ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner, whose writ petition being W.P. (S) No.4510 of 2007 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 14th July, 2016, whereby, the order of punishment of dismissal was confirmed because of the misappropriation of the money by this appellant-delinquent being a Head Cashier of the respondents-Bank. 2. Having heard learned counsel for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that this appellant is an original petitioner. He was working as a Head Cashier with the respondents-Bank of India, Baghmara Branch, District Dhanbad. 3. Because of the several misconducts committed by this appellant (original petitioner)-delinquent, this appellant was suspended with effect from 1st August, 2005. Charge-sheet was issued upon this appellant on 24th November, 2005 (Annexure 2). 4. There are as many as five charges levelled against this appellant and they read as under:- “CHARGE-I that, Shri Sriram Nonia, customer having S.B. A/c No.9833 had deposited his S.B. A/c Pass Book for updation with the Branch sometime during the third week of April 2005 and could get it back only in the second week of May 2005. Taking advantage of the fact that the Pass Book was lying with the Branch, you surreptitiously removed the said Pass Book, dishonestly got a withdrawal slip filled up in your own hand for Rs.10,000/-dated 03.05.2005 for the debit of S.B. A/c. No.9833 of Shri Sriram Nonia, forged the signature/s of the customer on the face and reverse of the said withdrawal slip, managed to present the same along with the Pass Book for payment and the withdrawal slip having been paid on 03.05.2005, Bank is involved in fraud to the tune of Rs.10,000/-and consequent loss; that, your afore-said acts, if proved, will amount to the gross misconduct of “doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank” within the meaning of clause 5(j) of the Bi-partite Settlement dated 10.4.2002. CHARGE – II that, Shri Jethu Dhoba, customer having S.B. A/c. No.12398 had deposited his S.B. A/c. Pass Book with you for updation on 04.05.2005 and could get it back only on 08.05.2005 with the Pass Book updated only upto 04.05.2005. CHARGE – II that, Shri Jethu Dhoba, customer having S.B. A/c. No.12398 had deposited his S.B. A/c. Pass Book with you for updation on 04.05.2005 and could get it back only on 08.05.2005 with the Pass Book updated only upto 04.05.2005. Taking advantage of the fact that the Pass Book is in your hand, you dishonestly got a withdrawal slip filled up in your own hand for Rs.15,000/-dated 05.05.2005 for the debit of S.B. A/c. No.12398 of Shri Jethu Dhoba, forged the signature/s of the customer on the face and reverse of the said withdrawal slip, managed to present the same along with the Pass Book for payment and the withdrawal slip having been paid on 05.05.2005, Bank is involved in fraud to the tune of Rs.15,000/-and consequent loss; that, your afore-said acts, if proved, will amount to the gross misconduct of “doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank” within the meaning of clause 5(j) of the Bi-partite Settlement dated 10.4.2002. CHARGE – III that, Shri K. Chauhan having joint S.B. A/c No.13922 with Smt Gauri Devi, had deposited his S.B. A/c Pass Book with the Branch for updation on 15.04.2005 and could get it back updated only on 15.06.2005. Taking advantage of the fact that the Pass Book is in the Branch, you surreptitiously removed the said Passbook, dishonestly got a withdrawal slip filled up in your own hand for Rs.30,000/-dated 05.05.2005 for the debit of S.B. A/c. No.13922 of Shri K. Chauhan, forged the signature/s of Shri Chauhan on the face and reverse of the said withdrawal slip, managed to present the same along with the Pass Book for payment and the withdrawal slip having been paid on 05.05.2005, Bank is involved in fraud to the tune of Rs.30,000/-and consequent loss; that, your afore-said acts, if proved, will amount to the gross misconduct of “doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank” within the meaning of clause 5(j) of the Bi-partite Settlement dated 10.4.2002. CHARGE – IV that, Shir M. Chauhan having joint S.B. A/c No.15603 with Shri S. Chauhan, had deposited his S.B. A/c Pass Book with the Branch for updation and the same was with the Branch when he had deposited cash in his account on 05.05.2005 and 07.05.2005 and could get it back updated only on 14.05.2005. CHARGE – IV that, Shir M. Chauhan having joint S.B. A/c No.15603 with Shri S. Chauhan, had deposited his S.B. A/c Pass Book with the Branch for updation and the same was with the Branch when he had deposited cash in his account on 05.05.2005 and 07.05.2005 and could get it back updated only on 14.05.2005. Taking advantage of the fact that the Pass Book is in the Branch, you surreptitiously removed the said Pass Book, dishonestly got a withdrawal slip filled up in your own hand for Rs.40,000/-dated 06.05.2005 for the debit of S.B. A/c. No.15603 of Shri M. Chouhan (Jt.), forged the signature/s of Shri M. Chauhan & Shri S. Chauhan on the face and reverse of the said withdrawal slip, managed to present the same along with the Pass Book for payment and the withdrawal slip having been paid on 06.05.2005, Bank is involved in fraud to the tune of Rs.40,000/-and consequent loss; that, your afore-said acts, if proved, will amount to the gross misconduct of “doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank” within the meaning of clause 5(j) of the bi-partite Settlement dated 10.4.2002. CHARGE – V that, Shri Singeshwar Mehta, customer having S.B. A/c. No.6463 had deposited his S.B. A/c. Pass Book with you on 30th April 2005 and when he withdrew Rs.5000/-on 16.05.2005 and used the Pass Book for that purpose, it was found updated only upto 30.04.2005. Taking advantage of the fact that the Pass Book is deposited with you, you dishonestly got a withdrawal slip filled up in your own hand for Rs.25,000/-dated 14.05.2005 for the debit of withdrawal slip filled up in your own hand for Rs.25,000/-dated 14.05.2005 for the debit of S.B. A/c. No.6463 of Shri Mehta, forged the signature/s of the customer on the face and reverse of the said withdrawal slip, managed to present the same along with the Pass Book for payment and the withdrawal slip having been paid on 14.05.2005, Bank is involved in fraud to the tune of Rs.25,000/-and consequent loss; that, your afore-said acts, if proved, will amount to the gross misconduct of “doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank” within the meaning of clause 5(j) of the Bi-partite Settlement dated 10.4.2002.” 5. For the aforesaid charges, Enquiry Officer was appointed and several witnesses were examined and several documentary evidences were also placed before the Enquiry Officer. For the aforesaid charges, Enquiry Officer was appointed and several witnesses were examined and several documentary evidences were also placed before the Enquiry Officer. After giving adequate opportunity of being heard to this appellant, the Enquiry Officer gave his report on 06.02.2006, wherein following were the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer:- “CONCLUSION Based on the enquiry proceedings, supporting documents placed from Management and Defence and Examination and Cross Examination of witnesses both (Management & Defence), Argument given by the P.O, Argument given by the Defence, by applying my own prudence, Circumstantial and sequential incidents in the transaction involving the instruments ME-6, ME-7, ME-8, ME-9, ME10 by which the bank has been defrauded to the tune of Rs.10000/-, Rs.15000/-, Rs.40000/-, Rs.30000/-& Rs.25000/-are written by the C.S.E. in his own handwriting and the C.S.E. was instrumental in forging the signatures on ME-6, ME-7, ME-8, ME-9, ME-10, managed to present the same alongwith Pass Book for Payment. Hence, I hold the charges levelled against the C.S.E. Md. Salahuddin Azad vide Charge Sheet No.ZO:DNB:IR:2150 DT. 24.11.2005 under Charge No.I, Charge No:II, Charge No:III, Charge No:IV, Charge No:V, are PROVED.” (Emphasis supplied) 6. After the Enquiry Officer gave his report, 2nd show-cause notice was given to this appellant-delinquent dated 20th March, 2006 (Annexure 4) for the quantum of punishment. 7. Again after giving an opportunity of being heard after issuance of the nd show-cause notice, the Disciplinary Authority has passed the order of dismissal for this appellant on 27th April, 2006 (Annexure 6). 8. This appellant (original petitioner) preferred a departmental appeal which was also rejected by the Departmental Appellate Authority vide order dated 2nd February, 2007, against which this appellant had preferred writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 4510 of 2007, which was also dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order 14th July, 2016 and, hence, the original petitioner has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 9. Thus, looking to the facts and circumstances of this case, it appears that because of the misconduct committed by this appellant (original petitioner) as a Head Cashier of the respondent-Bank, charge-sheet was issued on 24th November, 2005 (Annexure 2). There are five charges levelled against this appellant about the withdrawal of money from the bank accounts of the customers of the Bank fraudulently and without knowledge of the customers. There are five charges levelled against this appellant about the withdrawal of money from the bank accounts of the customers of the Bank fraudulently and without knowledge of the customers. Total amount withdrawn by this appellant without knowledge of the customers and without knowledge of the Bank and without permission of the customers, comes to Rs.1,20,000/-. For these charges, adequate opportunity of being heard was given and ultimately the Enquiry Officer has arrived at a conclusion that the charges levelled against this appellant (original petitioner)-delinquent have been proved. Looking to the Enquiry Officer's report dated 06.02.2006, it is based upon the evidences on record – oral evidences as well as documentary evidences. 10. Much has been argued out by the counsel for the appellant that the charges levelled against this appellant have not been proved at all, especially, looking to the handwriting expert's report which is annexed with the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal at Annexure 9. It was also argued out that there is an acquittal of the appellant in the Criminal Case being G.R. No.1681 of 2005 order of the acquittal dated 10th February, 2014. None of this contention is helpful to this appellant, because this Court is not sitting in appeal against the Enquiry Officer's report. 11. It has been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Bhola Nath Singh reported in (1997) 3 SCC 657 at paragraph 6 as under:- “6. Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence and the manner in which the evidence was examined and to record a finding in that behalf. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. It has also been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Govt. of A.P. Vs. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan reported in (2006) 2 SCC 373 , at paragraphs 10 and 11 as under:- “10. From the finding recorded by the High Court it clearly appears that the High Court reappreciated the evidence as an appellate authority. Apart from reappreciating the evidence, which is not permissible in law, the High Court also fell in grave error by directing the Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the respondent herein to again view the cassettes. It is on record that the inquiry officer relied on the video cassettes displayed during the inquiry as part of additional evidence. The finding has been clearly recorded by the inquiry officer on the basis of the evidence adduced by PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4 during the inquiry. 11. By now it is a well-established principle of law that the High Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by reappreciating the evidence as an appellate authority.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. It has further been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of SBI Vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey reported in (2013) 2 SCC 740 at paragraph 25 as under:- “25. The High Court, in our view, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not justified in interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the appointing authority after a full-fledged inquiry, especially when the Service Rules provide for an alternative remedy of appeal. Narendra Kumar Pandey reported in (2013) 2 SCC 740 at paragraph 25 as under:- “25. The High Court, in our view, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not justified in interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the appointing authority after a full-fledged inquiry, especially when the Service Rules provide for an alternative remedy of appeal. It is a well-accepted principle of law that the High Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority. Of course, its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct an error of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of the principles of natural justice. In SBI v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde this Court held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence acting as a court of appeal. We have, on facts, found that no procedural irregularity has been committed either by the Bank, presenting officer or the inquiring authority. Disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the Service Rules.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. So far as the second contention raised by this appellant that there is an acquittal from the Criminal charges in G.R. o.1681 of 2005 vide order of acquittal dated 10th February, 2014 is concerned, the said contention is also of no help to this appellant mainly for the reasons that, (a) The charges on a Civil side and the charges on Criminal side are entirely different. 'Charges on a Civil side' against this appellant are violation of rules of discipline of the Bank, unbecoming to an Officer of the Bank, breach of trust between the employer and the employee, loss of prestige of the Bank in the eyes of the customers, dereliction in the duty, negligence in performing the duties. These are the charges on Civil side by the methodology adopted by this appellant that being a Head Cashier of the respondents-Bank, secretly and without the permission of the customers and keeping the respondents-Bank in dark, withdrew money from the bank accounts of the customers, whereas, charges on the Criminal side against this appellant is about the forgery or cheating, etc. (b) On a Criminal side, the charges levelled against this appellant are bound to be proved beyond reasonable doubts, whereas, on a Civil Side, the charges are to be proved on 'preponderance of probabilities'. (b) On a Criminal side, the charges levelled against this appellant are bound to be proved beyond reasonable doubts, whereas, on a Civil Side, the charges are to be proved on 'preponderance of probabilities'. (c) Even if the charges on a Criminal side are not proved, such an employee, who is known as delinquent, in the departmental proceeding, can always be punished, if the charges levelled against him are proved, on preponderance of probabilities. 15. It has been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Sarvesh Berry reported in (2005) 10 SCC 471 at paragraphs 7 and 8 as under:- “7. It is a fairly well-settled position in law that on basic principles, proceedings in criminal case and departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously, except in some cases where departmental proceedings and criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common. It is in these cases, the court has to decide, taking into account the special features of the case, whether simultaneous continuance of both would be proper. 8. The purposes of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. Criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society, or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So, crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of a grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of a grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”). Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. It has also been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Commr. Of Police Vs. Narender Singh reported in (2006) 4 SCC 265 at paragraph 13 as under:- “13. It is now well settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. It has further been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Pathrella Vs. Oriental Bank of Commerce reported in (2006) 10 SCC 572 , at paragraph 11 as under:- “11. In our view, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are fallacious. This Court has taken the view consistently that acquittal in a criminal case would be no bar for drawing up a disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent officer. It is well-settled principle of law that the yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the disciplinary proceeding. This Court has taken the view consistently that acquittal in a criminal case would be no bar for drawing up a disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent officer. It is well-settled principle of law that the yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the disciplinary proceeding. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is a proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. It has also been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka SRTC Vs. M.G. Vittal Rao reported in (2012) 1 SCC 442 at paragraphs 11 to 16 as under:- “11. The question of considering reinstatement after decision of acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal court arises only and only if the dismissal from services was based on conviction by the criminal court in view of the provisions of Article 311(2)(b)[sic Article 311(2) second proviso (a)] of the Constitution of India, or analogous provisions in the statutory rules applicable in a case. In a case where enquiry has been held independently of the criminal proceedings, acquittal in a criminal court is of no help. The law is otherwise. Even if a person stood acquitted by a criminal court, domestic enquiry can be held, the reason being that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are altogether different. In a criminal case, standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic enquiry it is the preponderance of probabilities that constitutes the test to be applied. 12. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India this Court held: “5. … The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceeding.” 13. In State of Karnataka v. T. Venkataramanappa, this Court held that acquittal in a criminal case cannot be held to be a bar to hold departmental enquiry for the same misconduct for the reason that in a criminal trial, standard of proof is different as the case is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt but in the departmental proceeding, such a strict proof of misconduct is not required. 14. 14. In State of A.P. v. K. Allabakash, while dismissing the appeal against acquittal by the High Court, this Court observed as under: “2. …that acquittal of the respondent shall not be construed as a clear exoneration of the respondent, for the allegations call for departmental proceedings, if not already initiated, against him.” 15. While dealing with a similar issue, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., held as under: “11. … In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of ‘preponderance of probability’.” 16. The issue as to whether disciplinary proceedings can be held at the time when the delinquent employee is facing the criminal trial, has also been considered from time to time. In State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena this Court while dealing with the issue observed as under: (SCC pp. 422-23, para 14) “14. The issue as to whether disciplinary proceedings can be held at the time when the delinquent employee is facing the criminal trial, has also been considered from time to time. In State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena this Court while dealing with the issue observed as under: (SCC pp. 422-23, para 14) “14. It would be evident from the above decisions that each of them starts with the indisputable proposition that there is no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously and then say that in certain situations, it may not be ‘desirable’, ‘advisable’ or ‘appropriate’ to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry when a criminal case is pending on identical charges. … The only ground suggested in the above decisions as constituting a valid ground for staying the disciplinary proceedings is that ‘the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced’. This ground has, however, been hedged in by providing further that this may be done in cases of grave nature involving questions of fact and law. In our respectful opinion, it means that not only the charges must be grave but that the case must involve complicated questions of law and fact. Moreover, ‘advisability’, ‘desirability’ or ‘propriety’, as the case may be, has to be determined in each case taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. … One of the contending considerations is that the disciplinary enquiry cannot be-and should not be-delayed unduly. So far as criminal cases are concerned, it is well known that they drag on endlessly where high officials or persons holding high public offices are involved. They get bogged down on one or the other ground. They hardly ever reach a prompt conclusion. … If a criminal case is unduly delayed that may itself be a good ground for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even where the disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier stage. The interests of administration and good government demand that these proceedings are concluded expeditiously. It must be remembered that interests of administration demand that undesirable elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanour is enquired into promptly. The disciplinary proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. The interest of the delinquent officer also lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. The disciplinary proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. The interest of the delinquent officer also lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. If he is not guilty of the charges, his honour should be vindicated at the earliest possible moment and if he is guilty, he should be dealt with promptly according to law. It is not also in the interest of administration that persons accused of serious misdemeanour should be continued in office indefinitely i.e. for long periods awaiting the result of criminal proceedings. It is not in the interest of administration. It only serves the interest of the guilty and dishonest.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. Once the departmental enquiry is held as legal and valid and there is no violation of principles of natural justice, the only question left out to be decided by this Court is the quantum of punishment. 20. Looking to the fact that this appellant (original petitioner) is a Head Cashier of the respondents-Bank and looking to the nature of misconduct committed by him, there is a total loss of faith by the employer in this appellant. Looking to the proved misconducts, this appellant is not befitting to continue as an employee of the respondents-Bank. The prestige of the respondents-Bank has also been seriously prejudiced by this appellant. Looking to the nature of misconduct, there is a serious lapse on the part of this appellant and there is a violation of minimum standard of discipline to be maintained by the employees of the Bank. Hence, looking to the quantum of punishment of dismissal after evaluating the same with the nature of the misconduct, it cannot be said that the punishment inflicted upon this appellant is shockingly disproportionate, nor the same can be labelled as unreasonably excessive. 21. It has been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Union Bank of India Vs. Vishwa Mohan reported in (1998) 4 SCC 310 at paragraph 12 as under:- “12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of the firm view that all the four charge-sheets which were enquired into relate to serious misconduct. The respondent was unable to demonstrate before us how prejudice was caused to him due to non-supply of the enquiry authority’s report/findings in the present case. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of the firm view that all the four charge-sheets which were enquired into relate to serious misconduct. The respondent was unable to demonstrate before us how prejudice was caused to him due to non-supply of the enquiry authority’s report/findings in the present case. It needs to be emphasised that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. It is for this reason, we are of the opinion that the High Court had committed an error while setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent on the ground of prejudice on account of non-furnishing of the enquiry report/findings to him.” (Emphasis supplied) 22. It has also been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank Vs. Munna Lal Jain reported in (2005) 10 SCC 84 at paragraph 17 as under:- “17. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, there is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulting in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organisation more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court. (Emphasis supplied) 23. It has further been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Noharlal Verma Vs. Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 445 at paragraphs 36 and 37 as under:- “36. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court. (Emphasis supplied) 23. It has further been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Noharlal Verma Vs. Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 445 at paragraphs 36 and 37 as under:- “36. So far as the prayer by the appellant that he has sufficiently suffered and should be reinstated in service without back wages also cannot be accepted. The appellant was holding position of trust and was Manager of a bank. The charges levelled against him were serious in nature concerning misappropriation of money. It is true that the amount was not big and it was also repaid and the Bank has not suffered. But even then the Manager of a cooperative bank was involved in financial irregularities. The Bank was satisfied that he should not be retained in service and passed an order of removal. 37. In our opinion, by no stretch of imagination, can it be said that such punishment is grossly disproportionate or excessively high. Normally in exercise of power of “judicial review”, a writ court will not substitute its own judgment or decision for the judgment or decision of a disciplinary authority unless it comes to the conclusion that it has shocked the conscience of the court or the punishment is such that no “reasonable man” would impose such punishment or in the words of Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secy. of State for the Environment that the decision is so absurd that one is satisfied that the decision-maker at the time of making decision “must have taken leave of his senses”. (Emphasis supplied) 24. It has also been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Diwan Singh Vs. LIC reported in (2015) 2 SCC 341 at paragraphs 8 to 12 as under:- “8. As far as argument relating to quantum of punishment, as modified by the High Court, which results in consequential forfeiture of pensionary benefits in view of Rule 23, quoted above, is concerned, we do not find the punishment to be harsh or disproportionate to the guilt, in view of the nature of the charge of which the appellant is found guilty in the present case. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in such matters no sympathy should be shown by the courts. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in such matters no sympathy should be shown by the courts. 9. In NEKRTC v. H. Amaresh, this Court, in para 18 of the judgment has expressed the views on this point as under: (SCC p. 193) “18. In the instant case, the misappropriation of the funds by the delinquent employee was only Rs 360.95. This Court has considered the punishment that may be awarded to the delinquent employees who misappropriated the funds of the Corporation and the factors to be considered. This Court in a catena of judgments held that the loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money misappropriated and that the sympathy or generosity cannot be a factor which is impermissible in law. When an employee is found guilty of pilferage or of misappropriating the Corporation’s funds, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment.” 10. In Karnataka SRTC v. A.T. Mane in which unaccounted amount was only Rs 93 this Court expressed its opinion in para 12 as under: (SCC p. 259) “12. Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, one should bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment; on the contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found guilty of misappropriating the corporation’s funds, there is nothing wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person and awarding a punishment of dismissal.” 11. In Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of Maharashtra, this Court has made following observations in para 25 of the judgment: (SCC p. 654) “25. … In the present day scenario, corruption has been treated to have the potentiality of corroding the marrows of the economy. There are cases where the amount is small, and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity of the offence in such a case, in our considered opinion, is not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. There are cases where the amount is small, and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity of the offence in such a case, in our considered opinion, is not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of benefit is a crime against the collective and an anathema to the basic tenets of democracy, for it erodes the faith of the people in the system. It creates an incurable concavity in the rule of law.” 12. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Bajrang Lal, this Court, following Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan Behari, has opined that in cases involving corruption there cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. It has been further held that any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. The amount misappropriated may be small or large; it is the act of misappropriation that is relevant. In the said case (Rajasthan SRTC), the respondent employee was awarded punishment of removal from service. In the present case it is compulsory retirement. The learned counsel for respondents submitted that on an earlier occasion, the appellant was awarded a minor punishment for his misconduct, regarding defalcation of stamps. And now he is found guilty for the second time.” (Emphasis supplied) 25. In view of the facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 4510 of 2007 vide judgment and order dated 14th July, 2016 and we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. We are in full agreement with the reasons given by the learned Single Judge. Hence, there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.