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2018 DIGILAW 2416 (PNJ)

Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab

2018-05-24

AMOL RATTAN SINGH

body2018
JUDGMENT : AMOL RATTAN SINGH, J. 1. By this petition the petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No.264 dated 03.11.2013, registered at Police Station Sadar Dhuri, District Sangrur, alleging therein the commission of offences punishable under Sections 304-A and 279 IPC, alongwith all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, including the judgment of conviction by the trial court; and Criminal Appeal no.298 of 29.08.2013 pending in the Court of the learned Addl.Sessions Judge, Sangrur. Quashing is sought on the basis of a compromise reached between the petitioner and those who are stated to be the legal heirs of deceased Jagdish Kumar, who unfortunately died in a motor accident, with the learned trial Court having recorded a finding that it was actually the petitioner who was negligent in causing the accident, leading to the death. Consequently, the petitioner having been found guilty for the commission of the aforesaid offences, he has been sentenced by that Court to two years' rigorous imprisonment vide the judgment of the trial Court dated 06.08.2016, against which he is stated to be in appeal before the learned Appellate Court. 2. Though the compromise arrived at between the petitioner and Jagdev Kaur alias Bholi widow of Jagdish Kumar, Sunny Kumar, Mandeep Singh, Mona Kumari, sons and daughter of Jagdish Kumar, with the deed of compromise (Annexure P-6), states that the said persons have no objection even to the quashing of the FIR, however, as reiterated again today by the learned State counsel, a Division Bench of this Court in 'Baldev Singh vs. State of Punjab and another' 2016 (3) Law Herald 2020, held as follows, after discussing various judgments as were cited before it :- “20. To say that Courts should not hesitate to intervene in favour of the accused in such cases is indeed a dangerous proposition with a potential to provide an impetus to a proclivity on the part of the drivers to continue with their rash and negligent act buoyed by the thought that they would get away with the crime by affording sufficient compensation to the victim's legal representatives. Once it has been authoritatively held by the Supreme Court that even grant of compensation under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. is not to be regarded as a mitigating circumstance to reduce the sentence imposed and neither can it be a substitute for an adequate sentence in all cases, it cannot be held that in cases where the matter is settled with the legal heirs of the deceased by giving adequate compensation, the proceedings should be quashed. 21. Likewise, to draw an analogy that in cases involving the offence under Section 307 which are of heinous nature, it has been opined by the courts that (though) the factum of a settlement or compromise between the parties can be a guiding factor, is not justified. In the case under Section 304-A the victim is obviously not present to settle the matter. To permit a legal representative or legal heir to compromise or settle the matter is indeed an invitation to a dangerous trend and cannot be permitted. To quash the proceedings under Section 304-A solely on the basis of a settlement or compromise arrived at between the accused and the legal representatives is not permissible and militates against all canons of justice. Inclusion of the legal representatives in the definition of victim does not clothe him/them to enter into such a settlement, though the legal representative, undoubtedly has the authority to file an appeal or receive compensation.” 3. Thereafter, it has been held, of course, that the Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in appropriate matters, where it is felt that even a prima facie case is not made out against the accused. 4. Mr. Pheruman, learned counsel for the petitioner, has cited a judgment of the Supreme Court in 'Aitha Chander Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh' 1981 SCC (Criminal) 637, wherein while refusing to interfere in the judgment of conviction, the appellant in that case was ordered to be released on probation of good conduct, in terms of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 5. While doing so, it had also been observed that as a consequence of being released on probation, the conviction “may not affect his service career in view of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.” 6. Mr. 5. While doing so, it had also been observed that as a consequence of being released on probation, the conviction “may not affect his service career in view of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.” 6. Mr. Pheruman has also cited the judgment in 'Puttaswamy vs. State of Karnataka and another' 2009 (1) RCR (Criminal) 501, wherein again, while maintaining the appellants' conviction for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC, the amount of fine to be paid was increased from Rs.2,000/- to Rs.20,000/-, while reducing the sentence of imprisonment, to the period already undergone by him. 7. Thus, as regards the conviction itself, it was not interfered with, in either of the two cases cited. 8. Though Mr. Pheruman has submitted that as was done in the case of Aitha Chander Rao (supra), while maintaining the conviction of the present petitioner, he may be released on probation of good conduct, in terms of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, Mr. Walia, learned State counsel opposes even that, on the basis of the ratio in Baldev Singhs' case (supra). 9. It is to be noticed that learned counsel appearing for respondents no. 2 to 5, i.e. the widow and the children of the deceased, does not oppose either quashing of the FIR itself, or the release of the petitioner on probation of good conduct, (naturally in terms of the compromise reached between the parties). 10. Having considered the rival submissions, in the opinion of this Court, releasing the petitioner on probation of good conduct at this stage, may result in actually negating the ratio and the spirit of the judgment of the Division Bench in Baldev Singhs' case (supra). 11. Undoubtedly, if a revision petition is filed invoking jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Cr. P.C., against judgments of conviction and orders of sentence passed by a trial Court and appellate Court, this Court may be within its jurisdiction to release a convict/prisoner on probation of good conduct, if he/she meets with the parameters laid down in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 12. However, exercising such jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C., against judgments of conviction and orders of sentence passed by a trial Court and appellate Court, this Court may be within its jurisdiction to release a convict/prisoner on probation of good conduct, if he/she meets with the parameters laid down in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 12. However, exercising such jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C., releasing a convict on probation of good conduct, for any term of the sentence imposed upon him, at a stage when his appeal is still pending before the appellate Court (against the judgment and order of sentence of the trial Court), in my opinion, may not be proper. 13. Again undoubtedly, this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C., very often quashes criminal proceedings including an FIR itself, in appropriate cases, when a compromise has been reached between the parties to the dispute, keeping in mind of course, settled law in terms of Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab 2014 (2) RCR (Criminal) 482 and other judgments on the issue (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another 2012 (4) RCR (Criminal) 543, etc.). 14. However, as regards quashing all criminal proceedings, whether at the stage of the FIR itself, or at any subsequent stage, simply on the basis of a compromise reached between the legal heirs of a deceased and the accused, where the offence alleged is one punishable under Section 304-A of the IPC, may not be appropriate, it having been held to be impermissible by the Division Bench in Baldev Singh's case, and as already noticed, even the Supreme Court has refused to set aside the conviction in such cases, though reducing the punishment to the extent already undergone by a convict, or by way of releasing him on probation of good conduct for the remaining part of his sentence. 15. However, that too was in cases (as cited before this Court in Rao and Puttaswamys' cases), when criminal proceedings had reached culmination even up to the High Courts concerned, and not at a stage when trials or appeals were pending. 16. Of course even if at such early stages the Supreme Court had done so, it would possibly be in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, which jurisdiction is obviously wholly different from jurisdiction exercised by this court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. 16. Of course even if at such early stages the Supreme Court had done so, it would possibly be in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, which jurisdiction is obviously wholly different from jurisdiction exercised by this court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. However, since a compromise has been reached in the present case between the legal heirs of the deceased and the petitioner-accused, and a prayer has been made before this Court that even if the FIR itself is not to be quashed and even the judgment of the trial Court convicting the petitioner is not to be set aside, yet this Court may direct release of the petitioner on probation of good conduct for the remaining part of his sentence, and this is an issue which comes up time and again, for final adjudication on the matter (as regards this Court), the following question of law may be referred to a larger Bench, after obtaining necessary orders from Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice :- “Can this Court, especially in view of the ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench in Baldev Singhs' case (supra), in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, release a convict on probation of good conduct for any term of his imprisonment, even where the matter has been 'compromised' by the convict with the legal heirs of the deceased, where the convict has been convicted for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of the IPC and sentenced to any term of imprisonment, when his appeal is still pending before the appellate Court?” 18. For constitution of an appropriate Bench, let the case file be put up before Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice.