Biswas, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. S. Sarkar, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, have been heard at length. The submissions of the learned senior counsel are that the FIR against the petitioner is based on false and concocted story as dictated by the local CPM leaders out of political rivalry and that no provocative speeches were ever made by him questioning the sovereignty and integrity of the country. Drawing my attention to Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 380 , the learned senior counsel submits that even if it is assumed that the petitioner is a member of a banned organization also, mere membership of such an organization without any evidence of him resorting or inciting people to violence or creating public disorder by violence or incitement to violence will not make the petitioner a criminal. According to the learned senior counsel, reading the various speeches of the petitioner allegedly made by him reading as a whole cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed to be seditious or promoting enmity between the tribals and Bengalis or doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony in the State. He, therefore, urges this Court to release the petitioner on bail and in the event of bail, he will neither abscond nor hamper the investigation or intimidate the prosecution witnesses, for which he is willing and able to furnish bail-bonds to the satisfaction of this Court. 3. On the other hand, Mr. S. Sarkar, the learned Public Prosecutor, vehemently opposes the bail application and submits that this is not a fit case for granting bail to the petitioner. He takes me to the statements of prosecution witnesses recorded U/s 161 Cr.P.C to convince me that there are sufficient materials to bring home the charges against the petitioner. On the other hand, Mr. S. Sarkar, the learned Public Prosecutor, vehemently opposes the bail application and submits that this is not a fit case for granting bail to the petitioner. He takes me to the statements of prosecution witnesses recorded U/s 161 Cr.P.C to convince me that there are sufficient materials to bring home the charges against the petitioner. It is the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that if the petitioner, who is an armed terrorist, is enlarged on bail, this will send a wrong signal to others to indulge in similar activities, which will ultimately result in revival of insurgency in the State; this must be avoided by denying him bail so that he cannot take part in unlawful activities. He relies on Redaul Hussain Khan v. National Investigating Agency, (2010) 1 SCC 521 and State of Maharashtra and others v. Dhanendra Shriram Bhurle and Ors., (2009) 11 SCC 541 to fortify his submissions. He, therefore, submits that bail must be denied to the petitioner so that public order and peace is maintained in this State. 4. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of both the parties. Once again, this Court is confronted with the perpetual rivalry between security of State and liberty of an individual. Nonetheless, bail is the rule and jail is still the exception. The law relating to bail is well-settled in a long chain of the decisions rendered by the Apex Court. In Anwari Begum v. Sher Mohammed and another, 2005 Cri L J 4132, the Apex Court observed: “8. .…… Though detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case is to be avoided by the Court while passing orders on bail applications, yet a court dealing with the bail application should be satisfied as to whether there is a prima facie case, but exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case is not necessary. The court dealing with the application for bail is required to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. 9. There is a need to indicate in the order, reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where an accused was charged of having committed a serious offence. The court dealing with the application for bail is required to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. 9. There is a need to indicate in the order, reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where an accused was charged of having committed a serious offence. It is necessary for the courts dealing with application for bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail, they are: 1. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence; 2. Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant; 3. Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge.” 5. The following observations of the Apex Court in Afzal Khan @ Babu Murthuzakhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2007 SC 2111 are quite instructive for disposing of this bail application: “16. We are not oblivious of some of the decisions of this Court that the Courts should assign reasons while allowing or refusing an application for bail. But then it is trite that detailed reasons touching the merit of the matter should not be given, which may prejudice the accused. What is necessary is that the order should not suffer from non-application of mind. At this stage a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case is not required to be undertaken. 17. Ordinarily, a bail application, in a case of this nature, which involves the security of the State should be rejected.” 18. Our attention has, however, been drawn to Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India and Ors., (1996) 2 SCC 616 , paragraph 13 of the case reads as under: “13. 17. Ordinarily, a bail application, in a case of this nature, which involves the security of the State should be rejected.” 18. Our attention has, however, been drawn to Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India and Ors., (1996) 2 SCC 616 , paragraph 13 of the case reads as under: “13. For the purpose of grant of bail to TADA detenus, we divide the undertrials into three (sic four) classes, namely, (a) hardcore undertrials whose release would prejudice the prosecution case and whose liberty may prove to be a menace to society in general and to the complainant and prosecution witnesses in particular; (b) other undertrials whose overt acts or involvement directly attract Sections 3 and/or 4 of the TADA Act; (c) undertrials who are roped in, not because of any activity directly attracting Sections 3 and 4, but by virtue of Section 120-B or 147, IPC, and; (d) those undertrials who were found possessing incriminating articles in notified areas and are booked under Section 5 of TADA. 19. In Nalini (supra), the learned Judges forming the Division Bench differed in their opinion as to whether confession of a co-accused would be admissible as a substantive evidence against another co-accused. We, however, at this stage, are not concerned with such a situation. 20. In a case of this nature, it is very difficult to say at this stage as to whether they are parties to the larger conspiracy or not. In the evidence, it is alleged that one of the appellants had gone for training to Pakistan, another had provided money and he had been in possession of a large quantity of arms. A strong prima facie case has been made out against the appellants herein. Their release at this juncture may hamper the smooth conduct of trial since main witnesses are yet to be examined. One of the appellants hails from a different State. It may be difficult to secure his presence, if released on bail at this crucial juncture.” (Underlined for emphasis) 6. I have carefully gone through the case diary including the statements of the witnesses recorded U/s 161 Cr.P.C. Admittedly, this is a case involving the security of the State. One of the appellants hails from a different State. It may be difficult to secure his presence, if released on bail at this crucial juncture.” (Underlined for emphasis) 6. I have carefully gone through the case diary including the statements of the witnesses recorded U/s 161 Cr.P.C. Admittedly, this is a case involving the security of the State. Considering the alleged statement of the petitioner on 7-11-2017 as unanimously reproduced by the aforesaid witnesses to the effect that “SS ATTF President Ranjit Debbarma also said that we have to be united to send back the Bengalis people to Bangladesh. Don’t worry, join the TUPC. We are not like IPFT party upon whom stones were pelted during their road march to Agartala. We are armed extremist. We are not afraid of Bengalee. All are requested to participate in our strategy programme to be carried out in ensuing 9th December.” What constitutes the offence of “sedition” has been succinctly explained by the Apex Court in Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 in the following manner: “It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. The provisions of the sections (Section 124-A and Section 505 IPC) read as a whole, along with the explanations, make it reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence. As already pointed out, the explanations appended to the main body of the section make it clear that criticism of public measures or comment on Government action, however strongly worded, would be within reasonable limits and would be consistent with the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. It is only when the words, written or spoken, etc. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order. So construed, the section, in our opinion, strikes the correct balance between individual fundamental rights and the interest of public order. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order. So construed, the section, in our opinion, strikes the correct balance between individual fundamental rights and the interest of public order. It is also well settled that in interpreting an enactment the Court should have regard not merely to the literal meaning of the words used, but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress (vide The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar MANU/SC/0083/1955: [1955] 2 SCR 603 and R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India MANU/SC/0020/1957: [1957] 1 SCR 930. Viewed in that light, we have no hesitation in so construing the provisions of the sections impugned in these cases as to limit their application to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder, or disturbance of law and order, or incitement to violence.” In light of the above observations of the Apex Court, in my opinion, such utterances complained of, if eventually proved in the course of trial, will come within the purview of Section 124-A IPC. Therefore, it cannot at this stage be said that there is no prima facie case of the charges levelled against the petitioner. 7. Consequently, no case for bail is made out by the petitioner. In the result, the bail application stands rejected. Nothing stated in the foregoing shall be construed as an observation by this Court on the merit of the case, which is yet to be tried before the trial court.